FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORP
Form 10-K
February 24, 2011

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**UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION**
**Washington, D.C. 20549**

# FORM 10-K

**ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d)**
**OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934**

**For the fiscal year ended December 31, 2010**

**Commission File Number: 000-53330**

**Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation**
*(Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)*

**Freddie Mac**

| **Federally chartered corporation** | **8200 Jones Branch Drive McLean, Virginia 22102-3110** | **52-0904874** | **(703) 903-2000** |
|---|---|---|---|
| *(State or other jurisdiction of incorporation or organization)* | *(Address of principal executive offices, including zip code)* | *(I.R.S. Employer Identification No.)* | *(Registrant s telephone number, including area code)* |

**Securities registered pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Act: None**

**Securities registered pursuant to Section 12(g) of the Act:**

Voting Common Stock, no par value per share (OTC: FMCC)
Variable Rate, Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, par value $1.00 per share (OTC: FMCCI)
5% Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, par value $1.00 per share (OTC: FMCKK)
Variable Rate, Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, par value $1.00 per share (OTC: FMCCG)
5.1% Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, par value $1.00 per share (OTC: FMCCH)
5.79% Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, par value $1.00 per share (OTC: FMCCK)
Variable Rate, Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, par value $1.00 per share (OTC: FMCCL)
Variable Rate, Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, par value $1.00 per share (OTC: FMCCM)
Variable Rate, Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, par value $1.00 per share (OTC: FMCCN)
5.81% Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, par value $1.00 per share (OTC: FMCCO)
6% Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, par value $1.00 per share (OTC: FMCCP)
Variable Rate, Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, par value $1.00 per share (OTC: FMCCJ)
5.7% Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, par value $1.00 per share (OTC: FMCKP)
Variable Rate, Non-Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, par value $1.00 per share (OTC: FMCCS)
6.42% Non-Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, par value $1.00 per share (OTC: FMCCT)
5.9% Non-Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, par value $1.00 per share (OTC: FMCKO)
5.57% Non-Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, par value $1.00 per share (OTC: FMCKM)
5.66% Non-Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, par value $1.00 per share (OTC: FMCKN)
6.02% Non-Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, par value $1.00 per share (OTC: FMCKL)
6.55% Non-Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, par value $1.00 per share (OTC: FMCKI)

Fixed-to-Floating Rate Non-Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, par value $1.00 per share (OTC: FMCKJ)

Indicate by check mark if the registrant is a well-known seasoned issuer, as defined in Rule 405 of the Securities Act. Yes o No x

Indicate by check mark if the registrant is not required to file reports pursuant to Section 13 or Section 15(d) of the Act. Yes o No x

Indicate by check mark whether the registrant: (1) has filed all reports required to be filed by Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 during the preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to file such reports), and (2) has been subject to such filing requirements for the past 90 days. Yes x No o

Indicate by check mark whether the registrant has submitted electronically and posted on its corporate Web site, if any, every Interactive Data File required to be submitted and posted pursuant to Rule 405 of Regulation S-T (§232.405 of this chapter) during the preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to submit and post such files). o Yes o No

Indicate by check mark if disclosure of delinquent filers pursuant to Item 405 of Regulation S-K is not contained herein, and will not be contained, to the best of registrant s knowledge, in definitive proxy or information statements incorporated by reference in Part III of this Form 10-K or any amendment to this Form 10-K. o

Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is a large accelerated filer, an accelerated filer, a non-accelerated filer, or a smaller reporting company. See the definitions of large accelerated filer, accelerated filer and smaller reporting company in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act. Large accelerated filer o Accelerated filer x Non-accelerated filer (Do not check if a smaller reporting company) o Smaller reporting company o

Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is a shell company (as defined in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act). Yes o No x

The aggregate market value of the common stock held by non-affiliates computed by reference to the price at which the common equity was last sold on June 30, 2010 (the last business day of the registrant s most recently completed second fiscal quarter) was $266.2 million.

As of February 11, 2011, there were 649,182,461 shares of the registrant s common stock outstanding.

**DOCUMENTS INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE**: None

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# PART I

*This Form 10-K includes forward-looking statements that are based on current expectations and are subject to significant risks and uncertainties. These forward-looking statements are made as of the date of this Form 10-K and we undertake no obligation to update any forward-looking statement to reflect events or circumstances occurring after the date of this Form 10-K. Actual results might differ significantly from those described in or implied by such statements due to various factors and uncertainties, including those described in BUSINESS Forward-Looking Statements, and RISK FACTORS in this Form 10-K. Throughout this Form 10-K, we use certain acronyms and terms which are defined in the Glossary.*

# ITEM 1. BUSINESS

## Conservatorship

We continue to operate under the direction of FHFA as our Conservator. We are also subject to certain constraints on our business activities by Treasury due to the terms of, and Treasury s rights under, the Purchase Agreement. Our ability to access funds from Treasury under the Purchase Agreement is critical to keeping us solvent. The conservatorship and related matters have had a wide-ranging impact on us, including our regulatory supervision, management, business, financial condition and results of operations.

As our Conservator, FHFA succeeded to all rights, titles, powers and privileges of Freddie Mac, and of any stockholder, officer or director thereof, with respect to the company and its assets. FHFA, as Conservator, has directed and will continue to direct certain of our business activities and strategies. FHFA has delegated certain authority to our Board of Directors to oversee, and management to conduct, day-to-day operations. The directors serve on behalf of, and exercise authority as directed by, the Conservator.

There is significant uncertainty as to whether or when we will emerge from conservatorship, as it has no specified termination date, and as to what changes may occur to our business structure during or following our conservatorship, including whether we will continue to exist. Our future structure and role are currently being considered by the Obama Administration and Congress. We have no ability to predict the outcome of these deliberations. While we are not aware of any current plans of our Conservator to significantly change our business model or capital structure in the near-term, there are likely to be significant changes beyond the near-term that we expect to be decided by the Obama Administration and Congress.

On February 11, 2011, the Obama Administration delivered a report to Congress that lays out the Administration s plan to reform the U.S. housing finance market, including options for structuring the government s long-term role in a housing finance system in which the private sector is the dominant provider of mortgage credit. The report recommends winding down Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, stating that the Obama Administration will work with FHFA to determine the best way to responsibly reduce the role of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae in the market and ultimately wind down both institutions. The report states that these efforts must be undertaken at a deliberate pace, which takes into account the impact that these changes will have on borrowers and the housing market.

The report states that the government is committed to ensuring that Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have sufficient capital to perform under any guarantees issued now or in the future and the ability to meet any of their debt obligations, and further states that the Obama Administration will not pursue policies or reforms in a way that would impair the ability of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to honor their obligations. The report states the Obama Administration s belief that under the companies senior preferred stock purchase agreements with Treasury, there is sufficient funding to ensure the orderly and deliberate wind down of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, as described in the

Administration s plan.

For more information, see Executive Summary *Long-Term Financial Sustainability and Future Status.*

Our business objectives and strategies have in some cases been altered since we were placed into conservatorship, and may continue to change. Based on our charter, public statements from Treasury and FHFA officials and guidance from our Conservator, we have a variety of different, and potentially competing, objectives. Certain changes to our business objectives and strategies are designed to provide support for the mortgage market in a manner that serves our public mission and other non-financial objectives. However, these changes to our business objectives and strategies may not contribute to our profitability. Some of these changes increase our expenses, while others require us to forego revenue opportunities in the near-term. In addition, the objectives set forth for us under our charter and by our Conservator, as well as the restrictions on our business under the Purchase Agreement, may adversely impact our financial results, including our segment results. For example, our current business objectives reflect, in part, direction given to us by the Conservator. These efforts are expected to help homeowners and the mortgage market and may help to mitigate future credit losses. However, some of our activities are expected to have an adverse impact on our near- and long-term financial results. The Conservator and Treasury also did not authorize us to engage in certain business activities and transactions, including the sale of certain assets, which we

believe may have had a beneficial impact on our results of operations or financial condition, if executed. Our inability to execute such transactions may adversely affect our profitability, and thus contribute to our need to draw additional funds under the Purchase Agreement.

In a letter to the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Congressional Banking and Financial Services Committees dated February 2, 2010, the Acting Director of FHFA stated that the focus of the conservatorship is on conserving assets, minimizing corporate losses, ensuring Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae continue to serve their mission, overseeing remediation of identified weaknesses in corporate operations and risk management, and ensuring that sound corporate governance principles are followed. Specifically, the Acting Director of FHFA stated that minimizing our credit losses is our central goal and that we will be limited to continuing our existing core business activities and taking actions necessary to advance the goals of the conservatorship. The Acting Director stated that permitting us to engage in the development of new products is inconsistent with the goals of the conservatorship. This directive could have an adverse effect on our business and profitability in future periods.

We had a net worth deficit of $401 million as of December 31, 2010, and, as a result, FHFA, as Conservator, will submit a draw request, on our behalf, to Treasury under the Purchase Agreement in the amount of $500 million. As a result of draws under the Purchase Agreement, the aggregate liquidation preference of the senior preferred stock increased from $1.0 billion as of September 8, 2008 to $64.2 billion as of December 31, 2010. Under the Purchase Agreement, our ability to repay the liquidation preference of the senior preferred stock is limited and we may not be able to do so for the foreseeable future, if at all. The aggregate liquidation preference of the senior preferred stock and our related dividend obligations will increase further if we receive additional draws under the Purchase Agreement or if any dividends or quarterly commitment fees payable under the Purchase Agreement are not paid in cash. The amounts we are obligated to pay in dividends on the senior preferred stock are substantial and will have an adverse impact on our financial position and net worth. We expect to make additional draws under the Purchase Agreement in future periods.

Our annual dividend obligation on the senior preferred stock, based on the current liquidation preference, is $6.4 billion, which is in excess of our annual historical earnings in all but one period. Continued cash payment of senior preferred dividends, combined with potentially substantial quarterly commitment fees payable to Treasury under the Purchase Agreement, will have an adverse impact on our future financial condition and net worth. The payment of dividends on our senior preferred stock in cash reduces our net worth. For periods in which our earnings and other changes in equity do not result in positive net worth, draws under the Purchase Agreement effectively fund the cash payment of senior preferred dividends to Treasury.

For more information on our current business objectives, see Executive Summary *Our Primary Business Objectives.* For more information on the conservatorship and government support for our business see Executive Summary *Government Support for Our Business* and Conservatorship and Related Matters.

## Executive Summary

*You should read this Executive Summary in conjunction with our MD&A and consolidated financial statements and related notes for the year ended December 31, 2010.*

### *Overview*

Freddie Mac is a GSE chartered by Congress in 1970 with a public mission to provide liquidity, stability, and affordability to the U.S. housing market. We have maintained a consistent market presence since our inception, providing mortgage liquidity in a wide range of economic environments. During the worst housing and financial crisis since the Great Depression, we are working to support the recovery of the housing market and the nation s economy by

providing essential liquidity to the mortgage market and helping to stem the rate of foreclosures. Taken together, we believe our actions are helping communities across the country by providing America s families with access to mortgage funding at low rates while helping distressed borrowers keep their homes and avoid foreclosure.

***Summary of Financial Results***

Our financial performance in 2010, including our net loss, continued to be impacted by the ongoing weakness in the economy, including the mortgage market. Our total comprehensive income (loss) was $1.2 billion and $282 million for the fourth quarter and full year of 2010, respectively, consisting of: (a) a net loss of $113 million and $14.0 billion, respectively, reflecting significant provisions for credit losses; and (b) $1.3 billion and $14.3 billion of changes in other comprehensive income (loss), respectively, primarily resulting from improved fair values on available-for-sale securities recorded in AOCI.

Our total equity (deficit) was $(401) million at December 31, 2010 due to several contributing factors, including our dividend payments on our senior preferred stock, which exceeded total comprehensive income (loss) for the fourth quarter of 2010. To address our deficit in net worth, FHFA, as Conservator, will submit a draw request on our behalf to Treasury under the Purchase Agreement for $500 million.

During 2010, we paid cash dividends to Treasury of $5.7 billion on our senior preferred stock. We received cash proceeds of $12.5 billion from draws under Treasury s funding commitment during 2010. These draws were driven in large part by changes in accounting principles adopted on January 1, 2010, which resulted in a net decrease to total equity (deficit) of $11.7 billion. As a result of these draws from Treasury under the Purchase Agreement during 2010, the aggregate liquidation preference of Treasury s senior preferred stock increased to $64.2 billion at December 31, 2010. See *Changes in Accounting Standards Related to Accounting for Transfers of Financial Assets and Consolidation of VIEs* for additional information related to our changes in accounting principles.

***Our Primary Business Objectives***

Under conservatorship, we are focused on: (a) meeting the needs of the U.S. residential mortgage market by making home ownership and rental housing more affordable by providing liquidity to mortgage originators and, indirectly, to mortgage borrowers; (b) working to reduce the number of foreclosures and helping to keep families in their homes, including through our role in the MHA Program initiatives, including HAMP, and our relief refinance mortgage initiative; (c) minimizing our credit losses; and (d) maintaining the credit quality of the loans we purchase and guarantee. These objectives reflect, in part, direction we have received from the Conservator. We also have a variety of different, and potentially competing, objectives based on our charter, public statements from Treasury and FHFA officials, and other guidance from our Conservator. For more information, see Conservatorship and Related Developments *Impact of Conservatorship and Related Actions on Our Business.*

*Providing Mortgage Liquidity and Conforming Loan Availability*

We provide liquidity and support to the U.S. mortgage market in a number of important ways:

- Our support enables borrowers to have access to a variety of conforming mortgage products, including the prepayable 30-year fixed-rate mortgage which represents the foundation of the mortgage market.

- Our support provides lenders with a constant source of liquidity. We estimate that we, Fannie Mae, and Ginnie Mae collectively guaranteed approximately 89% of the single-family conforming mortgages originated during 2010.

- Our consistent market presence provides assurance to our customers that there will be a buyer for their conforming loans that meet our credit standards. We believe this provides market stability in difficult environments.

- We are an important counter-cyclical influence as we stay in the market even when other sources of capital have pulled out, as evidenced by the events of the last three years.

During 2010, we guaranteed $384.6 billion in UPB of single-family conforming mortgage loans representing 1.8 million families who purchased homes or refinanced their mortgages. Relief refinance mortgages with LTV ratios of 80% and above represented approximately 12% of our total single-family credit guarantee portfolio purchases in 2010. These mortgages comprised approximately 4% of our total single-family credit guarantee portfolio at December 31, 2010.

Borrowers typically pay a lower interest rate on loans acquired or guaranteed by Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, or Ginnie Mae. Mortgage originators are generally able to offer homebuyers lower mortgage rates on conforming loan products, including ours, in part because of the value investors place on GSE-guaranteed mortgage-related securities. Prior to 2007, mortgage markets were less volatile, home values were stable or rising, and there were many sources of mortgage funds. We estimate that prior to 2007 the average effective interest rates on conforming single-family

mortgage loans were about 30 basis points lower than on non-conforming loans. Since 2007, there have been fewer sources of mortgage funds, and we estimate that interest rates on conforming loans, excluding conforming jumbo loans, have been lower than those on non-conforming loans by as much as 184 basis points. In December 2010, we estimate that borrowers were paying an average of 68 basis points less on these conforming loans than on non-conforming loans. These estimates are based on data provided by HSH Associates, a third-party provider of mortgage market data.

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*Reducing Foreclosures and Keeping Families in Homes*

During the current housing crisis, we are focused on reducing the number of foreclosures and helping to keep families in their homes. In addition to our participation in HAMP, we introduced several new initiatives to help eligible borrowers during this crisis, including our relief refinance mortgage initiative. In 2010, we helped more than 275,000 borrowers either stay in their homes or sell their properties and avoid foreclosure through our various workout programs, including HAMP. Table 1 presents our recent single-family loan workout activities.

**Table 1 Total Single-Family Loan Workout Volumes**[1]

| | For the Three Months Ended | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 12/31/2010 | 09/30/2010 | 06/30/2010 | 03/31/2010 | 12/31/2009 |
| | (number of loans) | | | | |
| Loan modifications | 37,203 | 39,284 | 49,562 | 44,228 | 15,805 |
| Repayment plans | 7,964 | 7,030 | 7,455 | 8,761 | 8,129 |
| Forbearance agreements[2] | 5,945 | 6,976 | 12,815 | 8,858 | 8,780 |
| Short sales and deed-in-lieu transactions | 12,097 | 10,472 | 9,542 | 7,064 | 6,533 |
| Total single-family loan workouts | 63,209 | 63,762 | 79,374 | 68,911 | 39,247 |

(1) Based on actions completed with borrowers for loans within our single-family credit guarantee portfolio. Excludes those modification, repayment, and forbearance activities for which the borrower has started the required process, but the actions have not been made permanent, or effective, such as loans in the trial period under HAMP. Also excludes certain loan workouts where our single-family seller/servicers have executed agreements in the current or prior periods, but these have not been incorporated into certain of our operational systems, due to delays in processing. These categories are not mutually exclusive and a loan in one category may also be included within another category in the same period.
(2) Excludes loans with long-term forbearance under a completed loan modification. Many borrowers complete a short-term forbearance agreement before another loan workout is pursued or completed. We only report forbearance activity for a single loan once during each quarterly period; however, a single loan may be included under separate forbearance agreements in separate periods.

We continue to execute a high volume of loan workouts. Recent highlights include the following:

- We completed 275,256 single-family loan workouts during 2010, including 170,277 loan modifications and 39,175 short sales and deed-in-lieu transactions.

- Based on information provided by the MHA Program administrator, our servicers had completed 107,073 loan modifications under HAMP from the introduction of the initiative in 2009 through December 31, 2010 and, as of December 31, 2010, 22,352 loans were in HAMP trial periods (this figure only includes borrowers who made at least their first payment under the trial period).

In addition to these efforts, we continue to focus on assisting consumers through outreach and other efforts. These efforts included: (a) meeting with borrowers nationwide in foreclosure prevention workshops; (b) launching the Borrower Help Network to provide distressed borrowers with free one-on-one counseling; (c) opening Borrower Help Centers in several cities nationwide to provide free counseling to distressed borrowers; and (d) in instances where foreclosure has occurred, allowing affected families who qualify to rent back their homes for a limited period of time.

We have also increased our efforts to directly assist our servicers by increasing our servicing staff and placing on-site specialists at many of our mortgage servicer locations.

For more information about HAMP, other loan workout programs, and our relief refinance mortgage initiative, and other options to help eligible borrowers, see MD&A RISK MANAGEMENT Credit Risk *Mortgage Credit Risk Portfolio Management Activities MHA Program* and *Loan Workout Activities*.

*Minimizing Credit Losses*

To help minimize the credit losses related to our guarantee activities, we are focused on:

- pursuing a variety of loan workouts, including foreclosure alternatives, in an effort to reduce the severity of losses we incur;
- managing foreclosure timelines;
- managing our inventory of foreclosed properties to reduce costs and maximize proceeds; and
- pursuing contractual remedies against originators, lenders, servicers, and credit enhancement providers, as appropriate.

We establish guidelines for our servicers and provide them with software tools to determine which loan workout solution would be expected to provide the best opportunity for minimizing our credit losses based on each borrower s qualifications. For example, if a borrower qualifies for a loan modification, this often provides us a better opportunity to minimize credit losses than a foreclosure. We rely on our servicers to pursue the best alternative available based on our guidelines and software tools.

Our servicers pursue repayment plans and loan modifications for borrowers facing financial or other hardships since the level of recovery (if a loan reperforms) may often be much higher than with foreclosure or foreclosure alternatives. In cases where this alternative is not possible or successful, a short sale transaction typically provides us with a comparable or higher level of recovery than what we would receive through property sales from our REO inventory. In large part, the benefit of

short sales arises from the avoidance of costs we would otherwise incur to complete the foreclosure and dispose of the property, including maintenance and other property expenses associated with holding REO property, legal fees, commissions, and other selling expenses of traditional real estate transactions. The foreclosure process is a lengthy one in many jurisdictions with significant associated costs to complete, including, in times of home value decline, foregone recovery we might receive from an earlier sale. The nationwide average for completion of a foreclosure (as measured from the date of the last scheduled payment made by the borrower) on our single-family delinquent loans, excluding those underlying our Other Guarantee Transactions, was 448 days for the foreclosures we completed during 2010 and varied widely among jurisdictions. We expect that the growth in short sales will continue, in part due to our recent initiatives, including offering incentives to servicers to complete short sales instead of foreclosures as well as our implementation of HAFA.

We have contractual arrangements with our seller/servicers under which they agree to provide us with mortgage loans that have been originated under specified underwriting standards. If we subsequently discover that contractual standards were not followed, we can exercise certain contractual remedies to mitigate our credit losses. These contractual remedies include the ability to require the seller/servicer to repurchase the loan at its current UPB or make us whole for any credit losses realized with respect to the loan. As of December 31, 2010, the UPB of loans subject to repurchase requests issued to our single-family seller/servicers was approximately $3.8 billion, and approximately 34% of these requests were outstanding for more than four months since issuance of our repurchase request. The actual amount we expect to collect on these requests is significantly less than their UPB amounts primarily because many of these requests are satisfied by reimbursement of our realized losses by seller/servicers, or may be rescinded in the course of the contractual appeals process. During 2010 and 2009, we entered into agreements with certain seller/servicers to release certain loans in their portfolio from repurchase obligations in exchange for one-time cash payments. We may enter into similar agreements or seek other remedies in the future. See MD&A RISK MANAGEMENT Credit Risk *Institutional Credit Risk Mortgage Seller/Servicers* for further information on our agreements with our seller/servicers.

Historically, our credit loss exposure has also been partially mitigated by mortgage insurance, which is a form of credit enhancement. Primary mortgage insurance is required to be purchased, at the borrower s expense, for certain mortgages with higher LTV ratios. We received payments under primary and other mortgage insurance of $1.8 billion and $952 million in the years ended December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively, to help mitigate our credit losses.

*Maintaining the Credit Quality of New Loan Purchases and Guarantees*

We continue to focus on maintaining underwriting standards that allow us to purchase and guarantee loans made to qualified borrowers that we believe will provide management and guarantee fee income, over the long-term, that exceeds our anticipated credit-related and administrative expenses on the underlying loans.

As of December 31, 2010, more than one-third of our single-family credit guarantee portfolio consisted of mortgage loans originated in 2009 and 2010. The substantial majority of the single-family mortgages we purchased in 2010 were 30-year and 15-year fixed-rate mortgages. We believe the credit quality of the single-family loans we acquired in 2009 and 2010 (excluding relief refinance mortgages) is better than that of loans we acquired from 2005 through 2008 as measured by original LTV ratios, FICO scores, and income documentation standards. These newer loans have also experienced significantly better serious delinquency trends at this stage in their lifecycle than loans acquired from 2006 through 2008. Early serious delinquency performance and home price declines have historically been indicators of long-term credit performance.

We believe the improvement in credit quality we are experiencing is primarily the result of the combination of: (a) changes in our underwriting guidelines implemented during 2009 and 2010; (b) fewer purchases in 2009 and 2010 of loans with higher-risk characteristics; (c) changes in mortgage insurers and lenders underwriting practices; and

(d) an increase in the relative amount of refinance mortgages versus new purchase mortgages we acquired in 2009 and 2010. Approximately 80% of our purchases for the single-family credit guarantee portfolio in both 2010 and 2009 were refinance mortgages. Refinance mortgages typically lower the borrower s monthly mortgage payment, and thereby reduce the risk that the borrower will default.

Table 2 presents the composition, loan characteristics, and serious delinquency rates of loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio, by year of origination at December 31, 2010.

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**Table 2 Single-Family Credit Guarantee Portfolio Data by Year of Origination**

| | At December 31, 2010 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | % of Portfolio[1] | Average Credit Score[2] | Current LTV Ratio[3] | Serious Delinquency Rate[4] |
| **Year of Origination** | | | | |
| 2010 | 18% | 755 | 70% | 0.05% |
| 2009 | 21 | 755 | 70 | 0.26 |
| 2008 | 9 | 728 | 86 | 4.89 |
| 2007 | 11 | 707 | 104 | 11.63 |
| 2006 | 9 | 712 | 104 | 10.46 |
| 2005 | 10 | 719 | 91 | 6.04 |
| 2004 and prior | 22 | 722 | 58 | 2.46 |
| Total | 100% | 733 | 78 | 3.84 |

(1) Based on the UPB of the single-family credit guarantee portfolio.
(2) Based on FICO credit score of the borrower as of the date of loan origination.
(3) Current market values are estimated by adjusting the value of the property at origination based on changes in the market value of homes since origination.
(4) See MD&A RISK MANAGEMENT Credit Risk *Mortgage Credit Risk Credit Performance* Delinquencies fo further information about our reported serious delinquency rates.

During 2010, the guarantee-related revenue from the mortgage loans originated in 2009 and 2010 exceeded the credit-related and administrative expenses associated with these loans. Credit-related expenses consist of our provision for credit losses and REO operations expense. These new vintages are replacing the older vintages that have a higher composition of mortgages with higher-risk characteristics. We currently expect that, over time, this should positively impact the serious delinquency rates and credit expenses of our single-family credit guarantee portfolio. See Table 19 Segment Earnings Composition Single-Family Guarantee Segment for an analysis of the contribution to Segment Earnings by loan origination year.

***Single-Family Credit Guarantee Portfolio***

Since the beginning of 2008, on an aggregate basis, we recorded provision for credit losses associated with single-family loans of approximately $62.3 billion, and an additional $4.7 billion in losses on loans purchased from our PCs, net of recoveries. The majority of these losses are associated with loans originated in 2005 through 2008. While loans we acquired in 2005 through 2008 will give rise to additional credit losses that we have not yet provisioned for, we believe, as of December 31, 2010, that we have reserved for or charged-off the majority of the total expected credit losses for these loans. Nevertheless, various factors, including continued high unemployment rates or further declines in home prices, could require us to provide for losses on these loans beyond our current expectations.

Table 3 provides certain credit statistics for our single-family credit guarantee portfolio. The UPB of our single-family credit guarantee portfolio decreased 5% during 2010 to $1.81 trillion at December 31, 2010 from $1.90 trillion at

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December 31, 2009. Liquidations have significantly exceeded our new guarantee activity during 2010, which drove the decline in UPB of this portfolio.

**Table 3 Credit Statistics, Single-Family Credit Guarantee Portfolio**

| | As of | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **12/31/2010** | **09/30/2010** | **06/30/2010** | **03/31/2010** | **12/31/2009** |
| Payment status | | | | | |
| One month past due | 2.07% | 2.11% | 2.02% | 1.89% | 2.24% |
| Two months past due | 0.78% | 0.80% | 0.77% | 0.79% | 0.95% |
| Seriously delinquent[1] | 3.84% | 3.80% | 3.96% | 4.13% | 3.98% |
| Non-performing loans (in millions)[2] | $ 115,478 | $ 112,746 | $ 111,758 | $ 110,079 | $ 98,689 |
| Single-family loan loss reserve (in millions)[3] | $ 39,098 | $ 37,665 | $ 37,384 | $ 35,969 | $ 33,026 |
| REO inventory (in units) | 72,079 | 74,897 | 62,178 | 53,831 | 45,047 |
| REO assets, net carrying value (in millions) | $ 6,961 | $ 7,420 | $ 6,228 | $ 5,411 | $ 4,661 |

| | For the Three Months Ended | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **12/31/2010** | **09/30/2010** | **06/30/2010** | **03/31/2010** | **12/31/2009** |
| | **(in units, unless noted)** | | | | |
| Seriously delinquent loan additions[1] | 113,235 | 115,359 | 123,175 | 150,941 | 166,459 |
| Loan modifications[4] | 37,203 | 39,284 | 49,562 | 44,228 | 15,805 |
| Foreclosure starts ratio[5] | 0.73% | 0.75% | 0.61% | 0.64% | 0.57% |
| REO acquisitions[6] | 23,771 | 39,053 | 34,662 | 29,412 | 24,749 |
| REO disposition severity ratio:[7] | | | | | |
| California | 43.9% | 41.9% | 42.0% | 43.9% | 44.4% |
| Florida | 53.0% | 54.9% | 53.8% | 56.2% | 54.3% |
| Arizona | 49.5% | 46.6% | 44.3% | 45.3% | 43.9% |
| Nevada | 53.1% | 51.6% | 49.4% | 50.7% | 50.4% |
| Michigan | 49.7% | 49.2% | 47.2% | 47.6% | 48.9% |
| Total U.S. | 41.3% | 41.5% | 39.2% | 40.5% | 40.1% |
| Single-family credit losses (in millions)[6] | $ 3,086 | $ 4,216 | $ 3,851 | $ 2,907 | $ 2,498 |

(1) See MD&A RISK MANAGEMENT Credit Risk *Mortgage Credit Risk* *Credit Performance* Delinquencies fo further information about our reported serious delinquency rates.
(2) Consists of the UPB of loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio that have undergone a TDR or that are seriously delinquent.
(3) Consists of the combination of: (a) our allowance for loan losses on mortgage loans held for investment; and (b) our reserve for guarantee losses associated with non-consolidated single-family mortgage securitization trusts and other guarantee commitments.
(4) Represents the number of completed modifications under agreement with the borrower during the quarter. Excludes forbearance agreements, repayment plans, and loans in the trial period under HAMP.
(5) Represents the ratio of the number of loans that entered the foreclosure process during the respective quarter divided by the number of loans in the portfolio at the end of the quarter. Excludes Other Guarantee Transactions

and mortgages covered under other guarantee commitments.

(6) Our REO acquisition volume temporarily slowed in the fourth quarter of 2010 due to delays in the foreclosure process, including delays related to concerns about deficiencies in foreclosure documentation practices, and reducing our credit losses for the period.

(7) Calculated as the amount of our losses recorded on disposition of REO properties during the respective quarterly period, excluding those subject to repurchase requests made to our seller/servicers, divided by the aggregate UPB of the related loans. The amount of losses recognized on disposition of the properties is equal to the amount by which the UPB of the loans exceeds the amount of sales proceeds from disposition of the properties. Excludes sales commissions and other expenses, such as property maintenance and costs, as well as related recoveries from credit enhancements, such as mortgage insurance.

Our REO disposition severity ratio was impacted in the fourth quarter of 2010, particularly in the state of Florida, by temporary suspensions of REO sales by us and our seller/servicers related to concerns about deficiencies in foreclosure documentation practices. We believe that these suspensions caused our REO disposition severity ratio in Florida to decline in the fourth quarter of 2010, as compared to the third quarter of 2010, while most other states experienced an increase in this ratio for the same periods.

As shown in Table 3 above, the number of seriously delinquent loan additions declined in each quarter of 2010. However, our single-family credit guarantee portfolio continued to experience a high level of serious delinquencies and foreclosure starts, as compared to periods before 2009. The credit losses of our single-family credit guarantee portfolio increased in 2010, compared to 2009, due in part to the ongoing weakness in the U.S. economy. Other factors affecting credit losses during the year include:

Losses associated with an increase in the volume of foreclosures and foreclosure alternatives. These actions related to efforts to resolve our significant inventory of seriously delinquent loans. This inventory accumulated in prior periods, primarily during 2009, due to the lengthening in the foreclosure and modification timelines caused by various suspensions of foreclosure transfers, process requirements for the implementation of HAMP, and constraints in servicers capabilities to process large volumes of problem loans. Due to the length of time necessary for servicers either to complete the foreclosure process or pursue foreclosure alternatives on seriously delinquent loans still in our portfolio, we expect our credit losses will continue to rise even as the volume of new serious delinquencies declines.

The impact of certain loan groups within the single-family credit guarantee portfolio, such as those underwritten with certain lower documentation standards and interest-only loans, as well as other 2005 through 2008 vintage loans. These groups continue to be large contributors to our credit losses.

Continued declines in home prices in many geographic areas, based on our own index, which resulted in continued high loss severity ratios on our dispositions of REO inventory.

Some of our loss mitigation activities create fluctuations in our delinquency statistics. For example, loans that we report as seriously delinquent before they enter the HAMP trial period continue to be reported as seriously delinquent until the modifications become effective and the loans are removed from delinquent status by our servicers. See MD&A RISK MANAGEMENT Credit Risk *Mortgage Credit Risk Credit Performance* Delinquencies for further information about factors affecting our reported delinquency rates during 2010 and 2009.

***Government Support for our Business***

We are dependent upon the continued support of Treasury and FHFA in order to continue operating our business. Our ability to access funds from Treasury under the Purchase Agreement is critical to keeping us solvent and avoiding the appointment of a receiver by FHFA under statutory mandatory receivership provisions. While the conservatorship has benefited us, we are subject to certain constraints on our business activities imposed by Treasury due to the terms of, and Treasury s rights under, the Purchase Agreement and by FHFA, as our Conservator.

Under the Purchase Agreement, Treasury made a commitment to provide funding, under certain conditions, to eliminate deficits in our net worth. The $200 billion cap on the funding commitment from Treasury will increase as necessary to eliminate any net worth deficits during 2010, 2011, and 2012. We believe that the support provided by Treasury pursuant to the Purchase Agreement currently enables us to maintain our access to the debt markets and to have adequate liquidity to conduct our normal business activities, although the costs of our debt funding could vary.

On December 30, 2010, we received $100 million in funding from Treasury under the Purchase Agreement relating to our net worth deficit as of September 30, 2010. The draws received during 2010 increased the aggregate liquidation preference of the senior preferred stock to $64.2 billion at December 31, 2010 from $51.7 billion at December 31, 2009. To address our net worth deficit of $401 million as of December 31, 2010, FHFA, as Conservator, will submit a draw request, on our behalf, to Treasury under the Purchase Agreement in the amount of $500 million. Upon funding of the draw request: (a) our aggregate funding received from Treasury under the Purchase Agreement will increase to $63.7 billion; and (b) the aggregate liquidation preference on the senior preferred stock owned by Treasury will increase from $64.2 billion to $64.7 billion and the corresponding annual cash dividend owed to Treasury will increase to $6.47 billion. We have paid cash dividends to Treasury of $10.0 billion to date, an amount equal to 16% of our aggregate draws under the Purchase Agreement. As of December 31, 2010, our annual cash dividend obligation to Treasury on the senior preferred stock exceeded our annual historical earnings in all but one period. As a result, we expect to make additional draws in future periods.

Neither the U.S. government nor any other agency or instrumentality of the U.S. government is obligated to fund our mortgage purchase or financing activities or to guarantee our securities or other obligations.

For more information on the Purchase Agreement, see Conservatorship and Related Matters.

***Long-Term Financial Sustainability and Future Status***

It is unlikely that we will generate net income or comprehensive income in excess of our annual dividends payable to Treasury over the long term, although we may experience period-to-period variability in earnings and comprehensive

income. As a result, there is uncertainty as to our long-term financial sustainability.

We expect to request additional draws under the Purchase Agreement in future periods. Over time, our dividend obligation to Treasury will increasingly drive future draws. In addition, we are required under the Purchase Agreement to pay a quarterly commitment fee to Treasury, which could also contribute to future draws if the fee is not waived in the future. Treasury waived the fee for the first quarter of 2011, but it has indicated that it remains committed to protecting taxpayers and ensuring that our future positive earnings are returned to taxpayers as compensation for their investment. The amount of the quarterly commitment fee has not yet been established and could be substantial.

In addition, continued high levels of unemployment, adverse changes in home prices, interest rates, mortgage security prices and spreads and other factors could lead to additional draws. For additional discussion of other factors that could result in additional draws, see MD&A LIQUIDITY AND CAPITAL RESOURCES Capital Resources.

On February 11, 2011, the Obama Administration delivered a report to Congress that lays out the Administration s plan to reform the U.S. housing finance market, including options for structuring the government s long-term role in a housing finance system in which the private sector is the dominant provider of mortgage credit. The report recommends winding down Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, stating that the Obama Administration will work with FHFA to determine the best way

to responsibly reduce the role of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae in the market and ultimately wind down both institutions. The report states that these efforts must be undertaken at a deliberate pace, which takes into account the impact that these changes will have on borrowers and the housing market.

The report states that the government is committed to ensuring that Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have sufficient capital to perform under any guarantees issued now or in the future and the ability to meet any of their debt obligations, and further states that the Obama Administration will not pursue policies or reforms in a way that would impair the ability of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to honor their obligations. The report states the Obama Administration s belief that under the companies senior preferred stock purchase agreements with Treasury, there is sufficient funding to ensure the orderly and deliberate wind down of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, as described in the Administration s plan.

The report identifies a number of policy levers that could be used to wind down Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, shrink the government s footprint in housing finance, and help bring private capital back to the mortgage market, including increasing guarantee fees, phasing in a 10% down payment requirement, reducing conforming loan limits, and winding down Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae s investment portfolios, consistent with the senior preferred stock purchase agreements.

These recommendations, if implemented, would have a material impact on our business volumes, market share, results of operations and financial condition. We cannot predict the extent to which these recommendations will be implemented or when any actions to implement them may be taken. However, we are not aware of any current plans of our Conservator to significantly change our business model or capital structure in the near-term.

***Changes in Accounting Standards Related to Accounting for Transfers of Financial Assets and Consolidation of VIEs***

In June 2009, the FASB issued two new accounting standards that amended the guidance applicable to the accounting for transfers of financial assets and the consolidation of VIEs. Effective January 1, 2010, we adopted these new accounting standards prospectively for all existing VIEs. The adoption of these two standards had a significant impact on our consolidated financial statements and other financial disclosures beginning in the first quarter of 2010. As a result of our adoption of these standards, our consolidated balance sheets reflect the consolidation of our single-family PC trusts and certain of our Other Guarantee Transactions. This consolidation resulted in an increase to our assets and liabilities of $1.5 trillion and a net decrease to total equity (deficit) as of January 1, 2010 of $11.7 billion.

Because our results of operations for the year ended December 31, 2010 (on both a GAAP and Segment Earnings basis) include the activities of the consolidated VIEs, they are not directly comparable with the results of operations for the years ended December 31, 2009 and 2008, which reflect the accounting policies in effect during that time (*i.e.*, when the majority of the securitization entities were accounted for off-balance sheet).

See NOTE 2: CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES for more information regarding the new accounting standards and the impact to our financial statements.

***Consolidated Results 2010 versus 2009***

Net loss was $14.0 billion and $21.6 billion for 2010 and 2009, respectively. Key highlights of our financial results for 2010 include:

- Net interest income for 2010 decreased slightly to $16.9 billion from $17.1 billion in 2009, mainly due to a decrease in the average balance of mortgage-related securities, partially offset by lower funding costs.

Provision for credit losses for 2010 decreased to $17.2 billion from $29.5 billion for 2009. The provision for credit losses in 2010 primarily reflects a substantial slowdown in the rate of growth of our non-performing single-family loans. The provision for credit losses in 2009 reflected significant increases in non-performing loans and serious delinquency rates in that period.

Non-interest income (loss) was $(11.6) billion for 2010, compared to $(2.7) billion for 2009. This decline was primarily due to higher derivative losses, lower gains on investment securities, and a decrease in other income in 2010. Other income declined primarily due to a significant decrease in income recognized on our guarantee activities, which was substantially eliminated as a result of our adoption of the new accounting standards for consolidation of VIEs on January 1, 2010. These declines were partially offset by reduced impairments of available-for-sale securities in 2010, compared to 2009.

Non-interest expense declined to $2.9 billion in 2010, compared to $7.2 billion in 2009, primarily due to lower losses on loans purchased, which was substantially eliminated as a result of our adoption of the new accounting standards for consolidation of VIEs on January 1, 2010.

Total comprehensive income (loss) was $282 million for 2010 compared to $(2.9) billion for 2009. Total comprehensive income for 2010 reflects the net result of the $14.0 billion net loss for 2010, and an increase of $14.3 billion in AOCI primarily resulting from fair value improvements on available-for-sale securities.

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## Our Business

We conduct business in the U.S. residential mortgage market and the global securities market under the direction of our Conservator, FHFA, and under regulatory supervision of FHFA, the SEC, HUD, and Treasury. The size of the U.S. residential mortgage market is affected by many factors, including changes in interest rates, home ownership rates, home prices, the supply of housing and lender preferences regarding credit risk and borrower preferences regarding mortgage debt. The amount of residential mortgage debt available for us to purchase and the mix of available loan products are also affected by several factors, including the volume of mortgages meeting the requirements of our charter (which is affected by changes in the conforming loan limit by FHFA), our own preference for credit risk reflected in our purchase standards and the mortgage purchase and securitization activity of other financial institutions. We conduct our operations solely in the U.S. and its territories, and do not generate any revenue from or have assets in geographic locations outside of the U.S. and its territories.

Our charter forms the framework for our business activities, the initiatives we bring to market and the services we provide to the nation s residential housing and mortgage industries. Our charter also determines the types of mortgage loans that we are permitted to purchase. Our statutory mission as defined in our charter is to:

- provide stability in the secondary market for residential mortgages;
- respond appropriately to the private capital market;
- provide ongoing assistance to the secondary market for residential mortgages (including activities relating to mortgages for low- and moderate-income families, involving a reasonable economic return that may be less than the return earned on other activities); and
- promote access to mortgage credit throughout the U.S. (including central cities, rural areas, and other underserved areas).

Our charter does not permit us to originate mortgage loans or lend money directly to consumers in the primary mortgage market. We provide liquidity, stability and affordability to the U.S. housing market primarily by providing our credit guarantee for residential mortgages originated by mortgage lenders and investing in mortgage loans and mortgage-related securities. We use mortgage securitization as an integral part of our activities. Mortgage securitization is a process by which we purchase mortgage loans that lenders originate, and pool these loans into guaranteed mortgage securities that are sold in global capital markets, generating proceeds that support future loan origination activity by lenders. The primary Freddie Mac guaranteed mortgage-related security is the single-class PC. We also aggregate and resecuritize mortgage-related securities that are issued by us, other GSEs, HFAs, or private (non-agency) entities, and issue other single-class and multiclass mortgage-related securities to third-party investors. We also enter into other guarantee commitments for multifamily mortgage loans, certain HFA bonds under the HFA initiative, and housing revenue bonds held by third parties.

Our charter limits our purchases of single-family loans to the conforming loan market. The conforming loan market is defined by loans originated with UPBs at or below limits determined annually based on changes in FHFA s housing price index, a method established and maintained by FHFA for determining the national average single-family home price. Since 2006, the base conforming loan limit for a one-family residence has been set at $417,000 with higher limits in certain high-cost areas. Higher limits also apply to two- to four-family residences. The conforming loan limits are 50% higher for mortgages secured by properties in Alaska, Guam, Hawaii and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

Our charter generally prohibits us from purchasing first-lien single-family mortgages if the outstanding UPB of the mortgage at the time of our purchase exceeds 80% of the value of the property securing the mortgage unless we have

one of the following credit protections:

- mortgage insurance from a mortgage insurer that we determine is qualified on the portion of the UPB of the mortgage that exceeds 80%;
- a seller s agreement to repurchase or replace any mortgage that has defaulted; or
- retention by the seller of at least a 10% participation interest in the mortgage.

Under our charter, our mortgage purchase operations are confined, so far as practicable, to mortgages which we deem to be of such quality, type and class as to meet generally the purchase standards of other private institutional mortgage investors. This is a general marketability standard.

Our charter requirement for credit protection on mortgages with LTV ratios greater than 80% does not apply to multifamily mortgages or to mortgages that have the benefit of any guarantee, insurance or other obligation by the U.S. or any of its agencies or instrumentalities (*e.g.*, the FHA, the VA or the USDA Rural Development).

Until June 2011, as part of the MHA Program, we may purchase single-family mortgages that refinance borrowers whose mortgages we currently own or guarantee without obtaining additional credit enhancement in excess of that already in

place for any such loan, provided that the current LTV ratio of the loan at the time of refinance does not exceed 125%. The relief refinance mortgage initiative is our implementation of this refinance program.

We also focus on maintaining underwriting standards that allow us to purchase and guarantee loans made to qualified borrowers that we believe will provide management and guarantee fee income, over the long-term, that exceeds our anticipated credit-related and administrative expenses on the underlying loans.

## Our Business Segments

Our operations consist of three reportable segments, which are based on the type of business activities each performs Single-family Guarantee, Investments, and Multifamily. Certain activities that are not part of a reportable segment are included in the All Other category.

We evaluate segment performance and allocate resources based on a Segment Earnings approach. Beginning January 1, 2010, we revised our method for presenting Segment Earnings to reflect changes in how management measures and assesses the financial performance of each segment and the company as a whole. For more information on our segments, including financial information, see MD&A CONSOLIDATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS Segment Earnings and NOTE 17: SEGMENT REPORTING.

### *Single-Family Guarantee Segment*

The Single-family Guarantee segment reflects results from our single-family credit guarantee activities. In our Single-family Guarantee segment, we purchase single-family mortgage loans originated by our seller/servicers in the primary mortgage market. In most instances, we use the mortgage securitization process to package the purchased mortgage loans into guaranteed mortgage-related securities. We guarantee the payment of principal and interest on the mortgage-related security in exchange for management and guarantee fees.

*Our Customers*

Our customers are predominantly lenders in the primary mortgage market that originate mortgages for homeowners. These lenders include mortgage banking companies, commercial banks, savings banks, community banks, credit unions, HFAs, and savings and loan associations.

We acquire a significant portion of our mortgages from several large lenders. These lenders are among the largest mortgage loan originators in the U.S. Due to the mortgage and financial market crisis during 2008 and 2009, a number of larger mortgage originators failed or were acquired and, as a result, mortgage origination volume during 2010 was concentrated in a smaller number of institutions. See RISK FACTORS Competitive and Market Risks for further information. During 2010, three mortgage lenders (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Bank of America, N.A. and Chase Home Finance LLC) each accounted for more than 10% of our single-family mortgage purchase volume and collectively accounted for approximately 50% of our single-family mortgage purchase volume. Our top ten lenders accounted for approximately 78% of our single-family mortgage purchase volume during 2010.

*Our Competition*

Historically, our principal competitors have been Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and FHA, and other financial institutions that retain or securitize mortgages, such as commercial and investment banks, dealers, and thrift institutions. Since 2008, most of our competitors, other than Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae, have ceased their activities in the residential mortgage securitization business or severely curtailed these activities relative to their previous levels. We compete on the basis of price, products, the structure of our securities, and service.

Ginnie Mae, which has become a more significant competitor since 2008, guarantees the timely payment of principal and interest on mortgage-related securities backed by federally insured or guaranteed loans, primarily those insured by FHA or guaranteed by VA. Ginnie Mae increased its share of the securitization market in 2010, in large part due to favorable pricing of loans insured by FHA, the increase in the FHA loan limit and the availability, through FHA, of a mortgage product for borrowers seeking greater than 80% financing who could not otherwise qualify for a conventional mortgage.

The conservatorship, including direction provided to us by our Conservator, and the restrictions on our activities under the Purchase Agreement may affect our ability to compete in the business of securitizing mortgages. On a number of occasions, FHFA has directed us and Fannie Mae to confer and consider uniform approaches to particular issues and problems, and FHFA has in a few cases directed the two GSEs to adopt common approaches. For example, in January 2011, FHFA announced that it has directed Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to work on a joint initiative, in coordination with HUD, to consider alternatives for future mortgage servicing structures and servicing compensation, including the possibility of reducing or eliminating the minimum servicing fee for performing loans, or other structures. FHFA has also directed Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to discuss with FHFA and with each other, and wherever feasible to develop consistent requirements, policies and processes for, the servicing of non-performing mortgages, and to discuss joint standards for the evaluation of the servicing performance of servicers. It is possible that FHFA could require us and Fannie Mae to take a common approach

that, because of differences in our respective businesses, could place Freddie Mac at a competitive disadvantage to Fannie Mae.

*Overview of the Mortgage Securitization Process*

Mortgage securitization is a process by which we purchase mortgage loans that lenders originate, and pool these loans into mortgage securities that are sold in global capital markets, generating proceeds that support future purchases from lenders. The following diagram illustrates how we support mortgage market liquidity when we create PCs through mortgage securitizations. These PCs can be sold to investors or held by us:

The U.S. residential mortgage market consists of a primary mortgage market that links homebuyers and lenders and a secondary mortgage market that links lenders and investors. We participate in the secondary mortgage market by purchasing mortgage loans and mortgage-related securities for investment and by issuing guaranteed mortgage-related securities. In the Single-family Guarantee segment, we purchase and securitize single-family mortgages, which are mortgages that are secured by one- to four-family properties.

In general, the securitization and Freddie Mac guarantee process works as follows: 1) a lender originates a mortgage loan to a borrower purchasing a home or refinancing an existing mortgage loan, 2) we purchase the loan from the lender and place it with other mortgages that are pooled into a security that can be sold to investors, 3) the lender may then use the proceeds from the sale to originate another mortgage loan, 4) we provide a credit guarantee, for a fee (generally a small portion of the interest collected on the mortgage loan), to those who invest in the security, 5) the borrower s monthly payment of mortgage principal and interest is passed through to the investors in the security, and 6) if the borrower stops making monthly payments because a family member loses a job, for example we step in and make the applicable payments to investors in the security. In the event a borrower defaults on the mortgage, our servicer works with the borrower to find a solution to help them stay in the home, if possible, through our many different workout options, or we ultimately foreclose and sell the home.

The terms of single-family mortgages that we purchase or guarantee allow borrowers to prepay these loans, thereby allowing borrowers to refinance their loans when mortgage rates decline. Because of the nature of long-term, fixed-rate mortgages, borrowers are protected against rising interest rates, but are able to take advantage of declining rates through refinancing. When a borrower prepays a mortgage that we have securitized, the outstanding balance of the security owned by

investors is reduced by the amount of the prepayment. Unscheduled reductions in loan principal, regardless of whether they are voluntary or involuntary (*e.g.* foreclosure), result in prepayments of security balances. Consequently, the owners of our guaranteed securities are subject to prepayment risk on the related mortgage loans, which is principally that the investor will receive an unscheduled return of the principal, and therefore may not earn the rate of return originally expected on the investment.

We guarantee these mortgage-related securities in exchange for compensation, which consists primarily of a combination of management and guarantee fees paid on a monthly basis as a percentage of the UPB of the underlying loans and initial upfront payments referred to as delivery fees. We may also make upfront payments to buy-up the monthly management and guarantee fee rate, or receive upfront payments to buy-down the monthly management and guarantee fee rate. These fees are paid in conjunction with the formation of a PC to provide for a uniform coupon rate for the mortgage pool underlying the issued PC.

We enter into mortgage purchase volume commitments with many of our larger customers in order to have a supply of loans for our guarantee business. These commitments provide for the lenders to deliver us a specified dollar amount of mortgages during a specified period of time. Some commitments may also provide for the lender to deliver to us a minimum percentage of their total sales of conforming loans. The purchase and securitization of mortgage loans from customers under these longer-term contracts have pricing schedules for our management and guarantee fees that are negotiated at the outset of the contract with initial terms that may range from one month to one year. We call these transactions flow activity and they represent the majority of our purchase volumes. The remainder of our purchases and securitizations of mortgage loans occurs in cash, or bulk, transactions for which purchase prices and management and guarantee fees are negotiated on an individual transaction basis. Mortgage purchase volumes from individual customers can fluctuate significantly. If a mortgage lender fails to meet its contractual commitment, we have a variety of contractual remedies, which may include the right to assess certain fees. Our mortgage purchase contracts contain no penalty or liquidated damages clauses based on our inability to take delivery of presented mortgage loans. However, if we were to fail to meet our contractual commitment, we could be deemed to be in breach of our contract and could be liable for damages in a lawsuit.

We seek to issue guarantees on our PCs with fee terms that we believe will, over the long-term, provide management and guarantee fee income that exceeds our anticipated credit-related and administrative expenses on the underlying loans. Our Single-family Guarantee segment is responsible for determining prices of our guarantee and delivery fees based on our assessment of credit risk and loss mitigation related to single-family loans, including single-family loans underlying our guaranteed mortgage-related securities. We vary our guarantee and delivery fee pricing for different mortgage products and mortgage or borrower underwriting characteristics. We implemented several increases in delivery fees that became effective in 2009 applicable to mortgages with certain higher-risk loan characteristics. We announced additional delivery fee increases in the fourth quarter of 2010 that become effective March 1, 2011 (or later, as outstanding contracts permit) for loans with higher LTV ratios. Given the uncertainty of the housing market in 2009 and 2010, we entered into arrangements with certain existing customers at their renewal dates that allow us to change credit and pricing terms more quickly than in the past.

For information on how we account for our securitization activities, see NOTE 1: SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING POLICIES and NOTE 2: CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES.

*Securitization Activities*

The types of mortgage-related securities we issue and guarantee include the following:

PCs;

REMICs and Other Structured Securities; and

Other Guarantee Transactions.

*PCs*

Our PCs are pass-through securities that represent undivided beneficial interests in trusts that hold pools of mortgages we have purchased. Holding single-family loans in the form of PCs rather than as unsecuritized loans gives us greater flexibility in managing the composition of our mortgage portfolio, as it is generally easier to purchase and sell PCs than unsecuritized mortgage loans, and allows more cost effective interest-rate risk management. For our fixed-rate PCs, we guarantee the timely payment of principal and interest. For our ARM PCs, we guarantee the timely payment of the weighted average coupon interest rate for the underlying mortgage loans. We also guarantee the full and final payment of principal for ARM PCs; however, we do not guarantee the timely payment of principal on ARM PCs. We issue most of

our PCs in transactions in which our customers exchange mortgage loans for PCs. We refer to these transactions as guarantor swaps. The following diagram illustrates a guarantor swap transaction:

**Guarantor Swap**

We also issue PCs in exchange for cash. The following diagram illustrates an exchange for cash in a cash auction of PCs:

**Cash Auction of PCs**

Institutional and other fixed-income investors, including pension funds, insurance companies, securities dealers, money managers, commercial banks and foreign central banks, purchase our PCs. Treasury and the Federal Reserve have also purchased mortgage-related securities issued by us, Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae under their purchase programs. Treasury s purchase program ended in December 2009. The Federal Reserve s purchase program ended in March 2010.

PCs differ from U.S. Treasury securities and other fixed-income investments in two ways. First, they can be prepaid at any time. Homeowners have the right to prepay their mortgage at any time (known as the prepayment option), and homeowner mortgage payments are passed through to the PC holder. Consequently, our securities implicitly have a call option that significantly reduces the average life of the security from the contractual loan maturity. As a result, our PCs generally provide a higher nominal yield than certain other fixed-income products. Second, PCs are not backed by the full faith and credit of the United States, as are U.S. Treasury securities.

In addition, we seek to support the liquidity of the market for our PCs through a variety of activities, including educating dealers and investors about the merits of PCs, and enhancing disclosures related to the collateral underlying our securities.

*REMICs and Other Structured Securities*

We issue single-class and multiclass securities. Single-class securities involve the straight pass-through of all of the cash flows of the underlying collateral to holders of the beneficial interests. Our principal multiclass securities qualify for tax treatment as REMICs. Multiclass securities divide all of the cash flows of the underlying mortgage-related assets into two or

more classes designed to meet the investment criteria and portfolio needs of different investors by creating classes of securities with varying maturities, payment priorities and coupons, each of which represents a beneficial ownership interest in a separate portion of the cash flows of the underlying collateral. Usually, the cash flows are divided to modify the relative exposure of different classes to interest-rate risk, or to create various coupon structures. The simplest division of cash flows is into principal-only and interest-only classes. Other securities we issue can involve the creation of sequential payment and planned or targeted amortization classes. In a sequential payment class structure, one or more classes receive all or a disproportionate percentage of the principal payments on the underlying mortgage assets for a period of time until that class or classes is retired, following which the principal payments are directed to other classes. Planned or targeted amortization classes involve the creation of classes that have relatively more predictable amortization schedules across different prepayment scenarios, thus reducing prepayment risk, extension risk, or both.

Our REMICs and Other Structured Securities represent beneficial interests in pools of PCs and/or certain other types of mortgage-related assets. We create these securities primarily by using PCs or previously issued REMICs and Other Structured Securities as the underlying collateral. Similar to our PCs, we guarantee the payment of principal and interest to the holders of tranches of our REMICs and Other Structured Securities. We do not charge a management and guarantee fee for these securities if the underlying collateral is already guaranteed by us since no additional credit risk is introduced. Because the collateral underlying nearly all of our single-family REMICs and Other Structured Securities consists of other mortgage-related securities that we guarantee, there are no concentrations of credit risk in any of the classes of these securities that are issued, and there are no economic residual interests in the related securitization trust. The following diagram provides a general example of how we create REMICs and Other Structured Securities.

**REMICs and Other Structured Securities**

We issue many of our REMICs and Other Structured Securities in transactions in which securities dealers or investors sell us mortgage-related assets or we use our own mortgage-related assets (*e.g.,* PCs and REMICs and Other Structured Securities) in exchange for the REMICs and Other Structured Securities. Since the creation of REMICs and Other Structured Securities allows for setting differing terms for specific classes of investors, our issuance of these securities can expand the range of investors in our mortgage-related securities to include those seeking specific security attributes. For REMICs and Other Structured Securities that we issue to third parties, we typically receive a transaction, or resecuritization, fee. This transaction fee is compensation for facilitating the transaction, as well as future administrative responsibilities.

*Other Guarantee Transactions*

We also issue mortgage-related securities to third parties in exchange for non-Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities. We refer to these as Other Guarantee Transactions. The non-Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities are transferred to trusts that were specifically created for the purpose of issuing securities, or certificates, in the Other Guarantee Transactions. The following diagram illustrates an example of an Other Guarantee Transaction:

**Other Guarantee Transaction**

Other Guarantee Transactions can generally be segregated into two different types. In one type, we purchase only senior tranches from a non-Freddie Mac senior-subordinated securitization, place the senior tranches into securitization trusts, and issue Other Guarantee Transaction certificates guaranteeing the principal and interest payments on those certificates. In this type of transaction, our credit risk is reduced by the credit protections from the related subordinated tranches, which we neither purchase nor guarantee. In the second type, we purchase single-class pass-through securities, place them in securitization trusts and issue Other Guarantee Transaction certificates guaranteeing the principal and interest payments on those certificates. Our single-family Other Guarantee Transactions backed by single-class pass-through securities do not benefit from structural or other credit enhancement protections.

Although Other Guarantee Transactions generally have underlying mortgage loans with varying risk characteristics, we do not issue tranches that have concentrations of credit risk beyond those embedded in the underlying assets, as all cash flows of the underlying collateral are passed through to the holders of the securities and there are no economic residual interests in the securitization trusts. Additionally, there may be other credit enhancements and structural features retained by the seller, such as excess interest or overcollateralization, that provide credit protection to our interests, and reduce the likelihood that we will have to perform under our guarantee of the senior tranches. In exchange for providing our guarantee, we may receive a management and guarantee fee or other delivery fees, if the underlying collateral is not already guaranteed by us.

In 2010 and 2009, we entered into transactions under Treasury s NIBP with HFAs, for the partial guarantee of certain single-family and multifamily HFA bonds, which were Other Guarantee Transactions with significant credit enhancement provided by Treasury. The securities issued by us pursuant to the NIBP were purchased by Treasury. See NOTE 3: CONSERVATORSHIP AND RELATED MATTERS for further information.

For information about the amount of mortgage-related securities we have issued, see Table 34 Freddie Mac Mortgage-Related Securities. For information about the relative performance of mortgages underlying these securities, refer to our MD&A RISK MANAGEMENT Credit Risk section.

*PC Trust Documents*

We establish trusts for all of our issued PCs pursuant to our PC master trust agreement. In accordance with the terms of our PC trust documents, we have the option, and in some instances the requirement, to purchase specified mortgage loans from the trust. We purchase these mortgages at an amount equal to the current UPB, less any outstanding advances of principal on the mortgage that have been distributed to PC holders. From time to time, we reevaluate our delinquent loan purchase practices and alter them if circumstances warrant. Our practice is to purchase mortgages that are 120 days or more delinquent from pools underlying our PCs when:

- the mortgages have been modified;
- foreclosure sales occur;
- the mortgages are delinquent for 24 months; or
- the cost of guarantee payments to PC holders, including advances of interest at the PC coupon rate, exceeds the expected cost of holding the nonperforming loans.

On February 10, 2010, we announced that we would purchase substantially all single-family mortgage loans that are 120 days or more delinquent underlying our issued PCs. This change in practice was made based on a determination that the cost of guarantee payments to the security holders will exceed the cost of holding unsecuritized non-performing loans on our consolidated balance sheets. The cost of holding unsecuritized non-performing loans on our consolidated balance sheets was significantly affected by our January 1, 2010 adoption of amendments to certain accounting standards and changing economics pursuant to which the recognized cost of purchasing most delinquent loans from PC trusts was less than the recognized cost of continued guarantee payments to security holders. See Executive Summary *Changes in Accounting Standards Related to Accounting for Transfers of Financial Assets and Consolidation of VIEs* for additional information.

In accordance with the terms of our PC trust documents, we are required to purchase a mortgage loan (or, in some cases, substitute a comparable mortgage loan) from a PC trust in the following situations:

- if a court of competent jurisdiction or a federal government agency, duly authorized to oversee or regulate our mortgage purchase business, determines that our purchase of the mortgage was unauthorized and a cure is not practicable without unreasonable effort or expense, or if such a court or government agency requires us to repurchase the mortgage;
- if a borrower exercises its option to convert the interest rate from an adjustable-rate to a fixed-rate on a convertible ARM; and
- in the case of balloon-reset loans, shortly before the mortgage reaches its scheduled balloon-reset date.

*The To Be Announced Market*

Because our fixed-rate PCs are homogeneous, issued in high volume and highly liquid, they trade on a generic basis by PC coupon rate, also referred to as trading in the TBA market. A TBA trade in Freddie Mac securities represents a

contract for the purchase or sale of PCs to be delivered at a future date; however, the specific PCs that will be delivered to fulfill the trade obligation, and thus the specific characteristics of the mortgages underlying those PCs, are not known (*i.e.*, announced ) at the time of the trade, but only shortly before the trade is settled. The use of the TBA market increases the liquidity of mortgage investments and improves the distribution of investment capital available for residential mortgage financing, thereby helping us to accomplish our statutory mission. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association publishes guidelines pertaining to the types of mortgages that are eligible for TBA trades.

*Underwriting Requirements and Quality Control Standards*

We use a process of delegated underwriting for the single-family mortgages we purchase or securitize. In this process, our contracts with seller/servicers describe mortgage underwriting standards and the seller/servicers represent and warrant to us that the mortgages sold to us meet these standards. In our contracts with individual seller/servicers, we sometimes waive or modify selected underwriting standards. Through our delegated underwriting process, mortgage loans and the borrowers ability to repay the loans are evaluated using several critical risk characteristics, including but not limited to, the borrower s credit score and credit history, the borrower s monthly income relative to debt payments, the original LTV ratio, the type of mortgage product and the occupancy type of the loan. We subsequently review a sample of these loans and, if we determine that any loan is not in compliance with our contractual standards, we may require the seller/servicer to repurchase that mortgage. In lieu of a repurchase, we may agree to allow a seller/servicer to indemnify us against loss in the event of a default by the borrower or enter into some other remedy. During the year ended December 31, 2010, we reviewed a

significant number of loans that defaulted in order to assess the sellers compliance with our purchase contracts. For more information on our seller/servicers repurchase obligations, including recent performance under those obligations, see MD&A RISK MANAGEMENT Credit Risk Institutional Credit Risk Mortgage Seller/Servicers.

The majority of our single-family mortgage purchase volume is evaluated using automated underwriting software tools, either our tool (Loan Prospector), the seller/servicers own tools, or Fannie Mae s tool. The percentage of our single-family mortgage purchase flow activity volume evaluated by the loan originator using Loan Prospector prior to being purchased by us was 39%, 45%, and 42% during 2010, 2009, and 2008, respectively. Since 2008, we have added a number of additional credit standards for loans evaluated by other underwriting tools to improve the quality of loans we purchase that are evaluated using these other tools. Consequently, we do not believe the use of a tool other than Loan Prospector significantly increases our loan performance risk.

As discussed above, our charter requires that single-family mortgages with LTV ratios above 80% at the time of purchase be covered by specified credit enhancements or participation interests. In addition, we employ other types of credit enhancements to further manage certain credit risk, including pool insurance, indemnification agreements, collateral pledged by lenders and subordinated security structures.

*Loss Mitigation and Loan Workout Activities*

Loan workout activities are a key component of our loss mitigation strategy for managing and resolving troubled assets and lowering credit losses. Our single-family loss mitigation strategy emphasizes early intervention in seriously delinquent mortgages and provides alternatives to foreclosure. Other single-family loss mitigation activities include providing our single-family servicers with default management tools designed to help them manage non-performing loans more effectively and to assist borrowers in retaining home ownership where possible, or facilitate foreclosure alternatives when continued homeownership is not an option. Loan workouts are intended to reduce the number of seriously delinquent mortgages that proceed to foreclosure and, ultimately, mitigate our total credit losses by reducing or eliminating a portion of the costs related to foreclosed properties and avoiding the additional credit losses that we would likely incur in a REO sale.

Our loan workouts include:

- Repayment plans, which are contractual plans to make up past due amounts. They mitigate our credit losses because they assist borrowers in returning to compliance with the original terms of their mortgages.

- Loan modifications, which may involve changing the terms of the loan, or adding outstanding indebtedness, such as delinquent interest, to the UPB of the loan, or a combination of both. We require our servicers to examine the borrower s capacity to make payments under the new terms by reviewing the borrower s qualifications, including income. Loan modifications either: (a) result in a concession to the borrower, such as a reduction in interest rate; or (b) do not result in a concession to the borrower, such as those which add the past due amounts to the balance of the loan, extend the term or a combination of both. Loan modifications that result in a concession to the borrower are situations in which we do not expect to recover the full original principal or interest due under the original loan terms. Such modifications are accounted for as TDRs. During 2010, we granted principal forbearance but did not utilize principal forgiveness for our loan modifications.

- Forbearance agreements, where reduced payments or no payments are required during a defined period. They provide additional time for the borrower to return to compliance with the original terms of the mortgage or to implement another loan workout.

Short sales, in which the borrower, working with the servicer, sells the home and pays off part of the outstanding loan, accrued interest and other expenses from the sale proceeds, in satisfaction of the full amount of the loan.

For more information regarding credit risk, see MD&A RISK MANAGEMENT Credit Risk, NOTE 5: MORTGAGE LOANS AND LOAN LOSS RESERVES, and NOTE 6: INDIVIDUALLY IMPAIRED AND NON-PERFORMING LOANS.

***Investments Segment***

The Investments segment reflects results from our investment, funding and hedging activities. In our Investments segment, we invest principally in mortgage assets funded by debt issuances and hedged using derivatives. We are not currently a substantial buyer or seller of mortgage assets, except for purchases of delinquent mortgages out of PC pools.

*Our Customers*

Our customers for our debt securities predominantly include insurance companies, money managers, central banks, depository institutions, and pension funds. Within the Investments segment, we buy securities through various market sources. We also invest in performing single-family mortgage loans, a significant portion of which is from several large lenders, as discussed in *Single-Family Guarantee Segment Our Customers*.

*Our Competition*

Historically, our principal competitors have been Fannie Mae and other financial institutions that invest in mortgage-related securities and mortgage loans, such as commercial and investment banks, dealers, thrift institutions, and insurance companies. The conservatorship, including direction provided to us by our Conservator, and the restrictions on our activities under the Purchase Agreement has affected and will continue to affect our ability to compete in the business of investing in mortgage-related securities and mortgage loans.

We compete for low-cost debt funding with Fannie Mae, the FHLBs and other institutions. Competition for debt funding from these entities can vary with changes in economic, financial market and regulatory environments.

*Assets*

Historically, we have primarily been a buy-and-hold investor in mortgage-related securities and single-family mortgage loans. We may sell assets to reduce risk, provide liquidity, and improve our returns. However, due to limitations under the Purchase Agreement and those imposed by FHFA, our ability to acquire and sell mortgage assets is significantly constrained. For more information, see Conservatorship and Related Matters and MD&A CONSOLIDATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS Segment Earnings *Segment Earnings-Results Investments.*

We may purchase assets for a variety of reasons, including to improve investment returns. We estimate our expected investment returns using an OAS approach, which is an estimate of the yield spread between a given financial instrument and a benchmark (LIBOR, agency or Treasury) yield curve. In this approach, we consider potential variability in the instrument s cash flows resulting from any options embedded in the instrument, such as the prepayment option. Additionally, in this segment we maintain a cash and other investments portfolio, comprised primarily of cash and cash equivalents, non-mortgage-related securities, federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell, to help manage our liquidity needs.

*Debt Financing*

We fund our investment activities by issuing short-term and long-term debt. The conservatorship, and the resulting support we receive from Treasury, has enabled us to access debt funding on terms sufficient for our needs. The support we received from the Federal Reserve through its debt purchase program, which was completed in March 2010, also contributed to our ability to access debt funding. While we believe that the support provided by Treasury pursuant to the Purchase Agreement currently enables us to maintain our access to the debt markets and to have adequate liquidity to conduct our normal business activities, the costs of our debt funding could vary due to the uncertainty about the future of the GSEs and potential investor concerns about the adequacy of funding available under the Purchase Agreement after 2012. Additionally, the Purchase Agreement limits the amount of indebtedness we can incur.

For more information, see Conservatorship and Related Matters and MD&A LIQUIDITY AND CAPITAL RESOURCES Liquidity.

*Risk Management*

Our Investments segment has responsibility for managing our interest rate risk and liquidity risk. Derivatives are an important part of our strategy to manage certain risks. We use derivatives primarily to: (a) regularly adjust or rebalance our funding mix in order to more closely match changes in the interest rate characteristics of our mortgage-related assets; (b) hedge forecasted issuances of debt; (c) synthetically create callable and non-callable funding; and (d) hedge foreign-currency exposure. For more information regarding our use of derivatives, see

QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DISCLOSURES ABOUT MARKET RISK and NOTE 12: DERIVATIVES. For information regarding our liquidity management, see MD&A LIQUIDITY AND CAPITAL RESOURCES.

*PC Support Activities*

Our PCs are an integral part of our mortgage purchase program. Our Single-family Guarantee segment purchases many of our mortgages by issuing PCs in exchange for those mortgage loans in guarantor swap transactions. We also issue PCs backed by mortgage loans that we purchased for cash. Our competitiveness in purchasing single-family mortgages from our seller/servicers, and thus the volume and profitability of new single-family business, can be directly affected by the relative price performance of our PCs and comparable Fannie Mae securities. We seek to support the price performance of our PCs through a variety of strategies, including the purchase and sale of PCs and other agency securities, as well as through the issuance of REMICs and Other Structured Securities. Our purchases and sales of mortgage-related securities influence the relative supply and demand for these securities, and the issuance of REMICs and Other Structured Securities helps support the price performance of our PCs. Depending upon market conditions, including the relative prices, supply of and demand for PCs and comparable Fannie Mae securities, as well as other factors, there may be substantial variability in any period in the total amount of securities we purchase or sell, and in the success of our efforts to support the liquidity and price performance of our PCs. We may increase, reduce or discontinue these or other related activities at any time, which could

affect the liquidity of the market for PCs. For more information, see RISK FACTORS Competitive and Market Risks *Any decline in the price performance of or demand for our PCs could have an adverse effect on the volume and profitability of our new single-family guarantee business.*

***Multifamily Segment***

The Multifamily segment reflects results from our investments and guarantee activities in multifamily mortgage loans and securities. Our new purchases of multifamily mortgage loans are primarily made for purposes of aggregation and then securitization, which supports the availability of financing for multifamily properties. Our Multifamily segment does not issue REMIC securities but does issue Other Structured Securities, Other Guarantee Transactions, and other guarantee commitments. We also purchase non-agency CMBS for investment; however we have not purchased significant amounts of non-agency CMBS for investment since 2008.

Prior to 2008, we principally purchased and held multifamily loans for investment purposes. Beginning in 2008, we also began purchasing certain multifamily mortgages for securitization purposes. In 2010, we purchased $10.3 billion of loans as part of our CME initiative and subsequently issued $6.4 billion of Other Guarantee Transaction certificates. Subject to market conditions, we expect to continue purchasing multifamily loans as part of our further expansion of the multifamily securitization business in 2011. We may also sell multifamily loans from time to time.

The multifamily property market is affected by general economic factors, such as employment rates, construction cycles, and relative affordability of single-family home prices, all of which influence the supply and demand for multifamily properties and pricing for apartment rentals. Our multifamily loan volume is largely sourced through established institutional channels where we are generally providing post-construction financing to larger apartment project operators with established performance records. Our lending decisions are primarily based on an assessment of the property s ability to generate sufficient operating cash flows to support payment of debt service obligations as measured by the expected DSCR.

Prior to 2010, our Multifamily segment also included investments in LIHTC partnerships formed for the purpose of providing equity funding for affordable multifamily rental properties. In these investments, we provided equity contributions to partnerships designed to sponsor the development and ongoing operations for low- and moderate-income multifamily apartments. We planned to realize a return on our investment through reductions in income tax expense that result from federal income tax credits and the deductibility of operating losses generated by the partnerships. However, we no longer invest in these partnerships because we do not expect to be able to use the underlying federal income tax credits or the operating losses generated from the partnerships as a reduction to our taxable income because of our inability to generate sufficient taxable income or to sell these interests to third parties. See NOTE 4: VARIABLE INTEREST ENTITIES for additional information.

*Our Customers*

We acquire a significant portion of our multifamily mortgage loans from several large seller/servicers. Our top three multifamily lenders, CBRE Capital Markets, Inc., Wells Fargo Multifamily Capital and Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC, each accounted for more than 10%, and collectively represented approximately 44% of our multifamily purchase volume during 2010.

We also enter into other guarantee commitments for multifamily mortgage loans, HFA bonds, and housing revenue bonds held by third parties. By engaging in these activities, we provide liquidity to this sector of the mortgage market.

*Our Competition*

Historically, our principal competitors have been Fannie Mae, FHA, and other financial institutions that retain or securitize multifamily mortgages, such as commercial and investment banks, dealers, thrift institutions, and insurance companies. Since 2008, most of our competitors, other than Fannie Mae and FHA, have ceased their activities in the multifamily mortgage business or severely curtailed these activities relative to their previous levels. Some market participants began to re-enter the market on a limited basis in 2010. We compete on the basis of price, products, structure and service.

*Underwriting Requirements and Quality Control Standards*

For our purchase or guarantee of multifamily mortgage loans, we rely significantly on pre-purchase underwriting, which includes third-party appraisals and cash flow analysis. The underwriting standards we provide to our seller/servicers focus on loan quality measurement based, in part, on the LTV ratio and DSCR at origination. The DSCR is one indicator of future credit performance. The DSCR estimates a multifamily borrower s ability to service its mortgage obligation using the secured property s cash flow, after deducting non-mortgage expenses from income. The higher the DSCR, the more likely a multifamily borrower will be able to continue servicing its mortgage obligation. Our standards for multifamily loans specify maximum original LTV ratio and minimum DSCR that vary based on the loan characteristics, such as loan type (new acquisition or supplemental financing), loan term (intermediate or longer-term), and loan features (interest-only or amortizing, fixed- or variable-rate). Since the beginning of 2009, our multifamily loans are generally underwritten with

requirements for a maximum original LTV ratio of 80% and a DSCR of greater than 1.25. In certain circumstances, our standards for multifamily loans allow for certain types of loans to have an original LTV ratio over 80% and/or a DSCR of less than 1.25, typically where this will serve our mission and contribute to achieving our affordable housing goals. In cases where we commit to purchase or guarantee a permanent loan upon completion of construction or rehabilitation, we generally require additional credit enhancements, since underwriting for these loans typically requires estimates of future cash flows for calculating the DSCR that is expected after construction or rehabilitation is completed. We previously allowed delegated underwriting of multifamily loans in limited circumstances for approved lenders that deliver loans meeting targeted affordable housing goals criteria. Loans outside of certain criteria were subject to our underwriting review prior to closing and all loans we acquired with delegated underwriting were reviewed after closing for compliance with our underwriting guidelines. In addition, we required loss sharing or credit enhancement on loans we acquired with delegated underwriting. In the fourth quarter of 2009, we announced that we would discontinue such delegated underwriting, except for mortgages already in approved lenders pipelines.

We generally require multifamily seller/servicers to service mortgage loans they have sold to us in order to mitigate potential losses. We do not oversee servicing with respect to multifamily loans underlying our Other Guarantee Transactions as that task is performed by subordinated bondholders. For loans over $1 million and where we have servicing oversight, servicers must generally submit an annual assessment of the mortgaged property to us based on the servicer s analysis of financial and other information about the property. Because the activities of multifamily seller/servicers are an important part of our loss mitigation process, we rate their performance regularly and may conduct on-site reviews of their servicing operations in an effort to confirm compliance with our standards.

For loans for which we oversee servicing, if a borrower is in distress, we may offer a workout option to the borrower. For example, we may modify the terms of a multifamily mortgage loan, which gives the borrower an opportunity to bring the loan current and retain ownership of the property. These arrangements are made with the expectation that we will recover our initial investment or minimize our losses. We do not enter into these arrangements in situations where we believe we would experience a loss in the future that is greater than or equal to the loss we would experience if we foreclosed on the property at the time of the agreement.

## Conservatorship and Related Matters

### *Overview*

We have been operating under conservatorship, with FHFA acting as our conservator, since September 6, 2008. The conservatorship and related matters have had a wide-ranging impact on us, including our regulatory supervision, management, business, financial condition and results of operations.

On September 7, 2008, the then Secretary of the Treasury and the then Director of FHFA announced several actions taken by Treasury and FHFA regarding Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. At that time, FHFA set forth the purpose and goals of the conservatorship as follows: The purpose of appointing the Conservator is to preserve and conserve the company s assets and property and to put the company in a sound and solvent condition. The goals of the conservatorship are to help restore confidence in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, enhance their capacity to fulfill their mission, and mitigate the systemic risk that has contributed directly to the instability in the current market. These actions included the following:

- placing us and Fannie Mae in conservatorship;
- the execution of the Purchase Agreement, pursuant to which we issued to Treasury both senior preferred stock and a warrant to purchase common stock; and

the establishment of a temporary secured lending credit facility that was available to us until December 31, 2009, which was effected through the execution of a lending agreement (this agreement expired on December 31, 2009).

We refer to the Purchase Agreement and the warrant as the Treasury Agreements.

***Entry Into Conservatorship***

Upon its appointment, FHFA, as Conservator, immediately succeeded to all rights, titles, powers and privileges of Freddie Mac, and of any stockholder, officer or director of Freddie Mac with respect to Freddie Mac and its assets, and succeeded to the title to all books, records and assets of Freddie Mac held by any other legal custodian or third party. During the conservatorship, the Conservator delegated certain authority to the Board of Directors to oversee, and management to conduct, day-to-day operations so that the company can continue to operate in the ordinary course of business. The directors serve on behalf of, and exercise authority as directed by, the Conservator. We describe the terms of the conservatorship and the powers of our Conservator in detail below under *Supervision of our Business During Conservatorship* and *Powers of the Conservator.*

There is significant uncertainty as to whether or when we will emerge from conservatorship, as it has no specified termination date, and as to what changes may occur to our business structure during or following our conservatorship,

including whether we will continue to exist. While we are not aware of any current plans of our Conservator to significantly change our business model or capital structure in the near-term, there are likely to be significant changes beyond the near-term that we expect to be decided by the Obama Administration and Congress. Our future structure and role will be determined by the Obama Administration and Congress. We have no ability to predict the outcome of these deliberations. On February 11, 2011, the Obama Administration delivered a report to Congress that lays out the Administration s plan to reform the U.S. housing finance market. The report recommends winding down Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. For more information, see Executive Summary *Long-Term Financial Sustainability and Future Status.*

We receive substantial support from Treasury and FHFA, as our Conservator and regulator, and are dependent upon their continued support in order to continue operating our business. Our ability to access funds from Treasury under the Purchase Agreement is critical to: (a) keeping us solvent; (b) allowing us to focus on our primary business objectives under conservatorship; and (c) avoiding the appointment of a receiver by FHFA under statutory mandatory receivership provisions.

For a description of certain risks to our business relating to the conservatorship and Treasury Agreements, see RISK FACTORS.

***Impact of Conservatorship and Related Actions on Our Business***

We conduct our business under the direction of FHFA as our Conservator. While the conservatorship has benefited us through, for example, improved access to the debt markets because of the support we receive from Treasury, we are also subject to certain constraints on our business activities by Treasury due to the terms of, and Treasury s rights under, the Purchase Agreement.

Our business objectives and strategies have in some cases been altered since we were placed into conservatorship, and may continue to change. Based on our charter, public statements from Treasury and FHFA officials and guidance from our Conservator, we have a variety of different, and potentially competing, objectives, including:

- providing liquidity, stability and affordability in the mortgage market;
- continuing to provide additional assistance to the struggling housing and mortgage markets;
- reducing the need to draw funds from Treasury pursuant to the Purchase Agreement;
- returning to long-term profitability; and
- protecting the interests of taxpayers.

These objectives create conflicts in strategic and day-to-day decision making that will likely lead to suboptimal outcomes for one or more, or possibly all, of these objectives. We regularly receive direction from our Conservator on how to pursue these objectives, including direction to focus our efforts on assisting homeowners in the housing and mortgage markets. Given the important role the Obama Administration and our Conservator have placed on Freddie Mac in addressing housing and mortgage market conditions and our public mission, we may be required to take additional actions that could have a negative impact on our business, operating results or financial condition. Because we expect many of these objectives and related initiatives to result in significant costs, there is significant uncertainty as to the ultimate impact these initiatives will have on our future capital or liquidity needs. Certain of these objectives are expected to help homeowners and the mortgage market and may help to mitigate future credit losses. However, some of our initiatives are expected to have an adverse impact on our near- and long-term financial results.

Certain changes to our business objectives and strategies are designed to provide support for the mortgage market in a manner that serves our public mission and other non-financial objectives, but may not contribute to profitability. Our efforts to help struggling homeowners and the mortgage market, in line with our mission, may help to mitigate credit losses, but in some cases may increase our expenses or require us to forego revenue opportunities in the near term. As a result, in some cases the objectives of reducing the need to draw funds from Treasury and returning to long-term profitability will be subordinated as we provide this assistance. There is significant uncertainty as to the ultimate impact that our efforts to aid the housing and mortgage markets will have on our future capital or liquidity needs and we cannot estimate whether, and the extent to which, costs we incur in the near term as a result of these efforts, which for the most part we are not reimbursed for, will be offset by the prevention or reduction of potential future costs.

In a letter to the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Congressional Banking and Financial Services Committees dated February 2, 2010, the Acting Director of FHFA stated that the focus of the conservatorship is on conserving assets, minimizing corporate losses, ensuring Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae continue to serve their mission, overseeing remediation of identified weaknesses in corporate operations and risk management, and ensuring that sound corporate governance principles are followed. Specifically, the Acting Director of FHFA stated that minimizing our credit losses is our central goal and that we will be limited to continuing our existing core business activities and taking actions necessary to advance the goals of the conservatorship. The Acting Director stated that permitting us to engage in new products is inconsistent with the goals of the conservatorship. This could limit our ability to return to profitability in future periods.

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The conservatorship has also impacted our investment activity. FHFA has stated that we will not be a substantial buyer or seller of mortgages for our mortgage-related investments portfolio, except for purchases of delinquent mortgages out of PC pools. FHFA also stated that, given the size of our current mortgage-related investments portfolio and the potential volume of delinquent mortgages to be purchased out of PC pools, it expects that any net additions to our mortgage-related investments portfolio would be related to that activity.

The Conservator and Treasury also did not authorize us to engage in certain business activities and transactions, including the sale of certain assets, some of which we believe may have had a beneficial impact on our results of operations or financial condition, if executed. Our inability to execute such transactions may adversely affect our profitability, and thus contribute to our need to draw additional funds from Treasury. We believe that the support provided by Treasury pursuant to the Purchase Agreement currently enables us to maintain our access to the debt markets and to have adequate liquidity to conduct our normal business activities, although the costs of our debt funding could vary.

Management is continuing its efforts to identify and evaluate actions that could be taken to reduce the significant uncertainties surrounding our business, as well as the level of future draws under the Purchase Agreement; however, our ability to pursue such actions may be limited by market conditions and other factors. Any actions we take will likely require approval by FHFA and Treasury before they are implemented. In addition, FHFA, Treasury or Congress may have a different perspective than management and may direct us to focus our efforts on supporting the mortgage markets in ways that make it more difficult for us to implement any such actions.

These actions and objectives also create risks and uncertainties that we discuss in RISK FACTORS. For more information on the impact of conservatorship and our current business objectives, see NOTE 3: CONSERVATORSHIP AND RELATED MATTERS and Executive Summary *Our Primary Business Objectives.*

***Limits on Mortgage-Related Investments Portfolio Under the Purchase Agreement and by FHFA***

Under the terms of the Purchase Agreement and FHFA regulation, our mortgage-related investments portfolio is subject to a cap that decreases by 10% each year until the portfolio reaches $250 billion. As a result, the UPB of our mortgage-related investments portfolio could not exceed $810 billion as of December 31, 2010 and may not exceed $729 billion as of December 31, 2011.

Table 4 presents the UPB of our mortgage-related investments portfolio, for purposes of the limit imposed by the Purchase Agreement and FHFA regulation. We disclose our mortgage assets on this basis monthly under the caption Mortgage-Related Investments Portfolio Ending Balance in our Monthly Volume Summary reports, which are available on our website and in current reports on Form 8-K we file with the SEC.

The UPB of our mortgage-related investments portfolio declined from December 31, 2009 to December 31, 2010, primarily due to liquidations, partially offset by the purchase of $127.5 billion of seriously delinquent loans from PC trusts.

**Table 4 Mortgage-Related Investments Portfolio**[1]

| | December 31, 2010 | December 31, 2009 |
|---|---|---|
| | (in millions) | |
| Investments segment Mortgage investments portfolio | $ 481,677 | $ 597,827 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Single-family Guarantee segment | Single-family unsecuritized mortgage loans[2] | 69,766 | 10,743 |
| Multifamily segment | Mortgage investments portfolio | 145,431 | 146,702 |
| Total mortgage-related investments portfolio | | $ 696,874 | $ 755,272 |

(1) Based on UPB and excludes mortgage loans and mortgage-related securities traded, but not yet settled.
(2) Represents unsecuritized non-performing single-family loans for which the Single-family Guarantee segment is actively pursuing a problem loan workout.

***Supervision of our Business During Conservatorship***

We experienced a change in control when we were placed into conservatorship on September 6, 2008. Under conservatorship, we have additional heightened supervision and direction from our regulator, FHFA, which is also acting as our Conservator. As Conservator, FHFA has succeeded to the powers of our Board of Directors and management, as well as the powers of our stockholders. During the conservatorship, the Conservator delegated certain authority to the Board of Directors to oversee, and management to conduct, day-to-day operations so that the company can continue to operate in the ordinary course of business. The Conservator retains the authority to withdraw or revise its delegations of authority at any time. The directors serve on behalf of, and exercise authority as directed by, the Conservator.

Because the Conservator succeeded to the powers, including voting rights, of our stockholders, who therefore do not currently have voting rights of their own, we do not expect to hold stockholders meetings during the conservatorship, nor will we prepare or provide proxy statements for the solicitation of proxies.

***Our Board of Directors and Management During Conservatorship***

While in conservatorship, we can, and have continued to, enter into and enforce contracts with third parties. The Conservator continues to work with the Board of Directors and management to address and determine the strategic direction for the company.

The Conservator instructed the Board of Directors that it should consult with and obtain the approval of the Conservator before taking action in the following areas:

actions involving capital stock, dividends, the Purchase Agreement, increases in risk limits, material changes in accounting policy, and reasonably foreseeable material increases in operational risk;

the creation of any subsidiary or affiliate or any substantial transaction between Freddie Mac and any of its subsidiaries or affiliates, except for transactions undertaken in the ordinary course (*e.g.*, the creation of a REMIC, REIT, or similar vehicle);

matters that relate to conservatorship, such as, but not limited to, the initiation and material actions in connection with significant litigation addressing the actions or authority of the Conservator, repudiation of contracts, qualified financial contracts in dispute due to our conservatorship, and counterparties attempting to nullify or amend contracts due to our conservatorship;

actions involving hiring, compensation and termination benefits of directors and officers at the executive vice president level and above (including, regardless of title, executive positions with the functions of Chief Operating Officer, Chief Financial Officer, General Counsel, Chief Business Officer, Chief Investment Officer, Treasurer, Chief Compliance Officer, Chief Risk Officer and Chief/General/Internal Auditor);

actions involving the retention and termination of external auditors and law firms serving as consultants to the Board of Directors;

settlements in excess of $50 million of litigation, claims, regulatory proceedings or tax-related matters;

any merger with or purchase or acquisition of a business involving consideration in excess of $50 million; and

any action that in the reasonable business judgment of the Board of Directors at the time that the action is taken is likely to cause significant reputational risk.

***Government Support for Our Business During Conservatorship***

We receive substantial support from Treasury and FHFA, as our Conservator and regulator, and are dependent upon their continued support in order to continue operating our business. This support includes our ability to access funds from Treasury under the Purchase Agreement. Since being placed into conservatorship, we also received support from Treasury and the Federal Reserve under their programs to purchase mortgage-related securities and, in the case of the Federal Reserve, debt securities. Treasury s program ended in December 2009 and the Federal Reserve s program ended in March 2010.

***Powers of the Conservator***

Under the GSE Act, the conservatorship provisions applicable to Freddie Mac are based generally on federal banking law. As discussed below, FHFA has broad powers when acting as our conservator. For more information on the GSE

Act, see Regulation and Supervision.

*General Powers of the Conservator*

Upon its appointment, the Conservator immediately succeeded to all rights, titles, powers and privileges of Freddie Mac, and of any stockholder, officer or director of Freddie Mac with respect to Freddie Mac and its assets. The Conservator also succeeded to the title to all books, records and assets of Freddie Mac held by any other legal custodian or third party.

Under the GSE Act, the Conservator may take any actions it determines are necessary and appropriate to carry on our business, support public mission objectives, and preserve and conserve our assets and property. The Conservator s powers include the ability to transfer or sell any of our assets or liabilities (subject to certain limitations and post-transfer notice provisions for transfers of qualified financial contracts, as defined below under Special Powers of the Conservator *Security Interests Protected; Exercise of Rights Under Qualified Financial Contracts* ) without any approval, assignment of rights or consent of any party. The GSE Act, however, provides that mortgage loans and mortgage-related assets that have been transferred to a Freddie Mac securitization trust must be held for the beneficial owners of the trust and cannot be used to satisfy our general creditors.

Under the GSE Act, in connection with any sale or disposition of our assets, the Conservator must conduct its operations to maximize the NPV return from the sale or disposition of such assets, to minimize the amount of any loss realized, and to ensure adequate competition and fair and consistent treatment of offerors. The Conservator is required to maintain a full accounting of the conservatorship and make its reports available upon request to stockholders and members of the public.

We remain liable for all of our obligations relating to our outstanding debt and mortgage-related securities. FHFA has stated that our obligations will be paid in the normal course of business during the conservatorship.

*Special Powers of the Conservator*

*Disaffirmance and Repudiation of Contracts*

Under the GSE Act, the Conservator may disaffirm or repudiate contracts (subject to certain limitations for qualified financial contracts) that we entered into prior to its appointment as Conservator if it determines, in its sole discretion, that performance of the contract is burdensome and that disaffirmance or repudiation of the contract promotes the orderly administration of our affairs. The GSE Act requires FHFA to exercise its right to disaffirm or repudiate most contracts within a reasonable period of time after its appointment as Conservator. The Conservator has advised us that it has no intention of repudiating any guarantee obligation relating to Freddie Mac s mortgage-related securities because it views repudiation as incompatible with the goals of the conservatorship. We can, and have continued to, enter into, perform and enforce contracts with third parties.

*Limitations on Enforcement of Contractual Rights by Counterparties*

The GSE Act provides that the Conservator may enforce most contracts entered into by us, notwithstanding any provision of the contract that provides for termination, default, acceleration, or exercise of rights upon the appointment of, or the exercise of rights or powers by, a conservator.

*Security Interests Protected; Exercise of Rights Under Qualified Financial Contracts*

Notwithstanding the Conservator s powers under the GSE Act described above, the Conservator must recognize legally enforceable or perfected security interests, except where such an interest is taken in contemplation of our insolvency or with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud us or our creditors. In addition, the GSE Act provides that no person will be stayed or prohibited from exercising specified rights in connection with qualified financial contracts, including termination or acceleration (other than solely by reason of, or incidental to, the appointment of the Conservator), rights of offset, and rights under any security agreement or arrangement or other credit enhancement relating to such contract. The term qualified financial contract means any securities contract, commodity contract, forward contract, repurchase agreement, swap agreement, and any similar agreement as determined by FHFA by regulation, resolution or order.

*Avoidance of Fraudulent Transfers*

Under the GSE Act, the Conservator may avoid, or refuse to recognize, a transfer of any property interest of Freddie Mac or of any of our debtors, and also may avoid any obligation incurred by Freddie Mac or by any debtor of Freddie Mac, if the transfer or obligation was made: (a) within five years of September 6, 2008; and (b) with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Freddie Mac, FHFA, the Conservator or, in the case of a transfer in connection with a qualified financial contract, our creditors. To the extent a transfer is avoided, the Conservator may recover, for our benefit, the property or, by court order, the value of that property from the initial or subsequent transferee, other than certain transfers that were made for value, including satisfaction or security of a present or antecedent debt, and in good faith. These rights are superior to any rights of a trustee or any other party, other than a federal agency, under the U.S. bankruptcy code.

*Modification of Statutes of Limitations*

Under the GSE Act, notwithstanding any provision of any contract, the statute of limitations with regard to any action brought by the Conservator is: (a) for claims relating to a contract, the longer of six years or the applicable period under state law; and (b) for tort claims, the longer of three years or the applicable period under state law, in each case, from the later of September 6, 2008 or the date on which the cause of action accrues. In addition, notwithstanding the state law statute of limitation for tort claims, the Conservator may bring an action for any tort claim that arises from fraud, intentional misconduct resulting in unjust enrichment, or intentional misconduct resulting in substantial loss to us, if the state s statute of limitations expired not more than five years before September 6, 2008.

*Suspension of Legal Actions*

Under the GSE Act, in any judicial action or proceeding to which we are or become a party, the Conservator may request, and the applicable court must grant, a stay for a period not to exceed 45 days.

*Treatment of Breach of Contract Claims*

Under the GSE Act, any final and unappealable judgment for monetary damages against the Conservator for breach of an agreement executed or approved in writing by the Conservator will be paid as an administrative expense of the Conservator.

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*Attachment of Assets and Other Injunctive Relief*

Under the GSE Act, the Conservator may seek to attach assets or obtain other injunctive relief without being required to show that any injury, loss or damage is irreparable and immediate.

*Subpoena Power*

The GSE Act provides the Conservator, with the approval of the Director of FHFA, with subpoena power for purposes of carrying out any power, authority or duty with respect to Freddie Mac.

***Treasury Agreements***

The Reform Act granted Treasury temporary authority (through December 31, 2009) to purchase any obligations and other securities issued by Freddie Mac on such terms and conditions and in such amounts as Treasury may determine, upon mutual agreement between Treasury and Freddie Mac. Pursuant to this authority, Treasury entered into several agreements with us, as described below.

*Purchase Agreement and Related Issuance of Senior Preferred Stock and Common Stock Warrant*

*Purchase Agreement*

On September 7, 2008, we, through FHFA, in its capacity as Conservator, and Treasury entered into the Purchase Agreement. The Purchase Agreement was subsequently amended and restated on September 26, 2008, and further amended on May 6, 2009 and December 24, 2009. Pursuant to the Purchase Agreement, on September 8, 2008 we issued to Treasury: (a) one million shares of Variable Liquidation Preference Senior Preferred Stock (with an initial liquidation preference of $1 billion), which we refer to as the senior preferred stock; and (b) a warrant to purchase, for a nominal price, shares of our common stock equal to 79.9% of the total number of shares of our common stock outstanding on a fully diluted basis at the time the warrant is exercised, which we refer to as the warrant. The terms of the senior preferred stock and warrant are summarized in separate sections below. We did not receive any cash proceeds from Treasury as a result of issuing the senior preferred stock or the warrant. However, deficits in our net worth have made it necessary for us to make substantial draws on Treasury s funding commitment under the Purchase Agreement. As a result, the aggregate liquidation preference of the senior preferred stock has increased from $1.0 billion as of September 8, 2008 to $64.2 billion at December 31, 2010 (this figure reflects the receipt of funds requested in the draw to address our net worth deficit as of September 30, 2010). Our dividend obligation on the senior preferred stock, based on that liquidation preference, is $6.42 billion, which exceeds our annual earnings in all but one period.

The senior preferred stock and warrant were issued to Treasury as an initial commitment fee in consideration of the initial commitment from Treasury to provide up to $100 billion (subsequently increased to $200 billion) in funds to us under the terms and conditions set forth in the Purchase Agreement. Under the Purchase Agreement, the $200 billion maximum amount of the commitment from Treasury will increase as necessary to accommodate any cumulative reduction in our net worth during 2010, 2011 and 2012. If we do not have a capital surplus (*i.e.*, positive net worth) at the end of 2012, then the amount of funding available after 2012 will be $149.3 billion ($200 billion funding commitment reduced by cumulative draws for net worth deficits through December 31, 2009). In the event we have a capital surplus at the end of 2012, then the amount of funding available after 2012 will depend on the size of that surplus relative to cumulative draws needed for deficits during 2010 to 2012, as follows:

If the year-end 2012 surplus is lower than the cumulative draws needed for 2010 to 2012, then the amount of available funding is $149.3 billion less the surplus.

If the year-end 2012 surplus exceeds the cumulative draws for 2010 to 2012, then the amount of available funding is $149.3 billion less the amount of those draws.

In addition to the issuance of the senior preferred stock and warrant, we are required under the Purchase Agreement to pay a quarterly commitment fee to Treasury. Under the Purchase Agreement, the fee is to be determined in an amount mutually agreed to by us and Treasury with reference to the market value of Treasury s funding commitment as then in effect, and reset every five years. We may elect to pay the quarterly commitment fee in cash or add the amount of the fee to the liquidation preference of the senior preferred stock. Treasury may waive the quarterly commitment fee for up to one year at a time, in its sole discretion, based on adverse conditions in the U.S. mortgage market. The fee was originally scheduled to commence on March 31, 2010, but was delayed until March 31, 2011 pursuant to an amendment to the Purchase Agreement. Treasury waived the fee for the first quarter of 2011, but has indicated that it remains committed to protecting taxpayers and ensuring that our future positive earnings are returned to taxpayers as compensation for their investment. Treasury stated that it would reevaluate whether the quarterly commitment fee should be set in the second quarter of 2011. Absent Treasury waiving the commitment fee in the second quarter of 2011, this quarterly commitment fee will begin accruing on April 1, 2011 and must be paid each quarter for as long as the Purchase Agreement is in effect. The amount of the fee has not yet been determined and could be substantial.

The Purchase Agreement provides that, on a quarterly basis, we generally may draw funds up to the amount, if any, by which our total liabilities exceed our total assets, as reflected on our GAAP balance sheet for the applicable fiscal quarter (referred to as the deficiency amount), provided that the aggregate amount funded under the Purchase Agreement may not exceed Treasury s commitment. The Purchase Agreement provides that the deficiency amount will be calculated differently if we become subject to receivership or other liquidation process. The deficiency amount may be increased above the otherwise applicable amount upon our mutual written agreement with Treasury. In addition, if the Director of FHFA determines that the Director will be mandated by law to appoint a receiver for us unless our capital is increased by receiving funds under the commitment in an amount up to the deficiency amount (subject to the maximum amount that may be funded under the agreement), then FHFA, in its capacity as our Conservator, may request that Treasury provide funds to us in such amount. The Purchase Agreement also provides that, if we have a deficiency amount as of the date of completion of the liquidation of our assets, we may request funds from Treasury in an amount up to the deficiency amount (subject to the maximum amount that may be funded under the agreement). Any amounts that we draw under the Purchase Agreement will be added to the liquidation preference of the senior preferred stock. No additional shares of senior preferred stock are required to be issued under the Purchase Agreement. As a result, the expiration on December 31, 2009 of Treasury s temporary authority to purchase obligations and other securities issued by Freddie Mac did not affect Treasury s funding commitment under the Purchase Agreement.

Under the Purchase Agreement, our ability to repay the liquidation preference of the senior preferred stock is limited and we may not be able to do so for the foreseeable future, if at all. The amounts payable for dividends on the senior preferred stock are substantial and will have an adverse impact on our financial position and net worth. The payment of dividends on our senior preferred stock in cash reduces our net worth. For periods in which our earnings and other changes in equity do not result in positive net worth, draws under the Purchase Agreement effectively fund the cash payment of senior preferred dividends to Treasury. It is unlikely that, over the long-term, we will generate net income or comprehensive income in excess of our annual dividends payable to Treasury, although we may experience period-to-period variability in earnings and comprehensive income. As a result, we expect to make additional draws in future periods.

The Purchase Agreement provides that the Treasury s funding commitment will terminate under any of the following circumstances: (a) the completion of our liquidation and fulfillment of Treasury s obligations under its funding commitment at that time; (b) the payment in full of, or reasonable provision for, all of our liabilities (whether or not contingent, including mortgage guarantee obligations); and (c) the funding by Treasury of the maximum amount of the commitment under the Purchase Agreement. In addition, Treasury may terminate its funding commitment and declare the Purchase Agreement null and void if a court vacates, modifies, amends, conditions, enjoins, stays or otherwise affects the appointment of the Conservator or otherwise curtails the Conservator s powers. Treasury may not terminate its funding commitment under the Purchase Agreement solely by reason of our being in conservatorship, receivership or other insolvency proceeding, or due to our financial condition or any adverse change in our financial condition.

The Purchase Agreement provides that most provisions of the agreement may be waived or amended by mutual written agreement of the parties; however, no waiver or amendment of the agreement is permitted that would decrease Treasury s aggregate funding commitment or add conditions to Treasury s funding commitment if the waiver or amendment would adversely affect in any material respect the holders of our debt securities or Freddie Mac mortgage guarantee obligations.

In the event of our default on payments with respect to our debt securities or Freddie Mac mortgage guarantee obligations, if Treasury fails to perform its obligations under its funding commitment and if we and/or the Conservator are not diligently pursuing remedies in respect of that failure, the holders of these debt securities or Freddie Mac mortgage guarantee obligations may file a claim in the United States Court of Federal Claims for relief requiring

Treasury to fund to us the lesser of: (a) the amount necessary to cure the payment defaults on our debt and Freddie Mac mortgage guarantee obligations; and (b) the lesser of: (i) the deficiency amount; and (ii) the maximum amount of the commitment less the aggregate amount of funding previously provided under the commitment. Any payment that Treasury makes under those circumstances will be treated for all purposes as a draw under the Purchase Agreement that will increase the liquidation preference of the senior preferred stock.

The Purchase Agreement has an indefinite term and can terminate only in limited circumstances, which do not include the end of the conservatorship. The Purchase Agreement therefore could continue after the conservatorship ends.

*Issuance of Senior Preferred Stock*

Shares of the senior preferred stock have a par value of $1, and have a stated value and initial liquidation preference equal to $1,000 per share. The liquidation preference of the senior preferred stock is subject to adjustment. Dividends that are not paid in cash for any dividend period will accrue and be added to the liquidation preference of the senior preferred stock. In addition, any amounts Treasury pays to us pursuant to its funding commitment under the Purchase Agreement and any quarterly commitment fees that are not paid in cash to Treasury nor waived by Treasury will be added to the liquidation

preference of the senior preferred stock. As described below, we may make payments to reduce the liquidation preference of the senior preferred stock in limited circumstances.

Treasury, as the holder of the senior preferred stock, is entitled to receive, when, as and if declared by our Board of Directors, cumulative quarterly cash dividends at the annual rate of 10% per year on the then-current liquidation preference of the senior preferred stock. Through December 31, 2010, we have paid cash dividends of $10.0 billion at the direction of the Conservator. If at any time we fail to pay cash dividends in a timely manner, then immediately following such failure and for all dividend periods thereafter until the dividend period following the date on which we have paid in cash full cumulative dividends (including any unpaid dividends added to the liquidation preference), the dividend rate will be 12% per year.

The senior preferred stock is senior to our common stock and all other outstanding series of our preferred stock, as well as any capital stock we issue in the future, as to both dividends and rights upon liquidation. The senior preferred stock provides that we may not, at any time, declare or pay dividends on, make distributions with respect to, or redeem, purchase or acquire, or make a liquidation payment with respect to, any common stock or other securities ranking junior to the senior preferred stock unless: (a) full cumulative dividends on the outstanding senior preferred stock (including any unpaid dividends added to the liquidation preference) have been declared and paid in cash; and (b) all amounts required to be paid with the net proceeds of any issuance of capital stock for cash (as described in the following paragraph) have been paid in cash. Shares of the senior preferred stock are not convertible. Shares of the senior preferred stock have no general or special voting rights, other than those set forth in the certificate of designation for the senior preferred stock or otherwise required by law. The consent of holders of at least two-thirds of all outstanding shares of senior preferred stock is generally required to amend the terms of the senior preferred stock or to create any class or series of stock that ranks prior to or on parity with the senior preferred stock.

We are not permitted to redeem the senior preferred stock prior to the termination of Treasury s funding commitment set forth in the Purchase Agreement; however, we are permitted to pay down the liquidation preference of the outstanding shares of senior preferred stock to the extent of: (a) accrued and unpaid dividends previously added to the liquidation preference and not previously paid down; and (b) quarterly commitment fees previously added to the liquidation preference and not previously paid down. In addition, if we issue any shares of capital stock for cash while the senior preferred stock is outstanding, the net proceeds of the issuance must be used to pay down the liquidation preference of the senior preferred stock; however, the liquidation preference of each share of senior preferred stock may not be paid down below $1,000 per share prior to the termination of Treasury s funding commitment. Following the termination of Treasury s funding commitment, we may pay down the liquidation preference of all outstanding shares of senior preferred stock at any time, in whole or in part. If, after termination of Treasury s funding commitment, we pay down the liquidation preference of each outstanding share of senior preferred stock in full, the shares will be deemed to have been redeemed as of the payment date.

*Issuance of Common Stock Warrant*

The warrant gives Treasury the right to purchase shares of our common stock equal to 79.9% of the total number of shares of our common stock outstanding on a fully diluted basis on the date of exercise. The warrant may be exercised in whole or in part at any time on or before September 7, 2028, by delivery to us of: (a) a notice of exercise; (b) payment of the exercise price of $0.00001 per share; and (c) the warrant. If the market price of one share of our common stock is greater than the exercise price, then, instead of paying the exercise price, Treasury may elect to receive shares equal to the value of the warrant (or portion thereof being canceled) pursuant to the formula specified in the warrant. Upon exercise of the warrant, Treasury may assign the right to receive the shares of common stock issuable upon exercise to any other person.

As of February 24, 2011, Treasury has not exercised the warrant.

*Covenants Under Treasury Agreements*

The Purchase Agreement and warrant contain covenants that significantly restrict our business activities. For example, as a result of these covenants, we can no longer obtain additional equity financing (other than pursuant to the Purchase Agreement) and we are limited in the amount and type of debt financing we may obtain.

*Purchase Agreement Covenants*

The Purchase Agreement provides that, until the senior preferred stock is repaid or redeemed in full, we may not, without the prior written consent of Treasury:

- declare or pay any dividend (preferred or otherwise) or make any other distribution with respect to any Freddie Mac equity securities (other than with respect to the senior preferred stock or warrant);

- redeem, purchase, retire or otherwise acquire any Freddie Mac equity securities (other than the senior preferred stock or warrant);

sell or issue any Freddie Mac equity securities (other than the senior preferred stock, the warrant and the common stock issuable upon exercise of the warrant and other than as required by the terms of any binding agreement in effect on the date of the Purchase Agreement);

terminate the conservatorship (other than in connection with a receivership);

sell, transfer, lease or otherwise dispose of any assets, other than dispositions for fair market value: (a) to a limited life regulated entity (in the context of a receivership); (b) of assets and properties in the ordinary course of business, consistent with past practice; (c) in connection with our liquidation by a receiver; (d) of cash or cash equivalents for cash or cash equivalents; or (e) to the extent necessary to comply with the covenant described below relating to the reduction of our mortgage-related investments portfolio;

issue any subordinated debt;

enter into a corporate reorganization, recapitalization, merger, acquisition or similar event; or

engage in transactions with affiliates unless the transaction is: (a) pursuant to the Purchase Agreement, the senior preferred stock or the warrant; (b) upon arm s length terms; or (c) a transaction undertaken in the ordinary course or pursuant to a contractual obligation or customary employment arrangement in existence on the date of the Purchase Agreement.

These covenants also apply to our subsidiaries.

The Purchase Agreement also provides that we may not own mortgage assets with UPB in excess of: (a) $900 billion on December 31, 2009; or (b) on December 31 of each year thereafter, 90% of the aggregate amount of mortgage assets we are permitted to own as of December 31 of the immediately preceding calendar year, provided that we are not required to own less than $250 billion in mortgage assets. Under the Purchase Agreement, we also may not incur indebtedness that would result in the par value of our aggregate indebtedness exceeding 120% of the amount of mortgage assets we are permitted to own on December 31 of the immediately preceding calendar year. The mortgage asset and indebtedness limitations are determined without giving effect to any change in the accounting standards related to transfers of financial assets and consolidation of VIEs or any similar accounting standard. Therefore, these limitations were not affected by our implementation of the changes to the accounting standards for transfers of financial assets and consolidation of VIEs, under which we consolidated our single-family PC trusts and certain of our Other Guarantee Transactions in our financial statements as of January 1, 2010.

In addition, the Purchase Agreement provides that we may not enter into any new compensation arrangements or increase amounts or benefits payable under existing compensation arrangements of any named executive officer or other executive officer (as such terms are defined by SEC rules) without the consent of the Director of FHFA, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury.

As of February 24, 2011, we believe we were in compliance with the covenants under the Purchase Agreement.

*Warrant Covenants*

The warrant we issued to Treasury includes, among others, the following covenants: (a) we may not permit any of our significant subsidiaries to issue capital stock or equity securities, or securities convertible into or exchangeable for such securities, or any stock appreciation rights or other profit participation rights; (b) we may not take any action to avoid the observance or performance of the terms of the warrant and we must take all actions necessary or appropriate to protect Treasury s rights against impairment or dilution; and (c) we must provide Treasury with prior notice of

specified actions relating to our common stock, such as setting a record date for a dividend payment, granting subscription or purchase rights, authorizing a recapitalization, reclassification, merger or similar transaction, commencing a liquidation of the company or any other action that would trigger an adjustment in the exercise price or number or amount of shares subject to the warrant.

As of February 24, 2011, we believe we were in compliance with the covenants under the warrant.

***Effect of Conservatorship and Treasury Agreements on Existing Stockholders***

The conservatorship, the Purchase Agreement and the senior preferred stock and warrant issued to Treasury have materially limited the rights of our common and preferred stockholders (other than Treasury as holder of the senior preferred stock) and had the following adverse effects on our common and preferred stockholders:

the rights and powers of the stockholders are suspended during the conservatorship, and our common stockholders do not have the ability to elect directors or to vote on other matters;

because we are in conservatorship, we are no longer managed with a strategy to maximize stockholder returns. In a letter to the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Congressional Banking and Financial Services Committees dated February 2, 2010, the Acting Director of FHFA stated that the focus of the conservatorship is on conserving assets, minimizing corporate losses, ensuring Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae continue to serve their mission, overseeing

remediation of identified weaknesses in corporate operations and risk management, and ensuring that sound corporate governance principles are followed;

the senior preferred stock ranks senior to the common stock and all other series of preferred stock as to both dividends and distributions upon dissolution, liquidation or winding up of the company;

the Conservator has eliminated dividends on Freddie Mac common and preferred stock (other than dividends on the senior preferred stock) during conservatorship. In addition, the Purchase Agreement prohibits the payment of dividends on common or preferred stock (other than the senior preferred stock) without the prior written consent of Treasury; and

the warrant provides Treasury with the right to purchase shares of our common stock equal to up to 79.9% of the total number of shares of our common stock outstanding on a fully diluted basis on the date of exercise for a nominal price, thereby substantially diluting the ownership in Freddie Mac of our common stockholders at the time of exercise. Until Treasury exercises its rights under the warrant, or its right to exercise the warrant expires on September 7, 2028 without having been exercised, the holders of our common stock continue to have the risk that, as a group, they will own no more than 20.1% of the total voting power of the company. Under our charter, bylaws and applicable law, 20.1% is insufficient to control the outcome of any vote that is presented to the common stockholders. Accordingly, existing common stockholders have no assurance that, as a group, they will be able to control the election of our directors or the outcome of any other vote after the time, if any, that the conservatorship ends.

As described above, the conservatorship and Treasury Agreements also impact our business in ways that indirectly affect our common and preferred stockholders. By their terms, the Purchase Agreement, senior preferred stock and warrant will continue to exist even if we are released from the conservatorship. For a description of the risks to our business relating to the conservatorship and Treasury Agreements, see RISK FACTORS.

**Regulation and Supervision**

In addition to our oversight by FHFA as our Conservator, we are subject to regulation and oversight by FHFA under our charter and the GSE Act, which was modified substantially by the Reform Act. We are also subject to certain regulation by other government agencies.

***Federal Housing Finance Agency***

FHFA is an independent agency of the federal government responsible for oversight of the operations of Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae and the FHLBs. The Director of FHFA is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for a five-year term, removable only for cause. In the discussion below, we refer to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae as the enterprises.

The Federal Housing Finance Oversight Board, or the Oversight Board, is responsible for advising the Director of FHFA with respect to overall strategies and policies. The Oversight Board consists of the Director of FHFA as Chairperson, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chair of the SEC and the Secretary of HUD.

Under the GSE Act, FHFA has safety and soundness authority that is comparable to, and in some respects, broader than that of the federal banking agencies. The GSE Act also provides FHFA with powers that, even if we were not in conservatorship, include the authority to raise capital levels above statutory minimum levels, regulate the size and content of our mortgage-related investments portfolio, and approve new mortgage products.

FHFA is responsible for implementing the various provisions of the GSE Act that were added by the Reform Act. In general, we remain subject to existing regulations, orders and determinations until new ones are issued or made.

*Receivership*

Under the GSE Act, FHFA must place us into receivership if FHFA determines in writing that our assets are less than our obligations for a period of 60 days. FHFA has notified us that the measurement period for any mandatory receivership determination with respect to our assets and obligations would commence no earlier than the SEC public filing deadline for our quarterly or annual financial statements and would continue for 60 calendar days after that date. FHFA has also advised us that, if, during that 60-day period, we receive funds from Treasury in an amount at least equal to the deficiency amount under the Purchase Agreement, the Director of FHFA will not make a mandatory receivership determination.

In addition, we could be put into receivership at the discretion of the Director of FHFA at any time for other reasons, including conditions that FHFA has already asserted existed at the time the then Director of FHFA placed us into conservatorship. These include: (a) a substantial dissipation of assets or earnings due to unsafe or unsound practices; (b) the existence of an unsafe or unsound condition to transact business; (c) an inability to meet our obligations in the ordinary course of business; (d) a weakening of our condition due to unsafe or unsound practices or conditions; (e) critical undercapitalization; (f) the likelihood of losses that will deplete substantially all of our capital; or (g) by consent.

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On July 9, 2010, FHFA published in the Federal Register a proposed rule to codify certain terms of conservatorship and receivership operations for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the FHLBs. FHFA noted that among the key issues addressed in the proposed rule are the status and priority of claims and the relationships among various classes of creditors and equity-holders under conservatorships or receiverships. The Acting Director of FHFA stated that publication of this rule for comment has no impact on the current conservatorship operations and is not a reflection of the condition of Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, or the FHLBs.

*Capital Standards*

FHFA has suspended capital classification of us during conservatorship in light of the Purchase Agreement. The existing statutory and FHFA-directed regulatory capital requirements are not binding during the conservatorship. We continue to provide submissions to FHFA on both minimum and risk-based capital. FHFA continues to publish relevant capital figures (minimum capital requirement, core capital, and GAAP net worth) but does not publish our critical capital, risk-based capital or subordinated debt levels during conservatorship.

On October 9, 2008, FHFA also announced that it will engage in rule-making to revise our minimum capital and risk-based capital requirements. The GSE Act provides that FHFA may increase minimum capital levels from the existing statutory percentages either by regulation or on a temporary basis by order. On February 8, 2010, FHFA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking setting forth procedures and standards for such a temporary increase in minimum capital levels. FHFA may also, by regulation or order, establish capital or reserve requirements with respect to any product or activity of an enterprise, as FHFA considers appropriate. In addition, under the GSE Act, FHFA must, by regulation, establish risk-based capital requirements to ensure the enterprises operate in a safe and sound manner, maintaining sufficient capital and reserves to support the risks that arise in their operations and management. In developing the new risk-based capital requirements, FHFA is not bound by the risk-based capital standards in effect prior to the amendment of the GSE Act by the Reform Act.

Our regulatory minimum capital is a leverage-based measure that is generally calculated based on GAAP and reflects a 2.50% capital requirement for on-balance sheet assets and 0.45% capital requirement for off-balance sheet obligations. Pursuant to regulatory guidance from FHFA, our minimum capital requirement was not automatically affected by our January 1, 2010 adoption of new accounting standards for transfers of financial assets and consolidation of VIEs. Specifically, upon adoption of these new accounting standards, FHFA directed us, for purposes of minimum capital, to continue reporting our PCs held by third parties and other aggregate off-balance sheet obligations using a 0.45% capital requirement. Notwithstanding this guidance, FHFA reserves the authority under the GSE Act to raise the minimum capital requirement for any of our assets or activities.

For additional information, see MD&A LIQUIDITY AND CAPITAL RESOURCES Capital Resources and NOTE 18: REGULATORY CAPITAL. Also, see RISK FACTORS Legal and Regulatory Risks for more information.

*New Products*

The GSE Act requires the enterprises to obtain the approval of FHFA before initially offering any product, subject to certain exceptions. The GSE Act provides for a public comment process on requests for approval of new products. FHFA may temporarily approve a product without soliciting public comment if delay would be contrary to the public interest. FHFA may condition approval of a product on specific terms, conditions and limitations. The GSE Act also requires the enterprises to provide FHFA with written notice of any new activity that we or Fannie Mae consider not to be a product.

On July 2, 2009, FHFA published an interim final rule on prior approval of new products, implementing the new product provisions for us and Fannie Mae in the GSE Act. The rule establishes a process for Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to provide prior notice to the Director of FHFA of a new activity and, if applicable, to obtain prior approval from the Director if the new activity is determined to be a new product. On August 31, 2009, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae filed joint public comments on the interim final rule with FHFA. FHFA has stated that permitting us to engage in new products is inconsistent with the goals of conservatorship and has instructed us not to submit such requests under the interim final rule. This could have an adverse effect on our business and profitability in future periods. We cannot currently predict when or if FHFA will permit us to engage in new products under the interim final rule, nor when the rule will be finalized.

*Affordable Housing Goals*

We are subject to annual affordable housing goals. In light of these housing goals, we may make adjustments to our mortgage loan sourcing and purchase strategies, which could further increase our credit losses. These strategies could include entering into some purchase and securitization transactions with lower expected economic returns than our typical transactions. Prior to 2010, we at times relaxed some of our underwriting criteria to obtain goal-qualifying mortgage loans and made additional investments in higher risk mortgage loan products that we believed were more likely to serve the borrowers targeted by the goals.

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If the Director of FHFA finds that we failed to meet a housing goal and that achievement of the housing goal was feasible, the GSE Act states that the Director may require the submission of a housing plan with respect to the housing goal for approval by the Director. The housing plan must describe the actions we would take to achieve the unmet goal in the future. FHFA has the authority to take actions against us, including issuing a cease and desist order or assessing civil money penalties, if we: (a) fail to submit a required housing plan or fail to make a good faith effort to comply with a plan approved by FHFA; or (b) fail to submit certain data relating to our mortgage purchases, information or reports as required by law. See RISK FACTORS Legal and Regulatory Risks.

*Affordable Housing Goals for 2010 and 2011*

Effective beginning calendar year 2010, the Reform Act requires that FHFA establish, by regulation, four single-family housing goals, one multifamily special affordable housing goal and requirements relating to multifamily housing for very low-income families.

On September 14, 2010, FHFA published in the Federal Register a final rule establishing new affordable housing goals for Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae for 2010 and 2011. The final rule was effective on October 14, 2010. The rule establishes four goals and one subgoal for single-family owner-occupied housing, one multifamily special affordable housing goal, and one multifamily special affordable housing subgoal. Three of the single-family housing goals and the subgoal target purchase money mortgages for: (a) low-income families; (b) very low-income families; and/or (c) families that reside in low-income areas. The single-family housing goals also include one that targets refinancing mortgages for low-income families. The multifamily special affordable housing goal targets multifamily rental housing affordable to low-income families. The multifamily special affordable housing subgoal targets multifamily rental housing affordable to very low-income families. In addition, the rule states that Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae must continue to report on their acquisition of mortgages involving low-income units in small (5- to 50-unit) multifamily properties.

Our housing goals for 2010 and 2011 are set forth in Table 5 below.

**Table 5 Affordable Housing Goals for 2010 and 2011**

| | **Goals for 2010 and 2011** |
|---|---|
| Single-family purchase money goals (benchmark levels): | |
| Low-income | 27% |
| Very low-income | 8% |
| Low-income areas[1] | 24% |
| Low-income areas subgoal | 13% |
| Single-family refinance low-income goal (benchmark level) | 21% |
| Multifamily low-income goal | 161,250 units |
| Multifamily very low-income subgoal | 21,000 units |

(1) FHFA will annually set the benchmark level for the low-income areas goal based on the benchmark level for the low-income areas subgoal, plus an adjustment factor reflecting the additional incremental share of mortgages for moderate-income families in designated disaster areas in the most recent year for which such data is available. For 2010, FHFA set the benchmark level for the low-income areas goal at 24%.

The single-family goals are expressed as a percentage of the total number of eligible mortgages underlying our total single-family mortgage purchases. The multifamily goals are expressed in terms of minimum numbers of units financed.

With respect to the single-family goals, the rule includes: (a) an assessment of performance as compared to the actual share of the market that meets the criteria for each goal; and (b) a benchmark level to measure performance. Where our performance on a single-family goal falls short of the benchmark for a goal, we still could achieve the goal if our performance meets or exceeds the actual share of the market that meets the criteria for the goal for that year. For example, if the actual market share of mortgages to low-income families relative to all mortgages originated to finance owner-occupied single-family properties is lower than the 27% benchmark rate, we would still satisfy this goal if we achieve that actual market percentage.

The rule makes a number of changes to the previous counting methods for goals credit, including prohibiting housing goals credit for purchases of private-label securities. However, the rule allows credit under the low-income refinance goal for permanent MHA Program loan modifications. The rule also states that FHFA does not intend for the enterprises to undertake economically adverse or high-risk activities in support of the goals, nor does it intend for the enterprises state of conservatorship to be a justification for withdrawing support from these important market segments.

In addition, as noted in the rule, FHFA expects to take future regulatory action to address the housing goals treatment of purchases of multifamily loans that aid the conversion of properties that have affordable rents to properties that have less affordable, market rate rents. FHFA also may solicit further comments on how the housing goals can further promote sustainable homeownership and how multifamily subordinate liens can be structured to benefit low-income residents.

We expect to report our performance with respect to the 2010 affordable housing goals in March 2011. At this time, based on preliminary information, we believe we did not achieve certain of the goals for 2010. We and FHFA are in discussions concerning whether achievement of such goals was infeasible under the terms of the GSE Act, due to market and

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economic conditions and our financial condition. For more information, see EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION Compensation Discussion and Analysis *Executive Management Compensation Program Determination of the Performance-Based Portion of 2010 Deferred Base Salary.*

We anticipate that the difficult market conditions and our financial condition will continue to affect our affordable housing activities in 2011. See also RISK FACTORS Legal and Regulatory Risks. However, we view the purchase of mortgage loans that are eligible to count toward our affordable housing goals to be a principal part of our mission and business and we are committed to facilitating the financing of affordable housing for low- and moderate-income families.

*Duty to Serve Underserved Markets*

The GSE Act establishes a duty for Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to serve three underserved markets (manufactured housing, affordable housing preservation and rural areas) by developing loan products and flexible underwriting guidelines to facilitate a secondary market for mortgages for very low-, low- and moderate-income families in those markets. Effective for 2010, FHFA is required to establish a manner for annually: (a) evaluating whether and to what extent Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have complied with the duty to serve underserved markets; and (b) rating the extent of compliance.

On June 7, 2010, FHFA published in the Federal Register a proposed rule regarding the duty of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to serve the underserved markets. Comments were due on July 22, 2010. We provided comments on the proposed rule to FHFA, but we cannot predict the contents of any final rule that FHFA may release, or the impact that the final rule will have on our business or operations.

*Affordable Housing Goals and Reported Results for 2009 and 2008*

Prior to 2010, we were subject to affordable housing goals related to mortgages for low- and moderate-income families, low-income families living in low-income areas, very low-income families and families living in defined underserved areas. These goals were set as a percentage of the total number of dwelling units underlying our total mortgage purchases. The goal relating to low-income families living in low-income areas and very low-income families was referred to as the special affordable housing goal. This special affordable housing goal also included a multifamily annual minimum dollar volume target of qualifying multifamily mortgage purchases. In addition, from 2005 to 2009, we were subject to three subgoals that were expressed as percentages of the total number of mortgages we purchased that financed the purchase of single-family, owner-occupied properties located in metropolitan areas.

Our housing goals and results for 2009 and 2008 are set forth in Table 6 below.

**Table 6 Affordable Housing Goals and Reported Results for 2009 and 2008[1]**

| | Year Ended December 31, | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2009 | | 2008 | |
| | Goal | Results | Goal | Results |
| Housing goals and actual results: | | | | |
| Low- and moderate-income goal[2] | 43% | 44.7% | 56% | 51.5% |
| Underserved areas goal[3][4] | 32 | 26.8 | 39 | 37.7 |
| Special affordable goal[2][5] | 18 | 17.8 | 27 | 23.1 |
| Multifamily special affordable volume target (in billions)[4] | $ 4.60 | $ 3.69 | $ 3.92 | $ 7.49 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Home purchase subgoals and actual results: | | | | |
| Low- and moderate-income subgoal(2) | 40% | 48.4% | 47% | 39.3% |
| Underserved areas subgoal(2)(5) | 30 | 27.9 | 34 | 30.3 |
| Special affordable subgoal(2) | 14 | 20.6 | 18 | 15.1 |

(1) An individual mortgage may qualify for more than one of the goals or subgoals. Each of the goal and subgoal percentages and each of our percentage results is determined independently and cannot be aggregated to determine a percentage of total purchases that qualifies for these goals or subgoals.
(2) These 2008 goals and subgoals were determined to be infeasible.
(3) FHFA concluded that achievement by us of this 2008 goal was feasible, but challenging. Accordingly, FHFA decided not to require us to submit a housing plan.
(4) These 2009 goals were determined to be infeasible.
(5) FHFA concluded that achievement by us of these 2009 goals and subgoals was feasible, but decided not to require us to submit a housing plan.

*Affordable Housing Allocations*

The GSE Act requires us to set aside in each fiscal year an amount equal to 4.2 basis points for each dollar of the UPB of total new business purchases, and allocate or transfer such amount to: (a) HUD to fund a Housing Trust Fund established and managed by HUD; and (b) a Capital Magnet Fund established and managed by Treasury. FHFA has the authority to suspend our allocation upon finding that the payment would contribute to our financial instability, cause us to be classified as undercapitalized or prevent us from successfully completing a capital restoration plan. In November 2008, FHFA advised us that it has suspended the requirement to set aside or allocate funds for the Housing Trust Fund and the Capital Magnet Fund until further notice.

*Prudential Management and Operations Standards*

The GSE Act requires FHFA to establish prudential standards, by regulation or by guideline, for a broad range of operations of the enterprises. These standards must address internal controls, information systems, independence and adequacy of internal audit systems, management of interest rate risk exposure, management of market risk, liquidity and reserves, management of asset and investment portfolio growth, overall risk management processes, investments and asset acquisitions, management of credit and counterparty risk, and recordkeeping. FHFA may also establish any additional operational and management standards the Director of FHFA determines appropriate.

*Portfolio Activities*

The GSE Act requires FHFA to establish, by regulation, criteria governing portfolio holdings to ensure the holdings are backed by sufficient capital and consistent with the enterprises mission and safe and sound operations. In establishing these criteria, FHFA must consider the ability of the enterprises to provide a liquid secondary market through securitization activities, the portfolio holdings in relation to the mortgage market and the enterprises compliance with the prudential management and operations standards prescribed by FHFA.

On December 28, 2010, FHFA issued a final rule adopting the portfolio holdings criteria established in the Purchase Agreement, as it may be amended from time to time, for so long as we remain subject to the Purchase Agreement.

See NOTE 3: CONSERVATORSHIP AND RELATED MATTERS Impact of the Purchase Agreement and FHFA Regulation on the Mortgage-Related Investments Portfolio for additional information on restrictions to our portfolio activities.

*Anti-Predatory Lending*

Predatory lending practices are in direct opposition to our mission, our goals and our practices. We have instituted anti- predatory lending policies intended to prevent the purchase or assignment of mortgage loans with unacceptable terms or conditions or resulting from unacceptable practices. These policies include processes related to the delivery, validation and certification of loans sold to us. In addition to the purchase policies we have instituted, we promote consumer education and financial literacy efforts to help borrowers avoid abusive lending practices and we provide competitive mortgage products to reputable mortgage originators so that borrowers have a greater choice of financing options.

*Subordinated Debt*

FHFA directed us to continue to make interest and principal payments on our subordinated debt, even if we fail to maintain required capital levels. As a result, the terms of any of our subordinated debt that provide for us to defer payments of interest under certain circumstances, including our failure to maintain specified capital levels, are no longer applicable. In addition, the requirements in the agreement we entered into with FHFA in September 2005 with respect to issuance, maintenance, and reporting and disclosure of Freddie Mac subordinated debt have been suspended during the term of conservatorship and thereafter until directed otherwise. See NOTE 18: REGULATORY CAPITAL Subordinated Debt Commitment for more information regarding subordinated debt.

***Department of Housing and Urban Development***

HUD has regulatory authority over Freddie Mac with respect to fair lending. Our mortgage purchase activities are subject to federal anti-discrimination laws. In addition, the GSE Act prohibits discriminatory practices in our mortgage purchase activities, requires us to submit data to HUD to assist in its fair lending investigations of primary

market lenders with which we do business and requires us to undertake remedial actions against such lenders found to have engaged in discriminatory lending practices. In addition, HUD periodically reviews and comments on our underwriting and appraisal guidelines for consistency with the Fair Housing Act and the anti-discrimination provisions of the GSE Act.

***Department of the Treasury***

Treasury has significant rights and powers with respect to our company as a result of the Purchase Agreement. In addition, under our charter, the Secretary of the Treasury has approval authority over our issuances of notes, debentures and substantially identical types of unsecured debt obligations (including the interest rates and maturities of these securities), as well as new types of mortgage-related securities issued subsequent to the enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989. The Secretary of the Treasury has performed this debt securities approval function by coordinating GSE debt offerings with Treasury funding activities. In addition, our charter authorizes Treasury to purchase Freddie Mac debt obligations not exceeding $2.25 billion in aggregate principal amount at any time.

The Reform Act granted the Secretary of the Treasury authority to purchase any obligations and securities issued by us and Fannie Mae until December 31, 2009 on such terms and conditions and in such amounts as the Secretary may determine, provided that the Secretary determined the purchases were necessary to provide stability to the financial markets, prevent

disruptions in the availability of mortgage finance, and protect taxpayers. See Conservatorship and Related Matters *Treasury Agreements.*

***Securities and Exchange Commission***

We are subject to the financial reporting requirements applicable to registrants under the Exchange Act, including the requirement to file with the SEC annual reports on Form 10-K, quarterly reports on Form 10-Q and current reports on Form 8-K. Although our common stock is required to be registered under the Exchange Act, we continue to be exempt from certain federal securities law requirements, including the following:

- Securities we issue or guarantee are exempted securities under the Securities Act and may be sold without registration under the Securities Act;
- We are excluded from the definitions of government securities broker and government securities dealer under the Exchange Act;
- The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 does not apply to securities issued by us; and
- We are exempt from the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as we are an agency, authority or instrumentality of the U.S. for purposes of such Acts.

***Legislative and Regulatory Developments***

*Dodd-Frank Act*

The Dodd-Frank Act, which was signed into law on July 21, 2010, significantly changed the regulation of the financial services industry, including by creating new standards related to regulatory oversight of systemically important financial companies, derivatives, capital requirements, asset-backed securitization, mortgage underwriting, and consumer financial protection. The Dodd-Frank Act will directly affect the business and operations of Freddie Mac by subjecting us to new and additional regulatory oversight and standards, including with respect to our activities and products. We may also be affected by provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and implementing regulations that affect the activities of banks, savings institutions, insurance companies, securities dealers, and other regulated entities that are our customers and counterparties.

At this time, it is difficult to assess fully the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on Freddie Mac and the financial services industry. Implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act is being accomplished through numerous rulemakings, many of which are still in process. The final effects of the legislation will not be known with certainty until these rulemakings are complete. The Dodd-Frank Act also mandates the preparation of studies on a wide range of issues, which could lead to additional legislation or regulatory changes.

Recently initiated rulemakings that may have an impact on Freddie Mac include the following:

- The Financial Stability Oversight Council has published a notice of proposed rulemaking inviting public comment on the criteria that will inform the Council s designation of nonbank financial companies as subject to enhanced supervision and prudential standards pursuant to the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, as well as the Council s processes and procedures for such designation. If Freddie Mac is so designated, it would be subject to Federal Reserve supervision and to prudential standards that may include risk-based capital and leverage requirements, liquidity requirements, resolution plan and credit exposure reporting requirements, concentration limits, contingent capital requirements, enhanced public disclosures, short-term debt limits, and overall risk

management requirements, as well as other requirements and restrictions.

The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, or CFTC, and the SEC recently published a proposed rule regarding certain definitions in the Dodd-Frank Act, including the definitions of swap dealer and major swap participant. If Freddie Mac is deemed to be a major swap participant, FHFA, in consultation with the CFTC and the SEC, will be required to establish new rules with respect to our activities as a major swap participant regarding capital requirements, and margin requirements for certain derivatives transactions. In addition, Freddie Mac would be required to register with the CFTC and to comply with certain business conduct standards and reporting requirements. Even if we are not deemed a major swap participant, we could become subject to new rules related to clearing, trading, and reporting requirements for derivatives transactions.

We continue to review and assess the impact of these proposals. For more information, see RISK FACTORS Legal and Regulatory Risks *The Dodd-Frank Act and related regulation may adversely affect our business activities and financial results*.

*SEC Regulation on Disclosure for Asset-Backed Securities*

On January 20, 2011, the SEC adopted a rule requiring issuers of asset-backed securities to disclose specified information concerning fulfilled and unfulfilled repurchase requests relating to the assets backing such securities, including certain historical information. This disclosure will first be required to be reported by February 14, 2012 (containing

information covering the three year period ended December 31, 2011), with subsequent filings due each quarter thereafter. While we are assessing the rule s impact on us, we currently believe compliance with the disclosure requirements will likely present significant operational challenges for us.

*Conforming Loan Limits*

On September 30, 2010, Congress temporarily extended the current higher loan limits in certain high-cost areas through September 30, 2011. The higher loan limits in certain high-cost areas were set to expire on December 31, 2010. Actual conforming loan limits are established by FHFA for each county (or equivalent) and the loan limits for specific high-cost areas may be lower than the maximum amounts. For a further discussion of conforming loan limits, see Our Business.

*Energy Loan Tax Assessment Programs*

A number of states have enacted laws allowing localities to create energy loan assessment programs for the purpose of financing energy efficient home improvements. These programs are typically denominated as Property Assessed Clean Energy, or PACE, programs. While the specific terms may vary, these laws generally treat the new energy assessments like property tax assessments, which generally create a new lien to secure the assessment that is senior to any existing first mortgage lien. These laws could have a negative impact on Freddie Mac s credit losses, to the extent a large number of borrowers obtain this type of financing.

On July 6, 2010, FHFA announced that it had determined that certain of these programs present significant safety and soundness concerns that must be addressed by the GSEs. FHFA directed Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to waive the uniform mortgage document prohibitions against senior liens for any homeowner who obtained a PACE or PACE-like loan with a first priority lien before July 6, 2010 and, in addressing PACE programs with first liens, to undertake actions that protect their safe and sound operation.

On August 31, 2010, we released a new directive to our seller/servicers in which we reinforced our long-standing requirement that mortgages sold to us must be and remain in the first-lien position, while also providing guidance on our requirements for refinancing loans that were originated with PACE obligations before July 6, 2010.

We are subject to lawsuits relating to PACE programs. See NOTE 21: LEGAL CONTINGENCIES for additional information. Legislation has been introduced in the Senate and the House of Representatives that would require Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to adopt standards that support PACE programs.

For more information regarding legislative and regulatory developments that could impact our business, see RISK FACTORS Legal and Regulatory Risks.

**Employees**

At February 11, 2011, we had 5,231 full-time and 78 part-time employees. Our principal offices are located in McLean, Virginia.

**Available Information**

***SEC Reports***

We file reports and other information with the SEC. In view of the Conservator s succession to all of the voting power of our stockholders, we do not expect to prepare or provide proxy statements for the solicitation of proxies from

stockholders during the conservatorship. We make available free of charge through our website at www.freddiemac.com our annual reports on Form 10-K, quarterly reports on Form 10-Q, current reports on Form 8-K, and all other SEC reports and amendments to those reports as soon as reasonably practicable after we electronically file the material with, or furnish it to, the SEC. In addition, materials that we filed with the SEC are available for review and copying free of charge at the SEC s Public Reference Room at 100 F Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20549. The public may obtain information on the operation of the Public Reference Room by calling the SEC at 1-800-SEC-0330. The SEC also maintains an internet site (www.sec.gov) that contains reports, proxy and information statements, and other information regarding companies that file electronically with the SEC.

We are providing our website addresses and the website address of the SEC here or elsewhere in this annual report on Form 10-K solely for your information. Information appearing on our website or on the SEC s website is not incorporated into this annual report on Form 10-K.

***Information about Certain Securities Issuances by Freddie Mac***

Pursuant to SEC regulations, public companies are required to disclose certain information when they incur a material direct financial obligation or become directly or contingently liable for a material obligation under an off-balance sheet arrangement. The disclosure must be made in a current report on Form 8-K under Item 2.03 or, if the obligation is incurred in connection with certain types of securities offerings, in prospectuses for that offering that are filed with the SEC.

Freddie Mac s securities offerings are exempted from SEC registration requirements. As a result, we are not required to and do not file registration statements or prospectuses with the SEC with respect to our securities offerings. To comply with the disclosure requirements of Form 8-K relating to the incurrence of material financial obligations, we report our incurrence of these types of obligations either in offering circulars (or supplements thereto) that we post on our website or in a current report on Form 8-K, in accordance with a no-action letter we received from the SEC staff. In cases where the information is disclosed in an offering circular posted on our website, the document will be posted on our website within the same time period that a prospectus for a non-exempt securities offering would be required to be filed with the SEC.

The website address for disclosure about our debt securities is www.freddiemac.com/debt. From this address, investors can access the offering circular and related supplements for debt securities offerings under Freddie Mac s global debt facility, including pricing supplements for individual issuances of debt securities.

Disclosure about our off-balance sheet obligations pursuant to some of the mortgage-related securities we issue can be found at www.freddiemac.com/mbs. From this address, investors can access information and documents about our mortgage-related securities, including offering circulars and related offering circular supplements.

**Forward-Looking Statements**

We regularly communicate information concerning our business activities to investors, the news media, securities analysts and others as part of our normal operations. Some of these communications, including this Form 10-K, contain forward-looking statements, including statements pertaining to the conservatorship, our current expectations and objectives for our efforts under the MHA Program and other programs to assist the U.S. residential mortgage market, future business plans, liquidity, capital management, economic and market conditions and trends, market share, the effect of legislative and regulatory developments, implementation of new accounting standards, credit losses, internal control remediation efforts, and results of operations and financial condition on a GAAP, Segment Earnings, and fair value basis. Forward-looking statements are often accompanied by, and identified with, terms such as objective, expect, trend, forecast, anticipate, believe, intend, could, future, and similar phrases. Th not historical facts, but rather represent our expectations based on current information, plans, judgments, assumptions, estimates, and projections. Forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties, some of which are beyond our control. Actual results may differ significantly from those described in or implied by such forward-looking statements due to various factors and uncertainties, including those described in the RISK FACTORS section of this Form 10-K and:

the actions FHFA, Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the Obama Administration, Congress, and our management may take;

the impact of the restrictions and other terms of the conservatorship, the Purchase Agreement, the senior preferred stock, and the warrant on our business, including our ability to pay the dividend on the senior preferred stock;

our ability to maintain adequate liquidity to fund our operations, including following changes in any support provided to us by Treasury or FHFA;

changes in our charter or applicable legislative or regulatory requirements, including any restructuring or reorganization in the form of our company, including whether we will remain a stockholder-owned company or continue to exist and whether we will be wound down or placed under receivership, regulations under the GSE Act, the Reform Act, or the Dodd-Frank Act, changes to affordable housing goals regulation, reinstatement of regulatory capital requirements, or the exercise or assertion of additional regulatory or administrative authority;

changes in the regulation of the mortgage and financial services industries, including changes caused by the Dodd-Frank Act, or any other legislative, regulatory, or judicial action at the federal or state level;

the extent to which borrowers participate in the MHA Program and other initiatives designed to help in the housing recovery and the impact of such programs on our credit losses, expenses, and the size and composition of our mortgage-related investments portfolio;

the impact of any deficiencies in foreclosure documentation practices and related delays in the foreclosure process;

the ability of our financial, accounting, data processing, and other operating systems or infrastructure, and those of our vendors to process the complexity and volume of our transactions;

changes in accounting or tax standards or in our accounting policies or estimates, and our ability to effectively implement any such changes in standards, policies, or estimates;

changes in general regional, national, or international economic, business, or market conditions and competitive pressures, including changes in employment rates and interest rates, and changes in the federal government s fiscal and monetary policy;

changes in the U.S. residential mortgage market, including changes in the rate of growth in total outstanding U.S. residential mortgage debt, the size of the U.S. residential mortgage market, and home prices;

our ability to effectively implement our business strategies, including our efforts to improve the supply and liquidity of, and demand for, our products;

our ability to recruit and retain executive officers and other key employees;

our ability to effectively identify and manage credit, interest-rate, operational, and other risks in our business, including changes to the credit environment and the levels and volatilities of interest rates, as well as the shape and slope of the yield curves;

the effects of internal control deficiencies and our ability to effectively identify, assess, evaluate, manage, mitigate, or remediate control deficiencies and risks, including material weaknesses and significant deficiencies, in our internal control over financial reporting and disclosure controls and procedures;

incomplete or inaccurate information provided by customers and counterparties;

consolidation among, or adverse changes in the financial condition of, our customers and counterparties;

the failure of our customers and counterparties to fulfill their obligations to us, including the failure of seller/servicers to meet their obligations to repurchase loans sold to us in breach of their representations and warranties;

changes in our judgments, assumptions, forecasts, or estimates regarding the volume of our business and spreads we expect to earn;

the availability of options, interest-rate and currency swaps, and other derivative financial instruments of the types and quantities, on acceptable terms, and with acceptable counterparties needed for investment funding and risk management purposes;

changes in pricing, valuation or other methodologies, models, assumptions, judgments, estimates and/or other measurement techniques, or their respective reliability;

changes in mortgage-to-debt OAS;

the potential impact on the market for our securities resulting from any future sales by the Federal Reserve or Treasury of Freddie Mac debt and mortgage-related securities they have purchased;

adverse judgments or settlements in connection with legal proceedings, governmental investigations, and IRS examinations;

volatility of reported results due to changes in the fair value of certain instruments or assets;

the development of different types of mortgage servicing structures and servicing compensation;

preferences of originators in selling into the secondary mortgage market;

changes to our underwriting requirements or investment standards for mortgage-related products;

investor preferences for mortgage loans and mortgage-related and debt securities compared to other investments;

borrower preferences for fixed-rate mortgages or adjustable-rate mortgages;

the occurrence of a major natural or other disaster in geographic areas in which our offices or portions of our total mortgage portfolio are concentrated;

other factors and assumptions described in this Form 10-K, including in the MD&A section;

our assumptions and estimates regarding the foregoing and our ability to anticipate the foregoing factors and their impacts; and

market reactions to the foregoing.

We undertake no obligation to update any forward-looking statements we make to reflect events or circumstances occurring after the date of this Form 10-K.

## ITEM 1A. RISK FACTORS

Before you invest in our securities, you should know that making such an investment involves risks, including the risks described below and in BUSINESS, MD&A, and elsewhere in this Form 10-K. These risks and uncertainties could, directly or indirectly, adversely affect our business, financial condition, results of operations, cash flows, strategies and/or prospects.

### Conservatorship and Related Matters

***The future status and role of Freddie Mac could be materially adversely affected by legislative and regulatory action that alters the ownership, structure and mission of the company.***

Future legislation will likely materially affect the role of the company, our business model, our structure and future results of operations. Some or all of our functions could be transferred to other institutions, and we could cease to exist as a stockholder-owned company or at all. If any of these events were to occur, our shares could further diminish in value, or

cease to have any value, and there can be no assurance that our stockholders would receive any compensation for such loss in value.

On February 11, 2011, the Obama Administration delivered a report to Congress that lays out the Administration s plan to reform the U.S. housing finance market, including options for structuring the government s long-term role in a housing finance system in which the private sector is the dominant provider of mortgage credit. The report recommends winding down Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, stating that the Obama Administration will work with FHFA to determine the best way to responsibly reduce the role of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae in the market and ultimately wind down both institutions. The report identifies a number of policy levers that could be used to wind down Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, shrink the government s footprint in housing finance, and help bring private capital back to the mortgage market, including increasing guarantee fees, phasing in a 10% down payment requirement, reducing conforming loan limits, and winding down Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae s investment portfolios, consistent with the senior preferred stock purchase agreements. For more information, see BUSINESS Executive Summary *Long-Term Financial Sustainability and Future Status.*

In addition to legislative actions, FHFA has expansive regulatory authority over us, and the manner in which FHFA will use its authority in the future is unclear. FHFA could take a number of regulatory actions that could materially adversely affect our company, such as changing or reinstating our current capital requirements, which are not binding during conservatorship.

***The conservatorship is indefinite in duration and the timing, conditions and likelihood of our emerging from conservatorship are uncertain. Even if the conservatorship is terminated, we would remain subject to the Purchase Agreement, senior preferred stock and warrant.***

FHFA has stated that there is no exact time frame as to when the conservatorship may end. Termination of the conservatorship (other than in connection with receivership) also requires Treasury s consent under the Purchase Agreement. There can be no assurance as to when, and under what circumstances, Treasury would give such consent. There is also significant uncertainty as to what changes may occur to our business structure during or following our conservatorship, including whether we will continue to exist. It is possible that the conservatorship will end with us being placed into receivership.

As discussed above, on February 11, 2011, the Obama Administration delivered a report to Congress that lays out the Administration s plan to reform the U.S. housing finance market. The report recommends winding down Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. For more information, see BUSINESS Executive Summary *Long-Term Financial Sustainability and Future Status.*

In addition, Treasury has the ability to acquire almost 80% of our common stock for nominal consideration by exercising the warrant we issued to it pursuant to the Purchase Agreement. Consequently, the company could effectively remain under the control of the U.S. government even if the conservatorship was ended and the voting rights of common stockholders restored. The warrant held by Treasury, the restrictions on our business contained in the Purchase Agreement and the senior status of the senior preferred stock issued to Treasury under the Purchase Agreement, if the senior preferred stock has not been redeemed, also could adversely affect our ability to attract new private sector capital in the future should the company be in a position to seek such capital. Moreover, our draws under Treasury s funding commitment, the senior preferred dividend obligation, and commitment fees paid to Treasury could permanently impair our ability to build independent sources of capital.

***We expect to make additional draws under the Purchase Agreement in future periods, which will adversely affect our future results of operations and financial condition.***

It is unlikely that we will generate net income or comprehensive income in excess of our annual dividends payable to Treasury over the long-term, which will lead us to require additional draws under the Purchase Agreement. A variety of factors could lead us to make additional draws under the Purchase Agreement in the future, including:

- dividend obligations on the senior preferred stock, which are cumulative and accrue at an annual rate of 10% (or 12% in any quarter in which dividends are not paid in cash) until all accrued dividends are paid in cash and which at their current level exceed our annual historical earnings in all but one period;
- future losses, driven by ongoing weak economic conditions, which could cause, among other things, continued high provision for credit losses, increased REO operations expense and additional unrealized losses on the non-agency mortgage-related securities we hold;
- required reductions in the size of our mortgage-related investments portfolio and other limitations on our investment activities that reduce the earnings capacity of our investment activities;

pursuit of public mission-oriented objectives that could produce suboptimal financial returns, such as our efforts under the MHA Program, the continued use or expansion of foreclosure suspensions, and other foreclosure prevention efforts, including any future requirements to reduce the principal amount of loans;

adverse changes in interest rates, the yield curve, implied volatility or mortgage-to-debt OAS, which could reduce net interest income and increase realized and unrealized mark-to-fair-value losses recorded in earnings or AOCI;

limitations in our access to the public debt markets, or increases in our debt funding costs;

establishment of a valuation allowance for our remaining deferred tax asset;

limitations on our ability to develop new products;

changes in business practices and requirements resulting from legislative or regulatory developments;

changes in accounting practices or standards; and

the quarterly commitment fee we must pay to Treasury under the Purchase Agreement (Treasury has waived the fee for the first quarter of 2011). The amount of the fee has not yet been established and could be substantial. Treasury has indicated that it remains committed to protecting taxpayers and ensuring that our future positive earnings are returned to taxpayers as compensation for their investment.

Under the Purchase Agreement, the $200 billion cap on Treasury s funding commitment will increase as necessary to accommodate any cumulative reduction in our net worth during 2010, 2011 and 2012. Although additional draws under the Purchase Agreement will allow us to remain solvent and avoid mandatory receivership, they will also increase the liquidation preference of, and the dividends we owe on, the senior preferred stock. Based on the aggregate liquidation preference of the senior preferred stock of $64.2 billion as of December 31, 2010, Treasury is entitled to annual cash dividends of $6.42 billion, which exceeds our annual historical earnings in all but one period. Increases in the already substantial liquidation preference and senior preferred dividend obligation, along with limited flexibility to redeem the senior preferred stock, will adversely affect our results of operations and financial condition and add to the significant uncertainty regarding our long-term financial sustainability.

***Our business objectives and strategies have in some cases been significantly altered since we were placed into conservatorship, and may continue to change, in ways that negatively affect our future financial condition and results of operations.***

FHFA, as Conservator, has directed the company to focus on managing to a positive stockholders equity. At the direction of the Conservator, we have made changes to certain business practices that are designed to provide support for the mortgage market in a manner that serves our public mission and other non-financial objectives but may not contribute to our goal of managing to a positive stockholders equity. Some of these changes have increased our expenses or caused us to forego revenue opportunities. For example, FHFA has directed that we implement various initiatives under the MHA Program. We expect to incur significant costs associated with the implementation of these initiatives and we cannot currently estimate whether, or the extent to which, costs incurred in the near term from these initiatives may be offset, if at all, by the prevention or reduction of potential future costs of serious delinquencies and foreclosures due to these initiatives. The Conservator and Treasury have also not authorized us to engage in certain business initiatives and transactions, including the purchase or sale of certain assets, which we believe may have had a beneficial impact on our results of operations or financial condition, if executed. Our inability to execute such initiatives and transactions may adversely affect our profitability. Other agencies of the U.S. government, as well as

Congress, also have an interest in the conduct of our business. We do not know what actions they may request us to take.

In view of the conservatorship and the reasons stated by FHFA for its establishment, it is likely that our business model and strategic objectives will continue to change, possibly significantly, including in pursuit of our public mission and other non-financial objectives. Among other things, we could experience significant changes in the size, growth and characteristics of our guarantee and investment activities, and we could further change our operational objectives, including our pricing strategy in our core mortgage guarantee business. Accordingly, our strategic and operational focus may not always be consistent with the generation of net income. It is possible that we will make material changes to our capital strategy and to our accounting policies, methods, and estimates. It is also possible that the company could be restructured and its statutory mission revised. In addition, we may be directed to engage in initiatives that are operationally difficult or costly to implement.

In a letter to the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Congressional Banking and Financial Services Committees dated February 2, 2010, the Acting Director of FHFA stated that minimizing our credit losses is our central goal and that we will be limited to continuing our existing core business activities and taking actions necessary to advance the goals of the conservatorship. The Acting Director stated that FHFA does not expect we will be a substantial buyer or seller of mortgages for our mortgage-related investments portfolio, except for purchases of delinquent mortgages out of PC pools. The Acting

Director also stated that permitting us to engage in new products is inconsistent with the goals of the conservatorship. These restrictions could also adversely affect our financial results in future periods.

As our Conservator, FHFA possesses all of the powers of our stockholders, officers and directors. During the conservatorship, the Conservator has delegated certain authority to the Board of Directors to oversee, and management to conduct, day-to-day operations so that the company can continue to operate in the ordinary course of business. FHFA has the ability to withdraw or revise its delegations of authority and override actions of our Board of Directors at any time. The directors serve on behalf of, and exercise authority as directed by, the Conservator. In addition, FHFA has the power to take actions without our knowledge that could be material to investors and could significantly affect our financial performance.

FHFA is also Conservator of Fannie Mae, our primary competitor, and FHFA s actions as Conservator of both companies could affect competition between us and Fannie Mae. On a number of occasions, FHFA has directed us and Fannie Mae to confer and consider uniform approaches to particular issues and problems, and FHFA has in a few cases directed the two GSEs to adopt common approaches. For example, in January 2011, FHFA announced that it has directed Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to work on a joint initiative, in coordination with HUD, to consider alternatives for future mortgage servicing structures and servicing compensation, including the possibility of reducing or eliminating the minimum servicing fee for performing loans, or other structures. FHFA has also directed Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to discuss with FHFA and with each other, and wherever feasible to develop consistent requirements, policies and processes for, the servicing of non-performing mortgages, and to discuss joint standards for the evaluation of the servicing performance of servicers. We cannot predict the impact on our business of these actions or any similar actions FHFA may require us and Fannie Mae to take in the future. It is possible that FHFA could require us and Fannie Mae to take a common approach that, because of differences in our respective businesses, could place Freddie Mac at a competitive disadvantage to Fannie Mae.

These changes and other factors could have material adverse effects on, among other things, our portfolio growth, net worth, credit losses, net interest income, guarantee fee income, net deferred tax assets, and loan loss reserves, and could have a material adverse effect on our future results of operations and financial condition. In light of the significant uncertainty surrounding these changes, there can be no assurances regarding when, or if, we will return to profitability.

***We are subject to significant limitations on our business under the Purchase Agreement that could have a material adverse effect on our results of operations and financial condition.***

The Purchase Agreement includes significant restrictions on our ability to manage our business, including limitations on the amount of indebtedness we may incur, the size of our mortgage-related investments portfolio and the circumstances in which we may pay dividends, raise capital and pay down the liquidation preference on the senior preferred stock. In addition, the Purchase Agreement provides that we may not enter into any new compensation arrangements or increase amounts or benefits payable under existing compensation arrangements of any executive officers without the consent of the Director of FHFA, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury. In deciding whether or not to consent to any request for approval it receives from us under the Purchase Agreement, Treasury has the right to withhold its consent for any reason and is not required by the agreement to consider any particular factors, including whether or not management believes that the transaction would benefit the company. The limitations under the Purchase Agreement could have a material adverse effect on our future results of operations and financial condition.

***Our regulator may, and in some cases must, place us into receivership, which would result in the liquidation of our assets and terminate all rights and claims that our stockholders and creditors may have against our assets or under our charter; if we are liquidated, there may not be sufficient funds to pay the secured and unsecured claims of the***

***company, repay the liquidation preference of any series of our preferred stock or make any distribution to the holders of our common stock.***

Under the GSE Act, FHFA must place us into receivership if FHFA determines in writing that our assets are less than our obligations for a period of 60 days. FHFA has notified us that the measurement period for any mandatory receivership determination with respect to our assets and obligations would commence no earlier than the SEC public filing deadline for our quarterly or annual financial statements and would continue for 60 calendar days after that date. FHFA has also advised us that, if, during that 60-day period, we receive funds from Treasury in an amount at least equal to the deficiency amount under the Purchase Agreement, the Director of FHFA will not make a mandatory receivership determination.

In addition, we could be put into receivership at the discretion of the Director of FHFA at any time for other reasons, including conditions that FHFA has already asserted existed at the time the then Director of FHFA placed us into conservatorship. These include: a substantial dissipation of assets or earnings due to unsafe or unsound practices; the existence of an unsafe or unsound condition to transact business; an inability to meet our obligations in the ordinary course of business; a weakening of our condition due to unsafe or unsound practices or conditions; critical undercapitalization; the likelihood of losses that will deplete substantially all of our capital; or by consent. A receivership would terminate the conservatorship. The appointment of FHFA (or any other entity) as our receiver would terminate all rights and claims that our stockholders and creditors may have against our assets or under our charter arising as a result of their status as

stockholders or creditors, other than the potential ability to be paid upon our liquidation. Unlike a conservatorship, the purpose of which is to conserve our assets and return us to a sound and solvent condition, the purpose of a receivership is to liquidate our assets and resolve claims against us.

In the event of a liquidation of our assets, there can be no assurance that there would be sufficient proceeds to pay the secured and unsecured claims of the company, repay the liquidation preference of any series of our preferred stock or make any distribution to the holders of our common stock. To the extent that we are placed in receivership and do not or cannot fulfill our guarantee to the holders of our mortgage-related securities, such holders could become unsecured creditors of ours with respect to claims made under our guarantee. Only after paying the secured and unsecured claims of the company, the administrative expenses of the receiver and the liquidation preference of the senior preferred stock, which ranks senior to our common stock and all other series of preferred stock upon liquidation, would any liquidation proceeds be available to repay the liquidation preference on any other series of preferred stock. Finally, only after the liquidation preference on all series of preferred stock is repaid would any liquidation proceeds be available for distribution to the holders of our common stock. The aggregate liquidation preference on the senior preferred stock owned by Treasury was $64.2 billion as of December 31, 2010. The liquidation preference will increase further if we make additional draws under the Purchase Agreement, if we do not pay dividends owed on the senior preferred stock in cash or if we do not pay the quarterly commitment fee to Treasury under the Purchase Agreement.

***We have a variety of different, and potentially competing, objectives that may adversely affect our financial results and our ability to maintain positive net worth.***

Based on our charter, public statements from Treasury and FHFA officials and guidance from our Conservator, we have a variety of different, and potentially competing, objectives. These objectives include providing liquidity, stability and affordability in the mortgage market; continuing to provide additional assistance to the struggling housing and mortgage markets; reducing the need to draw funds from Treasury pursuant to the Purchase Agreement; returning to long-term profitability; and protecting the interests of the taxpayers. These objectives create conflicts in strategic and day-to-day decision making that will likely lead to suboptimal outcomes for one or more, or possibly all, of these objectives. Current portfolio investment and mortgage guarantee activities, liquidity support, and loan modification and foreclosure forbearance initiatives, including our efforts under the MHA Program, are intended to provide support for the mortgage market in a manner that serves our public mission and other non-financial objectives under conservatorship, but may negatively impact our financial results and net worth.

***We have experienced significant management changes and internal reorganizations which could increase our control risks and have a material adverse effect on our ability to do business and our results of operations.***

Since September 2008, we have had numerous changes in our senior management and governance structure, including FHFA becoming our Conservator, a reconstituted Board of Directors, three changes in our Chief Executive Officer, three changes in our Chief Financial Officer and a new Chief Operating Officer (who resigned in February 2011). We have recently experienced several significant internal reorganizations. The magnitude of these changes and the short time interval in which they have occurred, particularly during the ongoing housing and economic crisis, add to the risks of control failures, including a failure in the effective operation of our internal control over financial reporting or our disclosure controls and procedures. Control failures could result in material adverse effects on our financial condition and results of operations.

This turnover of key management positions could further harm our financial performance and results of operations. Management attention may be diverted from regular business concerns by these and future reorganizations and the need to operate under the framework of conservatorship.

***The conservatorship and uncertainty concerning our future may have an adverse effect on the retention and recruitment of management and other valuable employees.***

Our ability to recruit, retain, and engage management and other valuable employees with the necessary skills to conduct our business may be adversely affected by the conservatorship, the uncertainty regarding its duration, the potential for future legislative or regulatory actions that could significantly affect our existence and our role in the secondary mortgage market, and the negative publicity concerning the GSEs. The actions taken by Treasury and the Conservator to date, or that may be taken by them or other government agencies in the future, may have an adverse effect on the retention and recruitment of senior executives, management, and other valuable employees. For example, we are subject to restrictions on the amount and type of compensation we may pay our executives under conservatorship. The Conservator has also directed us to maintain individual salaries and wage rates for all employees at 2010 levels for 2011 (except in the case of promotions or significant changes in responsibilities). In addition, statutory and regulatory requirements restricting executive compensation at institutions that have received federal financial assistance, even if not expressly applicable to us, may be interpreted by FHFA or Treasury as limiting the compensation that we are able to provide to our executive officers and other employees. Although we have established compensation programs designed to help retain key employees, we are not currently in a

position to offer employees financial incentives that are equity-based and, as a result of this and other factors relating to the conservatorship that may affect our attractiveness as an employer, we may be at a competitive disadvantage compared to other potential employers. Uncertainty about the future of the GSEs affects all of our operations and heightens the risks related to retention of management and other valuable employees. A recovering economy is likely to put additional pressures on turnover in 2011, as other attractive opportunities may become available to people we want to retain. Accordingly, we may not be able to retain or replace executives or other employees with key skills, and may lose institutional knowledge, that could adversely affect our ability to conduct our business effectively. We may also face increased operational risk if key employees leave the company.

***The conservatorship and investment by Treasury has had, and will continue to have, a material adverse effect on our common and preferred stockholders.***

Prior to our entry into conservatorship, the market price for our common stock declined substantially. After our entry into conservatorship, the market price of our common stock continued to decline (to less than $1 per share for an extended period immediately following our entry into conservatorship, and again following the delisting of our common stock from the NYSE at the direction of FHFA). As a result, the investments of our common and preferred stockholders lost substantial value, which they may never recover. There is significant uncertainty as to what changes may occur to our business structure during or following our conservatorship, including whether we will continue to exist. Therefore, it is likely that our shares could further diminish in value, or cease to have any value.

The conservatorship and investment by Treasury has had, and will continue to have, other material adverse effects on our common and preferred stockholders, including the following:

*No voting rights during conservatorship.* The rights and powers of our stockholders are suspended during the conservatorship and our common stockholders do not have the ability to elect directors or to vote on other matters.

*No longer managed to maximize stockholder returns.* Because we are in conservatorship, we are no longer managed with a strategy to maximize stockholder returns. In a letter to the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Congressional Banking and Financial Services Committees dated February 2, 2010, the Acting Director of FHFA stated that the focus of the conservatorship is on conserving assets, minimizing corporate losses, ensuring Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae continue to serve their mission, overseeing remediation of identified weaknesses in corporate operations and risk management, and ensuring that sound corporate governance principles are followed.

*Priority of Senior Preferred Stock.* The senior preferred stock ranks senior to the common stock and all other series of preferred stock as to both dividends and distributions upon dissolution, liquidation or winding up of the company.

*Dividends have been eliminated.* The Conservator has eliminated dividends on Freddie Mac common and preferred stock (other than dividends on the senior preferred stock) during the conservatorship. In addition, under the terms of the Purchase Agreement, dividends may not be paid to common or preferred stockholders (other than on the senior preferred stock) without the consent of Treasury, regardless of whether or not we are in conservatorship.

*Warrant may substantially dilute investment of current stockholders.* If Treasury exercises its warrant to purchase shares of our common stock equal to 79.9% of the total number of shares of our common stock outstanding on a fully diluted basis, the ownership interest in the company of our then existing common stockholders will be substantially diluted. It is possible that stockholders, other than Treasury, will not own

more than 20.1% of our total common stock for the duration of our existence. Under our charter, bylaws and applicable law, 20.1% is insufficient to control the outcome of any vote that is presented to the common stockholders. Accordingly, existing common stockholders have no assurance that, as a group, they will be able to control the election of our directors or the outcome of any other vote after the time, if any, that the conservatorship ends.

**Competitive and Market Risks**

***Our investment activity is significantly limited under the Purchase Agreement and by FHFA, which will likely reduce our earnings from investment activities and result in greater reliance on our guarantee activities to generate revenue.***

We are subject to significant limitations on our investment activity, which will adversely affect the earnings capacity of our mortgage-related investments portfolio. These limitations include: (a) a requirement to reduce the size of our mortgage-related investments portfolio; and (b) significant constraints on our ability to purchase or sell mortgage assets.

Under the terms of the Purchase Agreement and FHFA regulation, our mortgage-related investments portfolio is subject to a cap that decreases by 10% each year until the portfolio reaches $250 billion. As a result, the UPB of our mortgage-related investments portfolio could not exceed $810 billion as of December 31, 2010 and may not exceed $729 billion as of December 31, 2011. Treasury has stated it does not expect us to be an active buyer to increase the size of our mortgage-related investments portfolio, but also does not expect that active selling will be necessary to meet the required portfolio reduction targets. In addition, FHFA has stated that, given the size of our current mortgage-related investments portfolio and

the potential volume of delinquent mortgages to be purchased out of PC pools, it expects that any net additions to our mortgage-related investments portfolio would be related to that activity. Therefore, our ability to take advantage of opportunities to purchase or sell mortgage assets at attractive prices has been, and likely will continue to be, limited. In addition, notwithstanding the expectations expressed by Treasury and FHFA regarding future selling activity, we can provide no assurance that the cap on our mortgage-related investments portfolio will not, over time, force us to sell mortgage assets at unattractive prices, particularly given the potential in coming periods for continued high volumes of loan modifications and purchases of seriously delinquent loans, both of which result in the purchase of mortgage loans from our PCs for our mortgage-related investments portfolio.

These limitations will reduce the earnings capacity of our mortgage-related investments portfolio business and require us to place greater emphasis on our guarantee activities to generate revenue. However, under conservatorship, our ability to generate revenue through guarantee activities may be limited, as we may be required to adopt business practices that provide support for the mortgage market in a manner that serves our public mission and other non-financial objectives, but that may negatively impact our future financial results. The combination of the restrictions on our business activities under the Purchase Agreement and FHFA regulation, combined with our potential inability to generate sufficient revenue through our guarantee activities to offset the effects of those restrictions, may have an adverse effect on our results of operations and financial condition. There can be no assurance that the current profitability levels on our new single-family business would be sufficient to attract new private sector capital in the future, should the company be in a position to seek such capital.

***We are subject to mortgage credit risks, including mortgage credit risk relating to off-balance sheet arrangements; increased credit costs related to these risks could adversely affect our financial condition and/or results of operations.***

Mortgage credit risk is the risk that a borrower will fail to make timely payments on a mortgage we own or guarantee, exposing us to the risk of credit losses and credit-related expenses. We are primarily exposed to mortgage credit risk with respect to the single-family and multifamily loans that we hold on our consolidated balance sheets. We are also exposed to mortgage credit risk with respect to securities and guarantee arrangements that are not reflected as assets on our consolidated balance sheets. These relate primarily to: (a) Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities backed by multifamily loans; (b) certain single-family Other Guarantee Transactions; and (c) other guarantee commitments, including long-term standby commitments.

Factors that affect the level of our mortgage credit risk include the credit profile of the borrower, home prices, the features of the mortgage loan, the type of property securing the mortgage, and local and regional economic conditions, including unemployment rates. We continue to face significant mortgage credit risk, and our credit losses will likely increase in the near term and remain significantly above historical levels for the foreseeable future due to the substantial number of mortgage loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio on which borrowers owe more than their home is currently worth, as well as the substantial backlog of seriously delinquent loans.

While mortgage interest rates remained low in 2010, many borrowers may not have been able to refinance into lower interest mortgages due to substantial declines in home values, market uncertainty and continued high unemployment rates. Therefore, there can be no assurance that continued low mortgage interest rates or efforts to modify and refinance mortgages pursuant to the MHA Program will reduce our overall mortgage credit risk.

We also continue to have significant amounts of mortgage loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio with certain characteristics, such as Alt-A, interest-only, option ARMs, loans with original LTV ratios greater than 90%, and loans where borrowers had FICO scores less than 620 at the time of origination, that expose us to greater credit risk than do other types of mortgage loans. See Table 44 Certain Higher Risk Categories in the Single-Family Credit Guarantee Portfolio for more information.

Beginning in 2008, the conforming loan limits were significantly increased for mortgages originated in certain high cost areas (the initial increases applied to loans originated after July 1, 2007). Due to our relative lack of experience with these larger loans, purchases pursuant to the high cost conforming loan limits may also expose us to greater credit risks.

We also face the risk that multifamily borrowers will default if they are unable to refinance their loans at an affordable rate. This risk is particularly important with respect to multifamily loans because such loans generally have a balloon payment and typically have a shorter contractual term than single-family mortgages. Borrowers may be less able to refinance their obligations during periods of rising interest rates, which could lead to default if the borrower is unable to find affordable refinancing. This risk is significant given the state of the economy, lower levels of liquidity, property cash flows, and property market values. Of the $108.7 billion in UPB of loans in our multifamily mortgage portfolio as of December 31, 2010, approximately 2% and 4% will reach their maturity during 2011 and 2012, respectively.

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***We are exposed to significant credit risk related to the subprime, Alt-A and option ARM loans that back the non-agency mortgage-related securities we hold.***

Our investments in non-agency mortgage-related securities have included securities that are backed by subprime, Alt-A and option ARM loans. Since 2007, mortgage loan delinquencies and credit losses in the U.S. mortgage market have substantially increased, particularly in the subprime, Alt-A and option ARM sectors of the residential mortgage market. In addition, home prices declined significantly, after extended periods during which home prices appreciated. As a result, the fair value of these investments has declined significantly since 2007 and we have incurred substantial losses through other-than-temporary impairments. In addition, many of these investments do not trade in a liquid secondary market and the size of our holdings relative to normal market activity is such that, if we were to attempt to sell a significant quantity of these securities, the pricing in such markets could be significantly disrupted and the price we ultimately realize may be materially lower than the value at which we carry these investments on our consolidated balance sheets.

We could experience additional GAAP losses due to other-than-temporary impairments on our investments in these non-agency mortgage-related securities if, among other things: (a) interest rates change; (b) delinquency and loss rates on subprime, Alt-A and option ARM loans increase; or (c) there is a further decline in actual or forecasted home prices. In addition, the fair value of these investments may decline further due to additional ratings downgrades or market events. Any credit enhancements covering these securities, including subordination, may not prevent us from incurring losses. During 2010, we continued to experience the depletion of credit enhancements on selected securities backed by subprime first lien, option ARM and Alt-A loans due to poor performance in the underlying collateral. See MD&A CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS ANALYSIS Investments in Securities for information about the credit ratings for these securities and the extent to which these securities have been downgraded.

***Certain strategies to mitigate our losses as an investor in non-agency mortgage-related securities may adversely affect our relationships with some of our largest seller/servicers.***

On July 12, 2010, FHFA, as Conservator of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, announced that it had issued subpoenas to various entities seeking loan files and other transaction documents related to non-agency mortgage-related securities in which the two enterprises invested. FHFA stated that the documents will enable it to determine whether issuers of these securities and others are liable to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae for certain losses they have suffered on the securities. We are assisting FHFA in this effort.

We also have joined an investor group that has delivered a notice of non-performance to Bank of New York Mellon, as Trustee, and Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP (now known as BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP). The notice related to the possibility that certain mortgage pools backing certain mortgage-related securities issued by Countrywide Financial and related entities include mortgages that may have been ineligible for inclusion in the pools due to breaches of representations or warranties.

These and other loss mitigation efforts may lead to disputes with some of our largest seller/servicers and counterparties that may result in litigation. The effectiveness of these loss mitigation efforts is highly uncertain and any potential recoveries may take significant time to realize.

***The credit losses we experience in future periods as a result of the housing and economic crisis are likely to be larger, perhaps substantially larger, than our current loan loss reserves.***

Our loan loss reserves, as reflected on our consolidated balance sheets, do not reflect our estimate of the total of all future credit losses inherent in our single-family and multifamily mortgage loans, including those underlying our financial guarantees. Rather, pursuant to GAAP, our reserves only reflect probable losses we believe we have already

incurred as of the balance sheet date. Accordingly, although we believe that our credit losses may exceed the amounts we have already reserved for loans currently identified as impaired, and that additional credit losses will be incurred in the future due to the housing and economic crisis, we are not permitted under GAAP to reflect the potential impact of these future trends in our loan loss reserves. As a result of the depth and extent of the housing and economic crisis, there is significant uncertainty regarding the full extent of future credit losses. Therefore, such credit losses are likely to be larger, perhaps substantially larger, than our current loan loss reserves. These additional credit losses we incur in future periods will adversely affect our business, results of operations, financial condition, liquidity and net worth.

***Further declines in U.S. home prices or other adverse changes in the U.S. housing market could negatively impact our business and increase our losses.***

Throughout 2010, the U.S. housing market continued to experience adverse trends, including continued price depreciation, and continued high serious delinquency and default rates. Home sales declined significantly following the expiration of the federal homebuyer tax credit program in April 2010, which increased the supply of unsold homes and placed further downward pressure on home prices. These conditions, coupled with high continued unemployment, led to

increases in credit losses and continued high loan delinquencies and provisioning for loan losses, all of which have adversely affected our financial condition and results of operations. We expect that national home prices in 2011 will likely be lower than in 2010, which could result in a continued high rate of serious delinquencies or defaults and a level of credit-related losses higher than our expectations when our guarantees were issued. It is possible that home price declines could be significantly greater than we anticipate, or that a sustained recovery in home prices would not begin until much later than we anticipate, which could result in higher losses due to other-than-temporary impairments on our investments in non-agency mortgage-related securities than would otherwise be recognized in earnings. Government programs designed to strengthen the U.S. housing market, such as the MHA Program, may fail to achieve expected results, and new programs could be instituted that cause our credit losses to increase. For more information, see MD&A RISK MANAGEMENT Credit Risk.

Our business volumes are closely tied to the rate of growth in total outstanding U.S. residential mortgage debt and the size of the U.S. residential mortgage market. Total residential mortgage debt declined approximately 2.3% in the first nine months of 2010 compared to a decline of 1.9% in 2009. If total outstanding U.S. residential mortgage debt were to continue to decline, there could be fewer mortgage loans available for us to purchase, and we could face more competition to purchase a smaller number of loans.

While major national multifamily market fundamentals (*i.e.*, vacancy rates and effective rents) improved during 2010, there can be no assurance that this trend will continue. Additionally, certain local markets continue to exhibit weak fundamentals. We expect that our multifamily non-performing assets may increase due to the continuation of the challenging economic conditions particularly in certain geographical areas. Improvements in loan performance have historically lagged improvements in broader economic and market trends during market recoveries. As a result, we may continue to experience elevated credit losses related to multifamily activities in the first half of 2011, even if market conditions continue to improve. In addition, given the significant weakness currently being experienced in the U.S. economy, it is also possible that apartment fundamentals could deteriorate during 2011, which could cause delinquencies and credit losses relating to our multifamily activities to increase beyond our current expectations.

***Our refinance volumes could decline if interest rates rise, which could cause our overall new issuance volumes to decline.***

We continued to experience a high composition of refinance mortgages in our purchase volume during 2010, due to continued low interest rates and the impact of our relief refinance mortgages. Interest rates have been at historically low levels for an extended period of time, but have recently begun to increase. Overall originations of refinance mortgages, and our purchases of them, will likely decrease if interest rates continue to rise. Originations of refinance mortgages will also likely decline after the Home Affordable Refinance Program expires in June 2011. It is possible that our overall issuance volumes could decline if our volumes of purchase money mortgages do not increase to offset any such decrease in refinance mortgages. This could adversely affect the amount of revenue we receive from our guarantee activities.

***We depend on our institutional counterparties to provide services that are critical to our business, and our results of operations or financial condition may be adversely affected if one or more of our institutional counterparties do not meet their obligations to us.***

We face the risk that one or more of the institutional counterparties that has entered into a business contract or arrangement with us may fail to meet its obligations. We face similar risks with respect to contracts or arrangements we benefit from indirectly or that we enter into on behalf of our securitization trusts. Our primary exposures to institutional counterparty risk are with:

- mortgage seller/servicers;

- mortgage insurers;
- issuers, guarantors or third-party providers of other credit enhancements (including bond insurers);
- counterparties to short-term lending and other investment-related agreements and cash equivalent transactions, including such agreements and transactions we manage for our PC trusts;
- derivative counterparties;
- hazard and title insurers;
- mortgage investors and originators; and
- document custodians and funds custodians.

Many of our counterparties provide several types of services to us. In some cases, our business with institutional counterparties is concentrated. A significant failure by a major institutional counterparty could harm our business and financial results in a variety of ways and have a material adverse effect on our investments in mortgage loans, investments in securities, our derivative portfolio or our credit guarantee activities. See NOTE 19: CONCENTRATION OF CREDIT AND OTHER RISKS for additional information.

Some of our counterparties may become subject to serious liquidity problems affecting, either temporarily or permanently, their businesses, which may adversely affect their ability to meet their obligations to us. Challenging market conditions have adversely affected and are expected to continue to adversely affect the liquidity and financial condition of a number of our counterparties, including some seller/servicers, mortgage insurers and bond insurers. In the past few years, some of our largest seller/servicers have experienced ratings downgrades and liquidity constraints, and certain large lenders have failed. These challenging market conditions could also increase the likelihood that we will have disputes with our counterparties concerning their obligations to us, especially with respect to counterparties that have experienced financial strain and/or have large exposures to us. A default by a counterparty with significant obligations to us could adversely affect our ability to conduct our operations efficiently and at cost-effective rates, which in turn could adversely affect our results of operations or our financial condition. See MD&A RISK MANAGEMENT Credit Risk *Institutional Credit Risk* for additional information regarding our credit risks to our counterparties and how we seek to manage them.

***Our financial condition or results of operations may be adversely affected if mortgage seller/servicers fail to repurchase loans sold to us in breach of representations and warranties or fail to honor any related indemnification or any recourse obligations. We also face the risk that seller/servicers may fail to perform their obligations to service loans in our single-family and multifamily mortgage portfolios or that their servicing performance could decline.***

We require seller/servicers to make certain representations and warranties regarding the loans they sell to us. If loans are sold to us in breach of those representations and warranties, we have the contractual right to require the seller/servicer to repurchase those loans from us. In lieu of repurchase, we may agree to allow a seller/servicer to indemnify us against losses on such mortgages or otherwise compensate us for the risk of continuing to hold the mortgages. Sometimes a seller/servicer sells us mortgages with recourse, meaning that the seller/servicer agrees to repurchase any mortgage that is delinquent for more than a specified period (usually 120 days), regardless of whether there has been a breach of representations and warranties.

Some of our seller/servicers have failed to fully perform their repurchase obligations due to lack of financial capacity, while others, including many of our larger seller/servicers, have not fully performed their repurchase obligations in a timely manner. As of December 31, 2010 and December 31, 2009, the UPB of loans subject to repurchase requests issued to our single-family seller/servicers was approximately $3.8 billion and $4.2 billion, respectively. Our contracts require that a seller/servicer repurchase a mortgage within 30 days after we issue a repurchase request, unless the seller/servicer avails itself of an appeal process provided for in our contracts, in which case the deadline for repurchase is extended until we decide the appeal. As of December 31, 2010, approximately 34% of these repurchase requests were outstanding more than four months since issuance of our repurchase request. The actual amount we collect on these requests and others we may make in the future could be significantly less than their UPB amounts because we expect many of these requests will be satisfied by reimbursement of our realized losses by seller/servicers, instead of repurchase of loans at their UPB, or may be rescinded in the course of the contractual appeals process. Based on our historical loss experience and the fact that many of these loans are covered by credit enhancement, we expect the actual credit losses experienced by us should we fail to collect on these repurchase requests would also be less than the UPB of the loans. We may also enter into agreements with seller/servicers to resolve claims for repurchases. The amounts we receive under any such agreements may be less than the losses we ultimately incur. Our credit losses may increase to the extent our seller/servicers do not fully perform their repurchase obligations. Enforcing repurchase obligations of seller/servicers who have the financial capacity to perform those obligations could also negatively impact our relationships with such customers and ability to retain market share.

We also have exposure to seller/servicers with respect to mortgage insurance. When a mortgage insurer rescinds coverage, the seller/servicer generally is in breach of representations and warranties made to us when we purchased the affected mortgage. Consequently, we may require the seller/servicer to repurchase the mortgage or to indemnify us

for additional loss. The volume of rescissions of claims under mortgage insurance remains high.

If a servicer is unable to fulfill its repurchase or other responsibilities, we may seek to recover the amounts that such servicer owes us, such as by attempting to sell the applicable mortgage servicing rights to a different servicer and applying the proceeds to such owed amounts, or by contracting the servicing responsibilities to a different servicer and retaining the net servicing fee. The ongoing weakness in the housing market has negatively affected the market for mortgage servicing rights, which increases the risk that we may be unable to sell such rights or may not receive a sufficient price for them. Increased industry consolidation, bankruptcies of mortgage bankers or bank failures may also make it more difficult for us to sell such rights, because there may not be sufficient capacity in the market, particularly in the event of multiple failures. This option may be difficult to accomplish with respect to our larger seller/servicers, as it may be difficult to transfer a large servicing portfolio. The financial stress on servicers and increased costs of servicing may lead to strategic defaults (*i.e.*, defaults done deliberately as a financial strategy, and not involuntarily) by servicers, which would also require us to seek a successor servicer.

Our seller/servicers have a significant role in servicing loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio, which includes an active role in our loss mitigation efforts. Therefore, a decline in their performance could impact the overall quality of our credit performance, which could adversely affect our financial condition or results of operations and have significant impacts on our ability to mitigate credit losses. The risk of such a decline in performance remains high as servicers continue to face challenges in building capacity to process the large volumes of problem loans and as weak economic conditions continue to affect the liquidity and financial condition of many of our seller/servicers, including some of our largest seller/servicers. Any efforts we take to attempt to improve our servicers performance could adversely affect our relationships with such servicers, many of which also sell loans to us.

The inability to realize the anticipated benefits of our loss mitigation plans, a lower realized rate of seller/servicer repurchases or default rates and severity that exceed our current projections could cause our losses to be significantly higher than those currently estimated.

Our seller/servicers also have a significant role in servicing loans in our multifamily mortgage portfolio. We are exposed to the risk that multifamily seller/servicers could come under financial pressure due to the current stressful economic environment, which could potentially cause degradation in the quality of servicing they provide or, in certain cases, reduce the likelihood that we could recover losses through lender repurchases or through recourse agreements or other credit enhancements, where applicable.

See MD&A RISK MANAGEMENT Credit Risk *Institutional Credit Risk Mortgage Seller/Servicers* for additional information on our institutional credit risk related to our mortgage seller/servicers.

***Our financial condition or results of operations may be adversely affected by the financial distress of our counterparties to derivatives, funding and other transactions.***

We use derivatives for several purposes, including to rebalance our funding mix in order to more closely match changes in the interest rate characteristics of our mortgage-related assets and to hedge forecasted issuances of debt. The relative concentration of our derivative exposure among our primary derivative counterparties remains high. This concentration increased in the last several years due to industry consolidation and the failure of certain counterparties, and could further increase. One of our derivative counterparties accounted for greater than 10% of our net uncollateralized exposure, excluding commitments, at December 31, 2010. For a further discussion of our derivative counterparty exposure, see MD&A RISK MANAGEMENT Credit Risk *Institutional Credit Risk Derivative Counterparties* and NOTE 19: CONCENTRATION OF CREDIT AND OTHER RISKS.

Some of our derivative and other capital markets counterparties have experienced various degrees of financial distress in the past few years, including liquidity constraints, credit downgrades and bankruptcy. Our financial condition and results of operations may be adversely affected by the financial distress of these derivative and other capital markets counterparties to the extent that they fail to meet their obligations to us. For example, we may incur losses if collateral held by us cannot be liquidated at prices that are sufficient to recover the full amount of the loan or derivative exposure due us.

In addition, our ability to engage in routine derivatives, funding and other transactions could be adversely affected by the actions of other financial institutions. Financial services institutions are interrelated as a result of trading, clearing, counterparty or other relationships. As a result, defaults by, or even rumors or questions about, one or more financial services institutions, or the financial services industry generally, could lead to market-wide disruptions in which it may be difficult for us to find acceptable counterparties for such transactions.

We also use derivatives to synthetically create the substantive economic equivalent of various debt funding structures. Thus, if our access to the derivative markets were disrupted, it may become more difficult or expensive to fund our

business activities and achieve the funding mix we desire, which could adversely affect our business and results of operations.

***Our credit and other losses could increase if our mortgage or bond insurers become insolvent or fail to perform their obligations to us.***

We are exposed to risk relating to the potential insolvency or non-performance of mortgage insurers that insure single-family mortgages we purchase or guarantee and bond insurers that insure bonds we hold as investment securities on our consolidated balance sheets. The weakened financial condition and liquidity position of these counterparties increases the risk that these entities will fail to reimburse us for claims under insurance policies. This risk could increase if home prices deteriorate further or if the economy worsens.

As a guarantor, we remain responsible for the payment of principal and interest if a mortgage insurer fails to meet its obligations to reimburse us for claims. Thus, if any of our mortgage insurers that provide credit enhancement fails to fulfill its obligation, we could experience increased credit losses. In addition, if a regulator determined that a mortgage insurer lacked sufficient capital to pay all claims when due, the regulator could take action that might impact the timing and amount of claim payments made to us. We independently assess the financial condition, including the claims-paying resources, of

each of our mortgage insurers. Based on our analysis of the financial condition of a mortgage insurer and pursuant to our eligibility requirements for mortgage insurers, we could take action against a mortgage insurer intended to protect our interests that may impact the timing and amount of claims payments received from that insurer.

In the event one or more of our bond insurers were to become insolvent, it is likely that we would not collect all of our claims from the affected insurer, and it would impact our ability to recover certain unrealized losses on our investments in non-agency mortgage-related securities. We expect to receive substantially less than full payment of our claims from Financial Guaranty Insurance Company, or FGIC, and Ambac Assurance Corporation, or Ambac, due to adverse developments concerning these companies. We believe that, in addition to FGIC and Ambac, some of our other bond insurers lack sufficient ability to fully meet all of their expected lifetime claims-paying obligations to us as such claims emerge. For more information on the developments concerning FGIC and Ambac, see MD&A RISK MANAGEMENT Credit Risk *Institutional Credit Risk Bond Insurers.*

***If mortgage insurers were to further tighten their standards or fall out of compliance with regulatory capital requirements, the volume of high LTV ratio mortgages available for us to purchase could be reduced, which could negatively affect our business and make it more difficult for us to meet our affordable housing goals. Mortgage insurance standards could constrain our ability to increase our purchases of high LTV loans in the future, should we want to do so.***

Our charter requires that single-family mortgages with LTV ratios above 80% at the time of purchase be covered by specified credit enhancements or participation interests. Our purchases of mortgages with LTV ratios above 80% (other than relief refinance mortgages) have declined in recent years, in part because mortgage insurers tightened their eligibility requirements with respect to the issuance of insurance on new mortgages with higher LTV ratios. Recently, mortgage insurers have loosened some of these requirements. However, if mortgage insurers further restrict their eligibility requirements for high LTV ratio loans, or if we are no longer willing or able to obtain mortgage insurance from these counterparties, and we are not able to avail ourselves of suitable alternative methods of obtaining credit enhancement for these loans, we may be further restricted in our ability to purchase or securitize loans with LTV ratios over 80% at the time of purchase.

If a mortgage insurance company were to fall out of compliance with regulatory capital requirements and not obtain appropriate waivers, it could become subject to regulatory actions that restrict its ability to write new business in certain, or in some cases all, states. At least one of our mortgage insurers has fallen out of compliance with regulatory capital requirements, and others may do so in the future.

A mortgage insurer may attempt a corporate restructuring designed to enable it to continue to write new business through a new entity in the event the insurer falls out of compliance with regulatory capital requirements. Several insurers have completed such a restructuring. However, there can be no assurance that an insurer would be able to effect such a restructuring in the future, as the restructured entity would be required to satisfy regulatory requirements as well as our own conditions. These restructuring plans generally involve contributing capital to a subsidiary or affiliate. This could result in less liquidity available to the mortgage insurer to pay claims on its existing book of business, and an increased risk that the mortgage insurer would not pay its claims in full in the future.

Where mortgage insurance or another charter-acceptable credit enhancement is not available, it may be more difficult for us to purchase high LTV ratio (above 80%) loans that refinance mortgages into more affordable loans. The unavailability of suitable credit enhancement could also negatively impact our ability to pursue new business opportunities relating to high LTV ratio and other higher risk loans, should we seek, or be directed, to pursue such business opportunities. This could also impact our ability to meet our affordable housing goals, as purchases of loans with high LTV ratios can contribute to our performance under those goals.

***The loss of business volume from key lenders could result in a decline in our market share and revenues.***

Our business depends on our ability to acquire a steady flow of mortgage loans. We purchase a significant percentage of our single-family mortgages from several large mortgage originators. During 2010 and 2009, approximately 78% and 74%, respectively, of our guaranteed mortgage securities issuances originated from purchase volume associated with our ten largest customers. During 2010, three mortgage lenders (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Bank of America, N.A. and Chase Home Finance LLC) each accounted for more than 10% of our single-family mortgage purchase volume and collectively accounted for approximately 50% of our single-family mortgage purchase volume. Similarly, we acquire a significant portion of our multifamily mortgage loans from several large lenders. We enter into mortgage purchase volume commitments with many of our single-family customers that provide for the customers to deliver to us a specified dollar amount of mortgages during a specified period of time. Some commitments may also provide for the lender to deliver to us a minimum percentage of their total sales of conforming loans. There is a risk that we will not be able to enter into a new commitment with a key customer that will maintain mortgage purchase volume following the expiration of the existing commitment. Since 2007, the mortgage industry has consolidated significantly and a smaller number of large lenders originate most single-family mortgages. The

loss of business from any one of our major lenders could adversely affect our market share and our revenues. Many of our seller/servicers also have tightened their lending criteria in recent years, which has reduced their loan volume, thus reducing the volume of loans available for us to purchase.

***Ongoing weak business and economic conditions in the U.S. and abroad may adversely affect our business and results of operations.***

Our business and results of operations are significantly affected by general business and economic conditions, including conditions in the international markets for our investments or our mortgage-related and debt securities. These conditions include employment rates, fluctuations in both debt and equity capital markets, the value of the U.S. dollar as compared to foreign currencies, the strength of the U.S. financial markets and national economy and the local economies in which we conduct business, and the economies of other countries that purchase our mortgage-related and debt securities. There is significant uncertainty regarding the strength of the U.S. economic recovery. While the financial markets appear to have stabilized, there can be no assurance that this will continue. If the U.S. economy remains weak, we could experience continued high serious delinquencies and credit losses, which will adversely affect our results of operations and financial condition.

The mortgage credit markets have experienced very difficult conditions and volatility since 2007. This has resulted in a decrease in availability of corporate credit and liquidity within the mortgage industry, causing disruptions to normal operations of major mortgage originators, including some of our largest customers, and contributed to the insolvency, closure or acquisition of a number of major financial institutions. These conditions also resulted in significant volatility, wide credit spreads and a lack of price transparency and could contribute to further consolidation within the financial services industry. We continue to be subject to adverse effects on our financial condition and results of operations due to our activities involving securities, mortgages, derivatives and other mortgage commitments with our customers.

***Competition from banking and non-banking companies may harm our business.***

Competition in the secondary mortgage market combined with a decline in the amount of residential mortgage debt outstanding may make it more difficult for us to purchase mortgages. Furthermore, competitive pricing pressures may make our products less attractive in the market and negatively impact our financial results. Increased competition from Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae may alter our product mix, lower volumes and reduce revenues on new business. FHFA is also Conservator of Fannie Mae, our primary competitor, and FHFA s actions as Conservator of both companies could affect competition between us and Fannie Mae. Efforts we may make to increase the profitability of new single-family guarantee business, such as by tightening credit standards or raising guarantee fees, could cause our market share to decrease and the volume of our single-family guarantee business to decline. Historically, we also competed with other financial institutions that retain or securitize mortgages, such as commercial and investment banks, dealers, thrift institutions, and insurance companies. While many of these institutions have ceased or substantially reduced their activities in the secondary market since 2008, it is possible that these institutions will reenter the secondary market.

***Our business may be adversely affected by limited availability of financing and increased funding costs.***

The amount, type and cost of our funding, including financing from other financial institutions and the capital markets, directly impacts our interest expense and results of operations. A number of factors could make such financing more difficult to obtain, more expensive or unavailable on any terms, both domestically and internationally, including:

- termination of, or future restrictions or other adverse changes with respect to, government support programs that may benefit us;
- reduced demand for our debt securities; and
- competition for debt funding from other debt issuers.

Our ability to obtain funding in the public debt markets or by pledging mortgage-related securities as collateral to other financial institutions could cease or change rapidly, and the cost of available funding could increase significantly due to changes in market confidence and other factors. For example, in the fall of 2008, we experienced significant deterioration in our access to the unsecured medium- and long-term debt markets, and were forced to rely on short-term debt to fund our purchases of mortgage assets and refinance maturing debt and to rely on derivatives to synthetically create the substantive economic equivalent of various debt funding structures.

We follow certain liquidity management practices and procedures. However, in the event we were unable to obtain funding from the public debt markets, there can be no assurance that such practices and procedures would provide us with sufficient liquidity to meet ongoing cash obligations for an extended period.

Since 2008, the ratings on the non-agency mortgage-related securities we hold backed by Alt-A, subprime and option ARM loans have decreased, limiting their availability as a significant source of liquidity for us through sales or use as

collateral in secured lending transactions. In addition, adverse market conditions have negatively impacted our ability to enter into secured lending transactions using agency securities as collateral. These trends are likely to continue in the future.

*Government Support*

Changes or perceived changes in the government s support of us could have a severe negative effect on our access to the debt markets and our debt funding costs. Under the Purchase Agreement, the $200 billion cap on Treasury s funding commitment will increase as necessary to accommodate any cumulative reduction in our net worth during 2010, 2011 and 2012. While we believe that the support provided by Treasury pursuant to the Purchase Agreement currently enables us to maintain our access to the debt markets and to have adequate liquidity to conduct our normal business activities, the costs of our debt funding could vary due to the uncertainty about the future of the GSEs and potential investor concerns about the adequacy of funding available to us under the Purchase Agreement after 2012. The cost of our debt funding could increase if debt investors believe that the risk that we could be placed into receivership is increasing. In addition, under the Purchase Agreement, without the prior consent of Treasury, we may not increase our total indebtedness above a specified limit or become liable for any subordinated indebtedness.

We do not currently have a liquidity backstop available to us (other than draws from Treasury under the Purchase Agreement and Treasury s ability to purchase up to $2.25 billion of our obligations under its permanent statutory authority) if we are unable to obtain funding from issuances of debt or other conventional sources. At present, we are not able to predict the likelihood that a liquidity backstop will be needed, or to identify the alternative sources of liquidity that might be available to us if needed, other than from Treasury as referenced above.

*Demand for Debt Funding*

The willingness of domestic and foreign investors to purchase and hold our debt securities can be influenced by many factors, including changes in the world economy, changes in foreign-currency exchange rates, regulatory and political factors, as well as the availability of and preferences for other investments. If investors were to divest their holdings or reduce their purchases of our debt securities, our funding costs could increase. The willingness of investors to purchase or hold our debt securities, and any changes to such willingness, may materially affect our liquidity, our business and results of operations.

*Competition for Debt Funding*

We compete for low-cost debt funding with Fannie Mae, the FHLBs and other institutions. Competition for debt funding from these entities can vary with changes in economic, financial market and regulatory environments. Increased competition for low-cost debt funding may result in a higher cost to finance our business, which could negatively affect our financial results. An inability to issue debt securities at attractive rates in amounts sufficient to fund our business activities and meet our obligations could have an adverse effect on our liquidity, financial condition and results of operations. See MD&A LIQUIDITY AND CAPITAL RESOURCES Liquidity *Other Debt Securities* for a description of our debt issuance programs.

Our funding costs may also be affected by changes in the amount of, and demand for, debt issued by Treasury.

*Line of Credit*

We maintain a secured intraday line of credit to provide additional intraday liquidity to fund our activities through the Fedwire system. This line of credit requires us to post collateral to a third party. In certain circumstances, this secured counterparty may be able to repledge the collateral underlying our financing without our consent. In addition, because

the secured intraday line of credit is uncommitted, we may not be able to continue to draw on it if and when needed.

***Any decline in the price performance of or demand for our PCs could have an adverse effect on the volume and profitability of our new single-family guarantee business.***

Our PCs are an integral part of our mortgage purchase program. We purchase many mortgages by issuing PCs in exchange for them in guarantor swap transactions. We also issue PCs backed by mortgage loans that we purchased for cash. Our competitiveness in purchasing single-family mortgages from our seller/servicers, and thus the volume and profitability of new single-family business, can be directly affected by the relative price performance of our PCs and comparable Fannie Mae securities. Increasing demand for our PCs helps support the price performance of our PCs, which in turn helps us compete with Fannie Mae and others in purchasing mortgages.

Our PCs typically trade at a discount to comparable Fannie Mae securities, which creates an incentive for customers to conduct a disproportionate share of their guarantor business with Fannie Mae. Various factors, including market conditions and the relative rates at which the underlying mortgages prepay, affect the price performance of our PCs. While we employ a variety of strategies to support the price performance of our PCs, any such strategies may fail or adversely affect our business. For example, we may attempt to compensate customers for the difference in price between our PCs and comparable

Fannie Mae securities by reducing guarantee fees. However, this could adversely affect the profitability of our single-family guarantee business.

We may be unable to maintain a liquid and deep market for our PCs, which could also adversely affect the price performance of PCs. A significant reduction in the volume of mortgage loans that we securitize could reduce the liquidity of our PCs.

***A reduction in the credit ratings for our debt could adversely affect our liquidity.***

Nationally recognized statistical rating organizations play an important role in determining, by means of the ratings they assign to issuers and their debt, the availability and cost of debt funding. We currently receive ratings from three nationally recognized statistical rating organizations for our unsecured borrowings. Our credit ratings are important to our liquidity. Actions by governmental entities or others, including changes in government support for us, additional GAAP losses, additional draws under the Purchase Agreement, a reduction in the credit ratings of or outlook on the U.S. Government, and other factors could adversely affect the credit ratings on our debt. A reduction in our credit ratings could adversely affect our liquidity, competitive position, or the supply or cost of debt financing available to us. A reduction in our credit ratings could also trigger additional collateral requirements under our derivatives contracts. A significant increase in our borrowing costs could cause us to sustain additional GAAP losses or impair our liquidity by requiring us to seek other sources of financing, which may be difficult to obtain.

***Mortgage fraud could result in significant financial losses and harm to our reputation.***

We rely on representations and warranties by seller/servicers about the characteristics of the single-family mortgage loans we purchase and securitize, and we do not independently verify most of the information that is provided to us before we purchase the loan. This exposes us to the risk that one or more of the parties involved in a transaction (such as the borrower, seller, broker, appraiser, title agent, loan officer, lender or servicer) will engage in fraud by misrepresenting facts about a mortgage loan or a borrower. While we subsequently review a sample of these loans to determine if such loans are in compliance with our contractual standards, there can be no assurance that this would detect or deter mortgage fraud, or otherwise reduce our exposure to the risk of fraud. We are also exposed to fraud by third parties in the mortgage servicing function, particularly with respect to sales of REO properties and other dispositions of non-performing assets. We may experience significant financial losses and reputational damage as a result of such fraud.

***The value of mortgage-related securities guaranteed by us and held as investments may decline if we were unable to perform under our guarantee or if investor confidence in our ability to perform under our guarantee were to diminish.***

A portion of our investments in mortgage-related securities are securities guaranteed by us. Our valuation of these securities is consistent with GAAP and the legal structure of the guarantee transaction, which includes the Freddie Mac assets transferred to the securitization trusts that serve as collateral for the mortgage-related securities issued by the trusts (*i.e.*: (a) multifamily PCs; (b) REMICs and Other Structured Securities; and (c) certain Other Guarantee Transactions). The valuation of our guaranteed mortgage securities necessarily reflects investor confidence in our ability to perform under our guarantee and the liquidity that our guarantee provides. If we were unable to perform under our guarantee or if investor confidence in our ability to perform under our guarantee were to diminish, the value of our guaranteed securities may decline, thereby reducing the value of the securities reported on our consolidated balance sheets, which could have an adverse affect on our financial condition and results of operations. This could also adversely affect our ability to sell or otherwise use these securities for liquidity purposes.

***Changes in interest rates could negatively impact our results of operations, stockholders equity (deficit) and fair value of net assets.***

Our investment activities and credit guarantee activities expose us to interest rate and other market risks. Changes in interest rates, up or down, could adversely affect our net interest yield. Although the yield we earn on our assets and our funding costs tend to move in the same direction in response to changes in interest rates, either can rise or fall faster than the other, causing our net interest yield to expand or compress. For example, due to the timing of maturities or rate reset dates on variable-rate instruments, when interest rates rise, our funding costs may rise faster than the yield we earn on our assets. This rate change could cause our net interest yield to compress until the effect of the increase is fully reflected in asset yields. Changes in the slope of the yield curve could also reduce our net interest yield.

Our GAAP results can be significantly affected by changes in interest rates, and adverse changes in interest rates could increase our GAAP net loss or deficit in total equity (deficit) materially. For example, changes in interest rates affect the fair value of our derivatives portfolio. Since we generally record changes in fair values of our derivatives in current income, such changes could significantly impact our GAAP results. While derivatives are an important aspect of our management of interest-rate risk, they generally increase the volatility of reported net income (loss), because, while fair value changes in derivatives affect net income, fair value changes in several of the types of assets and liabilities being hedged do not affect net

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income. Additionally, increases in interest rates could increase other-than-temporary impairments on our investments in non-agency mortgage-related securities.

Changes in interest rates may also affect prepayment assumptions, thus potentially impacting the fair value of our assets, including our investments in mortgage-related assets. When interest rates fall, borrowers are more likely to prepay their mortgage loans by refinancing them at a lower rate. An increased likelihood of prepayment on the mortgages underlying our mortgage-related securities may adversely impact the value of these securities.

Interest rates can fluctuate for a number of reasons, including changes in the fiscal and monetary policies of the federal government and its agencies, such as the Federal Reserve. Federal Reserve policies directly and indirectly influence the yield on our interest-earning assets and the cost of our interest-bearing liabilities. The availability of derivative financial instruments (such as options and interest rate and foreign currency swaps) from acceptable counterparties of the types and in the quantities needed could also affect our ability to effectively manage the risks related to our investment funding. Our strategies and efforts to manage our exposures to these risks may not be effective. In particular, various factors, including uncertainty concerning trends in home prices, have made it more difficult for us to estimate future prepayments. This could make it more difficult for us to manage prepayment risk, and could cause our hedging-related losses to increase. See QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DISCLOSURES ABOUT MARKET RISK for a description of the types of market risks to which we are exposed and how we seek to manage those risks.

***Changes in OAS could materially impact our fair value of net assets and affect future results of operations and stockholders equity (deficit).***

OAS is an estimate of the yield spread between a given security and an agency debt yield curve. This includes consideration of potential variability in the security s cash flows resulting from any options embedded in the security, such as prepayment options. The OAS between the mortgage and agency debt sectors can significantly affect the fair value of our net assets. The fair value impact of changes in OAS for a given period represents an estimate of the net unrealized increase or decrease in the fair value of net assets arising from net fluctuations in OAS during that period. We do not attempt to hedge or actively manage the impact of changes in mortgage-to-debt OAS.

Changes in market conditions, including changes in interest rates, may cause fluctuations in OAS. A widening of the OAS on a given asset, which typically causes a decline in the current fair value of that asset, may cause significant mark-to-fair value losses, and may adversely affect our financial results and stockholders equity (deficit), but may increase the number of attractive investment opportunities in mortgage loans and mortgage-related securities. Conversely, a narrowing or tightening of the OAS typically causes an increase in the current fair value of that asset, but may reduce the number of attractive investment opportunities in mortgage loans and mortgage-related securities. Consequently, a tightening of the OAS may adversely affect our future financial results and stockholders equity (deficit). See MD&A FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENTS AND ANALYSIS Discussion of Fair Value Results for a more detailed description of the impacts of changes in mortgage-to-debt OAS.

While wider spreads might create favorable investment opportunities, we are limited in our ability to take advantage of any such opportunities because, under the Purchase Agreement and FHFA regulation, the UPB of our mortgage-related investments portfolio is subject to a cap that declines by 10% per year beginning in 2010 until it reaches $250 billion. FHFA has stated its expectation in the Acting Director s February 2, 2010 letter that any net additions to our mortgage-related investments portfolio would be related to purchasing delinquent mortgages out of PC pools.

***We could experience significant reputational harm, which could affect the future of our company, if our efforts under the MHA Program, and other initiatives to support the U.S. residential mortgage market do not succeed.***

We are focused on the MHA Program and other initiatives to support the U.S. residential mortgage market. If these initiatives do not achieve their desired results, or are otherwise perceived to have failed to achieve their objectives, we may experience damage to our reputation, which may impact the extent of future government support for our business and government decisions with respect to the future status and role of Freddie Mac.

***Negative publicity causing damage to our reputation could adversely affect our business prospects, financial results or net worth.***

Reputation risk, or the risk to our financial results and net worth from negative public opinion, is inherent in our business. Negative public opinion could adversely affect our ability to keep and attract customers or otherwise impair our customer relationships, adversely affect our ability to obtain financing, impede our ability to hire and retain qualified personnel, hinder our business prospects or adversely impact the trading price of our securities. Perceptions regarding the practices of our competitors, our seller/servicers or the financial services and mortgage industries as a whole, particularly as they relate to the current economic downturn, may also adversely impact our reputation. Adverse reputation impacts on third parties with whom we have important relationships may impair market confidence or investor confidence in our business

operations as well. In addition, negative publicity could expose us to adverse legal and regulatory consequences, including greater regulatory scrutiny or adverse regulatory or legislative changes, and could affect what changes may occur to our business structure during or following conservatorship, including whether we will continue to exist. These adverse consequences could result from perceptions concerning our activities and role in addressing the mortgage market crisis, the concerns about deficiencies in foreclosure documentation practices or our actual or alleged action or failure to act in any number of areas, including corporate governance, regulatory compliance, financial reporting and disclosure, purchases of products perceived to be predatory, safeguarding or using nonpublic personal information, or from actions taken by government regulators in response to our actual or alleged conduct.

***The MHA Program and other efforts to reduce foreclosures, modify loan terms and refinance mortgages may fail to mitigate our credit losses and may adversely affect our results of operations or financial condition.***

The MHA Program and other loss mitigation activities are a key component of our strategy for managing and resolving troubled assets and lowering credit losses. However, there can be no assurance that any of our loss mitigation strategies will be successful and that credit losses will not continue to escalate. To the extent that borrowers participate in HAMP in large numbers, it is likely that the costs we incur related to loan modifications and other activities under HAMP will be substantial because we will bear the full cost of the monthly payment reductions related to modifications of loans we own or guarantee, and all servicer and borrower incentive fees. We will not be reimbursed for these costs by Treasury.

FHFA has directed us to implement HAMP for troubled mortgages we own or guarantee. It is possible that Treasury could make changes to HAMP that, to the extent we were required to or elected to implement them, could make the program more costly to us, both in terms of credit expenses and the cost of implementing and operating the program. We could also be required or elect to make changes to our implementation of our other loss mitigation activities that could make these activities more costly to us. For example, we could be required to, or elect to, use principal reduction to achieve reduced payments for borrowers. This could further increase our losses, as we could bear the full costs of such reductions.

In June 2010, Treasury announced an initiative under which servicers will be required to consider an alternative modification approach that includes a possible reduction of principal for loans with LTV ratios over 115%. Mortgage investors will receive incentives based on the amount of reduced principal. In October 2010, Treasury provided guidance with respect to applying this alternative for borrowers who have already received permanent modifications or are in trial plans. Holders of mortgages and mortgage-related securities are not required to agree to a reduction of principal, but servicers must have a process for considering the approach. We do not currently have plans to apply these changes to mortgages that we own or guarantee. However, it is possible that FHFA might direct us to implement some or all of these changes. Our credit losses could increase to the extent we apply these changes.

A significant number of loans are in the trial period of HAMP. Although the ultimate completion rate remains uncertain, a large number of loans have failed to complete the trial period or qualify for any of our other loan modification and loss mitigation programs. It is possible that, in the future, additional loans will fail to complete the trial period or qualify for these other programs. For these loans, HAMP will have effectively delayed the foreclosure process and could increase our losses, to the extent the prices we ultimately receive for the foreclosed properties are less than the prices we could have received had we foreclosed upon the properties earlier, due to continued home price declines. These delays in foreclosure could also cause our REO operations expense to increase, perhaps substantially.

Our seller/servicers have a key role in the success of our loss mitigation activities. The continued increases in seriously delinquent loan volume, the ongoing weak conditions of the mortgage market during 2009 and 2010, and the number and variety of additions and changes to HAMP have placed a strain on the loss mitigation resources of many of our seller/servicers. This has also increased the operational complexity of the servicing function, as well as the risk

that errors will occur. A decline in the performance of seller/servicers in mitigation efforts could result in missed opportunities for successful loan modifications, an increase in our credit losses and damage to our reputation.

Mortgage modifications on the scale of HAMP, particularly any new focus on principal reductions, have the potential to change borrower behavior and mortgage underwriting. This, coupled with the phenomenon of widespread underwater mortgages, could significantly affect borrower attitudes towards homeownership, the commitment of borrowers to making their mortgage payments, the way the market values residential mortgage assets, the way in which we conduct business and, ultimately, our financial results.

Depending on the type of loss mitigation activities we pursue, those activities could result in accelerating or slowing prepayments on our PCs and REMICs and Other Structured Securities, either of which could negatively affect the pricing of such securities.

We are devoting significant internal resources to the implementation of the various initiatives under the MHA Program, which has, and will continue to, increase our expenses. The size and scope of our effort under the MHA Program may also limit our ability to pursue other business opportunities or corporate initiatives.

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***Our relationships with our customers could be harmed by our actions as the compliance agent under HAMP, which could negatively affect our ability to purchase loans from them in the future.***

We are the compliance agent for certain foreclosure avoidance activities under HAMP by mortgage holders other than Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae. In this role, we conduct examinations and review servicer compliance with the published requirements for the program. It is unclear how servicers will perceive our actions as compliance agent. It is possible that this could impair our relationships with our seller/servicers, which could negatively affect our ability to purchase loans from them in the future.

***We may experience further write-downs and losses relating to our assets, including our investment securities, net deferred tax assets, REO properties or mortgage loans, that could materially adversely affect our business, results of operations, financial condition, liquidity and net worth.***

We experienced significant losses and write-downs relating to certain of our assets during 2008, 2009, and 2010, including significant declines in market value, impairments of our investment securities, market-based write-downs of REO properties, losses on non-performing loans purchased out of PC pools, and impairments on other assets. The fair value of our assets may be further adversely affected by continued weakness in the economy, further deterioration in the housing and financial markets, additional ratings downgrades or other events.

We increased our valuation allowance for our net deferred tax assets by $8.3 billion during 2010. The future status and role of Freddie Mac could be affected by actions of the Conservator, and legislative and regulatory action that alters the ownership, structure and mission of the company. The uncertainty of these developments could materially affect our operations, which could in turn affect our ability or intent to hold investments until the recovery of any temporary unrealized losses. If future events significantly alter our current outlook, a valuation allowance may need to be established for the remaining deferred tax asset.

Due to the ongoing weaknesses in the economy and in the housing and financial markets, we may experience additional write-downs and losses relating to our assets, including those that are currently AAA-rated, and the fair values of our assets may continue to decline. This could adversely affect our results of operations, financial condition, liquidity and net worth.

We could also incur losses related to our REO properties due to the occurrence of a major natural or other disaster, such as hurricanes in Florida or earthquakes in California.

***There may not be an active, liquid trading market for our equity securities.***

Our common stock and classes of preferred stock that previously were listed and traded on the NYSE were delisted from the NYSE effective July 8, 2010, and now trade on the OTC market. The market price of our common stock declined significantly between June 16, 2010, the date we announced our intention to delist these securities, and July 8, 2010, the first day the common stock traded exclusively on the OTC market, and may decline further. Trading volumes on the OTC market have been, and will likely continue to be, less than those on the NYSE, which would make it more difficult for investors to execute transactions in our securities and could make the prices of our securities decline or be more volatile.

**Operational Risks**

***We have incurred and will continue to incur expenses and we may otherwise be adversely affected by deficiencies in foreclosure practices, as well as related delays in the foreclosure process.***

In the fall of 2010, several large seller/servicers announced issues relating to the improper preparation and execution of certain documents used in foreclosure proceedings, including affidavits. These announcements have raised various concerns relating to foreclosure practices. The integrity of the foreclosure process is critical to our business, and our financial results could be adversely affected by deficiencies in the conduct of that process.

A number of our seller/servicers, including several of our largest ones, temporarily suspended foreclosure proceedings in certain states in which they do business while they evaluated and addressed these issues. A number of these companies continue to address these issues, and certain of these suspensions remain in effect. In addition, a group consisting of state attorneys general and state bank and mortgage regulators in all 50 states and the District of Columbia is reviewing foreclosure practices. Some seller/servicers have announced issues relating to the improper execution of the documents used in foreclosure proceedings. In November 2010, we terminated the eligibility of one law firm to serve as counsel in foreclosures of Freddie Mac mortgages, due to issues with respect to the firm s foreclosure practices. That firm had been responsible for handling a significant number of foreclosures for our servicers in Florida. It is possible that additional deficiencies in foreclosure practices will be identified, including relating to the foregoing.

These issues and the related foreclosure suspensions could prolong the foreclosure process regionally or nationwide and could delay sales of our REO properties. The deficiencies in the conduct of the foreclosure process potentially affect the validity of a number of actions that have already been taken, including foreclosure transfers through which we acquired some of our REO properties and sales of some of our REO properties. It will take time for seller/servicers to complete their

evaluations of these issues and implement remedial actions. It is possible that different procedures will need to be developed and implemented for individual states because of differences in applicable state laws. In addition, a number of parties involved in residential real estate transactions as well as various federal, state and local regulatory authorities, may need to agree to any remedial actions, which could further complicate and delay the process of resolving these issues. These parties potentially include seller/servicers, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, FHFA, state or local authorities, mortgage insurers and title insurance companies. In many cases, the remedial actions will require court approval. It is possible that courts in different states, as well as individual courts within the same state, may come to different conclusions with respect to what remedial actions are acceptable.

Any delays in the foreclosure process could cause properties awaiting foreclosure to deteriorate until we acquire ownership of them through foreclosure. Such deterioration would increase our expenses to repair and maintain the properties when we do acquire them. Delays in selling REO properties could cause our REO operations expense for current REO properties to increase because those properties will stay in REO status for a longer period of time, which would increase the ongoing costs we incur to maintain or protect them. In addition, our disposition losses, which are a component of REO operations expense, could increase to the extent home prices decline during this period of delay and the prices we ultimately receive for the REO properties are less than the prices we could have received had we acquired and sold them earlier.

Concerns about the impact of deficient foreclosure practices on title to REO properties may create additional uncertainty among mortgage investors and potential home buyers about future trends in home prices. Over the long term, concerns about foreclosure practices may adversely affect trends in home prices regionally or nationally, which could also adversely affect our financial results. These concerns could increase both the uncertainty about the results of our models and the risk of errors in the implementation, operation or use of our models, in part because greater management judgment will need to be applied.

Any delays in the foreclosure process could also create fluctuations in our single-family credit statistics, including our credit loss statistics and reported serious delinquency rates. Our realization of credit losses, which consists of REO operations income (expense) plus charge-offs, net, could be delayed because we record charge-offs at the time we take ownership of a property through foreclosure. Delays in the foreclosure process could reduce the rate at which delinquent loans proceed to foreclosure, which could cause a temporary decline in our REO acquisitions and the rate of growth of our REO inventory. This could also temporarily increase the number of seriously delinquent loans that remain in our single-family mortgage portfolio, which could result in higher reported serious delinquency rates and a larger number of non-performing loans than would otherwise have been the case.

It also is possible that mortgage insurance claims could be denied if delays caused by servicers deficient foreclosure practices prevent servicers from completing foreclosures within required timelines defined by mortgage insurers.

We have incurred, and will continue to incur, expenses related to deficiencies in foreclosure documentation practices and the costs of remediating them, which may be significant. These costs will include expenses to remediate issues relating to practices of certain legal counsel that will increase our expenses in future periods. We may also incur costs if we become involved in litigation or investigations relating to these issues. While we believe that our seller/servicers would be in violation of their servicing contracts with us to the extent that they improperly executed documents in foreclosure or bankruptcy proceedings, as such contracts require that foreclosure proceedings be conducted in accordance with applicable law, it may be difficult, expensive, and time consuming for us to enforce our contractual rights. Our efforts to enforce our contractual rights may negatively impact our relationships with these seller/servicers, some of which are among our largest sources of mortgage loans.

We expect that remedying the document execution issues affecting the foreclosure process and related developments will likely place further strain on the resources of our seller/servicers, possibly including seller/servicers where such

issues have not been identified to date. This could negatively affect their ability to service loans in our single-family mortgage portfolio or the quality of service they provide to us. Since our seller/servicers have an active role in our loss mitigation efforts, this could impact the overall quality of our credit performance and our ability to mitigate credit losses.

Delays in the foreclosure process may also adversely affect the values of, and our losses on, the non-agency mortgage-related securities we hold. Foreclosure delays may increase the administrative expenses of the securitization trusts for the non-agency mortgage-related securities, thereby reducing the amount of funds available for distribution to investors. In addition, the subordinate classes of securities issued by the securitization trusts will continue to receive interest payments while the defaulted loans remain in the trusts, rather than absorbing the default losses. This may reduce the amount of funds available for the senior tranches we own. The prospect of losses due to these impacts could adversely affect the market value of non-agency mortgage-related securities we own.

It has been difficult for us to determine the potential scope of these issues, in part because we must rely on our seller/servicers for much of the pertinent information and these companies have not yet completed their assessments of these

issues. Our evaluation of these issues, as well as the evaluations made by the seller/servicers, is complicated by the fact that state law governs the foreclosure process and, thus, the laws and regulations of a large number of different states must be examined.

***Issues related to mortgages recorded through MERS could delay or disrupt foreclosure activities and have an adverse effect on our business.***

The Mortgage Electronic Registration System, or the MERS® System, is an electronic registry that is widely used by seller/servicers, Freddie Mac, and other participants in the mortgage finance industry, to maintain records of beneficial ownership of mortgages. The MERS System is maintained by MERSCORP, Inc., a privately held company, the shareholders of which include a number of organizations in the mortgage industry, including Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, and certain seller/servicers, mortgage insurance companies and title insurance companies.

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., or MERS, a wholly-owned subsidiary of MERSCORP, Inc., has the ability to serve as a nominee for the owner of a mortgage loan and in that role become the mortgagee of record for the loan in local land records. Freddie Mac seller/servicers may choose to use MERS as a nominee, and to initiate foreclosures in MERS name. Approximately 39% of the loans Freddie Mac owns or guarantees are registered in MERS name; the beneficial ownership and the ownership of the servicing rights related to those loans are tracked in the MERS System.

MERS has been the subject of numerous lawsuits challenging foreclosures on mortgages for which MERS is mortgagee of record as nominee for the beneficial owner. It is possible that adverse judicial decisions, regulatory proceedings or action, or legislative action related to MERS, could delay or disrupt foreclosure of mortgages that are registered on the MERS System. Publicity concerning regulatory or judicial decisions, even if such decisions were not adverse, or MERS-related concerns about the integrity of the assignment process, could adversely affect the mortgage industry and negatively impact public confidence in the foreclosure process, which could lead to legislative or regulatory action. Because MERS often executes legal documents in connection with foreclosure proceedings, it is possible that investigations by governmental authorities and others into deficiencies in foreclosure practices may negatively impact MERS and the MERS System.

Federal or state legislation or regulatory action also could prevent us from using the MERS System for mortgages that we currently own, guarantee, and securitize and for mortgages acquired in the future, or could create additional requirements for the transfer of mortgages that could affect the process for and costs of acquiring, transferring, servicing, and foreclosing mortgages. Such legislation or regulatory action could increase our costs or otherwise adversely affect our business. For example, we could be required to transfer mortgages out of the MERS System. There is also uncertainty regarding the extent to which seller/servicers will choose to use the MERS System in the future.

Failures by MERS to apply prudent and effective process controls and to comply with legal and other requirements in the foreclosure process could pose legal, operational and reputational risks for us.

We cannot predict the impact that such events or actions may have on our business.

***Weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting and in disclosure controls could result in errors and inadequate disclosures, affect operating results and cause investors to lose confidence in our reported results.***

We face continuing challenges because of deficiencies in our controls. Control deficiencies could result in errors, and lead to inadequate or untimely disclosures, affect operating results and cause investors to lose confidence in our reported financial results. For information about our ineffective disclosure controls and remaining material weakness

in internal control over financial reporting, see CONTROLS AND PROCEDURES.

There are a number of factors that may impede our efforts to establish and maintain effective disclosure controls and internal control over financial reporting, including: the nature of the conservatorship and our relationship with FHFA; the complexity of, and significant changes in, our business activities and related GAAP requirements; significant management changes and internal reorganizations in 2010; uncertainty regarding the sustainability of newly established controls; data quality or servicing-related issues; and the uncertain impacts of the ongoing housing and credit market volatility on the results of our models, which are used for financial accounting and reporting purposes. We cannot be certain that our efforts to improve and maintain our internal control over financial reporting will ultimately be successful.

Effectively designed and operated internal control over financial reporting provides only reasonable assurance that material errors in our financial statements will be prevented or detected on a timely basis. A failure to maintain effective internal control over financial reporting increases the risk of a material error in our reported financial results and delay in our financial reporting timeline. Depending on the nature of a control failure and any required remediation, ineffective controls could have a material adverse effect on our business.

Ineffective controls could also cause investors to lose confidence in our reported financial information, which may have an adverse effect on the trading price of our securities.

***We face risks and uncertainties associated with the internal models that we use for financial accounting and reporting purposes, to make business decisions and to manage risks. Market conditions have raised these risks and uncertainties.***

We make significant use of business and financial models for financial accounting and reporting purposes and to manage risk. We face risk associated with our use of models. First, there is inherently some uncertainty associated with model results. Second, we could fail to properly implement, operate or use our models. Either of these situations could adversely affect our financial statements and our ability to manage risks.

We use market-based information as inputs to our models. However, it can take time for data providers to prepare information, and thus the most recent market information may not be available for the preparation of our financial statements. When market conditions change quickly and in unforeseen ways, there is an increased risk that the inputs reflected in our models are not representative of current market conditions.

The severe deterioration of the housing and credit markets beginning several years ago and, more recently, the extended period of economic weakness and uncertainty has increased the risks associated with our use of models. Our models may not perform as well in situations for which there are few or no recent historical precedents. We have adjusted our models in response to recent events, but there remains some uncertainty about model results.

Models are inherently imperfect predictors of actual results. Our models rely on various assumptions that may be incorrect, including that historical experience can be used to predict future results. It has been more difficult to predict the behaviors of the housing and credit capital markets and market participants over the past several years, due to, among other factors: (a) the uncertainty concerning trends in home prices; (b) the lack of historical evidence about the behavior of deeply underwater borrowers, the effect of an extended period of extremely low interest rates on prepayments, and the impact of widespread loan modification programs, including the potential for the extensive use of principal reductions; and (c) the impact of the concerns about deficiencies in foreclosure documentation practices and related delays in the foreclosure process.

We face the risk that we could fail to implement, operate or use our models properly. For example, the assumptions underlying a model could be invalid, or we could apply a model to events or products outside the model s intended use. We may fail to code a model correctly, or we could use incorrect data. The complexity and interconnectivity of our models create additional risk regarding the accuracy of model output. While we have processes and controls in place designed to mitigate these risks, there can be no assurances that such processes and controls will be successful.

Management often needs to exercise judgment to interpret or adjust modeled results to take into account new information or changes in conditions. The dramatic changes in the housing and credit capital markets in recent years have required frequent adjustments to our models and the application of greater management judgment in the interpretation and adjustment of the results produced by our models. This further increases both the uncertainty about model results and the risk of errors in the implementation, operation or use of the models.

We face the risk that the valuations, risk metrics, amortization results, loan loss reserve estimations and security impairment charges produced by our internal models may be different from actual results, which could adversely affect our business results, cash flows, fair value of net assets, business prospects and future financial results. Changes in, or replacements of, any of our models or in any of the assumptions, judgments or estimates used in the models may cause the results generated by the model to be materially different from those generated by the prior model. The different results could cause a revision of previously reported financial condition or results of operations, depending on when the change to the model, assumption, judgment or estimate is implemented. Any such changes may also cause difficulties in comparisons of the financial condition or results of operations of prior or future periods.

Due to increased uncertainty about model results, we also face increased risk that we could make poor business decisions in areas where model results are an important factor, including loan purchases, management and guarantee fee pricing and asset and liability management. Furthermore, any strategies we employ to attempt to manage the risks associated with our use of models may not be effective. See MD&A CRITICAL ACCOUNTING POLICIES AND ESTIMATES and QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DISCLOSURES ABOUT MARKET RISK Interest-Rate Risk and Other Market Risks for more information on our use of models.

***Changes in our accounting policies, as well as estimates we make, could materially affect how we report our financial condition or results of operations.***

Our accounting policies are fundamental to understanding our financial condition and results of operations. Certain of our accounting policies, as well as estimates we make, are critical, as they are both important to the presentation of our financial condition and results of operations and they require management to make particularly difficult, complex or subjective judgments and estimates, often regarding matters that are inherently uncertain. Actual results could differ from our estimates and the use of different judgments and assumptions related to these policies and estimates could have a material

impact on our consolidated financial statements. For a description of our critical accounting policies, see MD&A CRITICAL ACCOUNTING POLICIES AND ESTIMATES.

From time to time, the FASB and the SEC change the financial accounting and reporting standards that govern the preparation of our financial statements. These changes are beyond our control, can be difficult to predict and could materially impact how we report our financial condition and results of operations. We could be required to apply a new or revised standard retrospectively, which may result in the revision of prior period financial statements by material amounts. The implementation of new or revised accounting standards could result in material adverse effects to our stockholders equity (deficit) and result in or contribute to the need for additional draws under the Purchase Agreement.

See NOTE 1: SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING POLICIES and NOTE 2: CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES for more information.

***A failure in our operational systems or infrastructure, or those of third parties, could impair our liquidity, disrupt our business, damage our reputation and cause losses.***

Shortcomings or failures in our internal processes, people or systems could lead to impairment of our liquidity, financial loss, errors in our financial statements, disruption of our business, liability to customers, further legislative or regulatory intervention or reputational damage. We experienced a number of operational problems in 2010 related to inadequately designed or improperly executed systems. Servicing and loss mitigation processes are currently under considerable stress, which increases the risk that we may experience further operational problems in the future. Corporate reorganizations, inability to retain key staff members, and our efforts to reduce administrative expenses may increase the stress on existing processes.

Our business is highly dependent on our ability to process a large number of transactions on a daily basis and manage and analyze significant amounts of information, much of which is provided by third parties. The transactions we process are complex and are subject to various legal, accounting and regulatory standards. The types of transactions we process and the standards relating to those transactions can change rapidly in response to external events, such as the implementation of government-mandated programs and changes in market conditions. Our financial, accounting, data processing or other operating systems and facilities may fail to operate properly or become disabled, adversely affecting our ability to process these transactions. The information provided by third parties may be incorrect, or we may fail to properly manage or analyze it. Our core systems and technical architecture include many legacy systems and applications that lack scalability and flexibility, which increases the risk of system failure. The inability of our systems to accommodate an increasing volume of transactions or new types of transactions or products could constrain our ability to pursue new business initiatives. We are investing considerable resources in a long-term project to improve our existing systems infrastructure. There can be no assurance that we will be able to complete this project successfully, or that it will reduce our operational risk. In the past, we have had difficulty in conducting similar large-scale infrastructure improvement projects.

Our employees could act improperly for their own gain and cause unexpected losses or reputational damage. While we have processes and systems in place to prevent and detect fraud, there can be no assurance that such processes and systems will be successful.

We also face the risk of operational failure or termination of any of the clearing agents, exchanges, clearinghouses or other financial intermediaries we use to facilitate our securities and derivatives transactions. Any such failure or termination could adversely affect our ability to effect transactions, service our customers and manage our exposure to risk.

Most of our key business activities are conducted in our principal offices located in McLean, Virginia. Despite the contingency plans and facilities we have in place, our ability to conduct business may be adversely impacted by a disruption in the infrastructure that supports our business and the communities in which we are located. Potential disruptions may include those involving electrical, communications, transportation or other services we use or that are provided to us. If a disruption occurs and our employees are unable to occupy our offices or communicate with or travel to other locations, our ability to service and interact with our customers or counterparties may suffer and we may not be able to successfully implement contingency plans that depend on communication or travel.

We are exposed to the risk that a catastrophic event, such as a terrorist event or natural disaster, could result in a significant business disruption and an inability to process transactions through normal business processes. Any measures we take to mitigate this risk may not be sufficient to respond to the full range of catastrophic events that may occur.

***We may not be able to protect the confidentiality of our information.***

Our operations rely on the secure processing, storage and transmission of confidential and other information in our computer systems and networks. Our computer systems, software and networks may be vulnerable to unauthorized access, computer viruses or other malicious code and other events that could have a security impact. If one or more of such events occur, this potentially could jeopardize confidential and other information, including nonpublic personal information and

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sensitive business data, processed and stored in, and transmitted through, our computer systems and networks, or otherwise cause interruptions or malfunctions in our operations or the operations of our customers or counterparties, which could result in significant losses or reputational damage. We may be required to expend significant additional resources to modify our protective measures or to investigate and remediate vulnerabilities or other exposures, and we may be subject to litigation and financial losses that are not fully insured.

***We rely on third parties for certain important functions, including some that are critical to financial reporting, our mortgage-related investment activity and mortgage loan underwriting. Any failures by those vendors could disrupt our business operations.***

We outsource certain key functions to external parties, including: (a) processing functions for trade capture, market risk management analytics, and financial instrument valuation; (b) custody and recordkeeping for our mortgage-related investments; (c) processing functions for mortgage loan underwriting and servicing; and (d) certain services we provide to Treasury in our role as program compliance agent under HAMP. We may enter into other key outsourcing relationships in the future. If one or more of these key external parties were not able to perform their functions for a period of time, at an acceptable service level, or for increased volumes, our business operations could be constrained, disrupted or otherwise negatively impacted. Our use of vendors also exposes us to the risk of a loss of intellectual property or of confidential information or other harm. We may also be exposed to reputational harm, to the extent vendors do not conduct their activities under appropriate ethical standards. Financial or operational difficulties of an outside vendor could also hurt our operations if those difficulties interfere with the vendor s ability to provide services to us.

***Our risk management efforts may not effectively mitigate the risks we seek to manage.***

We could incur substantial losses and our business operations could be disrupted if we are unable to effectively identify, manage, monitor and mitigate operational risks, interest rate and other market risks and credit risks related to our business. Our risk management policies, procedures and techniques may not be sufficient to mitigate the risks we have identified or to appropriately identify additional risks to which we are subject. See QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DISCLOSURES ABOUT MARKET RISK and MD&A RISK MANAGEMENT for a discussion of our approach to managing the risks we face.

**Legal and Regulatory Risks**

***The Dodd-Frank Act and related regulation may adversely affect our business activities and financial results.***

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which was signed into law on July 21, 2010, significantly changed the regulation of the financial services industry and could affect us in substantial and unforeseeable ways and have an adverse effect on our business, results of operations, financial condition, liquidity and net worth. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act and related future regulatory changes could impact the value of assets that we hold, require us to change certain of our business practices, impose significant additional costs on us, limit the products we offer, require us to increase our regulatory capital, or make it more difficult for us to retain and recruit management and other valuable employees. We will also face a more complicated regulatory environment due to the Dodd-Frank Act and related future regulatory changes, which will increase compliance costs and could divert management attention or other resources. The Dodd-Frank Act and related future regulatory changes will also significantly affect many aspects of the financial services industry and potentially change the business practices of our customers and counterparties; it is possible that any such changes could adversely affect our business and financial results.

Implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act is being accomplished through numerous rulemakings, many of which are expected to be finalized in 2011. The final effects of the legislation will not be known with certainty until these rulemakings are complete. The Dodd-Frank Act also mandates the preparation of studies of a wide range of issues, which could lead to additional legislative or regulatory changes. It could be difficult for us to comply with any future regulatory changes in a timely manner, due to the potential scope and number of such changes, which could limit our operations and expose us to liability.

The long-term impact of the Dodd-Frank Act and related future regulatory changes on our business and the financial services industry will depend on a number of factors that are difficult to predict, including our ability to successfully implement any changes to our business, changes in consumer behavior and our competitors and customers responses to the Dodd-Frank Act and related future regulatory changes.

Examples of aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act that may significantly affect us include the following:

The new Financial Stability Oversight Council could designate Freddie Mac as a non-bank financial company to be subject to supervision and regulation by the Federal Reserve. If this occurs, the Federal Reserve will have authority to examine Freddie Mac and we may be required to meet more stringent prudential standards than those applicable to

other non-bank financial companies. New prudential standards potentially could include capital requirements that are based on standards applicable to insured depository institutions.

The Dodd-Frank Act will have a significant impact on the derivatives market, including by subjecting large derivatives users, which may include Freddie Mac, to extensive new oversight and regulation. These new regulatory standards could impose significant additional costs on us relating to derivatives transactions and it may become more difficult for us to enter into desired hedging transactions with acceptable counterparties on favorable terms.

The Dodd-Frank Act will create new standards and requirements related to asset-backed securities, including requiring securitizers and potentially originators to retain a portion of the underlying loans credit risk. Any such new standards and requirements could weaken or remove incentives for financial institutions to sell mortgage loans to us.

The Dodd-Frank Act and related future regulatory changes could negatively impact the volume of mortgage originations, and thus adversely affect the number of mortgages available for us to purchase.

Under the Dodd-Frank Act, new minimum mortgage underwriting standards will be required for residential mortgages, including a requirement that lenders make a reasonable and good faith determination based on verified and documented information that the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the mortgage. The Act requires regulators to establish a class of qualified loans that will receive certain protections from legal liability, such as the borrower s right to rescind the loan and seek damages. Mortgage originators and assignees, including Freddie Mac, may be subject to increased legal risk for loans that do not meet these requirements.

Under the Dodd-Frank Act, federal regulators, including FHFA, are directed to promulgate regulations, to be applicable to financial institutions, including Freddie Mac, that will prohibit incentive-based compensation structures that the regulators determine encourage inappropriate risks by providing excessive compensation or benefits or that could lead to material financial loss. It is possible that any such regulations will have an adverse effect on our ability to retain and recruit management and other valuable employees, as we may be at a competitive disadvantage as compared to other potential employers not subject to these or similar regulations.

For more information on the Dodd-Frank Act, see BUSINESS Regulation and Supervision *Legislative and Regulatory Developments*.

***Legislative or regulatory actions could adversely affect our business activities and financial results.***

In addition to possible GSE reform legislation and the Dodd-Frank Act discussed above, our business initiatives may be directly adversely affected by other legislative and regulatory actions at the federal, state and local levels. We could be negatively affected by legislation or regulatory action that changes the foreclosure process of any individual state. For example, various states and local jurisdictions have implemented mediation programs designed to bring servicers and borrowers together to negotiate workout options. These actions could delay the foreclosure process and increase our expenses, including by potentially delaying the final resolution of delinquent mortgage loans and the disposition of non-performing assets. We could also be affected by any legislative or regulatory changes to existing bankruptcy laws or proceedings or foreclosure processes, including any changes that would allow bankruptcy judges to unilaterally change the terms of mortgage loans or otherwise require principal reductions. Our business could also be adversely affected by any modification, reduction or repeal of the federal income tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments.

Legislation or regulatory actions could indirectly adversely affect us to the extent such legislation or actions affect the activities of banks, savings institutions, insurance companies, securities dealers and other regulated entities that constitute a significant part of our customer base or counterparties, or could indirectly affect us to the extent that they modify industry practices. Legislative or regulatory provisions that create or remove incentives for these entities to sell mortgage loans to us, purchase our securities or enter into derivatives or other transactions with us could have a material adverse effect on our business results and financial condition.

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is in the process of substantially revising capital guidelines for financial institutions and has recently finalized portions of the so-called Basel III guidelines, which would set new capital and liquidity requirements for banks. Phase-in of Basel III is expected to take several years and there is significant uncertainty about how regulators might implement these guidelines or how the resulting regulations might impact us. For example, it is possible that any new regulations on the capital treatment of mortgage servicing rights, risk-based capital requirements for credit risk, and liquidity treatment of our debt and guarantee obligations could adversely affect our business results and financial condition.

***We may make certain changes to our business in an attempt to meet the housing goals and subgoals set for us by FHFA that may increase our losses.***

We may make adjustments to our mortgage loan sourcing and purchase strategies in an effort to meet our housing goals and subgoals, including changes to our underwriting guidelines and the expanded use of targeted initiatives to reach

underserved populations. For example, we may purchase loans that offer lower expected returns on our investment and increase our exposure to credit losses. Doing so could cause us to forgo other purchase opportunities that we would expect to be more profitable. If our current efforts to meet the goals and subgoals prove to be insufficient, we may need to take additional steps that could further increase our losses. FHFA has not yet published a final rule with respect to our duty to serve underserved markets. However, it is possible that we could also make changes to our business in the future in response to this duty. If we do not meet our housing goals or duty to serve requirements, and FHFA finds that the goals or requirements were feasible, we may become subject to a housing plan that could require us to take additional steps that could have an adverse effect on our results of operations and financial condition.

***We are involved in legal proceedings, governmental investigations and IRS examinations that could result in the payment of substantial damages or otherwise harm our business.***

We are a party to various legal actions, including litigation in the U.S. Tax Court as result of a dispute of certain tax matters with the IRS related to our 1998 through 2005 federal income tax returns. We are also subject to investigations by the SEC and the U.S. Attorney s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. In addition, certain of our current and former directors, officers and employees are involved in legal proceedings for which they may be entitled to reimbursement by us for costs and expenses of the proceedings. The defense of these or any future claims or proceedings could divert management s attention and resources from the needs of the business. We may be required to establish reserves and to make substantial payments in the event of adverse judgments or settlements of any such claims, investigations, proceedings or examinations. Any legal proceeding, governmental investigation or examination issue, even if resolved in our favor, could result in negative publicity or cause us to incur significant legal and other expenses. Furthermore, developments in, outcomes of, impacts of, and costs, expenses, settlements and judgments related to these legal proceedings and governmental investigations and examinations may differ from our expectations and exceed any amounts for which we have reserved or require adjustments to such reserves. We are also cooperating with other investigations, such as the review being conducted by state attorneys general and state bank and mortgage regulators into foreclosure practices. These proceedings could divert management s attention or other resources. See LEGAL PROCEEDINGS for information about our pending legal proceedings and NOTE 14: INCOME TAXES for information about our litigation with the IRS relating to potential additional income taxes and penalties for the 1998 to 2005 tax years and other tax-related matters.

## ITEM 1B. UNRESOLVED STAFF COMMENTS

None.

## ITEM 2. PROPERTIES

Our principal offices consist of five office buildings in McLean, Virginia. We own four of the office buildings, comprising approximately 1.3 million square feet. We occupy the fifth building, comprising approximately 200,000 square feet, under a lease from a third party.

## ITEM 3. LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

We are involved as a party to a variety of legal proceedings arising from time to time in the ordinary course of business. See NOTE 21: LEGAL CONTINGENCIES for more information regarding our involvement as a party to various legal proceedings.

**ITEM 4. RESERVED**

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# PART II

## ITEM 5. MARKET FOR REGISTRANT S COMMON EQUITY, RELATED STOCKHOLDER MATTERS AND ISSUER PURCHASES OF EQUITY SECURITIES

### Market Information

Our common stock, par value $0.00 per share, trades in the OTC market and is quoted on the OTC Bulletin Board under the ticker symbol FMCC. As of February 11, 2011, there were 649,182,461 shares of our common stock outstanding.

On July 8, 2010, our common stock and 20 previously-listed classes of preferred securities were delisted from the NYSE. We delisted such securities pursuant to a directive by the Conservator. The classes of preferred stock that were previously listed on the NYSE also now trade in the OTC market.

Table 7 sets forth the high and low prices of our common stock on the NYSE and the high and low bid information for our common stock on the OTC Bulletin Board for the indicated periods. The OTC Bulletin Board quotations reflect inter-dealer prices, without retail mark-up, mark-down, or commission and may not necessarily represent actual transactions.

**Table 7 Quarterly Common Stock Information**

| | High | Low |
|---|---|---|
| **2010 Quarter Ended** | | |
| December 31(1) | $ 0.50 | $ 0.29 |
| September 30(2) | 0.44 | 0.24 |
| June 30(3) | 1.68 | 0.40 |
| March 31(3) | 1.52 | 1.12 |
| **2009 Quarter Ended(3)** | | |
| December 31 | $ 1.86 | $ 1.02 |
| September 30 | 2.50 | 0.54 |
| June 30 | 1.05 | 0.53 |
| March 31 | 1.50 | 0.35 |

(1) Based on bid information for our common stock on the OTC Bulletin Board.
(2) Based on the prices of our common stock on the NYSE prior to July 8, 2010 and bid information for our common stock on the OTC Bulletin Board on and after July 8, 2010.
(3) Based on the prices of our common stock on the NYSE.

### Holders

As of February 11, 2011, we had 2,153 common stockholders of record.

### Dividends and Dividend Restrictions

We did not pay any cash dividends on our common stock during 2010 or 2009.

Our payment of dividends is subject to the following restrictions:

***Restrictions Relating to the Conservatorship***

As Conservator, FHFA announced on September 7, 2008 that we would not pay any dividends on Freddie Mac s common stock or on any series of Freddie Mac s preferred stock (other than the senior preferred stock). FHFA has instructed our Board of Directors that it should consult with and obtain the approval of FHFA before taking actions involving dividends.

***Restrictions Under the Purchase Agreement***

The Purchase Agreement prohibits us and any of our subsidiaries from declaring or paying any dividends on Freddie Mac equity securities (other than the senior preferred stock) without the prior written consent of Treasury.

***Restrictions Under the GSE Act***

Under the GSE Act, FHFA has authority to prohibit capital distributions, including payment of dividends, if we fail to meet applicable capital requirements. Under the GSE Act, we are not permitted to make a capital distribution if, after making the distribution, we would be undercapitalized, except the Director of FHFA may permit us to repurchase shares if the repurchase is made in connection with the issuance of additional shares or obligations in at least an equivalent amount and will reduce our financial obligations or otherwise improve our financial condition. If FHFA classifies us as undercapitalized, we are not permitted to make a capital distribution that would result in our being reclassified as significantly undercapitalized or critically undercapitalized. If FHFA classifies us as significantly undercapitalized, approval of the Director of FHFA is required for any dividend payment; the Director may approve a capital distribution only if the Director determines that the distribution will enhance the ability of the company to meet required capital levels promptly, will contribute to the long-term financial safety-and-soundness of the company or is otherwise in the public interest. Our capital requirements have been suspended during conservatorship.

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***Restrictions Under our Charter***

Without regard to our capital classification, we must obtain prior written approval of FHFA to make any capital distribution that would decrease total capital to an amount less than the risk-based capital level or that would decrease core capital to an amount less than the minimum capital level. As noted above, our capital requirements have been suspended during conservatorship.

***Restrictions Relating to Subordinated Debt***

During any period in which we defer payment of interest on qualifying subordinated debt, we may not declare or pay dividends on, or redeem, purchase or acquire, our common stock or preferred stock. Our qualifying subordinated debt provides for the deferral of the payment of interest for up to five years if either: (a) our core capital is below 125% of our critical capital requirement; or (b) our core capital is below our statutory minimum capital requirement, and the Secretary of the Treasury, acting on our request, exercises his or her discretionary authority pursuant to Section 306(c) of our charter to purchase our debt obligations. FHFA has directed us to make interest and principal payments on our subordinated debt, even if we fail to maintain required capital levels. As a result, the terms of any of our subordinated debt that provide for us to defer payments of interest under certain circumstances, including our failure to maintain specified capital levels, are no longer applicable. As noted above, our capital requirements have been suspended during conservatorship.

***Restrictions Relating to Preferred Stock***

Payment of dividends on our common stock is also subject to the prior payment of dividends on our 24 series of preferred stock and one series of senior preferred stock, representing an aggregate of 464,170,000 shares and 1,000,000 shares, respectively, outstanding as of December 31, 2010. Payment of dividends on all outstanding preferred stock, other than the senior preferred stock, is subject to the prior payment of dividends on the senior preferred stock. On December 31, 2010, we paid dividends of $1.6 billion in cash on the senior preferred stock at the direction of the Conservator. We did not declare or pay dividends on any other series of preferred stock outstanding in 2010.

**Recent Sales of Unregistered Securities**

The securities we issue are exempted securities under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended. As a result, we do not file registration statements with the SEC with respect to offerings of our securities.

Following our entry into conservatorship, we suspended the operation of, and ceased making grants under, equity compensation plans. Under the Purchase Agreement, we cannot issue any new options, rights to purchase, participations, or other equity interests without Treasury s prior approval. However, grants outstanding as of the date of the Purchase Agreement remain in effect in accordance with their terms.

No stock options were exercised during the three months ended December 31, 2010. However, restrictions lapsed on 23,137 restricted stock units.

See NOTE 13: FREDDIE MAC STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY (DEFICIT) for more information.

**Issuer Purchases of Equity Securities**

We did not repurchase any of our common or preferred stock during the three months ended December 31, 2010. Additionally, we do not currently have any outstanding authorizations to repurchase common or preferred stock.

Under the Purchase Agreement, we cannot repurchase our common or preferred stock without Treasury s prior consent, and we may only purchase or redeem the senior preferred stock in certain limited circumstances set forth in the Certificate of Creation, Designation, Powers, Preferences, Rights, Privileges, Qualifications, Limitations, Restrictions, Terms and Conditions of Variable Liquidation Preference Senior Preferred Stock.

**Transfer Agent and Registrar**

Computershare Trust Company, N.A.
P.O. Box 43078
Providence, RI 02940-3078
Telephone: 781-575-2879
http://www.computershare.com/investors

## ITEM 6. SELECTED FINANCIAL DATA[1]

The selected financial data presented below should be reviewed in conjunction with MD&A and our consolidated financial statements and related notes for the year ended December 31, 2010.

| | At or for the Year Ended December 31, | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 | 2007 | 2006 |
| | (dollars in millions, except share-related amounts) | | | | |
| **Statements of Operations Data** | | | | | |
| Net interest income | $ 16,856 | $ 17,073 | $ 6,796 | $ 3,099 | $ 3,412 |
| Provision for credit losses | (17,218) | (29,530) | (16,432) | (2,854) | (296) |
| Non-interest income (loss) | (11,588) | (2,732) | (29,175) | (275) | 1,679 |
| Non-interest expense | (2,932) | (7,195) | (5,753) | (5,959) | (2,513) |
| Net income (loss) attributable to Freddie Mac | (14,025) | (21,553) | (50,119) | (3,094) | 2,327 |
| Net income (loss) attributable to common stockholders | (19,774) | (25,658) | (50,795) | (3,503) | 2,051 |
| Earnings (loss) per common share: | | | | | |
| Basic | (6.09) | (7.89) | (34.60) | (5.37) | 3.01 |
| Diluted | (6.09) | (7.89) | (34.60) | (5.37) | 3.00 |
| Cash dividends per common share | | | 0.50 | 1.75 | 1.91 |
| Weighted average common shares outstanding (in thousands)[2]: | | | | | |
| Basic | 3,249,369 | 3,253,836 | 1,468,062 | 651,881 | 680,856 |
| Diluted | 3,249,369 | 3,253,836 | 1,468,062 | 651,881 | 682,664 |
| **Balance Sheets Data** | | | | | |
| Mortgage loans held-for-investment, at amortized cost by consolidated trusts (net of allowance for loan losses) | $ 1,646,172 | $ | $ | $ | $ |
| Total assets | 2,261,780 | 841,784 | 850,963 | 794,368 | 804,910 |
| Debt securities of consolidated trusts held by third parties | 1,528,648 | | | | |
| Other debt | 713,940 | 780,604 | 843,021 | 738,557 | 744,341 |
| All other liabilities | 19,593 | 56,808 | 38,576 | 28,906 | 33,139 |
| Total Freddie Mac stockholders equity (deficit) | (401) | 4,278 | (30,731) | 26,724 | 26,914 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Portfolio Balances**[3] | | | | | |
| Mortgage-related investments portfolio | $ 696,874 | $ 755,272 | $ 804,762 | $ 720,813 | $ 703,959 |
| Total Freddie Mac Mortgage-Related Securities[4] | 1,712,918 | 1,854,813 | 1,807,553 | 1,701,207 | 1,470,481 |
| Total mortgage portfolio[5] | 2,164,859 | 2,250,539 | 2,207,476 | 2,102,676 | 1,826,720 |
| Non-performing assets[6] | 125,405 | 104,984 | 46,620 | 16,119 | 7,761 |
| **Ratios** | | | | | |
| Return on average assets[7], [12] | (0.6)% | (2.5)% | (6.1)% | (0.4)% | 0.3% |
| Non-performing assets ratio[8] | 6.4 | 5.2 | 2.4 | 0.9 | 0.5 |
| Return on common equity[9], [12] | N/A | N/A | N/A | (21.0) | 9.8 |
| Dividend payout ratio on common stock[10] | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 63.9 |
| Equity to assets ratio[11], [12] | (0.2) | (1.6) | (0.2) | 3.4 | 3.3 |

(1) See NOTE 1: SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING POLICIES and NOTE 2: CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES for more information regarding our accounting policies and adjustments made to previously reported results due to changes in accounting principles.

(2) Includes the weighted average number of shares during 2008, 2009 and 2010 that are associated with the warrant for our common stock issued to Treasury as part of the Purchase Agreement. This warrant is included in basic earnings per share, because it is unconditionally exercisable by the holder at a cost of $0.00001 per share.

(3) Represents the UPB and excludes mortgage loans and mortgage-related securities traded, but not yet settled. Effective in December 2007, we established trusts for the administration of cash remittances received related to the underlying assets of our PCs and REMICs and Other Structured Securities issued. As a result, after 2006, we report the balance of our mortgage portfolios to reflect the publicly-available security balances of Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities. For 2006, we report these balances based on the UPB of the underlying mortgage loans. We reflected this change as an increase in the UPB of our mortgage-related investments portfolio by $2.8 billion at December 31, 2007.

(4) See Table 34 Freddie Mac Mortgage-Related Securities for the composition of this line item.

(5) See Table 16 Segment Mortgage Portfolio Composition for the composition of our total mortgage portfolio.

(6) See Table 54 Non-Performing Assets for a description of our non-performing assets.

(7) Ratio computed as net income (loss) attributable to Freddie Mac divided by the simple average of the beginning and ending balances of total assets.

(8) Ratio computed as non-performing assets divided by the ending UPB of our total mortgage portfolio, excluding non-Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities.

(9) Ratio computed as net income (loss) attributable to common stockholders divided by the simple average of the beginning and ending balances of total Freddie Mac stockholders equity (deficit), net of preferred stock (at redemption value). Ratio is not presented for periods in which the simple average of the beginning and ending balances of total Freddie Mac stockholders equity (deficit) is less than zero.

(10) Ratio computed as common stock dividends declared divided by net income (loss) attributable to common stockholders. Ratio is not presented for periods in which net income (loss) attributable to common stockholders was a loss.

(11) Ratio computed as the simple average of the beginning and ending balances of total Freddie Mac stockholders equity (deficit) divided by the simple average of the beginning and ending balances of total assets.

(12) To calculate the simple averages for 2010, the beginning balances of total assets, total Freddie Mac stockholders equity, net of preferred stock (at redemption value), and total Freddie Mac stockholders equity are based on the January 1, 2010 balances included in NOTE 2: CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES Table 2.1 Impact of the Change in Accounting for Transfers of Financial Assets and Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities on

Our Consolidated Balance Sheet so that both the beginning and ending balances reflect changes in accounting principles.

## ITEM 7. MANAGEMENT S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL CONDITION AND RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

*You should read this MD&A in conjunction with BUSINESS Executive Summary and our consolidated financial statements and related notes for the year ended December 31, 2010.*

## MORTGAGE MARKET AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, AND OUTLOOK

### Mortgage Market and Economic Conditions

#### *Overview*

Mortgage and credit market conditions remained weak in 2010 due primarily to a continued weak labor market. The pace of economic recovery increased slightly in the fourth quarter of 2010, with the U.S. gross domestic product rising by 3.2% on an annualized basis during the period, compared to 2.6% during the third quarter of 2010, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis advance estimate. Unemployment was 9.4% in December 2010, down slightly compared to 9.9% at December 2009, based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Table 8 provides important indicators for the U.S. residential mortgage market.

**Table 8 Mortgage Market Indicators**

| | Year Ended December 31, | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **2010** | **2009** | **2008** |
| Home sale units (in thousands)[(1)] | 5,229 | 5,531 | 5,398 |
| Home price depreciation[(2)] | (4.1)% | (2.4)% | (11.9)% |
| Single-family originations (in billions)[(3)] | $ 1,570 | $ 1,815 | $ 1,500 |
| Adjustable-rate mortgage share[(4)] | 10% | 7% | 13% |
| Refinance share[(5)] | 73% | 68% | 50% |
| U.S. single-family mortgage debt outstanding (in billions)[(6)] | $ 10,612 | $ 10,861 | $ 11,072 |
| U.S. multifamily mortgage debt outstanding (in billions)[(6)] | $ 847 | $ 851 | $ 841 |

(1) Includes sales of new and existing homes in the U.S. Source: National Association of Realtors news release dated January 20, 2011 (sales of existing homes) and U.S. Census Bureau news release dated January 26, 2011 (sales of new homes).

(2) Calculated internally using estimates of changes in single-family home prices by state, which are weighted using the property values underlying our single-family credit guarantee portfolio to obtain a national index. The depreciation rate for each year presented incorporates property value information on loans purchased by both Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae through December 31, 2010 and the percentage change will be subject to revision based on more recent purchase information. Other indices of home prices may have different results, as they are determined using different pools of mortgage loans and calculated under different conventions than our own.

(3) Source: Inside Mortgage Finance estimates of originations of single-family first-and second liens dated January 28, 2011.

(4) Adjustable-rate mortgage share of the dollar amount of total mortgage applications. Source: Mortgage Bankers Association s Mortgage Applications Survey. Data reflect annual average of weekly figures.

(5)

Refinance share of the number of conventional mortgage applications. Source: Mortgage Bankers Association s Mortgage Applications Survey. Data reflect annual average of weekly figures.

(6) Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States dated December 9, 2010. The outstanding amounts for 2010 presented above reflect balances as of September 30, 2010, which is the latest information available.

***Single-Family Housing Market***

We believe the level of home sales in the U.S. is a significant driver of the direction of home prices. Within the industry, existing home sales are important for assessing the rate at which the mortgage market might absorb the inventory of listed, but unsold, homes in the U.S. (including listed REO properties), while we believe new home sales can be an indicator of other economic trends, such as the potential for growth in total U.S. mortgage debt outstanding. We believe that the end of the federal homebuyer tax credit program in April 2010 contributed to a decline in home sales mid-year, and the market slowly improved in the fourth quarter. New home sales fell 31.9% in May 2010 to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 282,000, reflecting the fourth lowest level since the U.S. Census Bureau s series began in 1963. New home sales recovered modestly in the second half of 2010, but ended the year at an annual rate of 329,000 in December. Because existing home sales are reported at closing, typically a month or more after the contract is signed, the full effect of the expiration of the federal homebuyer tax credit program was not felt until July 2010, when existing home sales decreased by 27.0%, as compared to June 2010 sales. Sales of existing homes rose 37.5% over the remainder of 2010, to an annual rate of 5.3 million in December.

We estimate that home prices decreased 4.1% nationwide during 2010, as a slight increase in home prices during the first half of 2010 was more than offset by a decrease in home prices during the second half of 2010, including a 1.4% decrease in the fourth quarter of 2010. These estimates are based on our own index of our single-family credit guarantee portfolio. Other indices of home prices may have different results, as they are determined using different pools of mortgage loans and calculated under different conventions than our own. We believe home prices in the first half of the year were positively impacted by the availability of the federal homebuyer tax credit, as well as strong home sales in the spring and summer months of 2010, which is consistent with historical trends.

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Serious delinquency rates on single-family loans declined during 2010, but remain at historically high levels for all major product types. The MBA reported in its National Delinquency Survey that delinquency rates on all single-family loans in their survey dipped to 8.6% as of December 31, 2010, down from the record 9.7% at year-end 2009. Residential loan performance was generally better in areas with lower unemployment rates and where property prices have fallen slightly or not declined at all in the last two years. In its survey, the MBA presents delinquency rates both for mortgages it classifies as subprime and for mortgages it classifies as prime conventional. The delinquency rates of subprime mortgages are markedly higher than those of prime conventional loan products in the MBA survey; however, the delinquency experience in prime conventional mortgage loans during the last two years has been significantly worse than in any year since the 1930s.

Based on data from the Federal Reserve s Flow of Funds Accounts, there was a sustained and significant increase in single-family mortgage debt outstanding from 2001 to 2006. This increase in mortgage debt was driven by increasing sales of new and existing single-family homes during this same period. As reported by FHFA in its Conservator s Report on the Enterprises Financial Condition, dated August 26, 2010, the market share of mortgage-backed securities issued by the GSEs and Ginnie Mae declined significantly from 2001 to 2006 while the market share of non-GSE securities peaked. Non-traditional mortgage types, such as interest-only, Alt-A, and option ARMs, also increased in market share during these years, which we believe introduced greater risk into the market. We believe these shifts in market activity, in part, help explain the significant differentiation in delinquency performance of securitized non-GSE and GSE mortgage loans as discussed below.

We estimate that we owned or guaranteed approximately one-fourth of the outstanding single-family mortgages in the U.S. at December 31, 2010. At December 31, 2010, we held or guaranteed approximately 462,000 seriously delinquent single-family loans, representing approximately one-tenth of the seriously delinquent single-family mortgages in the market as of December 31, 2010. We estimate that loans backing non-GSE securities comprised approximately one-tenth of the single-family mortgages in the U.S. and represented approximately one-fourth of the seriously delinquent single-family mortgages at December 31, 2010. As of December 31, 2010, we held non-GSE securities with a UPB of $158.4 billion as investments.

***Concerns Regarding Deficiencies in Foreclosure Documentation Practices***

In the fall of 2010, several large seller/servicers announced issues relating to the improper preparation and execution of certain documents used in foreclosure proceedings, including affidavits. These announcements raised various concerns relating to foreclosure practices. A number of our seller/servicers, including several of our largest ones, temporarily suspended foreclosure proceedings in certain states in which they do business while they evaluated and addressed these issues. A number of these companies continue to address these issues, and certain of these suspensions remain in effect. We temporarily suspended certain foreclosure proceedings, and certain REO sales and eviction proceedings for REO properties for certain servicers during the fourth quarter of 2010 while we evaluated the impact of these issues. We resumed REO sales in November 2010.

In November 2010, we terminated the eligibility of one law firm to serve as counsel in foreclosures of Freddie Mac mortgages, due to issues with respect to the firm s foreclosure practices. That firm had been responsible for handling a significant number of foreclosures for our servicers in Florida.

We expect that these issues and the related foreclosure suspensions could prolong the foreclosure process in many states and may delay sales of our REO properties.

On October 13, 2010, FHFA made public a four-point policy framework detailing FHFA s plan to address these issues, including guidance for consistent remediation of identified foreclosure process deficiencies, and directed Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to implement this plan.

We have incurred, and will continue to incur, expenses related to these deficiencies in foreclosure documentation practices and the costs of remediating them, which may be significant. For more information regarding how these deficiencies in foreclosure documentation practices could impact our business, see RISK FACTORS Operational Risks *Our expenses could increase and we may otherwise be adversely affected by deficiencies in foreclosure practices, as well as related delays in the foreclosure process* and RISK MANAGEMENT Credit Risk *Institutional Credit Risk Mortgage Seller/Servicers.* Throughout this Form 10-K, we generally refer to these matters as the concerns about foreclosure documentation practices.

Issues have also been raised with respect to the MERS System. For more information, see RISK FACTORS Operational Risks *Issues related to mortgages recorded through MERS could delay or disrupt foreclosure activities and have an adverse effect on our business.*

***Multifamily Housing Market***

Major national multifamily market fundamentals improved during 2010 with several consecutive quarters apartment statistics reflecting positive trends. Vacancy rates, which had climbed to record levels in early 2010, improved, and effective

rents, the principal source of income for property owners, stabilized and began to increase on a national basis. Vacancy rates and effective rents are important to loan performance because multifamily loans are generally repaid from the cash flows generated by the underlying property. These improving fundamentals helped to stabilize property values in a number of markets. However, the multifamily market continues to be negatively impacted by high unemployment and ongoing weakness in the economy. Since 2008, most of our competitors, other than Fannie Mae and FHA, ceased their activities in the multifamily mortgage business or severely curtailed these activities relative to their previous levels. However, some market participants began to re-enter the market on a limited basis in 2010.

## Outlook

Forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties, some of which are beyond our control. These statements are not historical facts, but rather represent our expectations based on current information, plans, judgments, assumptions, estimates, and projections. Actual results may differ significantly from those described in or implied by such forward-looking statements due to various factors and uncertainties. For example, a number of factors could cause the actual performance of the housing and mortgage markets and the U.S. economy during 2011 to be significantly worse than we expect, including adverse changes in consumer confidence, national or international economic conditions and changes in the federal government s fiscal policies. See BUSINESS Forward-Looking Statements for additional information.

### *Overview*

As in the past, we expect key macroeconomic drivers of the economy such as income growth, unemployment rate, and inflation will affect the performance of the housing and mortgage markets in 2011. With the federal government s fiscal policy supporting aggregate demand for goods and services and a monetary policy that provides low interest rates and ample liquidity to capital markets, we believe the economic recovery will continue and gradually accelerate during 2011, with the second half of 2011 exhibiting stronger fundamentals than the early part of the year.

### *Single-Family Market*

Below are four features that we believe will influence the 2011 housing and mortgage markets. The likelihood that any or all of these features will occur depends on a variety of factors, including the pace of the economic recovery.

*Mortgage rates* By November 2010, fixed-rate mortgage rates had declined to their lowest level since the early 1950s. This allowed for the continuation of the refinance boom that began in 2009. If the federal funds rate remains under 0.5% for most of 2011, relatively low mortgage rates should be a feature of the 2011 mortgage market.

*Home prices* We believe those local markets that have relatively large inventories of for-sale homes and REO dispositions will continue to see home price declines in 2011. We also believe that while certain markets may experience modest home price increases in 2011, home prices for the U.S. as a whole are likely to be lower than in 2010.

*Homebuyer affordability* The three primary factors that affect buyer affordability are: (a) mortgage rates; (b) home prices; and (c) income. We believe buyer affordability is higher than the past several years. We believe that many first-time buyers will be attracted to the housing market in 2011, which should translate into more home sales in 2011 than in 2010 and a slight increase in mortgage debt outstanding.

*Lower mortgage origination volume* More home sales in 2011 would generally result in increased purchase-money originations, and that is expected to be a feature of 2011 s mortgage market. However, refinance

activity is expected to decline during 2011 as a result of at least three factors: (a) many borrowers have refinanced over the past year or are currently in the midst of refinancing, and hence will have little need to do so again in 2011; (b) MHA s Home Affordable Refinance Program is scheduled to expire on June 30, 2011, which is expected to further dampen refinance volume during the second half of 2011; and (c) we expect interest rates will move up during 2011, reducing the financial incentive to refinance for those borrowers who have not done so already. As a result, we believe the anticipated decline in refinance originations should offset the potential increase in purchase-money originations, which should lead to lower total mortgage lending volume in 2011.

***Multifamily Market***

While major multifamily market fundamentals improved on a national basis during 2010, certain local markets continue to exhibit weak fundamentals. We expect that our multifamily non-performing assets may increase due to the continuation of challenging economic conditions, particularly in certain geographical areas. Improvements in loan performance have historically lagged improvements in broader economic and market trends during market recoveries. As a result, we may continue to experience elevated credit losses in the first half of 2011, even if market conditions continue to improve.

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## CONSOLIDATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

The following discussion of our consolidated results of operations should be read in conjunction with our consolidated financial statements, including the accompanying notes. Also see CRITICAL ACCOUNTING POLICIES AND ESTIMATES for more information concerning our more significant accounting policies and estimates applied in determining our reported results of operations.

### Change in Accounting Principles

As discussed in BUSINESS Executive Summary, our adoption of two new accounting standards that amended the guidance applicable to the accounting for transfers of financial assets and the consolidation of VIEs had a significant impact on our consolidated financial statements and other financial disclosures beginning in the first quarter of 2010.

The cumulative effect of these changes in accounting principles was a net decrease of $11.7 billion to total equity (deficit) as of January 1, 2010, which included changes to the opening balances of retained earnings (accumulated deficit) and AOCI. See NOTE 1: SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING POLICIES Consolidation and Equity Method of Accounting, NOTE 2: CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES, NOTE 4: VARIABLE INTEREST ENTITIES, and NOTE 23: SELECTED FINANCIAL STATEMENT LINE ITEMS for additional information regarding these changes.

As these changes in accounting principles were applied prospectively, our results of operations for the year ended December 31, 2010 (on both a GAAP and Segment Earnings basis), which reflect the consolidation of trusts that issue our single-family PCs and certain Other Guarantee Transactions, are not directly comparable with the results of operations for the years ended December 31, 2009 and 2008, which reflect the accounting policies in effect during that time (*i.e.*, when the majority of the securitization entities were accounted for off-balance sheet).

**Table 9 Summary Consolidated Statements of Operations GAAP Results[1]**

| | Year Ended December 31, | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 |
| | (in millions) | | |
| Net interest income | $ 16,856 | $ 17,073 | $ 6,796 |
| Provision for credit losses | (17,218) | (29,530) | (16,432) |
| Net interest income (loss) after provision for credit losses | (362) | (12,457) | (9,636) |
| Non-interest income (loss): | | | |
| Gains (losses) on extinguishment of debt securities of consolidated trusts | (164) | | |
| Gains (losses) on retirement of other debt | (219) | (568) | 209 |
| Gains (losses) on debt recorded at fair value | 580 | (404) | 406 |
| Derivative gains (losses) | (8,085) | (1,900) | (14,954) |
| Impairment of available-for-sale securities:[2] | | | |
| Total other-than-temporary impairment of available-for-sale securities | (1,778) | (23,125) | (17,682) |
| Portion of other-than-temporary impairment recognized in AOCI | (2,530) | 11,928 | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net impairment of available-for-sale securities recognized in earnings | (4,308) | (11,197) | (17,682) |
| Other gains (losses) on investment securities recognized in earnings | (1,252) | 5,965 | 1,501 |
| Other income | 1,860 | 5,372 | 1,345 |
| Total non-interest income (loss) | (11,588) | (2,732) | (29,175) |
| Non-interest expense: | | | |
| Administrative expenses | (1,546) | (1,651) | (1,505) |
| REO operations expense | (673) | (307) | (1,097) |
| Other expenses | (713) | (5,237) | (3,151) |
| Total non-interest expense | (2,932) | (7,195) | (5,753) |
| Loss before income tax benefit (expense) | (14,882) | (22,384) | (44,564) |
| Income tax benefit (expense) | 856 | 830 | (5,552) |
| Net loss | (14,026) | (21,554) | (50,116) |
| Less: Net (income) loss attributable to noncontrolling interest | 1 | 1 | (3) |
| Net loss attributable to Freddie Mac | $ (14,025) | $ (21,553) | $ (50,119) |

(1) See NOTE 2: CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES for information regarding accounting changes impacting the current period.

(2) We adopted an amendment to the accounting standards for investments in debt and equity securities effective April 1, 2009. See NOTE 2: CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES Other Changes in Accounting Principles for additional information regarding the impact of this amendment.

**Net Interest Income**

Table 10 summarizes our net interest income and net interest yield and provides an attribution of changes in annual results to changes in interest rates or changes in volumes of our interest-earning assets and interest-bearing liabilities. Average balance sheet information is presented because we believe end-of-period balances are not representative of activity throughout the periods presented. For most components of the average balances, a daily weighted average balance was calculated for the period. When daily weighted average balance information was not available, a simple monthly average balance was calculated.

**Table 10 Average Balance, Net Interest Income and Rate/Volume Analysis**

| | Year Ended December 31, | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | | | 2009 | | | 2008 | |
| | Average Balance[1][2] | Interest Income (Expense)[1] | Average Rate | Average Balance[1][2] | Interest Income (Expense)[1] | Average Rate | Average Balance[1][2] | Interest Income (Expense)[1] |
| | (dollars in millions) | | | | | | | |
| rning assets: | | | | | | | | |
| ash equivalents | $ 48,803 | $ 77 | 0.16% | $ 55,764 | $ 193 | 0.35% | $ 29,311 | $ 618 |
| ds sold and securities under agreements to | 46,739 | 79 | 0.17 | 28,524 | 48 | 0.17 | 23,018 | 423 |
| related securities: | | | | | | | | |
| related securities[3] | 526,748 | 25,366 | 4.82 | 675,167 | 32,563 | 4.82 | 661,756 | 34,263 |
| ment of PCs held by ac | (213,411) | (11,182) | (5.24) | | | | | |
| gage-related securities, | 313,337 | 14,184 | 4.53 | 675,167 | 32,563 | 4.82 | 661,756 | 34,263 |
| age-related securities[3] | 27,995 | 191 | 0.68 | 16,471 | 727 | 4.42 | 19,757 | 804 |
| oans held by d trusts[4][5] | 1,722,387 | 86,698 | 5.03 | | | | | |
| zed mortgage loans[4][6] | 206,116 | 8,727 | 4.23 | 127,429 | 6,815 | 5.35 | 93,649 | 5,369 |
| est-earning assets | $ 2,365,377 | $ 109,956 | 4.65 | $ 903,355 | $ 40,346 | 4.47 | $ 827,491 | $ 41,477 |
| aring liabilities: | | | | | | | | |
| ties of consolidated ding PCs held by ac | $ 1,738,330 | $ (86,398) | (4.97) | $ | $ | | $ | $ |
| ment of PCs held by ac | (213,411) | 11,182 | 5.24 | | | | | |
| securities of d trusts held by third | 1,524,919 | (75,216) | (4.93) | | | | | |
| debt | 219,654 | (552) | (0.25) | 287,259 | (2,234) | (0.78) | 244,569 | (6,800) |
| debt[7] | 543,306 | (16,363) | (3.01) | 557,184 | (19,916) | (3.57) | 561,261 | (26,532) |
| debt | 762,960 | (16,915) | (2.22) | 844,443 | (22,150) | (2.62) | 805,830 | (33,332) |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| est-bearing liabilities | 2,287,879 | (92,131) | (4.03) | 844,443 | (22,150) | (2.62) | 805,830 | (33,332) |
| pense) related to (8) | | (969) | (0.04) | | (1,123) | (0.13) | | (1,349) |
| net non-interest-bearing | 77,498 | | 0.13 | 58,912 | | 0.17 | 21,661 | |
| ng of interest-earning | $ 2,365,377 | $ (93,100) | (3.94) | $ 903,355 | $ (23,273) | (2.58) | $ 827,491 | $ (34,681) |
| t income/yield | | $ 16,856 | 0.71 | | $ 17,073 | 1.89 | | $ 6,796 |

| | 2010 vs. 2009 Variance Due to | | | 2009 vs. 2008 Variance Due to | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Rate[9] | Volume[9] | Total Change | Rate[9] | Volume[9] | Total Change |
| | (in millions) | | | | | |
| Interest-earning assets: | | | | | | |
| Cash and cash equivalents | $ (83) | $ (33) | $ (116) | $ (740) | $ 315 | $ (425) |
| Federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell | (1) | 32 | 31 | (457) | 82 | (375) |
| Mortgage-related securities: | | | | | | |
| Mortgage-related securities[3] | (50) | (7,147) | (7,197) | (2,384) | 684 | (1,700) |
| Extinguishment of PCs held by Freddie Mac | | (11,182) | (11,182) | | | |
| Total mortgage-related securities, net | (50) | (18,329) | (18,379) | (2,384) | 684 | (1,700) |
| Non-mortgage-related securities[3] | (850) | 314 | (536) | 65 | (142) | (77) |
| Mortgage loans held by consolidated trusts[4][5] | | 86,698 | 86,698 | | | |
| Unsecuritized mortgage loans[4][6] | (1,641) | 3,553 | 1,912 | (381) | 1,827 | 1,446 |
| Total interest-earning assets | $ (2,625) | $ 72,235 | $ 69,610 | $ (3,897) | $ 2,766 | $ (1,131) |
| Interest-bearing liabilities: | | | | | | |
| Debt securities of consolidated trusts including PCs held by Freddie Mac | $ | $ (86,398) | $ (86,398) | $ | $ | $ |
| Extinguishment of PCs held by Freddie Mac | | 11,182 | 11,182 | | | |
| Total debt securities of consolidated trusts held by third parties | | (75,216) | (75,216) | | | |
| Other debt: | | | | | | |
| Short-term debt | 1,248 | 434 | 1,682 | 5,587 | (1,021) | 4,566 |
| Long-term debt[7] | 3,068 | 485 | 3,553 | 6,424 | 192 | 6,616 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total other debt | 4,316 | 919 | 5,235 | 12,011 | (829) | 11,182 |
| Total interest-bearing liabilities | 4,316 | (74,297) | (69,981) | 12,011 | (829) | 11,182 |
| Income (expense) related to derivatives[8] | 154 | | 154 | 226 | | 226 |
| Total funding of interest-earning assets | $ 4,470 | $ (74,297) | $ (69,827) | $ 12,237 | $ (829) | $ 11,408 |
| Net interest income | $ 1,845 | $ (2,062) | $ (217) | $ 8,340 | $ 1,937 | $ 10,277 |

(1) Excludes mortgage loans and mortgage-related securities traded, but not yet settled.
(2) We calculate average balances based on their amortized cost.
(3) Interest income (expense) includes accretion of the portion of impairment charges recognized in earnings expected to be recovered.
(4) Non-performing loans, where interest income is generally recognized when collected, are included in average balances.
(5) Loan fees, primarily consisting of delivery fees, included in interest income for mortgage loans held by consolidated trusts were $127 million, $0 million, and $0 million for 2010, 2009 and 2008, respectively.
(6) Loan fees, primarily consisting of delivery fees and multifamily prepayment fees, included in unsecuritized mortgage loan interest income were $130 million, $78 million, and $102 million for 2010, 2009 and 2008, respectively.
(7) Includes current portion of long-term debt.
(8) Represents changes in fair value of derivatives in cash flow hedge relationships that were previously deferred in AOCI and have been reclassified to earnings as the associated hedged forecasted issuance of debt affects earnings. 2008 also includes the accrual of periodic cash settlements of all derivatives in qualifying hedge accounting relationships.
(9) Rate and volume changes are calculated on the individual financial statement line item level. Combined rate/volume changes were allocated to the individual rate and volume change based on their relative size.

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Table 11 summarizes components of our net interest income.

**Table 11 Net Interest Income[1]**

| | Year Ended December 31, | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 |
| | (in millions) | | |
| Contractual amounts of net interest income[2] | $ 17,684 | $ 18,907 | $ 9,001 |
| Amortization income (expense), net:[3] | | | |
| Accretion of impairments on available-for-sale securities[4] | 392 | 1,180 | 551 |
| Asset-related amortization expense, net: | | | |
| Mortgage loans held by consolidated trusts | (712) | | |
| Unsecured mortgage loans | 311 | 233 | 52 |
| Mortgage-related securities | (272) | (1,345) | (311) |
| Other assets | 36 | 30 | |
| Asset-related amortization expense, net | (637) | (1,082) | (259) |
| Debt-related amortization expense, net: | | | |
| Debt securities of consolidated trusts | 1,152 | | |
| Other long-term debt securities | (766) | (809) | (1,148) |
| Debt-related amortization expense, net | 386 | (809) | (1,148) |
| Total amortization income (expense), net | 141 | (711) | (856) |
| Expense related to derivatives[5] | (969) | (1,123) | (1,349) |
| Net interest income | 16,856 | 17,073 | 6,796 |
| Provision for credit losses | (17,218) | (29,530) | (16,432) |
| Net interest income (loss) after provision for credit losses | $ (362) | $ (12,457) | $ (9,636) |

(1) Our prospective adoption of the changes in accounting standards related to transfers of financial assets and consolidation of VIEs significantly impacted the presentation of our financial results. Consequently, our financial results for 2010 are not directly comparable to our financial results for 2009 and 2008. For more information, see NOTE 2: CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES.
(2) Includes the reversal of interest income accrued, net of interest received on a cash basis related to mortgage loans that are on non-accrual status.
(3) Represents amortization related to premiums, discounts, deferred fees and other adjustments to the carrying value of our financial instruments, and the reclassification of previously deferred balances from AOCI for certain derivatives in cash flow hedge relationships related to individual debt issuances and mortgage purchase transactions.
(4) The portion of the impairment charges recognized in earnings expected to be recovered is recognized as net interest income. Upon our adoption of an amendment to the accounting standards for investments in debt and equity securities on April 1, 2009, previously recognized non-credit-related other-than-temporary impairments are no longer accreted into net interest income.
(5) Represents changes in fair value of derivatives in cash flow hedge relationships that were previously deferred in AOCI and have been reclassified to earnings as the associated hedged forecasted issuance of debt affects

earnings. 2008 also includes the accrual of periodic cash settlements of all derivatives in qualifying hedge accounting relationships.

Our adoption of the change to the accounting standards for transfers of financial assets and consolidation of VIEs, as discussed above, had the following impact on net interest income and net interest yield for the year ended December 31, 2010, and will have similar effects on those items in future periods:

- we now include in net interest income both: (a) the interest income earned on the assets held in our consolidated single-family trusts, comprised primarily of mortgage loans, restricted cash and cash equivalents and investments in securities purchased under agreements to resell (the average balance of such assets was $1.7 trillion for the year ended December 31, 2010); and (b) the interest expense related to the debt in the form of PCs and Other Guarantee Transactions issued by consolidated trusts that are held by third parties (the average balance of such debt was $1.5 trillion for the year ended December 31, 2010). Prior to January 1, 2010, we reflected the earnings impact of these securitization activities as management and guarantee income, recorded within non-interest income on our consolidated statements of operations, and as interest income on single-family PCs and on certain Other Guarantee Transactions held for investment; and

- we reverse accrued but uncollected interest income recognized in prior periods on non-performing loans, where the collection of principal and interest is not reasonably assured, and do not recognize any further interest income associated with these loans upon their placement on non-accrual status except when cash payments are received. Interest income that we did not recognize, which we refer to as forgone interest income, and reversals of previously recognized interest income, net of cash received, related to non-performing loans was $4.7 billion during 2010, compared to $349 million during 2009 on loans held at December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively. The increase in forgone interest income and the reversal of interest income reduced our net interest yield for the year ended December 31, 2010, compared to the years ended December 31, 2009 and 2008, respectively. Prior to consolidation of these trusts, we did not reverse interest income on non-performing loans for loans held by the trusts, and the forgone interest income on non-performing loans of the trusts did not reduce net interest income or net interest yield, since it was accounted for through a charge to provision for credit losses.

See NOTE 2: CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES for additional information.

Net interest income decreased by $217 million during the year ended December 31, 2010, compared to the year ended December 31, 2009, due to: (a) a decrease in the average balance of mortgage-related securities; and (b) higher interest

expense on seriously delinquent mortgage loans. These factors were partially offset by: (a) lower funding costs; and (b) the inclusion of amounts previously classified as management and guarantee income. Net interest yield declined substantially during 2010 because the net interest yield of the assets held in our consolidated single-family trusts was lower than the net interest yield of PCs previously included in net interest income and our balance of non-performing mortgage loans increased.

During the year ended December 31, 2010, spreads on our debt and our access to the debt markets remained favorable relative to historical levels. For more information, see LIQUIDITY AND CAPITAL RESOURCES Liquidity.

Net interest income and net interest yield during 2010 and 2009 also benefited, compared to prior years, from the funds we received from Treasury under the Purchase Agreement. These funds are reinvested and generate net interest income while the costs of such funds are not reflected in interest expense, but instead are reflected as dividends paid on senior preferred stock.

Net interest income and net interest yield increased significantly during 2009 compared to 2008 primarily due to a decrease in funding costs as a result of the replacement of some higher cost short- and long-term debt with new lower cost debt; and an increase in the average balance of our investments in mortgage loans and mortgage-related securities, including an increase in our holdings of fixed-rate assets. These items were partially offset by the impact of declining short-term interest rates on floating-rate mortgage-related and non-mortgage-related securities.

**Provision for Credit Losses**

We maintain loan loss reserves at levels we deem adequate to absorb probable incurred losses on mortgage loans held-for-investment and loans underlying our financial guarantees. Increases in our loan loss reserves are generally reflected in earnings through the provision for credit losses. As discussed in Net Interest Income, our provision for credit losses in 2010 was positively impacted by the changes in accounting standards for transfers of financial assets and consolidation of VIEs effective January 1, 2010, since we no longer account for forgone interest income on non-performing loans within our provision for credit losses. See NOTE 2: CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES for further information.

Since the beginning of 2008, on an aggregate basis, we recorded provision for credit losses associated with single-family loans of approximately $62.3 billion, and recorded an additional $4.7 billion in losses on loans purchased from our PCs, net of recoveries. The majority of these losses are associated with loans originated in 2005 through 2008. While loans we acquired in 2005 through 2008 will give rise to additional credit losses that we have not yet provisioned for, we believe, as of December 31, 2010, that we have reserved for or charged-off the majority of the total expected credit losses for these loans. Nevertheless, various factors, such as continued high unemployment rates or further declines in home prices, could require us to provide for losses on these loans beyond our current expectations. See Table 3 Credit Statistics, Single-Family Credit Guarantee Portfolio for certain quarterly credit statistics for our single-family credit guarantee portfolio.

Our provision for credit losses decreased to $17.2 billion in 2010, compared to $29.5 billion in 2009, due to a substantial slow down in the rate of growth in non-performing single-family loans. Loss severity rates on our single-family mortgage loans increased only slightly in 2010, whereas severity rates increased steadily throughout the first half of 2009 before moderating in the second half of 2009. The adverse effect of a slight increase in loss severity rates during 2010 was partially offset by higher recoveries from mortgage insurers and repurchases by seller/servicers. We also experienced an increase in the number of single-family loans subject to individual impairment resulting from an increase in modifications considered TDRs during 2010.

During the second quarter of 2010, we identified a backlog related to the processing of certain loan workout activities reported to us by our servicers, principally loan modifications and short sales. This backlog resulted in erroneous loan data within our loan reporting systems, thereby impacting our financial accounting and reporting systems. The resulting error impacted our provision for credit losses, allowance for loan losses, and provision for income taxes and affected our previously reported financial statements for the interim period ended March 31, 2010, the interim 2009 periods, and the full year ended December 31, 2009. The cumulative effect of this error was recorded as a correction in the second quarter of 2010, which included a $1.0 billion pre-tax cumulative effect of this error associated with the year ended December 31, 2009. For additional information, see NOTE 1: SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING POLICIES Basis of Presentation *Out-of-Period Accounting Adjustment.*

Our provision for credit losses exceeded the level of our charge-offs, net, by $4.3 billion during 2010, primarily as a result of a continued increase in our non-performing single-family loans. While the quarterly amount of our provision for credit losses declined for all four consecutive quarters in 2010, our quarterly amount of charge-offs, net of recoveries remained elevated. We believe the level of our charge-offs will continue to increase in 2011 as more of our single-family non-performing loans are resolved. As of December 31, 2010 and 2009, the UPB of our single-family non-performing loans was $115.5 billion and $98.7 billion, respectively, and the UPB of multifamily non-performing loans was $2.9 billion and $1.6 billion, respectively. Although still increasing, the rate of growth in the UPB of our non-performing loans slowed substantially during 2010. See RISK MANAGEMENT Credit Risk *Mortgage Credit Risk* for further information on

our single-family credit guarantee portfolio, including credit performance, charge-offs, and growth in the balance of our non-performing assets.

In 2010, we also experienced high volumes of loan modifications involving concessions to borrowers and consequently, a rise in the number of loans categorized as TDRs. Impairment analysis for TDRs requires giving recognition in the provision for credit losses to the excess of our recorded investment in the loan over the present value of the expected future cash flows. This generally results in a higher allowance for loan losses than for loans that are not TDRs. We expect the number of loan modifications to decline in 2011; however, we expect the percentage of modifications that qualify as TDRs in 2011 will remain high, since the majority of our modifications are anticipated to include a significant reduction in the contractual interest rate, which represents a concession to the borrower.

Our serious delinquencies have remained high due to the continued weakness in home prices and persistently high unemployment, extended foreclosure timelines and foreclosure suspensions in many states, and challenges faced by servicers in building capacity to process large volumes of problem loans. Our seller/servicers have an active role in our loan workout activities, including under the MHA Program, and a decline in their performance could result in a failure to realize the anticipated benefits of our loss mitigation plans. In an effort to help mitigate such risk, beginning in the fourth quarter of 2010, we are making significant investments in systems and personnel to help our seller/servicers manage their performance. We believe this will help us to better realize the benefits of our loss mitigation plans, though it is too early to determine if this will be successful.

Our allowance for loan losses and amount of charge-offs in the future will be affected by a number of factors, including: (a) the actual level of mortgage defaults; (b) the impact of the MHA Program and our other loss mitigation efforts; (c) any governmental actions or programs that impact the ability of troubled borrowers to obtain modifications, including legislative changes to bankruptcy laws; (d) changes in property values; (e) regional economic conditions, including unemployment rates; (f) delays in the foreclosure process, including those related to the concerns about deficiencies in foreclosure documentation practices; (g) third-party mortgage insurance coverage and recoveries; and (h) the realized rate of seller/servicer repurchases. See RISK MANAGEMENT Credit Risk *Institutional Credit Risk* for additional information on seller/servicer repurchase obligations.

Our loan loss reserves associated with our multifamily mortgage portfolio were $828 million and $831 million as of December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively. The multifamily market improved on a national basis in 2010, with several consecutive quarters of positive trends in vacancy rates and effective rents. However, some geographic areas in which we have investments in multifamily mortgage loans, including the states of Nevada, Arizona, and Georgia, continue to exhibit weaker than average fundamentals.

### Non-Interest Income (Loss)

#### *Gains (Losses) on Extinguishment of Debt Securities of Consolidated Trusts*

Due to the change in accounting standards for consolidation of VIEs, beginning January 1, 2010, when we purchase PCs that have been issued by consolidated PC trusts, we extinguish a pro rata portion of the outstanding debt securities of the related consolidated trust. We recognize a gain (loss) on extinguishment of the debt securities to the extent the amount paid to extinguish the debt security differs from its carrying value. During 2010, we extinguished debt securities of consolidated trusts with a UPB of $33.5 billion (representing our purchase of single-family PCs with a corresponding UPB amount) and our losses on extinguishment of these debt securities of consolidated trusts were $164 million. See NOTE 2: CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES for additional information.

#### *Gains (Losses) on Retirement of Other Debt*

We repurchase or call our outstanding other debt securities from time to time to help support the liquidity of the market for our other debt securities and to manage the mix of liabilities funding our assets. When we repurchase or call outstanding debt securities, or holders put outstanding debt securities to us, we recognize a gain or loss to the extent the amount paid to redeem the debt security differs from its carrying value. See NOTE 1: SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING POLICIES for information regarding our accounting policies related to debt retirements.

Gains (losses) on retirement of other debt were $(219) million, $(568) million, and $209 million during 2010, 2009, and 2008, respectively. We recognized fewer losses on debt retirement during 2010 compared to 2009 primarily due to decreased losses on calls and puts in 2010 compared to 2009. A tender offer for our subordinated debt also contributed to losses during 2009. During 2008, we recognized gains due to an increased level of call activity, primarily involving our debt with coupon levels that increase at predetermined intervals. For more information, see LIQUIDITY AND CAPITAL RESOURCES Liquidity *Other Debt Securities* *Other Debt Retirement Activities*.

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***Gains (Losses) on Debt Recorded at Fair Value***

Gains (losses) on debt recorded at fair value primarily relates to changes in the fair value of our foreign-currency denominated debt. During 2010, we recognized gains on debt recorded at fair value of $580 million primarily due to the U.S. dollar strengthening relative to the Euro. During 2009 and 2008, we recognized gains (losses) on debt recorded at fair value of $(404) million and $406 million, respectively, primarily due to fluctuations in exchange rates of the U.S. dollar relative to the Euro. We mitigate changes in the fair value of our foreign-currency denominated debt by using foreign currency swaps and foreign-currency denominated interest-rate swaps.

***Derivative Gains (Losses)***

Table 12 presents derivative gains (losses) reported in our consolidated statements of operations. See NOTE 12: DERIVATIVES Table 12.2 Gains and Losses on Derivatives for information about gains and losses related to specific categories of derivatives. Changes in fair value and interest accruals on derivatives not in hedge accounting relationships are recorded as derivative gains (losses) in our consolidated statements of operations. At December 31, 2010 and 2009, we did not have any derivatives in hedge accounting relationships; however, there are amounts recorded in AOCI related to discontinued cash flow hedges. Amounts deferred in AOCI associated with these closed cash flow hedges are reclassified to earnings when the forecasted transactions affect earnings. While derivatives are an important aspect of our management of interest-rate risk, they generally increase the volatility of reported net income (loss), because, while fair value changes in derivatives affect net income, fair value changes in several of the types of assets and liabilities being hedged do not affect net income.

**Table 12 Derivative Gains (Losses)**

| **Derivatives not designated as hedging instruments under the accounting standards for derivatives and hedging** | **Derivative Gains (Losses) Year Ended December 31,** | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **2010** | **2009** | **2008** |
| | **(in millions)** | | |
| Interest-rate swaps | $ (7,679) | $ 13,611 | $ (27,965) |
| Option-based derivatives[1] | 4,843 | (10,686) | 17,080 |
| Other derivatives[2] | (755) | (882) | (2,774) |
| Accrual of periodic settlements[3] | (4,494) | (3,943) | (1,295) |
| Total | $ (8,085) | $ (1,900) | $ (14,954) |

(1) Primarily includes purchased call and put swaptions and purchased interest rate caps and floors.
(2) Includes futures, foreign currency swaps, commitments, swap guarantee derivatives, and credit derivatives. Foreign-currency swaps are defined as swaps in which net settlement is based on one leg calculated in a foreign-currency and the other leg calculated in U.S. dollars. Commitments include: (a) our commitments to purchase and sell investments in securities; and (b) our commitments to purchase and extinguish or issue debt securities of our consolidated trusts.
(3) Includes imputed interest on zero-coupon swaps.

Gains (losses) on derivatives not accounted for in hedge accounting relationships are principally driven by changes in: (a) swap and forward interest rates and implied volatility; and (b) the mix and volume of derivatives in our derivatives portfolio.

Our mix and volume of derivatives change period to period as we respond to changing interest rate environments. We use receive- and pay-fixed interest rate swaps to adjust the interest-rate characteristics of our debt funding in order to more closely match changes in the interest-rate characteristics of our mortgage-related assets. A receive-fixed swap results in our receipt of a fixed interest-rate payment from our counterparty in exchange for a variable-rate payment. Conversely, a pay-fixed swap requires us to make a fixed interest-rate payment to our counterparty in exchange for a variable-rate payment. Receive-fixed swaps increase in value and pay-fixed swaps decrease in value when interest rates decrease (with the opposite being true when interest rates increase).

We use swaptions and other option-based derivatives to adjust the interest-rate characteristics of our debt in response to changes in the expected lives of our investments in mortgage-related assets. Purchased call and put swaptions, where we make premium payments, are options for us to enter into receive- and pay-fixed swaps, respectively. Conversely, written call and put swaptions, where we receive premium payments, are options for our counterparty to enter into receive and pay-fixed swaps, respectively. The fair values of both purchased and written call and put swaptions are sensitive to changes in interest rates and are also driven by the market s expectation of potential changes in future interest rates (referred to as implied volatility ). Purchased swaptions generally become more valuable as implied volatility increases and less valuable as implied volatility decreases. Recognized losses on purchased options in any given period are limited to the premium paid to purchase the option plus any unrealized gains previously recorded. Potential losses on written options are unlimited.

We also use derivatives to synthetically create the substantive economic equivalent of various debt funding structures. For example, the combination of a series of short-term debt issuances over a defined period and a pay-fixed interest rate swap with the same maturity as the last debt issuance is the substantive economic equivalent of a long-term fixed-rate debt

instrument of comparable maturity. Similarly, the combination of non-callable debt and a call swaption with the same maturity as the noncallable debt is the substantive economic equivalent of callable debt. Due to limits on our ability to issue long-term and callable debt in the second half of 2008 and the first few months of 2009, we pursued these strategies to an increased extent during those periods. However, the use of these derivatives may expose us to additional counterparty credit risk. For a discussion regarding our ability to issue debt, see LIQUIDITY AND CAPITAL RESOURCES Liquidity *Other Debt Securities.*

During 2010, declining longer-term swap interest rates resulted in a loss on derivatives of $8.1 billion. Specifically, the decrease in longer-term swap interest rates resulted in fair value losses on our pay-fixed swaps of $17.5 billion, partially offset by fair value gains on our receive-fixed swaps of $9.7 billion. We recognized fair value gains of $4.8 billion on our option-based derivatives, resulting from gains on our purchased call swaptions primarily due to the declines in forward interest rates during 2010.

During 2009, the mix and volume of our derivative portfolio were impacted by fluctuations in swap interest rates, resulting in a loss on derivatives of $1.9 billion. Longer-term swap interest rates and implied volatility both increased during 2009. As a result of these factors, we recorded gains on our pay-fixed swap positions, partially offset by losses on our receive-fixed swaps, resulting in a $13.6 billion net gain. We also recorded losses of $10.7 billion on option-based derivatives, primarily on our purchased call swaptions, as the impact of the increasing forward swap interest rates more than offset the impact of higher implied volatility.

During 2008, we recognized a net derivative loss of $15.0 billion primarily because swap interest rates declined significantly in 2008. We had a loss of $28.0 billion for interest-rate swaps that was partially offset by the gain of $17.1 billion related to our option-based derivatives as a result of a decrease in forward swap interest rates combined with an increase in implied volatility during 2008.

***Investment Securities-Related Activities***

Since January 1, 2010, as a result of our adoption of amendments to the accounting standards for transfers of financial assets and consolidation of VIEs, we no longer account for the single-family PCs and certain Other Guarantee Transactions we hold as investments in securities. Instead, we now recognize the underlying mortgage loans on our consolidated balance sheets through consolidation of the related trusts. Our adoption of these amendments resulted in a decrease in our investments in securities of $286.5 billion on January 1, 2010. See NOTE 2: CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES for additional information.

*Impairments of Available-For-Sale Securities*

We recorded net impairments of available-for-sale securities recognized in earnings of $4.3 billion, $11.2 billion, and $17.7 billion during 2010, 2009, and 2008, respectively. See CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS ANALYSIS Investments in Securities *Mortgage-Related Securities* *Other-Than-Temporary Impairments on Available-For-Sale Mortgage-Related Securities* and NOTE 8: INVESTMENTS IN SECURITIES for information regarding the accounting principles for investments in debt and equity securities and the other-than-temporary impairments recorded during 2010, 2009, and 2008. See NOTE 1: SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING POLICIES for information on how other-than-temporary impairments are recorded on our financial statements commencing in the second quarter of 2009.

*Other Gains (Losses) on Investment Securities Recognized in Earnings*

Other gains (losses) on investment securities recognized in earnings primarily consists of gains (losses) on trading securities. We recognized $(1.3) billion, $4.9 billion and $955 million related to gains (losses) on trading securities

during 2010, 2009, and 2008, respectively.

The fair value of our securities classified as trading was approximately $60.3 billion at December 31, 2010 compared to approximately $222.3 billion at December 31, 2009. The decline in fair value was primarily due to our adoption of amendments to the accounting standards for transfers of financial assets and consolidation of VIEs on January 1, 2010, pursuant to which we no longer account for the single-family PCs and certain Other Guarantee Transactions that we hold as investment securities as stated above.

During 2010, the losses on trading securities was primarily due to the movement of securities with unrealized gains towards maturity, particularly interest-only securities, partially offset by fair value gains on our non-interest-only securities classified as trading primarily due to decreased interest rates.

During 2009, we recognized net gains on trading securities of $4.9 billion, compared to net gains of $955 million in 2008. The fair value of our securities classified as trading increased to $222.3 billion at December 31, 2009 compared to $190.4 billion at December 31, 2008, primarily due to the increased balance of agency securities. The increased balance in our investments in trading securities, combined with a steepening yield curve and tightening OAS levels, contributed

$3.3 billion to the gains on these trading securities during 2009. In addition, we sold agency securities classified as trading with UPBs of approximately $148.7 billion, which generated realized gains of $1.7 billion.

In 2008, we elected the fair value option for approximately $87 billion of securities and transferred the securities previously classified as available-for-sale to trading. The increase in the balance of the trading securities along with a decrease in interest rates resulted in significant gains on trading securities. Partially offsetting these gains were losses related to interest-only securities classified as trading, primarily as a result of the decrease in interest rates, and the realization of $481 million of losses from the sale of certain agency securities prior to our entry into conservatorship during the third quarter of 2008 in an effort to meet the mandatory target capital surplus requirement then in effect.

***Other Income***

Table 13 summarizes the significant components of other income.

**Table 13 Other Income**

| | Year Ended December 31, | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 |
| | | (in millions) | |
| Other income (losses): | | | |
| Management and guarantee income | $ 143 | $ 3,033 | $ 3,370 |
| Gains (losses) on guarantee asset | (61) | 3,299 | (7,091) |
| Income on guarantee obligation | 135 | 3,479 | 4,826 |
| Gains (losses) on sale of mortgage loans | 267 | 745 | 117 |
| Lower-of-cost-or-fair-value adjustments on held-for-sale mortgage loans | | (679) | (30) |
| Gains (losses) on mortgage loans recorded at fair value | (249) | (190) | (14) |
| Recoveries on loans impaired upon purchase | 806 | 379 | 495 |
| Low-income housing tax credit partnerships | | (4,155) | (453) |
| Trust management income (expense) | | (761) | (70) |
| All other | 819 | 222 | 195 |
| Total other income | $ 1,860 | $ 5,372 | $ 1,345 |

Other income includes items associated with our guarantee business activities on non-consolidated trusts, including management and guarantee income, gains (losses) on guarantee asset, income on guarantee obligation, gains (losses) on sale of mortgage loans, and trust management income (expense). Upon consolidation of our single-family PC trusts and certain Other Guarantee Transactions commencing January 1, 2010, guarantee-related items no longer have a material impact on our results and are therefore included in other income on our consolidated statements of operations. The management and guarantee income recognized during 2010 was earned from our non-consolidated securitization trusts and other mortgage credit guarantees which had an aggregate UPB of $44.0 billion as of December 31, 2010 compared to $1.87 trillion as of December 31, 2009. For additional information on the impact of consolidation of our single-family PC trusts and certain Other Guarantee Transactions, see NOTE 2: CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES AND NOTE 23: SELECTED FINANCIAL STATEMENT LINE ITEMS.

All other income increased to $819 million in 2010 from $222 million in 2009, primarily due to recognition of mortgage-servicing income related to reclaimed servicing rights associated with one of our former single-family

seller/servicers, and assessment of penalties and other fees on single-family seller servicers, including penalties arising from failures to complete foreclosures within required time periods, and to a lesser extent, increased expectations of recoveries from certain legal claims.

*Lower-of-Cost-or-Fair-Value Adjustments on Held-for-Sale Mortgage Loans*

We recognized lower-of-cost-or-fair-value adjustments of $0 million, $(679) million, and $(30) million in 2010, 2009, and 2008, respectively. Due to the change in the accounting standard for consolidation of VIEs, which we adopted on January 1, 2010, all single-family mortgage loans on our consolidated balance sheet were reclassified as held-for-investment. Consequently, beginning in 2010, we no longer record lower-of-cost-or-fair-value adjustments on single-family mortgage loans. During 2009, we transferred $10.6 billion of single-family mortgage loans from held-for-sale to held-for-investment. Upon transfer, we evaluated the lower of cost or fair value for each individual loan. We recognized approximately $438 million of losses associated with these transfers during 2009, representing the unrealized losses of certain loans on the dates of transfer; however, we were not permitted to similarly recognize any unrealized gains on individual loans at the time of transfer. We did not transfer any mortgage loans between these categories during 2008.

*Recoveries on Loans Impaired upon Purchase*

Recoveries on loans impaired upon purchase represent the recapture into income of previously recognized losses on loans purchased and provision for credit losses associated with purchases of delinquent loans from our PCs in conjunction with our guarantee activities. Recoveries occur when a non-performing loan is repaid in full or when at the time of foreclosure the estimated fair value of the acquired property, less costs to sell, exceeds the carrying value of the loan. For

impaired loans where the borrower has made required payments that return the loan to less than three months past due, the recovery amounts are instead recognized as interest income over time as periodic payments are received.

During 2010, 2009, and 2008, we recognized recoveries on loans impaired upon purchase of $806 million, $379 million and $495 million, respectively. Our recoveries on loans impaired upon purchase increased in 2010, compared to 2009, due to a higher volume of short sales and foreclosure transfers, combined with improvements in home prices in certain geographical areas during 2010. Recoveries on impaired loans decreased in 2009, compared to 2008, because a greater percentage of loans purchased from PCs were modified instead of being repaid in full or proceeding to foreclosure. Modifications on seriously delinquent loans can delay the ultimate resolution of losses and consequently extend the timeframe for the recognition of our recoveries, if any, on loans impaired upon purchase. Our recoveries on these loans may be volatile in the short-term due to the effects of changes in home prices, among other factors.

Commencing January 1, 2010, we no longer recognize losses on loans purchased from PC pools related to our single-family PC trusts and certain Other Guarantee Transactions due to adoption of the amendments to the accounting standards for transfers of financial assets and consolidation of VIEs, as these loans are already recognized on our balance sheets. Consequently, our recoveries on loans impaired upon purchase will decrease over time since we can only recognize recoveries on impaired loans purchased prior to January 1, 2010. See NOTE 1: SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING POLICIES for further information about the impact of adoption of these amendments.

*Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Partnerships*

We wrote down the carrying value of our LIHTC investments to zero in the fourth quarter of 2009, as we will not be able to realize any value either through reductions to our taxable income and related tax liabilities or through a sale to a third party. See NOTE 14: INCOME TAXES for information on the availability of unexpired tax credits.

**Non-Interest Expense**

Table 14 summarizes the components of non-interest expense.

**Table 14 Non-Interest Expense**

| | Year Ended December 31, | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 |
| | (in millions) | | |
| Administrative expenses: | | | |
| Salaries and employee benefits | $ 895 | $ 912 | $ 828 |
| Professional services | 246 | 310 | 262 |
| Occupancy expense | 64 | 68 | 67 |
| Other administrative expenses | 341 | 361 | 348 |
| Total administrative expenses | 1,546 | 1,651 | 1,505 |
| REO operations expense | 673 | 307 | 1,097 |
| Other expenses | 713 | 5,237 | 3,151 |
| Total non-interest expense | $ 2,932 | $ 7,195 | $ 5,753 |

***Administrative Expenses***

Administrative expenses decreased in 2010 compared to 2009, in part due to our focus on cost reduction measures in 2010, particularly on professional services costs. Administrative expenses increased in 2009 compared to 2008, in part due to higher professional services costs to support corporate initiatives, including our efforts under MHA Programs, and higher legal fees.

*REO Operations Expense*

The table below presents the components of our REO operations expense for 2010, 2009, and 2008, and REO inventory and disposition information.

**Table 15 REO Operations Expense, REO Inventory and Dispositions**

| | Year Ended December 31, | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 |
| | (dollars in millions) | | |
| REO operations expense: | | | |
| Single-family: | | | |
| REO property expenses[1] | $ 1,163 | $ 708 | $ 372 |
| Disposition (gains) losses, net[2] | 102 | 749 | 682 |
| Change in holding period allowance[3] | 211 | (612) | 495 |
| Recoveries[4] | (800) | (558) | (452) |
| Total single-family REO operations expense | 676 | 287 | 1,097 |
| Multifamily REO operations (income) expense | (3) | 20 | |
| Total REO operations expense | $ 673 | $ 307 | $ 1,097 |
| REO inventory (in properties), at December 31: | | | |
| Single-family | 72,079 | 45,047 | 29,340 |
| Multifamily | 14 | 5 | 6 |
| Total | 72,093 | 45,052 | 29,346 |
| REO property dispositions (in properties) | 101,215 | 69,406 | 35,579 |

(1) Consists of costs incurred to maintain or protect a property after foreclosure acquisition, such as legal fees, insurance, taxes, cleaning and other maintenance charges.
(2) Represents the difference between the disposition proceeds, net of selling expenses, and the fair value of the property on the date of the foreclosure transfer. Excludes holding period write-downs while in REO inventory.
(3) Includes both the increase (decrease) in the estimated fair value of properties that remain in inventory at the end of the year as well as any reductions associated with dispositions during the year.
(4) Includes recoveries from primary mortgage insurance, pool insurance and seller/servicer repurchases.

Total REO operations expense was $673 million in 2010 as compared to $307 million in 2009 and $1.1 billion in 2008. The increase in 2010 was primarily due to higher property expenses associated with larger REO inventories. We currently expect REO property expenses to continue to increase due to expected continued high levels of REO acquisitions and inventory in 2011. Net disposition losses declined in 2010, compared to the prior two years, as the pace of home value declines slowed and sales proceeds were more closely aligned with acquisition values of our REO inventory. We also experienced increases in recoveries associated with foreclosed loans during 2010 and 2009, primarily due to the increases in those years in our REO acquisitions for which we had credit protection.

Our REO acquisition volume temporarily slowed in the fourth quarter of 2010 due to delays in the foreclosure process, including delays related to concerns about deficiencies in foreclosure documentation practices. For more

information on how this could adversely affect our REO operations (income) expense, see RISK FACTORS Operational Risks *Our expenses could increase and we may otherwise be adversely affected by deficiencies in foreclosure practices, as well as related delays in the foreclosure process.*

***Other Expenses***

Other expenses were $0.7 billion, $5.2 billion, and $3.2 billion in 2010, 2009, and 2008, respectively. During 2009 and 2008, other expenses include significant losses on loans purchased. Our losses on loans purchased were $25 million, $4.8 billion, and $1.6 billion in 2010, 2009, and 2008, respectively. When a loan underlying our PCs is seriously delinquent and modified, we generally exercise our repurchase option and purchase the loan from the PC pool, recording the loan as an unsecuritized mortgage loan, held-for-investment. We record losses on loans purchased when the acquisition basis of a loan purchased from our non-consolidated securitization trusts exceeds the estimated fair value of the loan on the date of purchase. Beginning January 1, 2010, our single-family PC trusts are consolidated as a result of the change in the accounting standard for consolidation of VIEs. As a result, we no longer record losses on loans purchased when we purchase loans from these consolidated entities since the loans are already recorded on our consolidated balance sheets. During 2010, losses on loans purchased were associated solely with single-family loans purchased pursuant to other guarantee commitments. See *Recoveries on Loans Impaired Upon Purchase* for additional information about the impacts of these loans on our financial results. See NOTE 1: SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING POLICIES Impaired Loans and NOTE 23: SELECTED FINANCIAL STATEMENT LINE ITEMS for additional information.

Other expenses for 2008 also include a $1.1 billion securities administrator loss on investment activity, which was related to losses incurred on short-term lending transactions with Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., or Lehman, executed prior to Lehman s bankruptcy in 2008. We had no securities administrator losses on investment activity during 2009 or 2010.

### Income Tax Benefit (Expense)

For 2010, 2009, and 2008, we reported income tax benefit (expense) of $0.9 billion, $0.8 billion, and $(5.6) billion, respectively, resulting in effective tax rates of 6%, 4%, and (12)%, respectively. Our effective tax rate differed from the federal statutory tax rate of 35% primarily due to the establishment of a valuation allowance against a portion of our net deferred tax assets. The income tax benefits recognized in 2010 and 2009 represent the current tax benefits associated with our ability to carry back net operating tax losses generated in 2009 and expected to be generated in 2010, as well as amounts related to the amortization of net deferred losses on pre-2008 closed cash flow hedges. See NOTE 14: INCOME TAXES for additional information.

### Segment Earnings

Our operations consist of three reportable segments, which are based on the type of business activities each performs Investments, Single-family Guarantee, and Multifamily. Certain activities that are not part of a reportable segment are included in the All Other category.

The Investments segment reflects results from our investment, funding and hedging activities. In our Investments segment, we invest principally in mortgage-related securities and single-family mortgage loans funded by other debt issuances and hedged using derivatives. Segment Earnings for this segment consist primarily of the returns on these investments, less the related funding, hedging, and administrative expenses.

The Single-family Guarantee segment reflects results from our single-family credit guarantee activities. In our Single-family Guarantee segment, we purchase single-family mortgage loans originated by our seller/servicers in the primary mortgage market. In most instances, we use the mortgage securitization process to package the purchased mortgage loans into guaranteed mortgage-related securities. We guarantee the payment of principal and interest on the mortgage-related securities in exchange for management and guarantee fees. Segment Earnings for this segment consist primarily of management and guarantee fee revenues, including amortization of upfront fees, less the related credit costs (*i.e.*, provision for credit losses), administrative expenses, allocated funding costs, and amounts related to net float benefits or expenses.

The Multifamily segment reflects results from our investments and guarantee activities in multifamily mortgage loans and securities. Our new purchases of multifamily mortgage loans are primarily made for purposes of aggregation and then securitization, which supports the availability of financing for multifamily properties. We also purchase non-agency CMBS for investment; however we have not purchased significant amounts of non-agency CMBS for investment since 2008. The Multifamily segment does not issue REMIC securities but does issue Other Structured Securities, Other Guarantee Transactions, and other guarantee commitments. Segment Earnings for this segment include management and guarantee fee income and the interest earned on assets related to multifamily investment activities, net of allocated funding costs.

We evaluate segment performance and allocate resources based on a Segment Earnings approach, subject to the conduct of our business under the direction of the Conservator. Beginning January 1, 2010, we revised our method for presenting Segment Earnings to reflect changes in how management measures and assesses the performance of each segment and the company as a whole. This change in method, in conjunction with our implementation of changes in accounting standards relating to transfers of financial assets and the consolidation of VIEs, resulted in significant changes to our presentation of Segment Earnings. Under the revised method, the financial performance of our segments is measured based on each segment s contribution to GAAP net income (loss). Beginning January 1, 2010, under the revised method, the sum of Segment Earnings for each segment and the All Other category will equal GAAP net income (loss) attributable to Freddie Mac.

Segment Earnings for periods presented prior to 2010 include the following items that are included in our GAAP-basis earnings, but were deferred or excluded under the previous method for presenting Segment Earnings:

- Current period GAAP earnings impact of fair value accounting for investments, debt, and derivatives;
- Allocation of the valuation allowance established against our net deferred tax assets;
- Gains and losses on investment sales and debt retirements;
- Losses on loans purchased and related recoveries;
- Other-than-temporary impairment of securities recognized in earnings in excess of expected losses; and
- GAAP-basis accretion income that may result from impairment adjustments.

Under the revised method of presenting Segment Earnings, the All Other category consists of material corporate level expenses that are: (a) non-recurring in nature; and (b) based on management decisions outside the control of the management of our reportable segments. By recording these types of activities to the All Other category, we believe the financial results of our three reportable segments represent the decisions and strategies that are executed within the reportable segments and provide greater comparability across time periods. Items included in the All Other category consist of: (a) the deferred tax asset valuation allowance associated with previously recognized income tax credits carried forward; and (b) in 2009, the

write-down of our LIHTC investments. Other items previously recorded in the All Other category prior to the revision to our method for presenting Segment Earnings have been allocated to our three reportable segments.

Effective January 1, 2010, we also made significant changes to our GAAP consolidated statements of operations as a result of our adoption of changes in accounting standards for transfers of financial assets and the consolidation of VIEs. These changes make it difficult to see the earnings impact of the business activities conducted by our Investments, Single-family Guarantee and Multifamily segments. For example, much of the earnings impact of our securitization activity is now included within the net interest income line of our GAAP consolidated statements of operations, whereas, prior to January 1, 2010, the earnings impact of such activity was reflected in GAAP management and guarantee income and other line items. As a result, in presenting Segment Earnings we make significant reclassifications to certain line items in order to reflect a measure of net interest income on investments, and a measure of management and guarantee income on guarantees, that is in line with our internal measures of performance.

We present Segment Earnings by: (a) reclassifying certain investment-related activities and credit guarantee-related activities between various line items on our GAAP consolidated statements of operations; and (b) allocating certain revenues and expenses, including certain returns on assets and funding costs, and all administrative expenses to our three reportable segments.

As a result of these reclassifications and allocations, Segment Earnings for our reportable segments differs significantly from, and should not be used as a substitute for, net income (loss) as determined in accordance with GAAP. Our definition of Segment Earnings may differ from similar measures used by other companies. However, we believe that Segment Earnings provides us with meaningful metrics to assess the financial performance of each segment and our company as a whole.

We restated Segment Earnings for 2009 and 2008 to reflect the changes in our method of measuring and assessing the performance of our reportable segments described above. The restated Segment Earnings for 2009 and 2008 do not include changes to the guarantee asset, guarantee obligation or other items that were eliminated or changed as a result of our implementation of the amendments to the accounting standards for transfers of financial assets and consolidation of VIEs adopted on January 1, 2010, as this change was applied prospectively consistent with our GAAP results. As a result, our Segment Earnings results for 2010 are not directly comparable with the results for 2009 and 2008. See NOTE 2: CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES for further information regarding the consolidation of certain of our securitization trusts.

See NOTE 17: SEGMENT REPORTING for further information regarding our segments, including the descriptions and activities of the segments and the reclassifications and allocations used to present Segment Earnings.

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Table 16 provides information about our various segment mortgage portfolios at December 31, 2010, 2009 and 2008. For a discussion of each segment s portfolios, see *Segment Earnings Results.*

**Table 16 Segment Mortgage Portfolio Composition[1]**

| | December 31, 2010 | December 31, 2009 | December 31, 2008 |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | (in millions) | |
| **Segment portfolios:** | | | |
| *Investments Mortgage investments portfolio:* | | | |
| Single-family unsecuritized mortgage loans[2] | $ 79,097 | $ 44,135 | $ 33,552 |
| Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities | 263,152 | 374,362 | 424,220 |
| Non-Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities | 139,428 | 179,330 | 203,829 |
| *Total Investments Mortgage investments portfolio* | 481,677 | 597,827 | 661,601 |
| *Single-family Guarantee Managed loan portfolio:* | | | |
| Single-family unsecuritized mortgage loans[3] | 69,766 | 10,743 | 5,203 |
| Single-family Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities held by us | 261,508 | 372,666 | 422,463 |
| Single-family Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities held by third parties | 1,437,399 | 1,474,016 | 1,378,585 |
| Single-family other guarantee commitments[4] | 8,632 | 5,877 | 10,532 |
| *Total Single-family Guarantee Managed loan portfolio* | 1,777,305 | 1,863,302 | 1,816,783 |
| *Multifamily Guarantee portfolio:* | | | |
| Multifamily Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities held by us | 2,095 | 1,949 | 2,061 |
| Multifamily Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities held by third parties | 11,916 | 6,182 | 4,445 |
| Multifamily other guarantee commitments[4] | 10,038 | 9,192 | 9,152 |
| *Total Multifamily Guarantee portfolio* | 24,049 | 17,323 | 15,658 |
| *Multifamily Mortgage investments portfolio:* | | | |
| Multifamily investment securities portfolio | 59,548 | 62,764 | 65,237 |
| Multifamily loan portfolio | 85,883 | 83,938 | 72,721 |
| *Total Multifamily Mortgage investments portfolio* | 145,431 | 146,702 | 137,958 |
| *Total Multifamily portfolio* | 169,480 | 164,025 | 153,616 |
| Less: Freddie Mac single-family and certain multifamily securities[5] | (263,603) | (374,615) | (424,524) |
| **Total mortgage portfolio** | $ 2,164,859 | $ 2,250,539 | $ 2,207,476 |

(1) Based on UPB and excludes mortgage loans and mortgage-related securities traded, but not yet settled.
(2) Excludes unsecuritized non-performing single-family loans for which the Single-family Guarantee segment is actively pursuing a problem loan workout. However, the Single-family Guarantee segment continues to earn management and guarantee fees associated with unsecuritized single-family loans in the Investments segment.
(3) Represents unsecuritized non-performing single-family loans for which the Single-family Guarantee segment is actively pursuing a problem loan workout.
(4) Represents the UPB of mortgage-related assets held by third parties for which we provide our guarantee without our securitization of the related assets.
(5) Freddie Mac single-family mortgage-related securities held by us are included in both our Investments segment s mortgage investments portfolio and our Single-family Guarantee segment s managed loan portfolio, and certain Freddie Mac multifamily mortgage-related securities held by us are included in both the multifamily investment securities portfolio and the multifamily guarantee portfolio. Therefore, these amounts are deducted in order to reconcile to our total mortgage portfolio.

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***Segment Earnings Results***

*Investments*

Table 17 presents the Segment Earnings of our Investments segment.

**Table 17 Segment Earnings and Key Metrics Investments[1]**

| | Year Ended December 31, | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 |
| | (dollars in millions) | | |
| Segment Earnings: | | | |
| Net interest income | $ 6,192 | $ 8,090 | $ 2,815 |
| Non-interest income (loss): | | | |
| Net impairments of available-for-sale securities | (3,819) | (9,870) | (17,129) |
| Derivative gains (losses) | (1,859) | 4,695 | (12,845) |
| Other non-interest income (loss) | (405) | 4,682 | 2,793 |
| Total non-interest income (loss) | (6,083) | (493) | (27,181) |
| Non-interest expense: | | | |
| Administrative expenses | (455) | (515) | (486) |
| Other non-interest expense | (18) | (33) | (1,117) |
| Total non-interest expense | (473) | (548) | (1,603) |
| Segment adjustments[2] | 1,358 | | |
| Segment Earnings (loss) before income tax benefit (expense) | 994 | 7,049 | (25,969) |
| Income tax benefit (expense) | 259 | (572) | (2,047) |
| Less: Net (income) loss - noncontrolling interest | (2) | (1) | (5) |
| Segment Earnings (loss), net of taxes | $ 1,251 | $ 6,476 | $ (28,021) |
| Key metrics Investments: | | | |
| *Portfolio balances:* | | | |
| Average balances of interest-earning assets:[3][4][5] | | | |
| Mortgage-related securities[6] | $ 465,048 | $ 600,562 | $ 584,146 |
| Non-mortgage-related investments[7] | 123,537 | 100,759 | 72,087 |
| Unsecuritized single-family loans | 59,028 | 49,013 | 29,163 |
| Total average balances of interest-earning assets | $ 647,613 | $ 750,334 | $ 685,396 |
| *Return:* | | | |
| Net interest yield Segment Earnings basis | 0.96% | 1.08% | 0.42% |

(1) Under our revised method of presenting Segment Earnings, Segment Earnings for the Investments segment equals GAAP net income (loss) attributable to Freddie Mac for the Investments segment. For reconciliations of the

Segment Earnings line items to the comparable line items in our consolidated financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP, see NOTE 17: SEGMENT REPORTING Table 17.2 Segment Earnings and Reconciliation to GAAP Results.

(2) For a description of our segment adjustments, see NOTE 17: SEGMENT REPORTING Segment Earnings *Segment Adjustments.*

(3) Based on UPB and excludes mortgage-related securities traded, but not yet settled.

(4) Excludes non-performing single-family mortgage loans.

(5) For securities, we calculate average balances based on their amortized cost.

(6) Includes our investments in single-family PCs and certain Other Guarantee Transactions, which have been consolidated under GAAP on our consolidated balance sheet beginning on January 1, 2010.

(7) Includes the average balances of interest-earning cash and cash equivalents, non-mortgage-related securities, and federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell.

Segment Earnings for our Investments segment decreased by $5.2 billion to $1.3 billion in 2010, compared to $6.5 billion in 2009.

During 2010, the UPB of the Investments segment mortgage investments portfolio decreased by 19.4%, compared to a decrease of 9.6% during 2009. The UPB of the Investments segment mortgage investments portfolio decreased from $598 billion at December 31, 2009 to $482 billion at December 31, 2010.

We held $302.9 billion of agency securities and $99.6 billion of non-agency mortgage-related securities as of December 31, 2010 compared to $440.0 billion of agency securities and $113.7 billion of non-agency mortgage-related securities as of December 31, 2009. The decline in UPB of agency securities is due mainly to liquidations, including prepayments and select sales. Liquidations during 2010 increased substantially due to higher refinance activity, as mortgage rates hit record lows, and increased purchases of seriously delinquent and modified loans from the mortgage pools underlying both our PCs and other agency securities. The decline in UPB of non-agency mortgage-related securities is due mainly to the receipt of monthly remittances of principal repayments from both the recoveries of liquidated loans and voluntary repayments of the underlying collateral, representing a partial return of our investments in these securities. Purchase and sales activity in the Investments segment was minimal in 2010. See CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS ANALYSIS Investments in Securities for additional information regarding our mortgage-related securities.

Segment Earnings net interest income and net interest yield decreased $1.9 billion and 12 basis points, respectively, during 2010, compared to 2009. The primary driver underlying these decreases was a decrease in the average balance of

mortgage-related securities, partially offset by a decrease in funding costs as a result of the replacement of higher-cost long-term debt at lower rates.

Segment Earnings non-interest loss increased $5.6 billion in 2010, compared to 2009. Included in other non-interest income (loss) are gains (losses) on trading securities of $(1.4) billion in 2010, compared to $4.8 billion in 2009. In 2010, the losses on trading securities was primarily due to the movement of securities with unrealized gains towards maturity, particularly interest-only securities, partially offset by fair value gains on our non-interest-only securities classified as trading primarily due to decreased interest rates. The net gains on trading securities during 2009 related primarily to tightening OAS levels.

Impairments recorded in our Investments segment decreased by $6.1 billion during 2010, compared to 2009. Impairments for 2010 and 2009 are not comparable because the adoption of the amendment to the accounting standards for investments in debt and equity securities on April 1, 2009 significantly impacted both the identification and measurement of other-than-temporary impairments. See CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS ANALYSIS Investments in Securities *Mortgage-Related Securities* *Other-Than-Temporary Impairments on Available-For-Sale Mortgage-Related Securities* for additional information on our impairments.

We recorded derivative gains (losses) for this segment of $(1.9) billion in 2010, compared to $4.7 billion in 2009. While derivatives are an important aspect of our management of interest-rate risk, they generally increase the volatility of reported Segment Earnings, because, while fair value changes in derivatives affect Segment Earnings, fair value changes in several of the types of assets and liabilities being hedged do not affect Segment Earnings. During 2010, longer-term swap interest rates declined, resulting in fair value losses on our pay-fixed swaps that were partially offset by fair value gains on our receive-fixed swaps and gains on our purchased call swaptions. See Non-Interest Income (Loss) *Derivative Gains (Losses)* for additional information on our derivatives.

The objectives set forth for us under our charter and conservatorship, restrictions set forth in the Purchase Agreement and restrictions imposed by FHFA have negatively impacted, and will continue to negatively impact, our Investments segment results. For example, our mortgage-related investments portfolio is subject to a cap that decreases by 10% each year until the portfolio reaches $250 billion. This will likely cause a corresponding reduction in our net interest income from these assets and therefore negatively affect our Investments segment results. FHFA also stated its expectation that any net additions to our mortgage-related investments portfolio would be related to purchasing seriously delinquent mortgages out of PC pools. We are also subject to limits on the amount of mortgage assets we can sell in any calendar month without review and approval by FHFA and, if FHFA so determines, Treasury.

For information on the impact of the requirement to reduce the mortgage-related investments portfolio limit by 10% annually, see NOTE 3: CONSERVATORSHIP AND RELATED MATTERS Impact of the Purchase Agreement and FHFA Regulation on the Mortgage-Related Investments Portfolio.

Segment Earnings for our Investments segment increased $34.5 billion in 2009 compared to 2008. Impairments recorded in our Investments segment decreased by $7.3 billion during 2009, compared to 2008. As noted above, impairments for 2009 and 2008 are not comparable because of the adoption of the amendment to the accounting standards for investments in debt and equity securities on April 1, 2009. We recorded derivative gains of $4.7 billion in 2009, primarily due to increases in longer-term swap interest rates and implied volatility. Segment Earnings non-interest expense for 2008 includes a loss of $1.1 billion related to short-term lending transactions with Lehman. Segment Earnings net interest income increased $5.3 billion and Segment Earnings net interest yield increased 66 basis points to 108 basis points for 2009 compared to 2008. The increases in Segment Earnings net interest income and Segment Earnings net interest yield were primarily due to decreased funding costs due to the replacement of higher cost short- and long-term debt with lower cost debt issuances, and increases in the average balance of interest-earning assets.

*Single-Family Guarantee*

Table 18 presents the Segment Earnings of our Single-family Guarantee segment.

**Table 18 Segment Earnings and Key Metrics Single-Family Guarantee[1]**

| | Year Ended December 31, | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 |
| | (dollars in millions) | | |
| Segment Earnings: | | | |
| Net interest income | $ 72 | $ 307 | $ 280 |
| Provision for credit losses | (18,785) | (29,102) | (16,325) |
| Non-interest income: | | | |
| Management and guarantee income | 3,635 | 3,448 | 3,615 |
| Other non-interest income | 1,351 | 721 | 880 |
| Total non-interest income | 4,986 | 4,169 | 4,495 |
| Non-interest expense: | | | |
| Administrative expenses | (879) | (915) | (826) |
| REO operations expense | (676) | (287) | (1,097) |
| Other non-interest expense | (629) | (4,888) | (1,730) |
| Total non-interest expense | (2,184) | (6,090) | (3,653) |
| Segment adjustments[2] | (953) | | |
| Segment Earnings (loss) before income tax benefit (expense) | (16,864) | (30,716) | (15,203) |
| Income tax benefit (expense) | 608 | 3,573 | (5,146) |
| Segment Earnings (loss), net of taxes | (16,256) | (27,143) | (20,349) |
| Reconciliation to GAAP net income (loss): | | | |
| Credit guarantee-related adjustments[3] | | 5,941 | (2,871) |
| Tax-related adjustments | | (2,080) | 1,005 |
| Total reconciling items, net of taxes | | 3,861 | (1,866) |
| Net income (loss) attributable to Freddie Mac | $ (16,256) | $ (23,282) | $ (22,215) |
| Key metrics Single-family Guarantee: | | | |
| *Balances and Growth (in billions, except rate):* | | | |
| Average securitized balance of single-family credit guarantee portfolio[4] | $ 1,728 | $ 1,799 | $ 1,771 |
| Issuance Single-family credit guarantees[4] | $ 385 | $ 472 | $ 353 |
| Fixed-rate products Percentage of purchases[5] | 95% | 99% | 92% |
| Liquidation rate Single-family credit guarantees[6] | 29% | 24% | 16% |
| *Management and Guarantee Fee Rate (in bps):* | | | |
| Contractual management and guarantee fees | 13.5 | 13.9 | 15.3 |
| Amortization of delivery fees | 6.1 | 4.8 | 4.8 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Segment Earnings management and guarantee income | 19.6 | 18.7 | 20.1 |
| *Credit:* | | | |
| Serious delinquency rate, at end of period | 3.84% | 3.98% | 1.83% |
| REO inventory, at end of period (number of units) | 72,079 | 45,047 | 29,340 |
| Single-family credit losses, in bps(7) | 76.2 | 42.7 | 20.9 |
| *Market:* | | | |
| Single-family mortgage debt outstanding (total U.S. market, in billions)(8) | $ 10,612 | $ 10,861 | $ 11,072 |
| 30-year fixed mortgage rate(9) | 4.9% | 5.1% | 5.1% |

(1) Beginning January 1, 2010, under our revised method, Segment Earnings for the Single-family Guarantee segment equals GAAP net income (loss) attributable to Freddie Mac for the Single-family Guarantee segment. For reconciliations of Segment Earnings for the Single-family Guarantee segment in 2010, 2009 and 2008 and the Segment Earnings line items to the comparable line items in our consolidated financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP, see NOTE 17: SEGMENT REPORTING Table 17.2 Segment Earnings and Reconciliation to GAAP Results.

(2) For a description of our segment adjustments see NOTE 17: SEGMENT REPORTING Segment Earnings *Segment Adjustments.*

(3) Consists primarily of amortization and valuation adjustments pertaining to the guarantee obligation and guarantee asset which were excluded from Segment Earnings and cash compensation exchanged at the time of securitization, excluding buy-up and buy-down fees, which were amortized into earnings. These reconciling items existed in periods prior to 2010 as the amendment to the accounting standards for transfers of financial assets and consolidation of VIEs was applied prospectively on January 1, 2010.

(4) Based on UPB.

(5) Excludes Other Guarantee Transactions, and includes purchases of interest-only mortgages with fixed interest rates.

(6) Includes our purchases of delinquent loans from PCs. On February 10, 2010, we announced that we would begin purchasing substantially all 120 days or more delinquent mortgages from our PC pools. See NOTE 6: INDIVIDUALLY IMPAIRED AND NON-PERFORMING LOANS for more information.

(7) Credit losses are equal to REO operations expenses plus charge-offs, net of recoveries, associated with single-family mortgage loans. Calculated as the amount of credit losses divided by the average balance of our single-family credit guarantee portfolio.

(8) Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States of America dated December 9, 2010. The outstanding amount for 2010 reflects the balance as of September 30, 2010, which is the latest available information.

(9) Based on Freddie Mac s Primary Mortgage Market Survey rate for the last week in the year, which represents the national average mortgage commitment rate to a qualified borrower exclusive of any fees and points required by the lender. This commitment rate applies only to financing on conforming mortgages with LTV ratios of 80%.

During 2010, 2009 and 2008, Segment Earnings (loss) for our Single-family Guarantee segment was $(16.3) billion, $(27.1) billion and $(20.3) billion, respectively. Segment Earnings (loss) improved in 2010, compared to 2009, primarily due to a decline in credit-related expenses. Credit-related expenses consist of our provision for credit losses and REO operations

expense. The increase in Segment Earnings (loss) during 2009, as compared to 2008, was primarily due to higher Segment Earnings provision for credit losses and, to a lesser extent, higher losses on loans purchased.

Table 19 provides summary information about the composition of Segment Earnings (loss) for this segment in 2010. Segment Earnings management and guarantee income consists of contractual amounts due to us related to our management and guarantee fees as well as amortization of delivery fees.

**Table 19 Segment Earnings Composition Single-Family Guarantee Segment**

| | Year Ended December 31, 2010 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Segment Earnings Management and Guarantee Income(1) | | Credit Expenses(2) | | |
| | Amount | Average Rate | Amount | Average Rate(3) | Net Amount(4) |
| | (dollars in millions, rates in bps) | | | | |
| Year of origination(5): | | | | | |
| 2010 | $ 418 | 23.8 | $ (109) | 6.2 | $ 309 |
| 2009 | 837 | 19.3 | (367) | 8.4 | 470 |
| 2008 | 554 | 29.5 | (2,151) | 114.3 | (1,597) |
| 2007 | 493 | 21.2 | (7,170) | 307.2 | (6,677) |
| 2006 | 289 | 16.5 | (5,847) | 332.6 | (5,558) |
| 2005 | 313 | 15.8 | (2,644) | 132.8 | (2,331) |
| 2004 and prior | 731 | 16.3 | (1,173) | 26.1 | (442) |
| Total | $ 3,635 | 19.6 | $ (19,461) | 104.7 | (15,826) |
| Administrative expenses | | | | | (879) |
| Net interest income | | | | | 72 |
| Income tax benefit and other non-interest income and (expense), net(6) | | | | | 377 |
| Segment Earnings (loss), net of taxes | | | | | $ (16,256) |

(1) Includes amortization of delivery fees of $1.1 billion for the year ended December 31, 2010.
(2) Consists of the aggregate of the Segment Earnings provision for credit losses and Segment Earnings REO operations expense.
(3) Based on the average securitized balance of the single-family credit guarantee portfolio. Historical rates of average credit expenses may not be representative of future results.
(4) Calculated as Segment Earnings management and guarantee income less credit expenses.
(5) Segment Earnings management and guarantee income is presented by year of guarantee origination, whereas credit expenses are presented based on year of loan origination.
(6) Includes segment adjustments.

During 2010, we raised our management and guarantee fee rates with certain of our seller/servicers; however, these increased rates are still lower than the average rates of the PCs that were liquidated during 2010. We implemented delivery fee increases in 2009 for mortgages with certain combinations of LTV ratios and other higher-risk loan characteristics, subject to certain maximum limits. We currently believe the increase in management and guarantee fee rates we implemented in 2009 and 2010, when coupled with the higher credit quality of the mortgages within our new PC issuances in 2009 and 2010, will provide management and guarantee fee income, over the long term, that exceeds our anticipated credit-related and administrative expenses associated with the underlying loans. However, the increase in management and guarantee fees associated with 2009 and 2010 originated business will not be sufficient to offset the future expenses associated with our 2005 to 2008 PC issuances since the management and guarantee fees associated with those securities do not change. Consequently, we expect to continue to report a net loss for the Single-family Guarantee segment in 2011.

Segment Earnings management and guarantee income increased slightly in 2010 compared to 2009, primarily due to an increase in the amortization of delivery fees. Increased amortization of delivery fees in 2010, compared to 2009, reflects the impact of higher delivery fees associated with loans purchased in the last two years combined with higher prepayment rates on guaranteed mortgages in 2010 as mortgage rates declined and refinancing activity increased. Segment Earnings management and guarantee income was lower in 2009 than in 2008 primarily due to lower average fee rates in 2009.

The UPB of the Single-family Guarantee managed loan portfolio was $1.78 trillion at December 31, 2010 compared to $1.86 trillion at December 31, 2009. The decline in this portfolio was primarily attributable to liquidations of Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities, partially offset by increased purchases of seriously delinquent mortgages out of PC pools. The liquidation rate on our securitized single-family credit guarantees increased to 29% for 2010, compared to 24% and 16% in 2009 and 2008, respectively.

Our single-family mortgage purchases in 2010 decreased by 19% to $386.4 billion, as compared to $475.4 billion in 2009. Single-family mortgage purchase volumes from individual customers can fluctuate significantly. Our mortgage purchase volumes are impacted by several factors, including origination volumes, the price performance of our PCs, mortgage product and underwriting trends, competition, customer-specific behavior, contract terms, and governmental initiatives concerning our business activities. Origination volumes can be affected by government programs, such as the increase in refinance loan volume during 2010 and 2009 associated with our relief refinance initiative. Ginnie Mae, which

has become a more significant competitor since 2008, guarantees the timely payment of principal and interest on mortgage-related securities backed by federally insured or guaranteed loans, primarily those insured by FHA or guaranteed by VA. Ginnie Mae increased its share of the securitization market in 2010, in large part due to favorable pricing of loans insured by FHA, the increase in the FHA loan limit and the availability, through FHA, of a mortgage product for borrowers seeking greater than 80% financing who could not otherwise qualify for a conventional mortgage.

Refinance volumes continued to be high due to continued low interest rates, and represented 80% of our single-family mortgage purchase volume during 2010. Relief refinance mortgages represented 28% of our single-family mortgage purchase volume during 2010. We believe the combination of high refinance activity (excluding relief refinance mortgages), changes in underwriting standards and fewer purchases of loans with higher-risk characteristics resulted in overall improvement in the credit quality associated with our single-family mortgage purchases in 2009 and 2010 as compared to purchases from 2005 through 2008 as measured by original LTV ratios, FICO credit scores, and income documentation standards.

During 2010, 2009 and 2008, our Segment Earnings provision for credit losses for the Single-family Guarantee segment was $18.8 billion, $29.1 billion and $16.3 billion, respectively. Segment Earnings provision for credit losses decreased in 2010, compared to 2009, primarily due to a substantial slow down in the rate of growth in non-performing single-family loans, as well as a less significant increase in loss severity, but was partially offset by an increase in the number of single-family loans subject to individual impairment resulting from an increase in modifications classified as TDRs during 2010. Our estimates of allowance for loan losses associated with loans classified as TDRs generally result in an increase in the allowance for loan losses as compared to non-TDR loans evaluated on an aggregate basis. Our Segment Earnings provision for credit losses for the segment was higher in 2009, compared to 2008, due to increased credit deterioration in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio, primarily related to loans with higher-risk characteristics and loans originated in 2007 and 2006. Our Segment Earnings provision for loan losses is generally higher than that recorded under GAAP primarily due to recognized provision associated with forgone interest income on non-performing loans, which is not recognized under GAAP since the loans are placed on non-accrual status.

The serious delinquency rate on our single-family credit guarantee portfolio decreased slightly to 3.84% as of December 31, 2010 from 3.98% as of December 31, 2009 due to a higher volume of loan modifications and foreclosure transfers, as well as a slowdown in new serious delinquencies. As of December 31, 2010, more than one-third of our single-family credit guarantee portfolio is comprised of mortgage loans originated during 2009 and 2010. These new vintages reflect the combination of changes in underwriting practices and other factors discussed in BUSINESS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Our Primary Business Objectives and are replacing the older vintages that have a higher composition of loans with higher-risk characteristics. We currently expect that, over time, this should positively impact the serious delinquency rates and credit losses of our single-family credit guarantee portfolio. Although the volume of new serious delinquencies declined in each quarter of 2010, our serious delinquency rate remains high, reflecting continued stress in the housing and labor markets.

Charge-offs associated with single-family loans increased to $16.7 billion in 2010, compared to $9.7 billion in 2009 and $3.4 billion in 2008, primarily due to an increase in the volume of foreclosure transfers and short sales. See RISK MANAGEMENT Credit Risk *Mortgage Credit Risk* for further information on our single-family credit guarantee portfolio, including credit performance, charge-offs, and growth in the balance of our non-performing assets.

Segment Earnings non-interest income was $5.0 billion, $4.2 billion, and $4.5 billion in 2010, 2009, and 2008, respectively. The increase in 2010, compared to 2009 was primarily due to higher management and guarantee fees, discussed above, and higher recoveries on loans impaired upon purchase. In 2010, increased recoveries on loans impaired upon purchase resulted from a higher volume of short sales and foreclosure transfers, compared to 2009,

combined with improvements in home prices in certain geographical areas.

Segment Earnings non-interest expense was $2.2 billion, $6.1 billion, and $3.7 billion in 2010, 2009 and 2008, respectively. The decline in non-interest expense in 2010, compared to 2009, was primarily due to a decline in losses on loans purchased that resulted from changes in accounting standards adopted on January 1, 2010. Single-family Guarantee REO operations expense increased during 2010, compared to 2009, as a result of higher property expenses and holding period write-downs that were partially offset by lower disposition losses and increased recoveries. Single-family Guarantee REO operations expense decreased during 2009, compared to 2008, primarily due to stabilization of single-family home prices in 2009, which mitigated holding period writedowns and disposition losses. During 2010 and 2009, we experienced significant increases in REO activity in all regions of the U.S., particularly in California, Florida, Nevada and Arizona. See RISK MANAGEMENT Credit Risk *Mortgage Credit Risk Portfolio Management Activities Credit Performance* for further information on serious delinquency rates and REO activity.

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Segment Earnings income tax benefit was $608 million and $3.6 billion in 2010 and 2009, respectively. The income tax benefit in 2010 primarily resulted from carrying back a portion of our expected current year tax loss to offset prior years income. We exhausted our capacity for carrying back net operating losses for tax purposes during 2010.

*Multifamily*

Table 20 presents the Segment Earnings of our Multifamily segment.

**Table 20 Segment Earnings and Key Metrics Multifamily[1]**

| | Year Ended December 31, | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 |
| | (dollars in millions) | | |
| Segment Earnings: | | | |
| Net interest income | $ 1,114 | $ 856 | $ 772 |
| Provision for credit losses | (99) | (574) | (229) |
| Non-interest income (loss): | | | |
| Management and guarantee income | 101 | 90 | 76 |
| Security impairments | (96) | (137) | |
| Derivative gains (losses) | 6 | (27) | (3) |
| Other non-interest income (loss) | 237 | (462) | (517) |
| Total non-interest income (loss) | 248 | (536) | (444) |
| Non-interest expense: | | | |
| Administrative expenses | (212) | (221) | (193) |
| REO operations income (expense) | 3 | (20) | |
| Other non-interest expense | (66) | (18) | (21) |
| Total non-interest expense | (275) | (259) | (214) |
| Segment adjustments[2] | | | |
| Segment Earnings (loss) before income tax benefit (expense) | 988 | (513) | (115) |
| LIHTC partnerships tax benefit | 585 | 594 | 589 |
| Income tax benefit (expense) | (611) | (594) | (532) |
| Less: Net (income) loss noncontrolling interest | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| Segment Earnings (loss), net of taxes | 965 | (511) | (56) |
| Reconciliation to GAAP net income (loss): | | | |
| Credit guarantee-related adjustments[3] | | 7 | (2) |
| Fair value-related adjustments | | (3,761) | |
| Tax-related adjustments | | 1,313 | 1 |
| Total reconciling items, net of taxes | | (2,441) | (1) |
| Net income (loss) attributable to Freddie Mac | $ 965 | $ (2,952) | $ (57) |

| Key metrics Multifamily: | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Balances and Growth:* | | | |
| Average balance of Multifamily loan portfolio | $ 83,096 | $ 78,371 | $ 64,424 |
| Average balance of Multifamily guarantee portfolio | $ 21,756 | $ 16,188 | $ 14,118 |
| Average balance of Multifamily investment securities portfolio | $ 61,332 | $ 63,797 | $ 65,513 |
| Liquidation rate Multifamily loan portfolio | 5.7% | 3.6% | 6.4% |
| Growth rate | 8.6% | 14.6% | 27.9% |
| *Yield and Rate:* | | | |
| Net interest yield Segment Earnings basis | 0.77% | 0.60% | 0.59% |
| Average Management and guarantee fee rate, in bps(4) | 50.1 | 53.3 | 50.5 |
| *Credit:* | | | |
| Delinquency rate(5) | 0.26% | 0.20% | 0.05% |
| Loan loss reserves, in bps | 75.3 | 82.1 | 31.3 |
| Loan loss reserves at period end | $ 828 | $ 831 | $ 277 |
| Credit losses, in bps(6) | 9.6 | 4.4 | 1.1 |

(1) Beginning January 1, 2010, under our revised method, Segment Earnings for the Multifamily segment equals GAAP net income (loss) attributable to Freddie Mac for the Multifamily segment. For reconciliations of Segment Earnings for the Multifamily segment in 2010, 2009, and 2008 and the Segment Earnings line items to the comparable line items in our consolidated financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP, see NOTE 17: SEGMENT REPORTING Table 17.2 Segment Earnings and Reconciliation to GAAP Results.

(2) For a description of our segment adjustments see NOTE 17: SEGMENT REPORTING Segment Earnings *Segment Adjustments.*

(3) Consists primarily of amortization and valuation adjustments pertaining to the guarantee asset and guarantee obligation, which were excluded from Segment Earnings in 2009 and 2008.

(4) Represents Multifamily Segment Earnings management and guarantee income, excluding prepayment and certain other fees, divided by the average balance of the multifamily guarantee portfolio, excluding certain bonds under the NIBP.

(5) See RISK MANAGEMENT Credit Risk *Mortgage Credit Risk Credit Performance* Delinquencies for information on our reported multifamily delinquency rate.

(6) Credit losses are equal to REO operations expenses plus charge-offs, net of recoveries, associated with multifamily mortgage loans. Calculated as the amount of credit losses divided by the combined average balances of our multifamily loan portfolio and multifamily guarantee portfolio.

Segment Earnings (loss) for our Multifamily segment increased to $965 million for 2010 compared to $(511) million for 2009. Segment Earnings (loss) improved in 2010 primarily due to increased net interest income and lower provision for credit losses in 2010. Segment Earnings (loss) declined to $(511) million in 2009 from $(56) million in 2008, primarily due to higher provision for credit losses and recognition of security impairments in 2009.

A primary contributor to the change in Multifamily Segment Earnings in 2010 is the treatment of our LIHTC investments. In 2009 and 2008, LIHTC partnership losses were recognized in the Multifamily Segment, negatively impacting Segment Earnings in those years. At December 31, 2009, the LIHTC investments were written down to zero and resulted in a favorable variance in 2010 Segment Earnings as partnership losses were no longer being recognized.

Net interest income increased $258 million, or 30%, for 2010 compared to 2009, primarily attributable to lower funding costs on allocated debt in 2010, which declined principally due to the removal of the LIHTC investments from the Multifamily segment in the fourth quarter of 2009. Net interest income was also positively impacted by an increase in prepayment fees driven by an increase in refinancing in 2010, as compared to 2009. As a result, net interest yield was 77 basis points in 2010, an improvement of 17 basis points from 2009. Net interest income increased $84 million, or 11%, for 2009 compared to 2008, driven by a 22% increase in the average balance of our multifamily loan portfolio and lower interest rates, which decreased our cost of funding.

Segment Earnings non-interest income (loss) increased to $248 million in 2010 compared to $(536) million in 2009, primarily attributable to the absence of LIHTC partnership losses in 2010. Multifamily Segment Earnings non-interest income (loss) also increased, although to a much lesser extent, due to higher gains recognized on the sale of loans through securitization. We recognized $267 million in net gains on sales of $6.6 billion in UPB of multifamily loans during the year ended December 31, 2010. These gains were partially offset by $249 million in fair value losses recognized on mortgage loans held-for-sale reflecting market volatility. Impairment on CMBS during 2010 and 2009 totaled $96 million and $137 million, respectively. There were no impairments recognized for either GAAP or Segment Earnings on available-for-sale CMBS during 2008.

Major national multifamily market fundamentals improved during 2010, with several consecutive quarters of positive trends in vacancy rates and effective rents. Vacancy rates, which had climbed to record levels in early 2010, improved and effective rents, the principal source of income for property owners, stabilized and began to improve on a national basis. These improving fundamentals helped to stabilize property values in a number of markets. However, the multifamily market continues to be negatively impacted by high unemployment and ongoing weakness in the economy. The multifamily mortgage market differs from the residential single-family market in several respects. The likelihood that a multifamily borrower will make scheduled payments on its mortgage is based on the ability of the property to generate sufficient cash flow to make those payments, and is generally affected by rent levels, vacancy rates and property operating expenses. The multifamily market is affected by the balance between the supply of, and demand for, rental housing (both multifamily and single-family), which in turn is affected by unemployment rates, the number of new units added to the rental housing supply, rates of household formation and the relative cost of owner-occupied housing alternatives. However, some local markets continue to exhibit weaker than average fundamentals, particularly in the states of Nevada, Arizona, and Georgia, which may increase our risk for future losses. For further information on delinquencies, including geographical and other concentrations see NOTE 19: CONCENTRATION OF CREDIT AND OTHER RISKS.

Our Multifamily segment provision for credit losses decreased to $99 million in 2010 from $574 million in 2009, reflecting improved fundamentals, as discussed above. This decrease was partially offset by an increase in the amount of loans identified as impaired and the specific reserve recorded in connection with those loans. The increase in Multifamily segment provision for credit losses in 2009, as compared to 2008, reflected significant deterioration in multifamily market fundamentals including higher vacancy rates and declines in effective rental rates, which adversely affected our multifamily borrowers. For loans we identify as having deteriorating underlying performance characteristics, such as estimated current LTV ratio and DSCRs, we evaluate each individual property, using estimates of property value to determine if a specific reserve is needed. Although we use the most recently available results of our multifamily borrowers to assess a property s value, there is a significant lag in reporting as they prepare their results in the normal course of business.

The delinquency rate for loans in the multifamily mortgage portfolio was 0.26% and 0.20% as of December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively, and increased in 2010 due to weakness in certain markets. Our multifamily delinquent loans as of December 31, 2010 are principally loans on properties located in Georgia and Texas. As of December 31, 2010, over one-half of the multifamily loans, measured both in terms of number of loans and on a UPB basis, that were two monthly payments or more past due had credit enhancements that we currently believe will mitigate our expected losses on those loans. The multifamily delinquency rate of credit-enhanced loans as of December 31, 2010 and 2009, was 0.85% and 1.03%, respectively, while the delinquency rate for non-credit-enhanced loans was 0.12% and 0.07%, respectively. See RISK MANAGEMENT Credit Risk *Mortgage Credit Risk Credit Performance* Delinquencies for further information about our reported delinquency rates.

We account for multifamily mortgages as TDRs where the original terms of the mortgage loan agreement are modified due to the borrower s financial difficulties, and we have granted a concession. Accounting for TDRs requires recognition in the provision for credit losses for the excess of our recorded investment in the loan over the present value of the expected

future cash flows. This generally results in a higher allowance for loan losses than for loans that are not TDRs. In 2010, we experienced increased volumes of TDRs and REO acquisitions, compared to 2009. Refinance risk, which is the risk that a multifamily borrower with a maturing balloon mortgage will not be able to refinance and will instead default, is significant given the state of the economy, lower levels of liquidity, property cash flows, and property market values. This is also likely to lead to an increase in the volume of TDRs and REO acquisitions. REO and loss mitigation activities resulted in net charge-offs of $103 million in 2010. In 2011, we expect our charge-offs will continue to increase, driven by a higher level of REO acquisitions and loss mitigation activities, as we continue to work with borrowers to resolve troubled loans.

The UPB of the total multifamily portfolio increased to $169.5 billion at December 31, 2010 from $164.0 billion at December 31, 2009, due to increased guarantees of securities issued during 2010 as part of our CME initiative as well as increased purchases of loans, which we expect to securitize in 2011. Subject to market conditions, we expect to continue to purchase loans and subsequently securitize these loans in 2011 under our CME initiative, which supports liquidity for the multifamily market.

## CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS ANALYSIS

The following discussion of our consolidated balance sheets should be read in conjunction with our consolidated financial statements, including the accompanying notes. Also, see CRITICAL ACCOUNTING POLICIES AND ESTIMATES for more information concerning our more significant accounting policies and estimates applied in determining our reported financial position.

### Change in Accounting Principles

As a result of our adoption of two new accounting standards that amended the guidance applicable to the accounting for transfers of financial assets and the consolidation of VIEs, our consolidated balance sheets as of December 31, 2010 reflect the consolidation of our single-family PC trusts and certain Other Guarantee Transactions. The cumulative effect of these changes in accounting principles was an increase of $1.5 trillion to assets and liabilities, and a net decrease of $11.7 billion to total equity (deficit) as of January 1, 2010, which included changes to the opening balances of retained earnings (accumulated deficit) and AOCI. This net decrease was driven principally by: (a) the elimination of unrealized gains resulting from the extinguishment of PCs held as investment securities upon consolidation of the PC trusts, representing the difference between the UPB of the loans underlying the PC trusts and the fair value of the PCs, including premiums, discounts, and other basis adjustments; (b) the elimination of the guarantee asset and guarantee obligation established for guarantees issued to securitization trusts we consolidated; and (c) the application of our non-accrual policy to single-family seriously delinquent mortgage loans consolidated as of January 1, 2010.

See NOTE 1: SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING POLICIES Consolidation and Equity Method of Accounting, NOTE 2: CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES, NOTE 4: VARIABLE INTEREST ENTITIES, and NOTE 23: SELECTED FINANCIAL STATEMENT LINE ITEMS for additional information regarding these changes.

### Cash and Cash Equivalents, Federal Funds Sold and Securities Purchased Under Agreements to Resell

Cash and cash equivalents, federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell, and other liquid assets discussed in Investments in Securities *Non-Mortgage-Related Securities,* are important to our cash flow and asset and liability management, and our ability to provide liquidity and stability to the mortgage market. We use these assets to help manage recurring cash flows and meet our other cash management needs. We consider federal funds sold to be overnight unsecured trades executed with commercial banks that are members of the Federal Reserve

System. Securities purchased under agreements to resell principally consist of short-term contractual agreements such as reverse repurchase agreements involving Treasury and agency securities. As discussed above, commencing January 1, 2010, we consolidated the assets of our single-family PC trusts and certain Other Guarantee Transactions. These short-term assets are comprised primarily of restricted cash and cash equivalents and investments in securities purchased under agreements to resell.

Excluding amounts related to our consolidated VIEs, we held $37.0 billion and $64.7 billion of cash and cash equivalents, $1.4 billion and $0 billion of federal funds sold, and $15.8 billion and $7.0 billion of securities purchased under agreements to resell at December 31, 2010 and December 31, 2009, respectively. The aggregate decrease in these assets is largely related to using such assets for debt calls and maturities, as well as purchases of delinquent mortgages from PC pools during 2010. In addition, excluding amounts related to our consolidated VIEs, we held on average $42.2 billion and $55.8 billion of cash and cash equivalents and $29.4 billion and $28.5 billion of federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell during the years ended December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively.

**Investments in Securities**

Tables 21 and 22 provide detail regarding our investments in securities as of December 31, 2010, 2009, and 2008. Due to the accounting changes noted above, Tables 21 and 22 do not include our holdings of single-family PCs and certain Other

Guarantee Transactions as of December 31, 2010. For information on our holdings of such securities, see Table 16 Segment Mortgage Portfolio Composition.

**Table 21 Investments in Available-For-Sale Securities**

| December 31, 2010 | Amortized Cost | Gross Unrealized Gains | Gross Unrealized Losses[1] | Fair Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | (in millions) | | |
| Available-for-sale mortgage-related securities: | | | | |
| Freddie Mac | $ 80,742 | $ 5,142 | $ (195) | $ 85,689 |
| Subprime | 47,916 | 1 | (14,056) | 33,861 |
| CMBS | 58,455 | 1,551 | (1,919) | 58,087 |
| Option ARM | 10,726 | 16 | (3,853) | 6,889 |
| Alt-A and other | 15,561 | 58 | (2,451) | 13,168 |
| Fannie Mae | 23,025 | 1,348 | (3) | 24,370 |
| Obligations of states and political subdivisions | 9,885 | 31 | (539) | 9,377 |
| Manufactured housing | 945 | 13 | (61) | 897 |
| Ginnie Mae | 268 | 28 | | 296 |
| Total available-for-sale mortgage-related securities | 247,523 | 8,188 | (23,077) | 232,634 |
| Total investments in available-for-sale securities | $ 247,523 | $ 8,188 | $ (23,077) | $ 232,634 |
| **December 31, 2009** | | | | |
| Available-for-sale mortgage-related securities: | | | | |
| Freddie Mac | $ 215,198 | $ 9,410 | $ (1,141) | $ 223,467 |
| Subprime | 56,821 | 2 | (21,102) | 35,721 |
| CMBS | 61,792 | 15 | (7,788) | 54,019 |
| Option ARM | 13,686 | 25 | (6,475) | 7,236 |
| Alt-A and other | 18,945 | 9 | (5,547) | 13,407 |
| Fannie Mae | 34,242 | 1,312 | (8) | 35,546 |
| Obligations of states and political subdivisions | 11,868 | 49 | (440) | 11,477 |
| Manufactured housing | 1,084 | 1 | (174) | 911 |
| Ginnie Mae | 320 | 27 | | 347 |
| Total available-for-sale mortgage-related securities | 413,956 | 10,850 | (42,675) | 382,131 |
| Available-for-sale non-mortgage-related securities: | | | | |
| Asset-backed securities | 2,444 | 109 | | 2,553 |
| Total available-for-sale non-mortgage-related securities | 2,444 | 109 | | 2,553 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total investments in available-for-sale securities | $ 416,400 | $ 10,959 | $ (42,675) | $ 384,684 |
| **December 31, 2008** | | | | |
| Available-for-sale mortgage-related securities: | | | | |
| Freddie Mac | $ 271,796 | $ 6,333 | $ (2,921) | $ 275,208 |
| Subprime | 71,399 | 13 | (19,145) | 52,267 |
| CMBS | 64,214 | 2 | (14,716) | 49,500 |
| Option ARM | 12,117 | | (4,739) | 7,378 |
| Alt-A and other | 20,032 | 11 | (6,787) | 13,256 |
| Fannie Mae | 40,255 | 674 | (88) | 40,841 |
| Obligations of states and political subdivisions | 12,874 | 3 | (2,349) | 10,528 |
| Manufactured housing | 917 | 9 | (183) | 743 |
| Ginnie Mae | 367 | 16 | | 383 |
| Total available-for-sale mortgage-related securities | 493,971 | 7,061 | (50,928) | 450,104 |
| Available-for-sale non-mortgage-related securities: | | | | |
| Asset-backed securities | 8,788 | 6 | | 8,794 |
| Total available-for-sale non-mortgage-related securities | 8,788 | 6 | | 8,794 |
| Total investments in available-for-sale securities | $ 502,759 | $ 7,067 | $ (50,928) | $ 458,898 |

(1) Gross unrealized losses at December 31, 2010 and 2009 include non-credit-related other-than-temporary impairments on available-for-sale securities recognized in AOCI and all periods presented include temporary unrealized losses.

**Table 22 Investments in Trading Securities**

| | December 31, | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 |
| | | (in millions) | |
| Mortgage-related securities: | | | |
| Freddie Mac | $ 13,437 | $ 170,955 | $ 158,822 |
| Fannie Mae | 18,726 | 34,364 | 31,309 |
| Ginnie Mae | 172 | 185 | 198 |
| Other | 31 | 28 | 32 |
| Total mortgage-related securities | 32,366 | 205,532 | 190,361 |
| Non-mortgage-related securities: | | | |
| Asset-backed securities | 44 | 1,492 | |
| Treasury bills | 17,289 | 14,787 | |
| Treasury notes | 10,122 | | |
| FDIC-guaranteed corporate medium-term notes | 441 | 439 | |
| Total non-mortgage-related securities | 27,896 | 16,718 | |
| Total fair value of investments in trading securities | $ 60,262 | $ 222,250 | $ 190,361 |

***Non-Mortgage-Related Securities***

Our investments in non-mortgage-related securities provide an additional source of liquidity for us. We held investments in non-mortgage-related available-for-sale and trading securities of $27.9 billion and $19.3 billion as of December 31, 2010 and December 31, 2009, respectively. Our holdings of non-mortgage-related securities at December 31, 2010 increased compared to December 31, 2009 due to the acquisition of Treasury notes and additional Treasury bills to maintain required liquidity and contingency levels, partially offset by our sale of the majority of our non-mortgage-related asset-backed securities in 2010.

We did not record a net impairment of available-for-sale securities recognized in earnings during 2010 on our non-mortgage-related securities. We recorded net impairments of $185 million for our non-mortgage-related securities during 2009, as we could not assert that we did not intend to, or will not be required to, sell these securities before a recovery of the unrealized losses. See NOTE 1: SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING POLICIES for further information on how other-than-temporary impairments are recorded on our financial statements commencing in the second quarter of 2009.

***Mortgage-Related Securities***

We are primarily a buy-and-hold investor in mortgage-related securities, which consist of securities issued by Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae, and other financial institutions. We also invest in our own mortgage-related securities. However, upon our adoption of amendments to the accounting standards for transfers of financial assets and consolidation of VIEs on January 1, 2010, we no longer account for single-family PCs and certain Other Guarantee Transactions we purchase as investments in securities because we now recognize the underlying mortgage loans on our consolidated

balance sheets through consolidation of the related trusts.

Table 23 provides the UPB of our investments in mortgage-related securities classified as available-for-sale or trading on our consolidated balance sheets. Due to the accounting changes noted above, Table 23 does not include our holdings of single-family PCs and certain Other Guarantee Transactions as of December 31, 2010, but includes such securities as of December 31, 2009. For further information on our holdings of such securities, see Table 16 Segment Mortgage Portfolio Composition.

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**Table 23 Characteristics of Mortgage-Related Securities on Our Consolidated Balance Sheets**

| | December 31, | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | | | 2009 | | |
| | Fixed Rate | Variable Rate(1) | Total | Fixed Rate | Variable Rate(1) | Total |
| | (in millions) | | | | | |
| Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities:(2) | | | | | | |
| Single-family | $ 79,955 | $ 8,118 | $ 88,073 | $ 294,958 | $ 77,708 | $ 372,666 |
| Multifamily | 339 | 1,756 | 2,095 | 277 | 1,672 | 1,949 |
| Total Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities | 80,294 | 9,874 | 90,168 | 295,235 | 79,380 | 374,615 |
| Non-Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities: | | | | | | |
| Agency securities:(3) | | | | | | |
| Fannie Mae: | | | | | | |
| Single-family | 21,238 | 18,139 | 39,377 | 36,549 | 28,585 | 65,134 |
| Multifamily | 228 | 88 | 316 | 438 | 90 | 528 |
| Ginnie Mae: | | | | | | |
| Single-family | 296 | 117 | 413 | 341 | 133 | 474 |
| Multifamily | 27 | | 27 | 35 | | 35 |
| Total agency securities | 21,789 | 18,344 | 40,133 | 37,363 | 28,808 | 66,171 |
| Non-agency mortgage-related securities: | | | | | | |
| Single-family:(4) | | | | | | |
| Subprime | 363 | 53,855 | 54,218 | 395 | 61,179 | 61,574 |
| Option ARM | | 15,646 | 15,646 | | 17,687 | 17,687 |
| Alt-A and other | 2,405 | 16,438 | 18,843 | 2,845 | 18,594 | 21,439 |
| CMBS | 21,401 | 37,327 | 58,728 | 23,476 | 38,439 | 61,915 |
| Obligations of states and political subdivisions(5) | 9,851 | 26 | 9,877 | 11,812 | 42 | 11,854 |
| Manufactured housing | 930 | 150 | 1,080 | 1,034 | 167 | 1,201 |
| Total non-agency mortgage-related securities(6) | 34,950 | 123,442 | 158,392 | 39,562 | 136,108 | 175,670 |
| Total UPB of mortgage-related securities | $ 137,033 | $ 151,660 | 288,693 | $ 372,160 | $ 244,296 | 616,456 |
| Premiums, discounts, deferred fees, impairments of UPB and other basis adjustments | | | (11,839) | | | (5,897) |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Net unrealized (losses) on mortgage-related securities, pre-tax | (11,854) | (22,896) |
| Total carrying value of mortgage-related securities | $ 265,000 | $ 587,663 |

(1) Variable-rate mortgage-related securities include those with a contractual coupon rate that, prior to contractual maturity, is either scheduled to change or is subject to change based on changes in the composition of the underlying collateral.
(2) For our Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities we are subject to the credit risk associated with the mortgage loans underlying our securities. On January 1, 2010, we began prospectively recognizing on our consolidated balance sheets the mortgage loans underlying our issued single-family PCs and certain Other Guarantee Transactions as held-for-investment mortgage loans, at amortized cost. We do not consolidate our resecuritization trusts since we are not deemed to be the primary beneficiary of such trusts. See NOTE 1: SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING POLICIES Investments in Securities for further information.
(3) Agency securities are generally not separately rated by nationally recognized statistical rating organizations, but are viewed as having a level of credit quality at least equivalent to non-agency mortgage-related securities AAA-rated or equivalent.
(4) For information about how these securities are rated, see Table 28 Ratings of Available-For-Sale Non-Agency Mortgage-Related Securities Backed by Subprime, Option ARM, Alt-A and Other Loans, and CMBS.
(5) Consists of housing revenue bonds. Approximately 50% and 55% of these securities held at December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively, were AAA-rated as of those dates, based on the lowest rating available.
(6) Credit ratings for most non-agency mortgage-related securities are designated by no fewer than two nationally recognized statistical rating organizations. Approximately 23% and 26% of total non-agency mortgage-related securities held at December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively, were AAA-rated as of those dates, based on the UPB and the lowest rating available.

The total UPB of our investments in mortgage-related securities on our consolidated balance sheets decreased from $616.5 billion at December 31, 2009 to $288.7 billion at December 31, 2010 primarily as a result of a decrease of $286.5 billion related to our adoption of the amendments to the accounting standards for the transfer of financial assets and the consolidation of VIEs on January 1, 2010.

Table 24 summarizes our mortgage-related securities purchase activity for 2010, 2009, and 2008. The purchase activity for all years presented includes our purchase activity related to the single-family PCs and certain Other Guarantee Transactions issued by trusts that we consolidated. Due to the accounting changes noted above, effective January 1, 2010, purchases of single-family PCs and certain Other Guarantee Transactions issued by trusts that we consolidated are recorded as an extinguishment of debt securities of consolidated trusts held by third parties on our consolidated balance sheets.

**Table 24 Total Mortgage-Related Securities Purchase Activity[1]**

| | Year Ended December 31, | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 |
| | | (in millions) | |
| Non-Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities purchased for resecuritization: | | | |
| Ginnie Mae Certificates | $ 69 | $ 56 | $ 36 |
| Non-agency mortgage-related securities purchased for Other Guarantee Transactions[2] | 9,579 | 10,189 | 8,246 |
| Total Non-Freddie Mac mortgage related securities purchased for resecuritization | 9,648 | 10,245 | 8,282 |
| Non-Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities purchased as investments in securities: | | | |
| Agency securities: | | | |
| *Fannie Mae:* | | | |
| Fixed-rate | | 43,298 | 49,534 |
| Variable-rate | 373 | 2,697 | 18,519 |
| *Total Fannie Mae* | 373 | 45,995 | 68,053 |
| *Ginnie Mae fixed-rate* | | 27 | 8 |
| *Total agency securities* | 373 | 46,022 | 68,061 |
| Non-agency mortgage-related securities: | | | |
| *Single-family variable-rate* | | | 618 |
| *CMBS:* | | | |
| Fixed-rate | | | 713 |
| Variable-rate | 40 | | 703 |
| *Total CMBS* | 40 | | 1,416 |
| *Obligations of states and political subdivisions fixed-rate* | | 180 | 81 |
| *Total non-agency mortgage-related securities* | 40 | 180 | 2,115 |
| *Total non-Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities purchased as investments in securities* | 413 | 46,202 | 70,176 |
| Total non-Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities purchased | $ 10,061 | $ 56,447 | $ 78,458 |
| Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities repurchased: | | | |
| *Single-family:* | | | |
| Fixed-rate | $ 40,462 | $ 176,974 | $ 192,701 |
| Variable-rate | 923 | 5,414 | 26,344 |
| *Multifamily:* | | | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fixed-rate | 271 | | 111 |
| Variable-rate | 111 | | |
| *Total Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities repurchased* | $ 41,767 | $ 182,388 | $ 219,156 |

(1) Based on UPB. Excludes mortgage-related securities traded but not yet settled.
(2) Purchases in 2010 and 2009 include HFA bonds we acquired and resecuritized under the NIBP. See NOTE 3: CONSERVATORSHIP AND RELATED MATTERS for further information on this component of the HFA Initiative.

*Unrealized Losses on Available-For-Sale Mortgage-Related Securities*

At December 31, 2010, our gross unrealized losses, pre-tax, on available-for-sale mortgage-related securities were $23.1 billion, compared to $42.7 billion at December 31, 2009. This improvement in unrealized losses reflects: (a) a decline in market interest rates; and (b) fair value gains related to the movement of securities with unrealized losses towards maturity. We believe the unrealized losses related to these securities at December 31, 2010 were mainly attributable to poor underlying collateral performance, limited liquidity and large risk premiums in the market for residential non-agency mortgage-related securities. All securities in an unrealized loss position are evaluated to determine if the impairment is other-than-temporary. See Total Equity (Deficit) and NOTE 8: INVESTMENTS IN SECURITIES for additional information regarding unrealized losses on our available-for-sale securities.

*Higher-Risk Components of Our Investments in Mortgage-Related Securities*

As discussed below, we have exposure to subprime, option ARM, interest-only, and Alt-A and other loans as part of our investments in mortgage-related securities as follows:

*Single-family non-agency mortgage-related securities:* We hold non-agency mortgage-related securities backed by subprime, option ARM, and Alt-A and other loans.

*Single-family Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities:* We hold certain Other Guarantee Transactions as part of our investments in securities. There are subprime and option ARM loans underlying some of these Other Guarantee Transactions. For more information on single-family loans with certain higher-risk characteristics underlying our issued securities, see RISK MANAGEMENT Credit Risk *Mortgage Credit Risk*.

*Non-Agency Mortgage-Related Securities Backed by Subprime, Option ARM, and Alt-A Loans*

We categorize our investments in non-agency mortgage-related securities as subprime, option ARM, or Alt-A if the securities were identified as such based on information provided to us when we entered into these transactions. We have not

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identified option ARM, CMBS, obligations of states and political subdivisions, and manufactured housing securities as either subprime or Alt-A securities. Tables 25 and 26 present information about our holdings of these securities.

**Table 25 Non-Agency Mortgage-Related Securities Backed by Subprime First Lien, Option ARM, and Alt-A Loans and Certain Related Credit Statistics(1)**

| | As of | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 12/31/2010 | 09/30/2010 | 06/30/2010 | 03/31/2010 | 12/31/2009 |
| | (dollars in millions) | | | | |
| UPB: | | | | | |
| Subprime first lien | $ 53,756 | $ 55,250 | $ 56,922 | $ 58,912 | $ 61,019 |
| Option ARM | 15,646 | 16,104 | 16,603 | 17,206 | 17,687 |
| Alt-A(2) | 15,917 | 16,406 | 16,909 | 17,476 | 17,998 |
| Gross unrealized losses, pre-tax:(3) | | | | | |
| Subprime first lien | $ 14,026 | $ 16,446 | $ 17,757 | $ 18,462 | $ 20,998 |
| Option ARM | 3,853 | 4,815 | 5,770 | 6,147 | 6,475 |
| Alt-A(2) | 2,096 | 2,542 | 3,335 | 3,539 | 4,032 |
| Present value of expected credit losses: | | | | | |
| Subprime first lien | $ 5,937 | $ 4.364 | $ 3,311 | $ 4,444 | $ 4,263 |
| Option ARM | 4,850 | 4,208 | 3,534 | 3,769 | 3,700 |
| Alt-A(2) | 2,469 | 2,101 | 1,653 | 1,635 | 1,845 |
| Collateral delinquency rate:(4) | | | | | |
| Subprime first lien | 45% | 45% | 46% | 49% | 49% |
| Option ARM | 44 | 44 | 45 | 46 | 45 |
| Alt-A(2) | 27 | 26 | 26 | 27 | 26 |
| Cumulative collateral loss:(5) | | | | | |
| Subprime first lien | 18% | 17% | 16% | 15% | 13% |
| Option ARM | 13 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 7 |
| Alt-A(2) | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 4 |
| Average credit enhancement:(6) | | | | | |
| Subprime first lien | 25% | 25% | 26% | 28% | 29% |
| Option ARM | 12 | 12 | 13 | 15 | 16 |
| Alt-A(2) | 9 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 11 |

(1) See *Ratings of Available-For-Sale Non-Agency Mortgage-Related Securities* for additional information about these securities.
(2) Excludes non-agency mortgage-related securities backed by other loans, which are primarily comprised of securities backed by home equity lines of credit.
(3) Represents the aggregate of the amount by which amortized cost, after other-than-temporary impairments, exceeds fair value measured at the individual lot level.
(4) Determined based on the number of loans that are two monthly payments or more past due that underlie the securities using information obtained from a third-party data provider.
(5) Based on the actual losses incurred on the collateral underlying these securities. Actual losses incurred on the securities that we hold are significantly less than the losses on the underlying collateral as presented in this table, as non-agency mortgage-related securities backed by subprime first lien, option ARM, and Alt-A loans were structured to include credit enhancements, particularly through subordination.
(6) Reflects the ratio of the current amount of the securities that will absorb losses in the securitization structure before any losses are allocated to securities that we own. Percentage generally calculated based on the total UPB

of all credit enhancement in the form of subordination of the security divided by the total UPB of all of the tranches of collateral pools from which credit support is drawn for the security that we own. Excludes credit enhancement provided by monoline bond insurance.

**Table 26 Non-Agency Mortgage-Related Securities Backed by Subprime, Option ARM, Alt-A and Other Loans[(1)]**

| | Three Months Ended | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 12/31/2010 | 09/30/2010 | 06/30/2010 | 03/31/2010 | 12/31/2009 |
| | (in millions) | | | | |
| Net impairment of available-for-sale securities recognized in earnings: | | | | | |
| Subprime first and second liens | $ 1,207 | $ 213 | $ 17 | $ 332 | $ 515 |
| Option ARM | 668 | 577 | 48 | 102 | 15 |
| Alt-A and other | 372 | 296 | 333 | 19 | 51 |
| Principal repayments and cash shortfalls:[(2)] | | | | | |
| Subprime first and second liens: | | | | | |
| Principal repayments | $ 1,512 | $ 1,685 | $ 2,001 | $ 2,117 | $ 2,807 |
| Principal cash shortfalls | 6 | 8 | 12 | 13 | 14 |
| Option ARM: | | | | | |
| Principal repayments | $ 347 | $ 377 | $ 435 | $ 449 | $ 525 |
| Principal cash shortfalls | 111 | 122 | 80 | 32 | 2 |
| Alt-A and other: | | | | | |
| Principal repayments | $ 537 | $ 582 | $ 653 | $ 617 | $ 792 |
| Principal cash shortfalls | 62 | 56 | 67 | 22 | 21 |

(1) See *Ratings of Available-For-Sale Non-Agency Mortgage-Related Securities* for additional information about these securities.

(2) In addition to the contractual interest payments, we receive monthly remittances of principal repayments from both the recoveries of liquidated loans and, to a lesser extent, voluntary repayments of the underlying collateral of these securities representing a partial return of our investment in these securities.

Since the first quarter of 2008, we have not purchased any non-agency mortgage-related securities backed by subprime, option ARM, or Alt-A loans. As discussed below, we recognized impairment on our holdings of such securities in 2010 and 2009, including during the three months ended December 31, 2010 and 2009. See Table 27 Net Impairment on Available-For-Sale Mortgage-Related Securities Recognized in Earnings for more information.

We continue to pursue strategies to mitigate our losses as an investor in non-agency mortgage-related securities. On July 12, 2010, FHFA, as Conservator of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, announced that it had issued subpoenas to various entities seeking loan files and other transaction documents related to non-agency mortgage-related securities in which the two enterprises invested. FHFA stated that the documents will enable it to determine whether issuers of these securities and others are liable to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae for certain losses they have suffered on the securities. We are assisting FHFA in this effort. In its announcement, FHFA noted that, before and during conservatorship, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae sought to assess and enforce their rights as investors in non-agency mortgage-related securities, in an effort to recoup losses suffered in connection with their portfolios. However, difficulty in obtaining the loan documents has presented a challenge to the companies efforts. There is no assurance as to how the various entities will respond to the subpoenas, or to what extent the information sought will result in loss recoveries.

We also have joined an investor group that has delivered a notice of non-performance to Bank of New York Mellon, as Trustee, and Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP (now known as BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP). The notice related to the possibility that certain mortgage pools backing certain mortgage-related securities issued by Countrywide Financial and related entities include mortgages that may have been ineligible for inclusion in the pools due to breaches of representations or warranties.

The effectiveness of these or any other loss mitigation efforts for these securities is highly uncertain and any potential recoveries may take significant time to realize. These efforts could have a material impact on our estimate of future losses.

For purposes of our impairment analysis, our estimate of the present value of expected future credit losses on our portfolio of non-agency mortgage-related securities increased to $14.3 billion at December 31, 2010 from $12.0 billion at September 30, 2010. This deterioration was due to an increase in estimated cumulative losses on the collateral underlying these securities and a reduction in the projected structural credit enhancement of the securities. The increase in estimated cumulative losses resulted from declines in actual home prices, our expectation that home prices will be lower in 2011 compared to 2010 for the U.S. as a whole, as well as increasing interest rates, which affect the expected level of voluntary prepayments and defaults on adjustable rate mortgages. Increasing interest rates also reduce the expected benefits of credit enhancements by decreasing the excess interest available to the trust to absorb future collateral losses.

Since the beginning of 2007, we have incurred actual principal cash shortfalls of $705 million on impaired non-agency mortgage-related securities, of which $598 million related to 2010. Many of the trusts that issued non-agency mortgage-related securities we hold were structured so that realized collateral losses in excess of credit enhancements are not passed on to investors until the investment matures. We currently estimate that the future expected principal and interest shortfalls on non-agency mortgage-related securities we hold will be significantly less than the fair value declines experienced on these securities. In addition, it is difficult to estimate the point at which credit enhancements will be exhausted. During 2010, we continued to experience the depletion of credit enhancements on selected securities backed by subprime first lien, option ARM, and Alt-A loans due to poor performance of the underlying collateral.

The investments in non-agency mortgage-related securities we hold backed by subprime first lien, option ARM, and Alt-A loans were structured to include credit enhancements, particularly through subordination. Bond insurance is an additional credit enhancement covering some of the non-agency mortgage-related securities. These credit enhancements are one of the primary reasons we expect our actual losses, through principal or interest shortfalls, to be less than the underlying collateral losses in aggregate. For more information, see RISK MANAGEMENT Credit Risk *Institutional Credit Risk Bond Insurers*.

The concerns about deficiencies in foreclosure documentation practices may also adversely affect the values of, and our losses on, non-agency mortgage-related securities we hold, including by causing further delays in foreclosure timelines.

*Other-Than-Temporary Impairments on Available-For-Sale Mortgage-Related Securities*

Table 27 provides information about the mortgage-related securities for which we recognized other-than-temporary impairments for the three months ended December 31, 2010 and 2009.

**Table 27 Net Impairment on Available-For-Sale Mortgage-Related Securities Recognized in Earnings**

| | Three Months Ended | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | December 31, 2010 | | December 31, 2009 | |
| | UPB | Net Impairment of Available-For-Sale Securities Recognized in Earnings | UPB | Net Impairment of Available-For-Sale Securities Recognized in Earnings |
| | (in millions) | | | |
| Subprime: | | | | |
| 2006 & 2007 first lien | $ 31,315 | $ 1,191 | $ 26,398 | $ 499 |
| Other years first and second liens[1] | 1,005 | 16 | 870 | 16 |
| Total subprime first and second liens[1] | 32,320 | 1,207 | 27,268 | 515 |
| Option ARM: | | | | |
| 2006 & 2007 | 11,142 | 585 | 2,516 | 15 |
| Other years | 2,156 | 83 | 167 | |
| Total option ARM | 13,298 | 668 | 2,683 | 15 |
| Alt-A: | | | | |
| 2006 & 2007 | 4,987 | 204 | 2,516 | 35 |
| Other years | 6,062 | 161 | 871 | 16 |
| Total Alt-A | 11,049 | 365 | 3,387 | 51 |
| Other loans | 616 | 7 | 80 | |
| Total subprime, option ARM, Alt-A and other loans | 57,283 | 2,247 | 33,418 | 581 |
| CMBS | 1,141 | 19 | 1,596 | 83 |
| Manufactured housing | 312 | 4 | 142 | 3 |
| Total available-for-sale mortgage-related securities | $ 58,736 | $ 2,270 | $ 35,156 | $ 667 |

(1) Includes all second liens.

We recorded net impairment of available-for-sale mortgage-related securities recognized in earnings of $2.3 billion and $4.3 billion during the three months and year ended December 31, 2010, respectively, as our estimate of the present value of expected future credit losses on certain individual securities increased during the periods. Included in these net impairments are $2.2 billion and $4.2 billion of impairments related to securities backed by subprime, option ARM, and Alt-A and other loans during the three months and year ended December 31, 2010, respectively.

The credit performance of loans underlying our holdings of non-agency mortgage-related securities has been declining for several years. This decline has been particularly severe for subprime, option ARM, and Alt-A and other loans. Many of the same economic factors impacting the performance of our single-family credit guarantee portfolio also impact the performance of our investments in non-agency mortgage-related securities. High unemployment, a large inventory of seriously delinquent mortgage loans and unsold homes, tight credit conditions, and weak consumer confidence contributed to poor performance during the three months and year ended December 31, 2010. In addition, subprime, option ARM, and Alt-A and other loans backing the securities we hold have significantly greater concentrations in the states that are undergoing the greatest economic stress, such as California, Florida, Arizona, and Nevada. Loans in these states undergoing economic stress are more likely to become seriously delinquent and the credit losses associated with such loans are likely to be higher.

We rely on monoline bond insurance, including secondary coverage, to provide credit protection on some of our investments in non-agency mortgage-related securities. We have determined that there is substantial uncertainty surrounding certain monoline bond insurers ability to pay our future claims on expected credit losses related to our non-agency mortgage-related security investments. This uncertainty contributed to the impairments recognized in earnings during the years ended December 31, 2010 and 2009. See NOTE 19: CONCENTRATION OF CREDIT AND OTHER RISKS Bond Insurers for additional information.

While it is reasonably possible that collateral losses on our available-for-sale mortgage-related securities where we have not recorded an impairment earnings charge could exceed our credit enhancement levels, we do not believe that those conditions were likely at December 31, 2010. Based on our conclusion that we do not intend to sell our remaining available-for-sale mortgage-related securities in an unrealized loss position and it is not more likely than not that we will be required to sell these securities before a sufficient time to recover all unrealized losses and our consideration of other available information, we have concluded that the reduction in fair value of these securities was temporary at December 31, 2010 and as such has been recorded in AOCI.

During the three months and year ended December 31, 2009, we recorded net impairment of available-for-sale mortgage-related securities recognized in earnings of $0.7 billion and $11.0 billion, respectively. The impairments recorded during the three months ended December 31, 2009 related primarily to increases in expected future credit losses on our holdings of non-agency mortgage-related securities. Of the impairments recorded during the year ended December 31, 2009, $6.9 billion were recognized in the first quarter, prior to our adoption of the amendment to the accounting standards related to investments in debt and equity securities, and included both credit and non-credit-related other-than-temporary impairments. For further information on our adoption of the amendment to the accounting standards for investments in debt and equity securities and how other-than-temporary impairments are recorded on our financial statements commencing in the second quarter of 2009, see NOTE 2: CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES Other Changes in Accounting Principles *Change in the Impairment Model for Debt Securities.* See NOTE 8: INVESTMENTS IN SECURITIES for additional information regarding the accounting principles for investments in debt and equity securities and the other-than-temporary impairments recorded during the years ended December 31, 2010, 2009, and 2008.

Our assessments concerning other-than-temporary impairment require significant judgment and the use of models, and are subject to potentially significant change due to the performance of the individual securities and mortgage market conditions. Depending on the structure of the individual mortgage-related security and our estimate of collateral losses relative to the amount of credit support available for the senior tranches we own, a change in collateral loss estimates can have a disproportionate impact on the loss estimate for the security. Additionally, servicer performance, loan modification programs and backlogs, bankruptcy reform and other forms of government intervention in the housing market can significantly affect the performance of these securities, including the timing of loss recognition of the underlying loans and thus the timing of losses we recognize on our securities. Foreclosure processing suspensions can also affect our losses. For example, while defaulted loans remain in the trusts prior to completion of the foreclosure process, the subordinate classes of securities issued by the securitization trusts may continue to receive interest payments, rather than absorbing default losses. This may reduce the amount of funds available for the senior tranches we own. Given the extent of the housing and economic downturn over the past few years, it is difficult to estimate the future performance of mortgage loans and mortgage-related securities with any assurance, and actual results could differ materially from our expectations. Furthermore, various market participants could arrive at materially different conclusions regarding estimates of future cash shortfalls. For more information on how delays in the foreclosure process, including delays related to concerns about deficiencies in foreclosure documentation practices, could adversely affect the values of, and the losses on, the non-agency mortgage-related securities we hold, see RISK FACTORS Operational Risks *Our expenses could increase and we may otherwise be adversely affected by deficiencies in foreclosure practices, as well as related delays in the foreclosure process.*

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*Ratings of Available-For-Sale Non-Agency Mortgage-Related Securities*

Table 28 shows the ratings of available-for-sale non-agency mortgage-related securities backed by subprime, option ARM, Alt-A and other loans, and CMBS held at December 31, 2010 based on their ratings as of December 31, 2010 as well as those held at December 31, 2009 based on their ratings as of December 31, 2009 using the lowest rating available for each security.

**Table 28 Ratings of Available-For-Sale Non-Agency Mortgage-Related-Securities Backed by Subprime, Option ARM, Alt-A and Other Loans, and CMBS**

| Credit Ratings as of December 31, 2010 | UPB | Percentage of UPB | Amortized Cost | Gross Unrealized Losses | Monoline Insurance Coverage[1] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | (dollars in millions) | | | |
| Subprime loans: | | | | | |
| AAA-rated | $ 2,085 | 4% | $ 2,085 | $ (199) | $ 31 |
| Other investment grade | 3,407 | 6 | 3,408 | (436) | 449 |
| Below investment grade[2] | 48,718 | 90 | 42,423 | (13,421) | 1,789 |
| Total | $ 54,210 | 100% | $ 47,916 | $ (14,056) | $ 2,269 |
| Option ARM loans: | | | | | |
| AAA-rated | $ | % | $ | $ | $ |
| Other investment grade | 139 | 1 | 140 | (18) | 129 |
| Below investment grade[2] | 15,507 | 99 | 10,586 | (3,835) | 50 |
| Total | $ 15,646 | 100% | $ 10,726 | $ (3,853) | $ 179 |
| Alt-A and other loans: | | | | | |
| AAA-rated | $ 1,293 | 7% | $ 1,301 | $ (87) | $ 7 |
| Other investment grade | 2,761 | 15 | 2,765 | (362) | 368 |
| Below investment grade[2] | 14,789 | 78 | 11,495 | (2,002) | 2,443 |
| Total | $ 18,843 | 100% | $ 15,561 | $ (2,451) | $ 2,818 |
| CMBS: | | | | | |
| AAA-rated | $ 28,007 | 48% | $ 28,071 | $ (52) | $ 42 |
| Other investment grade | 26,777 | 45 | 26,740 | (676) | 1,655 |
| Below investment grade[2] | 3,897 | 7 | 3,644 | (1,191) | 1,704 |
| Total | $ 58,681 | 100% | $ 58,455 | $ (1,919) | $ 3,401 |
| **Credit Ratings as of December 31, 2009** | | | | | |
| Subprime loans: | | | | | |
| AAA-rated | $ 4,600 | 7% | $ 4,597 | $ (643) | $ 34 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Other investment grade | 6,248 | 10 | 6,247 | (1,562) | 625 |
| Below investment grade[(2)] | 50,716 | 83 | 45,977 | (18,897) | 1,895 |
| Total | $ 61,564 | 100% | $ 56,821 | $ (21,102) | $ 2,554 |
| Option ARM loans: | | | | | |
| AAA-rated | $ | % | $ | $ | $ |
| Other investment grade | 350 | 2 | 345 | (152) | 166 |
| Below investment grade[(2)] | 17,337 | 98 | 13,341 | (6,323) | 163 |
| Total | $ 17,687 | 100% | $ 13,686 | $ (6,475) | $ 329 |
| Alt-A and other loans: | | | | | |
| AAA-rated | $ 1,825 | 9% | $ 1,844 | $ (247) | $ 9 |
| Other investment grade | 4,829 | 23 | 4,834 | (1,051) | 530 |
| Below investment grade[(2)] | 14,785 | 68 | 12,267 | (4,249) | 2,752 |
| Total | $ 21,439 | 100% | $ 18,945 | $ (5,547) | $ 3,291 |
| CMBS: | | | | | |
| AAA-rated | $ 32,831 | 53% | $ 32,914 | $ (2,108) | $ 43 |
| Other investment grade | 26,233 | 42 | 26,167 | (4,661) | 1,658 |
| Below investment grade[(2)] | 2,813 | 5 | 2,711 | (1,019) | 1,701 |
| Total | $ 61,877 | 100% | $ 61,792 | $ (7,788) | $ 3,402 |

(1) Represents the amount of UPB covered by monoline insurance coverage. This amount does not represent the maximum amount of losses we could recover, as the monoline insurance also covers interest.
(2) Includes securities with S&P credit ratings below BBB- and certain securities that are no longer rated.

**Mortgage Loans**

The UPB of mortgage loans on our consolidated balance sheet increased to $1.9 trillion as of December 31, 2010 from $138.8 billion as of December 31, 2009, primarily due to a change in the accounting for consolidation of VIEs discussed in Change in Accounting Principles, which resulted in our consolidation of assets underlying approximately $1.8 trillion of our PCs and $21 billion of Other Guarantee Transactions as of January 1, 2010. See NOTE 2: CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES for further information on the impact of these accounting changes, and NOTE 5:

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MORTGAGE LOANS AND LOAN LOSS RESERVES for characteristics and other information, including amounts and changes in our loan loss reserves, as well as a reconciliation of the UPB amounts of our mortgage loans to the amounts recorded on our consolidated balance sheets.

The UPB of unsecuritized single-family mortgage loans increased by $94.0 billion, to $148.9 billion at December 31, 2010 from $54.9 billion at December 31, 2009, primarily due to increased purchases of seriously delinquent and modified loans from the mortgage pools underlying our PCs. As guarantor, we have the right to purchase mortgages that back our PCs from the underlying loan pools when they are significantly past due or when we determine that loss of the property is likely or default by the borrower is imminent due to borrower incapacity, death or other extraordinary circumstances that make future payments unlikely or impossible. This right to repurchase mortgages is known as our repurchase option, and we also exercise this option when we modify a mortgage. See NOTE 6: INDIVIDUALLY IMPAIRED AND NON-PERFORMING LOANS for more information on our purchases of single-family loans from PC pools.

The UPB of multifamily mortgage loans increased to $85.9 billion at December 31, 2010 from $83.9 billion at December 31, 2009, due to increased purchases of loans that we expect to securitize through our CME initiative. Our multifamily loan sales in 2010 primarily consisted of sales through Other Guarantee Transactions. Subject to market conditions, we expect to increase sales of multifamily mortgage loans through our Other Guarantee Transactions which may reduce the outstanding UPB of our multifamily loan portfolio in future periods.

Table 29 summarizes our purchase and guarantee activity in mortgage loans for the years ended December 31, 2010, 2009, and 2008. Activity for the year ended December 31, 2010 consists of: (a) mortgage loans underlying consolidated single-family PCs and certain Other Guarantee Transactions (regardless of whether such securities are held by us or third parties); (b) unsecuritized single-family and multifamily mortgage loans; and (c) mortgage loans underlying our mortgage-related financial guarantees which are not consolidated on our balance sheets. Activity for the years ended December 31, 2009 and 2008 consists of: (a) mortgage loans underlying Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities (regardless of whether such securities are held by us or third parties) which were not consolidated on our balance sheets prior to January 1, 2010; (b) unsecuritized single-family and multifamily mortgage loans on our consolidated balance sheets; and (c) mortgage loans associated with other guarantee commitments.

**Table 29 Mortgage Loan Purchase and Other Guarantee Commitment Activity[1]**

| | Year Ended December 31, | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | | 2009 | | 2008 | |
| | Purchase Amount | % of Purchases | Purchase Amount | % of Purchases | Purchase Amount | % of Purchases |
| | (dollars in millions) | | | | | |
| Mortgage loan purchases and guarantee issuances: | | | | | | |
| Single-family: | | | | | | |
| 30-year or more amortizing fixed-rate | $ 258,621 | 64% | $ 392,291 | 80% | $ 284,029 | 75% |
| 20-year amortizing fixed-rate | 23,852 | 6 | 11,895 | 2 | 7,303 | 2 |
| 15-year amortizing fixed-rate | 83,025 | 21 | 64,590 | 13 | 29,671 | 8 |
| Adjustable-rate[2] | 16,534 | 4 | 2,809 | 1 | 11,723 | 3 |
| Interest-only[3] | 909 | <1 | 845 | <1 | 24,063 | 6 |
| HFA bonds | 2,469 | 1 | 802 | <1 | | |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FHA/VA and USDA Rural Development[4] | 968 | <1 | 2,118 | <1 | 796 | <1 |
| *Total single-family[5]* | 386,378 | 96% | 475,350 | 97% | 357,585 | 94% |
| Multifamily[6] | 15,372 | 4 | 16,571 | 3 | 23,972 | 6 |
| *Total mortgage loan purchases and other guarantee commitment activity[7]* | $ 401,750 | 100% | $ 491,921 | 100% | $ 381,557 | 100% |
| Percentage of mortgage purchases and other guarantee commitment activity with credit enhancements[8] | 9% | | 8% | | 21% | |

(1) Based on UPB. Excludes mortgage loans traded but not yet settled. Excludes net additions of seriously delinquent loans and balloon/reset mortgages purchased out of PC pools. Includes other guarantee commitments associated with mortgage loans. See endnotes (6) and (7) for further information.

(2) Includes amortizing ARMs with 1-, 3-, 5-, 7- and 10-year initial fixed-rate periods. We did not purchase any option ARM loans during 2010, 2009, or 2008.

(3) Represents loans where the borrower pays interest only for a period of time before the borrower begins making principal payments. Includes both fixed-rate and variable-rate interest-only loans.

(4) Excludes FHA/VA loans that back Other Guarantee Transactions.

(5) Includes $23.9 billion, $26.3 billion, and $2.6 billion of mortgage loans in excess of $417,000, which are referred to as conforming jumbo mortgages, for the years ended December 31, 2010, 2009, and 2008, respectively.

(6) Includes $572 million and $14 million as of December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively, of our unsecuritized guarantees of HFA bonds under the TCLFP. See NOTE 3: CONSERVATORSHIP AND RELATED MATTERS Housing Finance Agency Initiative for further information on this component of the Housing Finance Agency Initiative.

(7) Includes issuances of other guarantee commitments on single-family loans of $5.7 billion, $2.4 billion, and $1.6 billion and issuances of other guarantee commitments on multifamily loans of $1.7 billion, $0.5 billion, and $4.4 billion during the years ended December 31, 2010, 2009, and 2008, respectively.

(8) See NOTE 5: MORTGAGE LOANS AND LOAN LOSS RESERVES Credit Protection and Other Forms of Credit Enhancement for further details on credit enhancement of mortgage loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio.

Second lien mortgages are another type of residential mortgage loan product with a higher risk of default; however, we do not purchase or hold significant amounts of these loans on our consolidated balance sheets. See RISK MANAGEMENT Credit Risk *Mortgage Credit Risk* and NOTE 19: CONCENTRATION OF CREDIT AND OTHER RISKS Table 19.3 Certain Higher-Risk Categories in the Single-Family Credit Guarantee Portfolio for information about mortgage loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio that we believe have higher-risk characteristics.

**Derivative Assets and Liabilities, Net**

The composition of our derivative portfolio changes from period to period as a result of derivative purchases, terminations, or assignments prior to contractual maturity and expiration of the derivatives at their contractual maturity. We classify net derivative interest receivable or payable, trade/settle receivable or payable, and cash collateral held or posted on our consolidated balance sheets to derivative assets, net and derivative liabilities, net. See NOTE 12: DERIVATIVES for additional information regarding our derivatives.

At December 31, 2010, the net fair value of our total derivative portfolio was $(1.1) billion, as compared to $(0.4) billion at December 31, 2009. This decrease in the net fair value of our total derivative portfolio was primarily due to the decline in longer-term swap interest rates. See NOTE 12: DERIVATIVES Table 12.1 Derivative Assets and Liabilities at Fair Value for our notional or contractual amounts and related fair values of our total derivative portfolio by product type at December 31, 2010 and 2009. Also see CONSOLIDATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS Non-Interest Income (Loss) *Derivative Gains (Losses)* for a description of gains (losses) on our derivative positions.

Table 30 shows the fair value for each derivative type and the maturity profile of our derivative positions as of December 31, 2010. A positive fair value in Table 30 for each derivative type is the estimated amount, prior to netting by counterparty, that we would be entitled to receive if the derivatives of that type were terminated. A negative fair value for a derivative type is the estimated amount, prior to netting by counterparty, that we would owe if the derivatives of that type were terminated. See Table 41 Derivative Counterparty Credit Exposure for additional information regarding derivative counterparty credit exposure. Table 30 also provides the weighted average fixed rate of our pay-fixed and receive-fixed swaps.

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**Table 30 Derivative Fair Values and Maturities**

| | December 31, 2010 | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Fair Value[1] | | | |
| | Notional or Contractual Amount[2] | Total Fair Value[3] | Less than 1 Year | 1 to 3 Years | Greater than 3 and up to 5 Years | In Excess of 5 Years |
| | (dollars in millions) | | | | | |
| Interest-rate swaps: | | | | | | |
| Receive-fixed: | | | | | | |
| Swaps | $ 302,178 | $ 3,314 | $ 137 | $ 534 | $ 1,269 | $ 1,374 |
| Weighted average fixed rate[4] | | | 1.54% | 1.12% | 2.39% | 3.66% |
| Forward-starting swaps[5] | 22,412 | 371 | | 123 | (9) | 257 |
| Weighted average fixed rate[4] | | | | 3.47% | 1.88% | 4.19% |
| Total receive-fixed | 324,590 | 3,685 | 137 | 657 | 1,260 | 1,631 |
| Basis (floating to floating) | 2,375 | 4 | | | 4 | |
| Pay-fixed: | | | | | | |
| Swaps | 338,035 | (17,189) | (273) | (1,275) | (3,297) | (12,344) |
| Weighted average fixed rate[4] | | | 3.11% | 2.21% | 3.04% | 4.02% |
| Forward-starting swaps[5] | 56,259 | (4,009) | | | | (4,009) |
| Weighted average fixed rate[4] | | | | | | 4.54% |
| Total pay-fixed | 394,294 | (21,198) | (273) | (1,275) | (3,297) | (16,353) |
| Total interest-rate swaps | 721,259 | (17,509) | (136) | (618) | (2,033) | (14,722) |
| Option-based: | | | | | | |
| Call swaptions | | | | | | |
| Purchased | 114,110 | 8,391 | 2,793 | 2,684 | 1,428 | 1,486 |
| Written | 11,775 | (244) | (39) | (23) | (182) | |
| Put swaptions | | | | | | |
| Purchased | 59,975 | 1,404 | 144 | 451 | 226 | 583 |
| Written | 6,000 | (8) | (8) | | | |
| Other option-based derivatives[6] | 47,234 | 1,450 | (8) | | (1) | 1,459 |
| Total option-based | 239,094 | 10,993 | 2,882 | 3,112 | 1,471 | 3,528 |
| Futures | 212,383 | (167) | (167) | | | |
| Foreign-currency swaps | 2,021 | 172 | | 123 | 49 | |
| Commitments[7] | 14,292 | (20) | (20) | | | |
| Swap guarantee derivatives | 3,614 | (36) | | | (3) | (33) |
| Subtotal | 1,192,663 | (6,567) | $ 2,559 | $ 2,617 | $ (516) | $ (11,227) |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Credit derivatives | 12,833 | 7 |
| Subtotal | 1,205,496 | (6,560) |
| Derivative interest receivable (payable), net | | (820) |
| Trade/settle receivable (payable), net | | 1 |
| Derivative collateral (held) posted, net | | 6,313 |
| Total | $ 1,205,496 | $ (1,066) |

(1) Fair value is categorized based on the period from December 31, 2010 until the contractual maturity of the derivative.
(2) Notional or contractual amounts are used to calculate the periodic settlement amounts to be received or paid and generally do not represent actual amounts to be exchanged. Notional or contractual amounts are not recorded as assets or liabilities on our consolidated balance sheets.
(3) The value of derivatives on our consolidated balance sheets is reported as derivative assets, net and derivative liabilities, net, and includes derivative interest receivable or (payable), net, trade/settle receivable or (payable), net and derivative cash collateral (held) or posted, net.
(4) Represents the notional weighted average rate for the fixed leg of the swaps.
(5) Represents interest-rate swap agreements that are scheduled to begin on future dates ranging from less than one year to fifteen years.
(6) Primarily includes purchased interest rate caps and floors.
(7) Commitments include: (a) our commitments to purchase and sell investments in securities; and (b) our commitments to purchase and extinguish or issue debt securities of our consolidated trusts.

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Table 31 summarizes the changes in derivative fair values.

**Table 31 Changes in Derivative Fair Values**

| | 2010[1] | 2009[1] |
|---|---|---|
| | (in millions) | |
| Beginning balance, at January 1 Net asset (liability) | $ (2,267) | $ (3,827) |
| Net change in: | | |
| Commitments[2] | (31) | 6 |
| Credit derivatives | (8) | (23) |
| Swap guarantee derivatives | (2) | (23) |
| Other derivatives:[3] | | |
| Changes in fair value | (3,508) | 2,762 |
| Fair value of new contracts entered into during the period[4] | 444 | 3,148 |
| Contracts realized or otherwise settled during the period | (1,188) | (4,310) |
| Ending balance, at December 31 Net asset (liability) | $ (6,560) | $ (2,267) |

(1) The value of derivatives on our consolidated balance sheets is reported as derivative assets, net and derivative liabilities, net, and includes derivative interest receivable (payable), net, trade/settle receivable (payable), net and derivative cash collateral (held) posted, net. Refer to Table 30 Derivative Fair Values and Maturities for reconciliation of fair value to the amounts presented on our consolidated balance sheets as of December 31, 2010. Fair value excludes derivative interest receivable or (payable), net of $(0.6) billion, trade/settle receivable or (payable), net of $1 million, and derivative cash collateral posted, net of $2.5 billion at December 31, 2009.
(2) Commitments include: (a) our commitments to purchase and sell investments in securities; and (b) our commitments to purchase and extinguish or issue debt securities of our consolidated trusts.
(3) Includes fair value changes for interest-rate swaps, option-based derivatives, futures, and foreign-currency swaps.
(4) Consists primarily of cash premiums paid or received on options.

**REO, Net**

As a result of borrower default on mortgage loans that we own, or for which we have issued our financial guarantee, we acquire properties, which are recorded as REO assets on our consolidated balance sheets. The balance of our REO, net increased to $7.1 billion at December 31, 2010 from $4.7 billion at December 31, 2009. Temporary suspensions of foreclosure transfers of occupied homes during portions of 2009, delays associated with the HAMP process and servicer capacity constraints generally resulted in higher balances of non-performing loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio in 2010. Foreclosure activity increased during 2010 as many of the non-performing loans transitioned to REO. We experienced the highest volume of single-family REO acquisitions in 2010 in the states of Florida, California, Illinois, Minnesota, Georgia and Arizona. We expect our REO inventory to continue to grow in 2011. However, the pace of our REO acquisitions could slow due to further delays in the foreclosure process, including delays related to concerns about deficiencies in foreclosure documentation practices. See RISK MANAGEMENT Credit Risk *Mortgage Credit Risk* *Credit Performance* Non-Performing Assets for additional information about our REO activity.

**Deferred Tax Assets, Net**

We recognize deferred tax assets and liabilities based upon the expected future tax consequences of existing temporary differences between the financial reporting and the tax reporting basis of assets and liabilities using enacted statutory tax rates. We record valuation allowances to reduce our net deferred tax assets when it is more likely than not that a tax benefit will not be realized. The realization of our net deferred tax assets is dependent upon the generation of sufficient taxable income or, with respect to the portion of our deferred tax assets related to our available-for-sale securities, upon our conclusion that we have the intent and ability to hold such securities to the recovery of any temporary unrealized losses. On a quarterly basis, we consider all evidence currently available, both positive and negative, in determining whether, based on the weight of that evidence, the net deferred tax assets will be realized or whether a valuation allowance is necessary.

Subsequent to the date of our entry into conservatorship, we determined that it was more likely than not that a portion of our net deferred tax assets would not be realized due to our inability to generate sufficient taxable income and, therefore, we recorded a valuation allowance. After evaluating all available evidence, including the events and developments related to our conservatorship, volatility in the economy, and related difficulty in forecasting future profit levels, we reached a similar conclusion in all subsequent quarters, including in the fourth quarter of 2010. We increased our valuation allowance by $8.3 billion in total during 2010. The $8.3 billion increase during 2010 was primarily attributable to the creation of a net operating loss carryforward in 2010 and other temporary differences generated during the year, as well as a $3.1 billion increase attributable to the adoption of the accounting standards for transfers of financial assets and consolidation of VIEs. See NOTE 2: CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES for additional information on our adoption of these accounting standards. Our total valuation allowance as of December 31, 2010 was $33.4 billion. As of December 31, 2010, after consideration of the valuation allowance, we had a net deferred tax asset of $5.5 billion, primarily representing the tax effect of unrealized losses on our available-for-sale securities. We believe the deferred tax asset related to these unrealized losses is more likely than not to be realized because of our conclusion that we have the intent and ability to hold our available-for-sale securities until any temporary unrealized losses are recovered. Our view of our ability to realize the net deferred tax assets may change in future periods, particularly if the mortgage and housing markets continue to decline.

*IRS Examinations*

The IRS completed its examinations of tax years 1998 to 2007. We received Statutory Notices from the IRS assessing $3.0 billion of additional income taxes and penalties for the 1998 to 2005 tax years. We filed a petition with the U.S. Tax Court in October 2010 in response to the Statutory Notices. The principal matter of controversy involves questions of timing and potential penalties regarding our tax accounting method for certain hedging transactions. The IRS responded to our petition with the U.S. Tax Court in December 2010. We currently believe adequate reserves have been provided for settlement on reasonable terms. For additional information, see NOTE 14: INCOME TAXES.

**Other Assets**

Other assets consist of the guarantee asset related to non-consolidated trusts, other guarantee commitments, accounts and other receivables, debt issuance costs, net, and other miscellaneous assets. Upon consolidation of our single-family PCs and certain Other Guarantee Transactions, our guarantee asset does not have a material impact on our financial position and is, therefore, included in other assets on our consolidated balance sheets. Our guarantee asset declined to $541 million as of December 31, 2010 from $10.4 billion as of December 31, 2009 primarily because we no longer recognize a guarantee asset on PCs and certain Other Guarantee Transactions issued by consolidated securitization trusts. All other assets increased to $10.3 billion as of December 31, 2010 from $4.9 billion as of December 31, 2009 primarily because of servicer receivables in our securitization trusts that were recorded on our consolidated balance sheets beginning January 1, 2010 upon consolidation of our single-family PCs and certain Other Guarantee Transactions. See NOTE 2: CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES and NOTE 23: SELECTED FINANCIAL STATEMENT LINE ITEMS for additional information.

**Total Debt, Net**

Commencing January 1, 2010, we consolidated our single-family PCs and certain Other Guarantee Transactions in our financial statements. Consequently, PCs and Other Guarantee Transactions issued by our consolidated trusts and held by third parties are recognized as debt securities of consolidated trusts held by third parties on our consolidated balance sheets. Debt securities of consolidated trusts held by third parties represents our liability to third parties that hold beneficial interests in our consolidated trusts. The debt securities of our consolidated trusts are prepayable without penalty at any time. Other debt consists of unsecured short-term and long-term debt securities we issue to third parties to fund our business activities. It is classified as either short-term or long-term based on the contractual maturity of the debt instrument.

Table 32 reconciles the par value of other debt and the UPB of debt securities of consolidated trusts held by third parties to the amounts shown on our consolidated balance sheets.

**Table 32 Reconciliation of the Par Value and UPB to Total Debt, Net**

| | December 31, 2010 | December 31, 2009 |
|---|---|---|
| | (in millions) | |
| Total debt: | | |
| Other debt: | | |
| Par value | $ 728,217 | $ 805,073 |
| Unamortized balance of discounts and premiums[1] | (14,529) | (24,907) |
| Hedging-related and other basis adjustments[2] | 252 | 438 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Subtotal | 713,940 | 780,604 |
| Debt securities of consolidated trusts held by third parties: | | |
| UPB | 1,517,001 | |
| Unamortized balance of discounts and premiums | 11,647 | |
| Subtotal | 1,528,648 | |
| Total debt, net | $ 2,242,588 | $ 780,604 |

(1) Primarily represents unamortized discounts on zero-coupon debt.

(2) Primarily represents deferrals related to debt instruments that were in hedge accounting relationships and changes in the fair value attributable to instrument-specific credit risk related to foreign-currency-denominated debt.

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Table 33 summarizes our other short-term debt.

**Table 33 Other Short-Term Debt**

| | 2010 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | December 31, | | Average Outstanding During the Year | | Maximum Balance, Net Outstanding at Any Month End |
| | Balance, Net(1) | Weighted Average Effective Rate(2) | Balance, Net(3) | Weighted Average Effective Rate(4) | |
| | (dollars in millions) | | | | |
| Reference Bills® securities and discount notes | $ 194,742 | 0.24% | $ 213,465 | 0.25% | $ 240,037 |
| Medium-term notes | 2,364 | 0.31 | 1,955 | 0.34 | 3,661 |
| Federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to repurchase | | | 72 | 0.30 | |
| Other short-term debt | $ 197,106 | 0.25 | | | |

| | 2009 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | December 31, | | Average Outstanding During the Year | | Maximum Balance, Net Outstanding at Any Month End |
| | Balance, Net(1) | Weighted Average Effective Rate(2) | Balance, Net(3) | Weighted Average Effective Rate(4) | |
| | (dollars in millions) | | | | |
| Reference Bills® securities and discount notes | $ 227,611 | 0.26% | $ 261,020 | 0.70% | $ 340,307 |
| Medium-term notes | 10,560 | 0.69 | 19,372 | 1.10 | 34,737 |
| Federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to repurchase | | | 33 | 0.29 | |
| Other short-term debt | $ 238,171 | 0.28 | | | |

| | 2008 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Average Outstanding | | |

| | December 31, | | During the Year | | Maximum Balance, Net Outstanding at Any Month End |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Balance, Net(1) | Weighted Average Effective Rate(2) | Balance, Net(3) | Weighted Average Effective Rate(4) | |
| | (dollars in millions) | | | | |
| Reference Bills® securities and discount notes | $ 310,026 | 1.67% | $ 231,361 | 2.65% | $ 310,026 |
| Medium-term notes | 19,676 | 2.61 | 11,758 | 2.74 | 19,676 |
| Federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to repurchase | | | 519 | 2.86 | 3,500 |
| Other short-term debt | $ 329,702 | 1.73 | | | |

(1) Represents par value, net of associated discounts, premiums and hedge-related basis adjustments, of which $0.9 billion, $0.5 billion, and $0 billion of short-term debt represents the fair value of debt securities with the fair value option elected at December 31, 2010, 2009, and 2008, respectively.
(2) Represents the approximate weighted average effective rate for each instrument outstanding at the end of the period, which includes the amortization of discounts or premiums and issuance costs.
(3) Represents par value, net of associated discounts, premiums and issuance costs. Issuance costs are reported in the other assets caption on our consolidated balance sheets.
(4) Represents the approximate weighted average effective rate during the period, which includes the amortization of discounts or premiums and issuance costs.

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Table 34 presents the UPB for Freddie Mac issued mortgage-related securities by the underlying mortgage product type. Balances as of December 31, 2010 are based on the UPB of the securities. Balances as of December 31, 2009 and 2008 are based on the UPB of the mortgage loans underlying our mortgage-related financial guarantees, including those underlying our securities (regardless of whether such securities are held by us or third parties) which were issued by trusts that were not consolidated on our balance sheets prior to January 1, 2010.

**Table 34 Freddie Mac Mortgage-Related Securities[1]**

| | December 31, 2010[2] | | | December 31, 2009[2] | December 31, 2008[2] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Issued by Consolidated Trusts | Issued by Non-Consolidated Trusts | Total | Total | Total |
| | | | (in millions) | | |
| Single-family: | | | | | |
| 30-year or more amortizing fixed-rate | $ 1,213,448 | $ | $ 1,213,448 | $ 1,318,053 | $ 1,213,361 |
| 20-year amortizing fixed-rate | 65,210 | | 65,210 | 57,705 | 63,587 |
| 15-year amortizing fixed-rate | 248,702 | | 248,702 | 241,721 | 243,704 |
| Adjustable-rate[3] | 61,269 | | 61,269 | 68,428 | 93,705 |
| Interest-only[4] | 79,835 | | 79,835 | 131,529 | 160,588 |
| FHA/VA and USDA Rural Development | 3,369 | | 3,369 | 1,343 | 1,428 |
| *Total single-family* | 1,671,833 | | 1,671,833 | 1,818,779 | 1,776,373 |
| Multifamily | | 4,603 | 4,603 | 5,085 | 5,677 |
| *Total single-family and multifamily* | 1,671,833 | 4,603 | 1,676,436 | 1,823,864 | 1,782,050 |
| Other Guarantee Transactions: | | | | | |
| HFA bonds:[5] | | | | | |
| Single-family | | 6,168 | 6,168 | 3,113 | |
| Multifamily | | 1,173 | 1,173 | 391 | |
| Total HFA bonds | | 7,341 | 7,341 | 3,504 | |
| All Other Guarantee Transactions: | | | | | |
| Single-family[6] | 15,806 | 4,243 | 20,049 | 23,841 | 23,585 |
| Multifamily | | 8,235 | 8,235 | 2,655 | 829 |
| Total Other Guarantee Transactions | 15,806 | 12,478 | 28,284 | 26,496 | 24,414 |
| | | 857 | 857 | 949 | 1,089 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| REMICs and Other Structured Securities backed by Ginnie Mae Certificates[7] | | | | | |
| Total Freddie Mac Mortgage-Related Securities | $ 1,687,639 | $ 25,279 | $ 1,712,918 | $ 1,854,813 | $ 1,807,553 |
| Less: Repurchased Freddie Mac Mortgage-Related Securities[8] | (170,638) | | | | |
| Total UPB of debt securities of consolidated trusts held by third parties | $ 1,517,001 | | | | |

(1) Based on UPB of the securities and excludes mortgage-related debt traded, but not yet settled.
(2) Excludes other guarantee commitments for mortgage assets held by third parties that require us to purchase loans from lenders when these loans meet certain delinquency criteria. Prior year amounts have been revised to conform to the current presentation.
(3) Includes $1.3 billion, $1.4 billion, and $1.6 billion in UPB of option ARM mortgage loans as of December 31, 2010, 2009, and 2008, respectively. See endnote (6) for additional information on option ARM loans that back our Other Guarantee Transactions.
(4) Represents loans where the borrower pays interest only for a period of time before the borrower begins making principal payments. Includes both fixed- and variable-rate interest-only loans.
(5) Consists of bonds we acquired and resecuritized under the NIBP.
(6) Backed by non-agency mortgage-related securities that include prime, FHA/VA and subprime mortgage loans and also include $8.4 billion, $9.6 billion, and $10.8 billion in UPB of securities backed by option ARM mortgage loans at December 31, 2010, 2009, and December 31, 2008, respectively.
(7) Backed by FHA/VA loans.
(8) Represents the UPB of repurchased Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities that are consolidated on our balance sheets and includes certain remittance amounts associated with our security trust administration that are payable to third-party mortgage-related security holders as of December 31, 2010. Our holdings of non-consolidated Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities are presented in Table 23 Characteristics of Mortgage-Related Securities on Our Consolidated Balance Sheets.

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Table 35 provides additional details regarding our issued and guaranteed mortgage-related securities.

**Table 35 Freddie Mac Mortgage-Related Securities by Class Type[1]**

| | December 31, 2010 | 2009 | 2008 |
|---|---|---|---|
| | (in millions) | | |
| *Held by Freddie Mac:* | | | |
| Single-Class | $ 157,752 | $ 255,171 | $ 293,597 |
| Multiclass | 105,851 | 119,444 | 130,927 |
| *Total held by Freddie Mac[2]* | 263,603 | 374,615 | 424,524 |
| *Held by third parties:* | | | |
| Single-Class | 1,020,200 | 1,031,869 | 865,375 |
| Multiclass | 429,115 | 448,329 | 517,654 |
| *Total held by third parties* | 1,449,315 | 1,480,198 | 1,383,029 |
| **Total Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities[2]** | $ 1,712,918 | $ 1,854,813 | $ 1,807,553 |

(1) Based on UPB of the securities and excludes mortgage-related securities traded, but not yet settled.
(2) Beginning January 1, 2010, includes single-family single-class and certain multiclass securities held by us, which are recorded as extinguishments of debt securities of consolidated trusts on our consolidated balance sheets. Prior to 2010, all Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities held by us were accounted for as investments in securities on our consolidated balance sheets. See NOTE 1: SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING POLICIES for a discussion of our significant accounting policies related to our investments in securities and debt securities of consolidated trusts.

Table 36 presents issuances and extinguishments of the debt securities of our consolidated trusts during 2010 as well as the UPB of consolidated trusts held by third parties.

**Table 36 Issuances and Extinguishments of Debt Securities of Consolidated Trusts[1]**

| | Year Ended December 31, 2010 (in millions) |
|---|---|
| Beginning balance of debt securities of consolidated trusts held by third parties | $ 1,564,093 |
| Issuances to third parties of debt securities of consolidated trusts: | |
| Issuances based on underlying mortgage product type: | |
| 30-year or more, amortizing fixed-rate | 255,101 |
| 20-year amortizing fixed-rate | 24,293 |
| 15-year amortizing fixed-rate | 78,316 |
| Adjustable-rate | 15,869 |
| Interest-only | 845 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| FHA/VA | | 1,429 |
| Debt securities of consolidated trusts retained by us at issuance | | (15,725) |
| Net issuances of debt securities of consolidated trusts | | 360,128 |
| Reissuances of debt securities of consolidated trusts previously held by us[2] | | 51,209 |
| Total issuances to third parties of debt securities of consolidated trusts | | 411,337 |
| Extinguishments, net[3] | | (458,429) |
| Ending balance of debt securities of consolidated trusts held by third parties | $ | 1,517,001 |

(1) Based on UPB.
(2) Represents our sales of PCs and certain Other Guarantee Transactions previously held by us.
(3) Represents: (a) UPB of our purchases from third parties of PCs and Other Guarantee Transactions issued by our consolidated trusts; (b) principal repayments related to PCs and Other Guarantee Transactions issued by our consolidated trusts; and (c) certain remittance amounts associated with our trust security administration that are payable to third-party mortgage-related security holders as of December 31, 2010.

**Other Liabilities**

Other liabilities consist of the guarantee obligation, the reserve for guarantee losses on non-consolidated trusts and other mortgage-related financial guarantees, servicer advanced interest payable and certain other servicer liabilities, accounts payable and accrued expenses, payables related to securities, and other miscellaneous liabilities. Upon consolidation of our single-family PC trusts and certain Other Guarantee Transactions, the guarantee obligation and related reserve for guarantee losses do not have a material effect on our financial position and are, therefore, included in other liabilities on our consolidated balance sheets. Our guarantee obligation declined to $625 million as of December 31, 2010 from $12.5 billion as of December 31, 2009, primarily because we no longer recognize a guarantee obligation on PCs and certain Other Guarantee Transactions that are issued by consolidated trusts. Our reserve for guarantee losses decreased by $32.2 billion during 2010 to $235 million as of December 31, 2010, as a result of the consolidation of our single-family PC trusts and certain Other Guarantee Transactions. Upon consolidation, reserves for credit losses related to mortgage loans held in consolidated securitization trusts are included in our allowance for loan losses. See NOTE 2: CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES and NOTE 23: SELECTED FINANCIAL STATEMENT LINE ITEMS for additional information.

### Total Equity (Deficit)

Total equity (deficit) decreased from $4.4 billion at December 31, 2009 to $(401) million at December 31, 2010, reflecting: (a) a net loss of $14.0 billion for the year ended December 31, 2010; (b) the cumulative effect of changes in accounting principles of $(11.7) billion due to our adoption of amendments to the accounting standards for transfers of financial assets and consolidation of VIEs; and (c) payment of senior preferred stock dividends in an aggregate amount of $5.7 billion. These amounts were partially offset by: (a) a $13.6 billion decrease in unrealized losses in AOCI on our available-for-sale securities; (b) $12.5 billion received from Treasury during 2010 under the Purchase Agreement; and (c) a $0.7 billion decrease in unrealized losses in AOCI related to our closed cash flow hedge relationships.

The balance of AOCI at December 31, 2010 was a net loss of approximately $12.0 billion, net of taxes, compared to a net loss of $23.6 billion, net of taxes, at December 31, 2009. The balance of AOCI was $26.3 billion at January 1, 2010, due to the impacts of the cumulative effect of changes in accounting principles. Net unrealized losses in AOCI on our available-for-sale securities decreased by $13.6 billion during 2010 primarily attributable to fair value increases resulting from: (a) the impact of a decline in interest rates, primarily related to our agency securities; and (b) improved market conditions for our investments in non-agency mortgage-related securities. Net unrealized losses in AOCI on our closed cash flow hedge relationships decreased by $0.7 billion during 2010, primarily attributable to the reclassification of losses into earnings related to our closed cash flow hedges as the originally forecasted transactions affected earnings. See NOTE 2: CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES for additional information on the cumulative effect of these changes in accounting principles.

## RISK MANAGEMENT

Our investment and credit guarantee activities expose us to three broad categories of risk: (a) credit risk; (b) interest rate risk and other market risk; and (c) operational risk. See RISK FACTORS for additional information regarding these and other risks.

Risk management is a critical aspect of our business. We manage risk through a framework whereby our executive management is responsible for independent risk evaluation. Within this framework, executive management monitors performance against our risk management strategies and established risk limits and reporting thresholds, identifies and assesses potential issues and provides oversight regarding changes in business processes and activities.

### Credit Risk

We are subject primarily to two types of credit risk: institutional credit risk and mortgage credit risk. Institutional credit risk is the risk that a counterparty that has entered into a business contract or arrangement with us will fail to meet its obligations. Mortgage credit risk is the risk that a borrower will fail to make timely payments on a mortgage we own or guarantee. We are exposed to mortgage credit risk on our total mortgage portfolio because we either hold the mortgage assets or have guaranteed mortgages in connection with the issuance of a Freddie Mac mortgage-related security, or other guarantee commitment.

#### *Institutional Credit Risk*

In recent periods, challenging market conditions adversely affected the liquidity and financial condition of our counterparties and this may continue in 2011. Despite federal intervention, bank failures remained high in 2010. Our exposure to mortgage seller/servicers remained high in 2010 with respect to their repurchase obligations arising from breaches of representations and warranties made to us for loans they underwrote and sold to us. We also rely significantly on our seller/servicers to perform loan workout activities as well as foreclosures on loans that they

service for us. Our credit losses could increase to the extent that our seller/servicers do not fully perform these obligations in a prudent and timely manner. Our exposure to derivatives counterparties remains highly concentrated as compared to historical levels.

Our investments in securities expose us to institutional credit risk to the extent that servicers, issuers, guarantors, or third parties providing credit enhancements become insolvent or do not perform their obligations. Our investments in non-Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities include both agency and non-agency securities. However, agency securities have historically presented minimal institutional credit risk due to the guarantee provided by those institutions. See CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS ANALYSIS Investments in Securities for additional information on institutional credit risk associated with our investments in mortgage-related securities, including higher-risk components and impairment charges we recognized in 2010 and 2009 related to these investments. For information about institutional credit risk associated with our investments in non-mortgage-related securities, see CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS ANALYSIS Non-Mortgage-Related Securities as well as Cash and Other Investments Counterparties below.

We are working to enforce our rights as an investor with respect to the non-agency mortgage-related securities we hold, and are engaged in efforts to potentially mitigate losses on our investments in non-agency mortgage-related securities. Our Conservator directed us to work with Fannie Mae to enforce investor rights in securitization trusts in which we both have

interests. We are also pursuing other loss mitigation strategies, in some cases in conjunction with other investors. The effectiveness of our efforts is highly uncertain and any potential recoveries may take significant time to realize. See CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS ANALYSIS Investments in Securities for information on our investments in non-agency mortgage-related securities.

Consolidation in the industry and any efforts we take to reduce exposure to financially weakened counterparties could further increase our exposure to individual counterparties. The failure of any of our primary counterparties to meet their obligations to us could have a material adverse effect on our results of operations, financial condition, and our ability to conduct future business.

*Mortgage Seller/Servicers*

We acquire a significant portion of our single-family mortgage purchase volume from several large lenders, or seller/servicers. Our top 10 single-family seller/servicers provided approximately 78% of our single-family purchase volume during 2010. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Bank of America, N.A., and Chase Home Finance LLC accounted for 27%, 12% and 10%, respectively, of our single-family mortgage purchase volume and were the only single-family seller/servicers that comprised 10% or more of our purchase volume for 2010. During 2010, our top three multifamily lenders, CBRE Capital Markets, Inc., Wells Fargo Multifamily Capital and Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC, accounted for 17%, 16%, and 11%, respectively, of our multifamily mortgage purchase volume. Our top 10 multifamily lenders represented an aggregate of approximately 84% of our multifamily purchase volume in 2010.

Pursuant to their repurchase obligations, our seller/servicers repurchase mortgages sold to us, whether we subsequently securitized the loans or held them as unsecuritized loans on our consolidated balance sheets. In lieu of repurchase, we may choose to allow a seller/servicer to indemnify us against losses on such mortgages or otherwise compensate us for the risk of continuing to hold the mortgages. We are exposed to institutional credit risk arising from the potential insolvency or non-performance by our mortgage seller/servicers, including non-performance of their repurchase obligations arising from breaches of the representations and warranties made to us for loans they underwrote and sold to us or failure to honor their recourse and indemnification obligations to us. In some cases, the ultimate amounts of recovery payments we received and may receive in the future from seller/servicers were and may be significantly less than the amount of our estimates of potential exposure to losses related to their obligations.

Some of our seller/servicers have failed to fully perform their repurchase obligations due to lack of financial capacity, while others, including many of our larger seller/servicers, have not fully performed their repurchase obligations in a timely manner. The UPB of loans subject to repurchase requests issued to our single-family seller/servicers declined to approximately $3.8 billion as of December 31, 2010 from $4.2 billion as of December 31, 2009, primarily because the volume of resolved requests exceeded our issuance of new requests in 2010. Repurchase request resolution during 2010 benefitted from agreements with certain seller/servicers, including the agreement with Bank of America discussed below. Our contracts require that a seller/servicer repurchase a mortgage within 30 days after we issue a repurchase request, unless the seller/servicer avails itself of an appeals process provided for in our contracts, in which case the deadline for repurchase is extended until we decide the appeal. As of December 31, 2010, approximately 34% of these repurchase requests were outstanding for more than four months since issuance of our repurchase request. The actual amount we expect to collect on these requests is significantly less than their UPB amounts primarily because many of these requests are satisfied by reimbursement of our realized losses by seller/servicers, or may be rescinded in the course of the contractual appeal process. Based on our historical loss experience and the fact that many of these loans are covered by credit enhancement, we expect the actual credit losses experienced by us should we fail to collect on these repurchase requests would also be less than the UPB of the loans. We may also enter into agreements with seller/servicers to resolve claims for repurchases.

During the years ended December 31, 2010 and 2009, we recovered amounts that covered losses with respect to $6.4 billion and $4.3 billion, respectively, of UPB of loans associated with our repurchase requests, including amounts associated with one-time settlement agreements. Four of our larger single-family seller/servicers collectively had approximately 32% and 23% of their repurchase obligations outstanding more than four months at December 31, 2010 and December 31, 2009, respectively as measured by the UPB of loans associated with our repurchase requests. In order to resolve outstanding repurchase requests on a more timely basis with our single-family seller/servicers in the future, we have begun to require certain of our larger seller/servicers to commit to plans for completing repurchases, with financial consequences or with stated remedies for non-compliance, as part of the annual renewals of our contracts with them. It is too early to tell if these provisions will help in resolving future repurchase requests or the impact they may have on the size or timing of our credit losses. In the event of non-performance by a seller/servicer, we may also seek partial recovery of amounts owed by the seller/servicer by transferring all or a portion of the mortgage servicing rights of the seller/servicer to a different servicer. However, this option may be difficult to accomplish with respect to our larger seller/servicers, as it may be challenging to transfer a large servicing portfolio.

Our estimate of probable incurred losses for exposure to seller/servicers for their repurchase obligations to us is a component of our allowance for loan losses as of December 31, 2010 and 2009. See NOTE 1: SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING POLICIES Allowance for Loan Losses and Reserve for Guarantee Losses for further information. We believe we have adequately provided for these exposures, based upon our estimates of incurred losses, in our loan loss reserves at December 31, 2010 and December 31, 2009; however, our actual losses may exceed our estimates.

GMAC Mortgage, LLC and Residential Funding Company, LLC (collectively, GMAC), indirect subsidiaries of Ally Financial Inc. (formerly, GMAC Inc.), are seller/servicers that together serviced and subserviced for an affiliated entity approximately 3% of the single-family loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio as of December 31, 2010. In March 2010, we entered into an agreement with GMAC under which they made a one-time payment to us for the partial release of repurchase obligations relating to loans sold to us prior to January 1, 2009. The partial release does not affect any of GMAC s potential repurchase obligations for loans sold to us by GMAC after January 1, 2009, nor does it affect the ability to recover amounts associated with failure to comply with our servicing requirements. The agreement did not have a material impact on our 2010 consolidated statements of operations.

On December 31, 2010, we entered into an agreement with Bank of America, N.A., and two of its affiliates, BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP and Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., to resolve currently outstanding and future claims for repurchases arising from the breach of representations and warranties on certain loans purchased by us from Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. and Countrywide Bank FSB. Under the terms of the agreement, we received a $1.28 billion cash payment in consideration for releasing Bank of America and its two affiliates from current and future repurchase requests arising from loans sold to us by the Countrywide entities for which the first regularly scheduled monthly payments were due on or before December 31, 2008. The UPB of the loans in this portfolio, as of December 31, 2010, was approximately $114 billion. The agreement applies only to certain claims for repurchase based on breaches of representations and warranties and the agreement contains specified limitations and does not cover loans sold to us or serviced for us by other Bank of America entities. The agreement did not have a material impact on our 2010 consolidated statements of operations.

On August 24, 2009, Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp., or TBW, filed for bankruptcy. TBW accounted for approximately 2% of our single-family mortgage purchase volume activity for the year ended December 31, 2009. We have exposure to TBW with respect to its loan repurchase obligations. We also have exposure with respect to certain borrower funds that TBW held for the benefit of Freddie Mac. TBW received and processed such funds in its capacity as a servicer of loans owned or guaranteed by Freddie Mac. TBW maintained certain bank accounts, primarily at Colonial Bank, to deposit such borrower funds and to provide remittance to Freddie Mac. Colonial Bank was placed into receivership by the FDIC in August 2009.

On or about June 14, 2010, we filed a proof of claim in the TBW bankruptcy aggregating $1.78 billion. Of this amount, approximately $1.15 billion relates to current and projected repurchase obligations and approximately $440 million relates to funds deposited with Colonial Bank, or with the FDIC as its receiver, which are attributable to mortgage loans owned or guaranteed by us and previously serviced by TBW. The remaining $190 million represents miscellaneous costs and expenses incurred in connection with the dissolution of TBW. On July 1, 2010, TBW filed a comprehensive final reconciliation report in the bankruptcy court indicating, among other things, that approximately $203 million in funds held in bank accounts maintained by TBW related to its servicing of Freddie Mac s loans and was potentially available to pay Freddie Mac s claims. These assets include certain funds on deposit with Colonial Bank. We have analyzed the report and, as necessary and appropriate, may revise the amount of our claim.

No actions against Freddie Mac related to TBW have been initiated in bankruptcy court or elsewhere to recover assets. However, TBW and Bank of America, N.A., which is also a claimant in the TBW bankruptcy, have indicated that they wish to determine whether the bankruptcy estate of TBW has any potential rights to seek to recover assets transferred

by TBW to Freddie Mac prior to bankruptcy. TBW has indicated to us that it may file an action to recover certain funds paid to us prior to the bankruptcy. At this time, we are unable to estimate our potential exposure, if any, to such claims. On or about May 14, 2010, certain underwriters of Lloyds of London brought an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court against TBW, Freddie Mac and other parties seeking a declaration rescinding mortgage bankers bonds insuring against loss resulting from dishonest acts by TBW s officers and directors. Freddie Mac has filed a proof of loss under the bonds, but we are unable to estimate our potential recovery, if any, thereunder. Discovery in the proceeding has been stayed at the request of the U.S. Department of Justice, pending completion of a criminal trial involving the former chief executive officer of TBW. See NOTE 21: LEGAL CONTINGENCIES for additional information on our claim arising from TBW s bankruptcy.

Our seller/servicers also have an active role in our loan workout efforts, including under the MHA Program, and therefore we also have exposure to them to the extent a decline in their performance results in a failure to realize the anticipated benefits of our loss mitigation plans. A significant portion of our single-family mortgage loans are serviced by several large seller/servicers. Our top five single-family loan servicers, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., Bank of America N.A.,

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Citimortgage, Inc., and U.S. Bank, N.A., together serviced approximately 68% of our single-family mortgage loans, the first three of which each serviced 10% or more of our single-family mortgage loans, as of December 31, 2010. We are also indirectly exposed to the actions and financial capacity of servicers in their roles as trustee and issuer of private-label mortgage-related securities we hold.

During the second half of 2010, a number of our single-family servicers, including several of our largest, announced that they were evaluating the potential extent of issues relating to the possible improper execution of documents associated with foreclosures of loans they service, including those they service for us. Some of these companies also announced they would temporarily suspend foreclosure proceedings in some or all states in which they do business while they assess these issues. A number of these companies continue to address these issues, and certain of these suspensions remain in effect. See RISK FACTORS Operational Risks *Our expenses could increase and we may otherwise be adversely affected by deficiencies in foreclosure practices, as well as related delays in the foreclosure process*. For information on our problem loan workouts, see *Mortgage Credit Risk Portfolio Management Activities Loan Workout Activities.* In addition, a group consisting of state attorneys general and state bank and mortgage regulators in all 50 states and the District of Columbia is reviewing foreclosure practices.

As of December 31, 2010, our top four multifamily servicers, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CBRE Capital Markets, Inc., and Deutsche Bank Berkshire Mortgage, each serviced more than 10% of our multifamily mortgage portfolio and together serviced approximately 52% of our multifamily mortgage portfolio.

We are exposed to the risk that multifamily seller/servicers could come under financial pressure due to the current stressful economic environment, which could potentially cause degradation in the quality of servicing they provide to us or, in certain cases, reduce the likelihood that we could recover losses through lender repurchase or through recourse agreements or other credit enhancements, where applicable. We continue to monitor the status of all our multifamily seller/servicers in accordance with our counterparty credit risk management framework.

*Mortgage Insurers*

We have institutional credit risk relating to the potential insolvency of or non-performance by mortgage insurers that insure single-family mortgages we purchase or guarantee. As a guarantor, we remain responsible for the payment of principal and interest if a mortgage insurer fails to meet its obligations to reimburse us for claims. If any of our mortgage insurers that provide credit enhancement fail to fulfill their obligation, we could experience increased credit losses.

We attempt to manage this risk by establishing eligibility standards for mortgage insurers and by monitoring our exposure to individual mortgage insurers. Our monitoring includes performing regular analysis of the estimated financial capacity of mortgage insurers under different adverse economic conditions. In addition, state insurance authorities regulate mortgage insurers and we periodically meet with certain state authorities to discuss their views. We also monitor the mortgage insurers credit ratings, as provided by nationally recognized statistical rating organizations, and we periodically review the methods used by such organizations. None of our mortgage insurers has a rating higher than BBB. In evaluating the likelihood that an insurer will have the ability to pay our expected claims, we consider our own analysis of the insurer s financial capacity, any downgrades in the insurer s credit rating and various other factors.

Table 37 summarizes our exposure to mortgage insurers as of December 31, 2010. In the event that a mortgage insurer fails to perform, the outstanding coverage represents our maximum exposure to credit losses resulting from such failure.

**Table 37 Mortgage Insurance by Counterparty**

| Counterparty Name | Credit Rating(1) | Credit Rating Outlook(1) | Primary Insurance(2) | Pool Insurance(2) | Coverage Outstanding(3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | As of December 31, 2010 (in billions) | | |
| Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation (MGIC) | B+ | Negative | $ 52.5 | $ 33.7 | $ 13.9 |
| Radian Guaranty Inc. | B+ | Negative | 38.3 | 16.2 | 11.3 |
| Genworth Mortgage Insurance Corporation | BB+ | Negative | 34.0 | 1.0 | 8.6 |
| United Guaranty Residential Insurance Co. | BBB | Stable | 29.0 | 0.4 | 7.1 |
| PMI Mortgage Insurance Co. | B | Positive | 27.3 | 2.4 | 6.9 |
| Republic Mortgage Insurance Company | BB+ | Negative | 23.1 | 2.5 | 5.8 |
| Triad Guaranty Insurance Corp.(4) | NR | NR | 10.2 | 1.3 | 2.5 |
| CMG Mortgage Insurance Co. | BBB | Negative | 2.7 | 0.1 | 0.7 |
| Total | | | $ 217.1 | $ 57.6 | $ 56.8 |

(1) Latest rating available as of February 11, 2011. Represents the lower of S&P and Moody s credit ratings and outlooks. In this table, the rating and outlook of the legal entity is stated in terms of the S&P equivalent.
(2) Represents the amount of UPB at the end of the period for our single-family credit guarantee portfolio covered by the respective insurance type.
(3) Represents the remaining aggregate contractual limit for reimbursement of losses under policies of both primary and pool insurance. These amounts are based on our gross coverage without regard to netting of coverage that may exist to the extent an affected mortgage is covered under both types of insurance.
(4) Beginning on June 1, 2009, Triad began paying valid claims 60% in cash and 40% in deferred payment obligations.

We received proceeds of $1.8 billion and $952 million during the years ended December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively, from our primary and pool mortgage insurance policies for recovery of losses on our single-family loans. We had outstanding receivables from mortgage insurers, net of associated reserves, of $1.5 billion and $1.0 billion as of December 31, 2010 and December 31, 2009, respectively.

During the year ended December 31, 2010, increases in default volumes and in the time between claim filing and receipt of payment resulted in an increase in our receivables for mortgage and pool insurance claims. Although the volume of rescissions of claims under mortgage insurance coverage temporarily declined mid-year, the volume of rescissions returned to elevated levels by year-end. When an insurer rescinds coverage, the seller/servicer generally is in breach of representations and warranties made to us when we purchased the affected mortgage. Consequently, we may require the seller/servicer to repurchase the mortgage or to indemnify us for additional loss.

The UPB of single-family loans covered by pool insurance declined approximately 25% during the year ended December 31, 2010, primarily due to payoffs and other liquidation events. We did not purchase any pool insurance on single-family loans during 2010 and 2009 and we do not expect to acquire any such policies for credit enhancement during 2011. We also reached the maximum limit of recovery on certain of these policies. As a result, losses we recognized on certain loans previously identified as credit enhanced increased during 2010, compared to prior years. We may reach aggregate loss limits on other pool insurance policies in the near term, which would further increase our credit losses.

Our pool insurance policies generally have coverage periods that range from ten to twelve years. In many cases, we entered into these agreements to cover higher-risk mortgage product types delivered to us through bulk transactions. As of December 31, 2010, pool insurance policies which will expire: (a) during 2011 covered approximately $1.1 billion in UPB of loans, and the remaining contractual limit for reimbursement of losses on such loans was approximately $373 million; and (b) between 2012 and 2017 covered approximately $44.0 billion in UPB of loans, and the remaining contractual limit for reimbursement of losses on such loans was approximately $1.0 billion. Any losses in excess of the contractual limit will be borne by us. We expect to generate claims sufficient to utilize the $1.4 billion of loss coverage on policies which expire between 2011 and 2017. The remaining pool insurance policies, for which the remaining contractual limit for reimbursement of losses was approximately $1.9 billion, expire after 2017. These figures include coverage under our pool insurance policies with Triad, based on the stated coverage amounts under such policies. As noted below, we do not expect to receive full payment of our claims from Triad.

Based upon currently available information, we believe that all of our mortgage insurance counterparties will continue to pay all claims as due in the normal course for the near term, except for claims obligations of Triad that were partially deferred beginning June 1, 2009, under order of Triad s state regulator. In 2010, we approved Essent Guaranty, Inc., which acquired certain assets and infrastructure of Triad in December 2009, as a new mortgage insurer.

*Bond Insurers*

Most of the non-agency mortgage-related securities we hold rely primarily on subordinated tranches to provide credit loss protection. Bond insurance, including primary and secondary policies, is a credit enhancement covering some of the non-agency mortgage-related securities we hold. Primary policies are acquired by the securitization trust issuing the securities we purchase while secondary policies are acquired by us. Bond insurance exposes us to the risks related to the bond insurer s ability to satisfy claims.

Table 38 presents our coverage amounts of monoline bond insurance, including secondary coverage, for the non-agency mortgage-related securities we hold. In the event a monoline bond insurer fails to perform, the coverage outstanding represents our maximum exposure to loss related to such a failure.

**Table 38 Monoline Bond Insurance by Counterparty**

| | | | December 31, 2010 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Counterparty Name** | **Credit Rating**(1) | **Credit Rating Outlook**(1) | **Coverage Outstanding**(2) **(dollars in billions)** | **Percent of Total**(2) |
| Ambac(3) | NR | N/A | $ 4.6 | 43% |
| FGIC(3) | NR | N/A | 2.0 | 19 |
| MBIA Insurance Corp. | B | Negative | 1.5 | 14 |
| Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. (AGMC) | AA | Negative | 1.3 | 12 |
| National Public Finance Guarantee Corp. (NPFGC) | BBB | Developing | 1.2 | 11 |
| Others | | | 0.1 | 1 |
| Total | | | $ 10.7 | 100% |

(1) Latest ratings available as of February 11, 2011. Represents the lower of S&P and Moody s credit ratings. In this table, the rating and outlook of the legal entity is stated in terms of the S&P equivalent.
(2) Represents the remaining contractual limit for reimbursement of losses, including lost interest and other expenses, on non-agency mortgage-related securities.
(3) Neither S&P nor Moody s provide credit ratings for Ambac or FGIC.

In November 2009, the New York State Insurance Department ordered FGIC to restructure in order to improve its financial condition and to suspend paying any and all claims effective immediately. On March 25, 2010, FGIC made an exchange offer to the holders of various residential mortgage-backed securities insured by FGIC. The offer was terminated due to insufficient participation by security holders. On August 4, 2010, FGIC Corporation, the parent company of FGIC, announced that it had filed for bankruptcy. We continue to monitor FGIC s efforts to restructure and assess the impact on our investments.

In March 2010, Ambac established a segregated account for certain Ambac-insured securities, including those held by Freddie Mac, and consented to the rehabilitation of the segregated account requested by the Wisconsin Office of the Commissioner of Insurance. On March 24, 2010, a Wisconsin state circuit court issued an order for rehabilitation and an order for temporary injunctive relief regarding the segregated account. Among other things, no claims arising under the segregated account will be paid, and policyholders are enjoined from taking certain actions until the plan of rehabilitation is approved by the circuit court. The plan of rehabilitation was filed with the circuit court by the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance on October 8, 2010, and approved on January 24, 2011. On November 8, 2010, Ambac Financial Group Inc, the parent company of Ambac, filed for bankruptcy. We continue to monitor these developments and assess the impact on our investments.

In accordance with our risk management policies we will continue to actively monitor the financial strength of our bond insurers. We believe that, in addition to FGIC and Ambac, some of our bond insurers lack sufficient ability to fully meet all of their expected lifetime claims-paying obligations to us as such claims emerge. In the event one or more of these bond insurers were to become insolvent, it is likely that we would not collect all of our claims from the affected insurer as they emerge, and it would impact our ability to recover certain unrealized losses on our mortgage-related securities, which may result in further impairment losses on our investments in securities. We considered the expected impact of the FGIC and Ambac developments, as well as our expectations regarding our other bond insurers ability to meet their obligations, in making our impairment determinations at December 31, 2010 and 2009. See NOTE 8: INVESTMENTS IN SECURITIES Other-Than-Temporary Impairments on Available-For-Sale Securities for additional information regarding impairment losses on securities covered by monoline bond insurers.

Table 39 shows the non-agency mortgage-related securities we hold that were covered by primary monoline bond insurance at December 31, 2010 and December 31, 2009.

**Table 39 Non-Agency Mortgage-Related Securities Covered by Primary Monoline Bond Insurance at December 31, 2010 and December 31, 2009**

| | Ambac | | FGIC | | MBIA Insurance Corp. | | AGMC[1] | | Other[2] | | Tot |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | UPB[3] | Gross Unrealized Losses[4] | UPB[3] | Gross Unrealized Losses[4] | UPB[3] | Gross Unrealized Losses[4] | UPB[3] | Gross Unrealized Losses[4] | UPB[3] | Gross Unrealized Losses[4] | UPB[3] |
| | | | | | (in millions) | | | | | | |
| r 31, 2010: | | | | | | | | | | | |
| prime | $ 676 | $ (207) | $ 924 | $ (322) | $ 12 | $ (1) | $ 427 | $ (99) | $ 3 | $ | $ 2,042 |
| subprime | | | 227 | (12) | | | | | | | 227 |
| I | 50 | | | | | | 129 | (16) | | | 179 |
| her[5] | 1,150 | (186) | 832 | (93) | 425 | (29) | 340 | (82) | 71 | (1) | 2,818 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ed housing | 97 | (11) | | | 154 | (15) | | | | | 251 |
| | 2,206 | (277) | | | | | | | 1,195 | (159) | 3,401 |
| of states | 419 | (44) | 38 | (2) | 234 | (19) | 366 | (18) | 17 | (3) | 1,074 |
| | $ 4,598 | $ (725) | $ 2,021 | $ (429) | $ 825 | $ (64) | $ 1,262 | $ (215) | $ 1,286 | $ (163) | $ 9,992 |
| r 31, 2009: | | | | | | | | | | | |
| bprime | $ 737 | $ (325) | $ 1,061 | $ (432) | $ 18 | $ (3) | $ 452 | $ (160) | $ 6 | $ | $ 2,274 |
| subprime | | | 280 | (70) | | | | | | | 280 |
| M | 163 | (47) | | | | | 166 | (65) | | | 329 |
| her[5] | 1,340 | (657) | 927 | (430) | 522 | (265) | 422 | (136) | 80 | (38) | 3,291 |
| ed housing | 105 | (24) | | | 171 | (30) | | | | | 276 |
| | 2,206 | (495) | | | | | | | 1,196 | (307) | 3,402 |
| of states | 459 | (33) | 38 | (3) | 247 | (13) | 390 | (13) | 17 | (3) | 1,151 |
| | $ 5,010 | $ (1,581) | $ 2,306 | $ (935) | $ 958 | $ (311) | $ 1,430 | $ (374) | $ 1,299 | $ (348) | $ 11,003 |

(1) Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. was formerly known as Financial Security Assurance.

(2) Represents monoline insurance provided by Syncora Guarantee Inc., Radian Group, Inc., and CIFG Holdings Ltd, and includes certain exposures to bonds insured by NPFGC, formerly known as MBIA Insurance Corp. of Illinois, which is a subsidiary of MBIA Inc., the parent company of MBIA Insurance Corp.

(3) Represents the amount of UPB covered by monoline insurance coverage. This amount does not represent the maximum amount of losses we could recover, as the monoline insurance also covers unpaid interest.

(4) Represents the amount of gross unrealized losses at the respective reporting date on the securities with monoline insurance.

(5) The majority of the Alt-A and other loans covered by monoline bond insurance are securities backed by home equity lines of credit.

*Cash and Other Investments Counterparties*

We are exposed to institutional credit risk arising from the potential insolvency or non-performance of counterparties of non-mortgage-related investment agreements and cash equivalent transactions, including those entered into on behalf of our securitization trusts. These financial instruments are investment grade at the time of purchase and primarily short-term in nature, which mitigates institutional credit risk for these instruments. To minimize counterparty risk of our on-balance-sheet assets, we access government programs and initiatives designed to support the economic environment in general and the credit and mortgage markets in particular. For example, we have adjusted our policies and exposure measurement methodology to reflect the FDIC s added insurance coverage on principal and interest deposits up to $250,000. We also manage significant cash flow for the securitization trusts that are created in connection with our issuance of Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities. See BUSINESS Our Business *Our Business Segments* *Single-Family Guarantee Segment* *Securitization Activities* and NOTE 19: CONCENTRATION OF CREDIT AND OTHER RISKS for further information on these transactions associated with securitization trusts.

Table 40 summarizes our counterparty credit exposure for cash equivalents, federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell that are presented both on our consolidated balance sheets as well as those off-balance sheet. As of December 31, 2009, cash and other investment transactions that we entered into on behalf of our securitization trusts represented off-balance sheet exposure.

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**Table 40 Counterparty Credit Exposure Cash Equivalents, Federal Funds Sold, and Securities Purchased Under Agreements to Resell[1]**

| | December 31, 2010 | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rating[2] | Number of Counterparties[3] | Contractual Amount[4] | Weighted Average Contractual Maturity (in days) |
| | (dollars in millions) | | |
| **On-balance sheet exposure:** | | | |
| Unrestricted: | | | |
| *Cash equivalents, unrestricted[5]* | | | |
| A-1+ | 17 | $ 15,270 | 5 |
| A-1 | 22 | 9,752 | 38 |
| *Federal funds sold, unrestricted* | | | |
| A-1 | 1 | 1,100 | 3 |
| A-2 | 1 | 300 | 3 |
| *Securities purchased under agreements to resell, unrestricted* | | | |
| A-1+ | 1 | 5,500 | 22 |
| A-1 | 6 | 9,574 | 18 |
| A-2 | 1 | 700 | 3 |
| Subtotal | 49 | 42,196 | 18 |
| Restricted, held by consolidated trusts:[6] | | | |
| *Cash equivalents, restricted[7]* | | | |
| A-1+ | 6 | 6,250 | 1 |
| *Federal funds sold, restricted* | | | |
| A-1 | 2 | 2,350 | 3 |
| *Securities purchased under agreements to resell, restricted* | | | |
| A-1+ | 1 | 10,000 | 27 |
| A-1 | 1 | 17,000 | 23 |
| Subtotal | 10 | 35,600 | 19 |
| **Off-balance sheet exposure** | | | |
| Total | 59 | $ 77,796 | 18 |

| December 31, 2009 | |
|---|---|
| | Weighted Average Contractual |

| Rating[2] | Number of Counterparties[3] | Contractual Amount[4] | Maturity (in days) |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | (dollars in millions) | |
| **On-balance sheet exposure:** | | | |
| *Cash equivalents[5]* | | | |
| A-1+ | 22 | $ 30,153 | 3 |
| A-1 | 27 | 9,439 | 54 |
| *Securities purchased under agreements to resell* | | | |
| A-1 | 1 | 7,000 | 25 |
| Subtotal | 50 | 46,592 | 17 |
| **Off-balance sheet exposure:[6]** | | | |
| *Cash equivalents[7]* | | | |
| A-1+ | 7 | 6,775 | 1 |
| *Securities purchased under agreements to resell* | | | |
| A-1 | 1 | 7,500 | 26 |
| Subtotal | 8 | 14,275 | 14 |
| Total | 58 | $ 60,867 | 16 |

(1) Excludes restricted cash balances as well as cash deposited with the Federal Reserve Bank and other federally-chartered institutions.
(2) Represents the lower of S&P and Moody s short-term credit ratings as of each period end; however, in this table, the rating of the legal entity is stated in terms of the S&P equivalent.
(3) Based on legal entities. Affiliated legal entities are reported separately.
(4) Represents the par value or outstanding principal balance.
(5) Consists of highly liquid investments that have an original maturity of three months or less. Excludes $12.0 billion and $25.1 billion of cash deposited with the Federal Reserve Bank as of December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively.
(6) Represents the non-mortgage-related assets managed by us on behalf of securitization trusts created for administration of remittances for Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities. Due to our January 1, 2010 adoption of the amendments to accounting standards on accounting for transfers of financial assets and consolidation of VIEs, the assets of single-family PCs were consolidated on our balance sheet, which caused a significant increase in on-balance sheet restricted assets and a corresponding decrease in off-balance sheet restricted assets as of December 31, 2010. These assets may only be used to settle the obligations of the trusts.
(7) Consists of highly liquid investments that have an original maturity of three months or less. Excludes $1.3 billion and $8.2 billion of cash deposited with the Federal Reserve Bank as of December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively.

*Derivative Counterparties*

We are exposed to institutional credit risk arising from the possibility that a derivative counterparty will not be able to meet its contractual obligations. We are an active user of exchange-traded products, such as Treasury and Eurodollar Futures,

to reduce our overall exposure to derivative counterparties. Exchange-traded derivatives do not measurably increase our institutional credit risk because changes in the value of open exchange-traded contracts are settled daily through a financial clearinghouse established by each exchange. OTC derivatives, however, expose us to institutional credit risk because transactions are executed and settled directly between us and the counterparty. When our net position with an OTC counterparty subject to a master netting agreement has a market value above zero at a given date (*i.e.*, it is an asset reported as derivative assets, net on our consolidated balance sheets), then the counterparty could potentially be obligated to deliver cash, securities, or a combination of both having that market value necessary to satisfy its obligation to us under the derivative.

The Dodd-Frank Act will require that, in the future, many types of derivatives be centrally cleared and traded on exchanges or comparable trading facilities. Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFTC is in the process of determining the types of derivatives that must be subject to this requirement. In addition, we continue to work with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and other parties to implement a central clearing platform for interest rate derivatives and we executed two trades through this platform in the fourth quarter of 2010, beginning on the first day it became operationally ready. We will be exposed to institutional credit risk with respect to the Chicago Mercantile Exchange or other comparable exchanges or trading facilities in the future, to the extent we use them to clear and trade derivatives, and to the members of such clearing organizations that execute and submit our transactions for clearing.

We seek to manage our exposure to institutional credit risk related to our OTC derivative counterparties using several tools, including:

- review of external rating analyses;
- strict standards for approving new derivative counterparties;
- ongoing monitoring of our positions with each counterparty;
- managing diversification mix among counterparties;
- master netting agreements and collateral agreements; and
- stress-testing to evaluate potential exposure under possible adverse market scenarios.

On an ongoing basis, we review the credit fundamentals of all of our OTC derivative counterparties to confirm that they continue to meet our internal standards. We assign internal ratings, credit capital, and exposure limits to each counterparty based on quantitative and qualitative analysis, which we update and monitor on a regular basis. We conduct additional reviews when market conditions dictate or certain events affecting an individual counterparty occur.

All of our OTC derivative counterparties are major financial institutions and are experienced participants in the OTC derivatives market. A large number of OTC derivative counterparties have credit ratings below AA . Our OTC derivative counterparties that have credit ratings below AA are required to post collateral if our net exposure to them on derivative contracts exceeds $1 million. See NOTE 19: CONCENTRATION OF CREDIT AND OTHER RISKS for additional information.

The relative concentration of our derivative exposure among our primary derivative counterparties remains high. This concentration increased in the last several years due to industry consolidation and the failure of certain counterparties, and could further increase. Table 41 summarizes our exposure to our derivative counterparties, which represents the net positive fair value of derivative contracts, related accrued interest and collateral held by us from our

counterparties, after netting by counterparty as applicable (*i.e.*, net amounts due to us under derivative contracts).

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**Table 41 Derivative Counterparty Credit Exposure**

| | December 31, 2010 | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rating(1) | Number of Counterparties(2) | Notional or Contractual Amount(3) | Total Exposure at Fair Value(4) | Exposure, Net of Collateral(5) | Weighted Average Contractual Maturity (in years) | Collateral Posting Threshold(6) |
| | (dollars in millions) | | | | | |
| AA | 3 | $ 53,975 | $ | $ | 6.8 | $10 million or less |
| AA− | 4 | 270,694 | 1,668 | 29 | 6.4 | $10 million or less |
| A+ | 7 | 441,004 | 460 | 1 | 6.2 | $1 million or less |
| A | 3 | 177,277 | 16 | 2 | 5.2 | $1 million or less |
| Subtotal(7) | 17 | 942,950 | 2,144 | 32 | 6.1 | |
| Other derivatives(8) | | 244,640 | | | | |
| Commitments(9) | | 14,292 | 103 | 103 | | |
| Swap guarantee derivatives | | 3,614 | | | | |
| Total derivatives(10) | | $ 1,205,496 | $ 2,247 | $ 135 | | |

| | December 31, 2009 | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rating(1) | Number of Counterparties(2) | Notional or Contractual Amount(3) | Total Exposure at Fair Value(4) | Exposure, Net of Collateral(5) | Weighted Average Contractual Maturity (in years) | Collateral Posting Threshold(6) |
| | (dollars in millions) | | | | | |
| AA+ | 1 | $ 1,150 | $ | $ | 6.4 | $ |
| AA | 3 | 61,058 | | | 7.3 | $10 million or less |
| AA | 4 | 265,157 | 2,642 | 78 | 6.4 | $10 million or less |
| A+ | 7 | 440,749 | 61 | 31 | 6.0 | $1 million or less |
| A | 4 | 241,779 | 511 | 19 | 4.6 | $1 million or less |
| Subtotal(7) | 19 | 1,009,893 | 3,214 | 128 | 5.9 | |
| Other derivatives(8) | | 199,018 | | | | |
| Commitments(9) | | 13,872 | 81 | 81 | | |
| Swap guarantee derivatives | | 3,521 | | | | |
| Total derivatives(10) | | $ 1,226,304 | $ 3,295 | $ 209 | | |

(1) We use the lower of S&P and Moody s ratings to manage collateral requirements. In this table, the rating of the legal entity is stated in terms of the S&P equivalent.
(2) Based on legal entities. Affiliated legal entities are reported separately.
(3) Notional or contractual amounts are used to calculate the periodic settlement amounts to be received or paid and generally do not represent actual amounts to be exchanged.
(4) For each counterparty, this amount includes derivatives with a net positive fair value (recorded as derivative assets, net), including the related accrued interest receivable/payable (net) and trade/settle fees.
(5) Calculated as Total Exposure at Fair Value less cash collateral held as determined at the counterparty level. Includes amounts related to our posting of cash collateral in excess of our derivative liability as determined at the counterparty level.
(6) Counterparties are required to post collateral when their exposure exceeds agreed-upon collateral posting thresholds. These thresholds are typically based on the counterparty s credit rating and are individually negotiated.
(7) Consists of OTC derivative agreements for interest-rate swaps, option-based derivatives (excluding certain written options), foreign-currency swaps, and purchased interest-rate caps.
(8) Consists primarily of exchange-traded contracts, certain written options, and certain credit derivatives. Written options do not present counterparty credit exposure, because we receive a one-time up-front premium in exchange for giving the holder the right to execute a contract under specified terms, which generally puts us in a liability position.
(9) Commitments include: (a) our commitments to purchase and sell investments in securities; and (b) our commitments to purchase and extinguish or issue debt securities of our consolidated trusts.
(10) The difference between the exposure, net of collateral column above and derivative assets, net on our consolidated balance sheets primarily represents exchange-traded contracts which are settled daily through a clearinghouse, and thus, do not present counterparty credit exposure.

Over time, our exposure to individual counterparties for OTC interest-rate swaps, option-based derivatives, foreign-currency swaps, and purchased interest rate caps varies depending on changes in fair values, which are affected by changes in period-end interest rates, the implied volatility of interest rates, foreign-currency exchange rates, and the amount of derivatives held. If all of our counterparties for these derivatives defaulted simultaneously on December 31, 2010, our uncollateralized exposure to these counterparties, or our maximum loss for accounting purposes after applying netting agreements and collateral, would have been approximately $32 million. Our uncollateralized exposure as of December 31, 2009 was $128 million. One of our counterparties, HSBC Bank USA, which was rated AA- as of February 11, 2011, accounted for greater than 10% of our net uncollateralized exposure to derivatives counterparties at December 31, 2010.

As indicated in Table 41, approximately 99% of our counterparty credit exposure for OTC interest-rate swaps, option-based derivatives, foreign-currency swaps, and purchased interest rate caps was collateralized at December 31, 2010. The uncollateralized exposure to non-AAA-rated counterparties was primarily due to exposure amounts below the applicable counterparty collateral posting threshold, as well as market movements during the time period between when a derivative was marked to fair value and the date we received the related collateral. Collateral is typically transferred within one business day based on the values of the related derivatives.

In the event of counterparty default, our economic loss may be higher than the uncollateralized exposure of our derivatives if we are not able to replace the defaulted derivatives in a timely and cost-effective fashion. We could also incur economic loss if the collateral held by us cannot be liquidated at prices that are sufficient to recover the amount of such exposure. We monitor the risk that our uncollateralized exposure to each of our OTC counterparties for interest-rate swaps, option-based derivatives, foreign-currency swaps, and purchased interest rate caps will increase under certain adverse market conditions by performing daily market stress tests. These tests, which involve significant management judgment, evaluate the potential additional uncollateralized exposure we would have to each of these derivative counterparties on OTC derivatives contracts assuming certain changes in the level and implied volatility of interest rates and certain changes in foreign currency exchange rates over a brief time period. Our actual exposure could vary significantly from amounts forecasted by these tests.

As indicated in Table 41, the total exposure on our OTC forward purchase and sale commitments, which are treated as derivatives, was $103 million and $81 million at December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively. These commitments are uncollateralized. Because the typical maturity of our forward purchase and sale commitments is less than 60 days and they are generally settled through a clearinghouse, we do not require master netting and collateral agreements for the counterparties of these commitments. However, we monitor the credit fundamentals of the counterparties to our forward purchase and sale commitments on an ongoing basis in an effort to ensure that they continue to meet our internal risk-management standards.

*Document Custodians*

We use third-party document custodians to provide loan document certification and custody services for some of the loans that we purchase and securitize. In many cases, our seller/servicer customers or their affiliates also serve as document custodians for us. Our ownership rights to the mortgage loans that we own or that back our PCs and REMICs and Other Structured Securities could be challenged if a seller/servicer intentionally or negligently pledges or sells the loans that we purchased or fails to obtain a release of prior liens on the loans that we purchased, which could result in financial losses to us. When a seller/servicer or one of its affiliates acts as a document custodian for us, the risk that our ownership interest in the loans may be adversely affected is increased, particularly in the event the seller/servicer were to become insolvent. We seek to mitigate these risks through legal and contractual arrangements with these custodians that identify our ownership interest, as well as by establishing qualifying standards for document custodians and requiring transfer of the documents to our possession or to an independent third-party document custodian if we have concerns about the solvency or competency of the document custodian.

***Mortgage Credit Risk***

We are exposed to mortgage credit risk on our total mortgage portfolio because we either hold the mortgage assets or have guaranteed mortgages in connection with the issuance of a Freddie Mac mortgage-related security, or other guarantee commitment. Mortgage credit risk is primarily influenced by the credit profile of the borrower on the mortgage, the features of the mortgage itself, the type of property securing the mortgage and the general economy. All mortgages that we purchase or guarantee have an inherent risk of default. To manage our mortgage credit risk in our single-family credit guarantee and multifamily mortgage portfolios, we focus on three key areas: underwriting standards and quality control process; portfolio diversification; and portfolio management activities, including loss mitigation and the use of credit enhancements.

Through our delegated underwriting process, single-family mortgage loans and the borrowers ability to repay the loans are evaluated using several critical risk characteristics, including but not limited to the borrower s credit score and credit history, the borrower s monthly income relative to debt payments, the original LTV ratio, the type of mortgage product and the occupancy type of the loan. See BUSINESS Our Business for information about our charter requirements for single-family loans purchases, and BUSINESS Our Business Segments *Single-Family Guarantee*

*Segment Underwriting Requirements and Quality Control Standards* for information about delegated underwriting and quality control monitoring. See BUSINESS Regulation and Supervision *Federal Housing Finance Agency Affordable Housing Goals* for a discussion of factors that may cause us to purchase loans that do not meet our normal standards.

We were significantly adversely affected by deteriorating conditions in the single-family housing and mortgage markets during 2008 and 2009. In recent years, particularly 2005 to 2007, financial institutions significantly increased mortgage lending and securitization of certain higher risk mortgage loans, such as subprime, option ARM, interest-only and Alt-A, and these loans comprised a much larger proportion of origination and securitization issuance volumes during 2006 and 2007, and to a lesser extent in 2005, as compared to prior or subsequent years. During this time, we increased our participation in the market for these products through our purchases of non-agency mortgage-related securities and through our guarantee activities. Our expanded participation in these products was driven by a combination of competing objectives and pressures, including meeting our affordable housing goals, competition, the desire to maintain or increase market share, and generating returns for investors. The mortgage market has changed significantly since 2007. Financial institutions tightened their

underwriting standards, which has significantly reduced the amount of subprime, option ARM, interest-only and Alt-A loans being originated.

Conditions in the mortgage market continued to remain challenging during 2010. All types of single-family mortgage loans have been affected by the compounding pressures on household wealth caused by declines in home values that began in 2006 and the ongoing weak employment environment. Our serious delinquency rates remained high in 2010, primarily due to economic factors which adversely affected borrowers. Contributing to this increase were: (a) delays related to servicer processing capacity constraints; (b) delays associated with the HAMP trial period and related processes; and (c) delays in the foreclosure process, including those associated with deficiencies in foreclosure documentation practices, those imposed by third parties, and our own temporary suspensions of foreclosure transfers. Although the UPB of our single-family non-performing loans continued to increase during 2010, the number of loans that transitioned to serious delinquency gradually declined during the same period, though it remained high.

*Characteristics of the Single-Family Credit Guarantee Portfolio*

The average UPB of loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio was approximately $150,000 at both December 31, 2010 and December 31, 2009, respectively. Table 42 provides additional characteristics of single-family mortgage loans purchased during the years ended December 31, 2010, 2009, and 2008, and of our single-family credit guarantee portfolio at December 31, 2010, 2009, and 2008.

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**Table 42 Characteristics of the Single-Family Credit Guarantee Portfolio**[1]

| | Purchases During the Year Ended December 31, | | | Portfolio[2] at December 31, | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 |
| **Original LTV Ratio Range**[3][4] | | | | | | |
| 60% and below | 31% | 34% | 24% | 23% | 23% | 22% |
| Above 60% to 70% | 17 | 18 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Above 70% to 80% | 45 | 41 | 40 | 43 | 45 | 46 |
| Above 80% to 90% | 4 | 5 | 11 | 9 | 8 | 8 |
| Above 90% to 100% | 3 | 2 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| Above 100% | | | | 1 | | |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Weighted average original LTV ratio | 67% | 66% | 71% | 71% | 71% | 72% |
| **Estimated Current LTV Ratio Range**[5] | | | | | | |
| 60% and below | | | | 27% | 28% | 32% |
| Above 60% to 70% | | | | 12 | 12 | 13 |
| Above 70% to 80% | | | | 17 | 16 | 16 |
| Above 80% to 90% | | | | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Above 90% to 100% | | | | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Above 100% to 110% | | | | 6 | 6 | 5 |
| Above 110% to 120% | | | | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| Above 120% | | | | 8 | 8 | 5 |
| Total | | | | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Weighted average estimated current LTV ratio: | | | | | | |
| Relief refinance mortgages[6] | | | | 78% | 85% | N/A |
| All other mortgages | | | | 78% | 77% | N/A |
| Total mortgages | | | | 78% | 77% | 72% |
| **Credit Score**[3][7] | | | | | | |
| 740 and above | 73% | 73% | 53% | 53% | 50% | 46% |
| 700 to 739 | 17 | 18 | 22 | 21 | 22 | 23 |
| 660 to 699 | 7 | 7 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 17 |
| 620 to 659 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| Less than 620 | 1 | | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 |
| Not available | | | | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Weighted average credit score: | | | | | | |
| Relief refinance mortgages[6] | | | | 745 | 738 | N/A |
| All other mortgages | | | | 732 | 729 | N/A |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total mortgages | | | | 733 | 730 | 725 |
| **Loan Purpose** | | | | | | |
| Purchase | 20% | 20% | 41% | 31% | 35% | 40% |
| Cash-out refinance | 21 | 26 | 31 | 29 | 30 | 30 |
| Other refinance[8] | 59 | 54 | 28 | 40 | 35 | 30 |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| **Property Type** | | | | | | |
| Detached/townhome[9] | 94% | 94% | 90% | 92% | 92% | 91% |
| Condo/Co-op | 6 | 6 | 10 | 8 | 8 | 9 |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| **Occupancy Type** | | | | | | |
| Primary residence | 93% | 93% | 89% | 91% | 91% | 91% |
| Second/vacation home | 4 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Investment | 3 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |

(1) Purchases and ending balances are based on the UPB of the single-family credit guarantee portfolio. Other Guarantee Transactions with ending balances of $2 billion at December 31, 2010, 2009, and 2008, are excluded from portfolio balance data since these securities are backed by non-Freddie Mac issued securities for which the loan characteristics data was not available.

(2) Includes loans acquired under our relief refinance initiative, which began in 2009.

(3) Purchases columns in 2010 and 2009 exclude mortgage loans acquired under our relief refinance initiative. See Table 47 Single-Family Refinance Loan Volume for further information on the LTV ratios of these loans.

(4) Original LTV ratios are calculated as the amount of the mortgage we guarantee including the credit-enhanced portion, divided by the lesser of the appraised value of the property at the time of mortgage origination or the mortgage borrower s purchase price. Second liens not owned or guaranteed by us are excluded from the LTV ratio calculation.

(5) Current market values are estimated by adjusting the value of the property at origination based on changes in the market value of homes since origination. Estimated current LTV ratio range is not applicable to purchase activity, includes the credit-enhanced portion of the loan and excludes any secondary financing by third parties.

(6) The ending balances of relief refinance mortgages comprised approximately 7% and 2% of our single-family credit guarantee portfolio as of December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively.

(7) Credit score data is based on FICO scores. Although we obtain updated credit information on certain borrowers after the origination of a mortgage, such as those borrowers seeking a modification, the scores presented in this table represent only the credit score of the borrower at the time of loan origination.

(8) Other refinance transactions include: (a) refinance mortgages with no cash-out to the borrower; and (b) refinance mortgages for which the delivery data provided was not sufficient for us to determine whether the mortgage was a cash-out or a no cash-out refinance transaction.

(9) Includes manufactured housing and homes within planned unit development communities.

*Loan-to-Value Ratios*

An important safeguard against credit losses on mortgage loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio is provided by the borrowers equity in the underlying properties. As discussed in BUSINESS Our Business, our charter requires that single-family mortgages with LTV ratios above 80% at the time of purchase be covered by specified credit enhancements or participation interests. In addition, we employ other types of credit enhancements, including pool insurance, indemnification agreements, collateral pledged by lenders and subordinated security structures.

As shown in Table 42, the percentage of borrowers in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio, based on UPB, with estimated current LTV ratios greater than 100% was 18% as of both December 31, 2010 and December 31, 2009. As estimated current LTV ratios increase, the borrower s equity in the home decreases, which negatively affects the borrower s ability to refinance or sell the property for an amount at or above the balance of the outstanding mortgage loan. If a borrower has an estimated current LTV ratio greater than 100%, the borrower is underwater and is more likely to default than other borrowers. The serious delinquency rate for single-family loans with estimated current LTV ratios greater than 100% was 14.9% and 14.8% as of December 31, 2010 and December 31 2009, respectively. In addition, as of December 31, 2010 and 2009, for the loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio with greater than 80% estimated current LTV ratios, the borrowers had a weighted average credit score at origination of 721 and 719, respectively.

*Credit Score*

Credit scores are a useful measure for assessing the credit quality of a borrower. Credit scores are numbers reported by credit repositories, based on statistical models, that summarize an individual s credit record. FICO scores are the most commonly used credit scores today. FICO scores are ranked on a scale of approximately 300 to 850 points. Statistically, borrowers with higher credit scores are more likely to repay or have the ability to refinance than those with lower scores.

*Loan Purpose*

Mortgage loan purpose indicates how the borrower intends to use the funds from a mortgage loan. In a purchase transaction, the funds are used to acquire a property. In a cash-out refinance transaction, in addition to paying off existing mortgage liens, the borrower obtains additional funds that may be used for other purposes, including paying off subordinate mortgage liens and providing unrestricted cash proceeds to the borrower. In other refinance transactions, the funds are used to pay off existing mortgage liens and may be used in limited amounts for certain specified purposes; such refinances are generally referred to as no cash-out or rate and term refinances. The percentage of purchase transactions in our single-family loan acquisition volume declined significantly in 2009 and remained at low levels during 2010. Due to continued lower interest rates, we expect refinance activity to remain high in 2011, though it will likely decline from 2010 levels. Historically, cash-out refinancings have a higher risk of default than mortgages originated in no cash-out, or rate and term, refinance transactions.

*Property Type*

Townhomes and detached single-family houses are the predominant type of single-family property. Condominiums are a property type that historically experiences greater volatility in home prices than detached single-family residences. Condominium loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio have a higher composition of first-time homebuyers and homebuyers whose purpose is for investment, or a second home. In practice, investors and second home borrowers often seek to finance the condominium purchase with loans having a higher original LTV ratio than other borrowers. Approximately 41% of the condominium loans within our single-family credit guarantee portfolio are in California, Florida, and Illinois, which are among the states that have been most adversely affected by the

economic recession and housing downturn. Condominium loans comprised 15% and 13% of our credit losses during the years ended December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively, while these loans comprised 8% of our single-family credit guarantee portfolio at both dates.

*Occupancy Type*

Borrowers may purchase a home as a primary residence, second/vacation home or investment property that is typically a rental property. Mortgage loans on properties occupied by the borrower as a primary residence tend to have a lower credit risk than mortgages on investment properties or secondary residences.

*Geographic Concentration*

Local economic conditions can affect borrowers ability to repay loans and the value of the collateral underlying the loans. Because our business involves purchasing mortgages from every geographic region in the U.S., we maintain a geographically diverse single-family credit guarantee portfolio. While our single-family credit guarantee portfolio s geographic distribution was relatively stable in recent years and remains broadly diversified across these regions, we were negatively impacted by overall home price declines in each region since 2006. Our credit losses continue to be greatest in those states that experienced significant decreases in property values since 2006, such as California, Florida, Nevada and

Arizona. See NOTE 19: CONCENTRATION OF CREDIT AND OTHER RISKS for more information concerning the distribution of our single-family credit guarantee portfolio by geographic region.

*Attribute Combinations*

Certain combinations of loan characteristics often can also indicate a higher degree of credit risk. For example, single-family mortgages with both high LTV ratios and borrowers who have lower credit scores typically experience higher rates of serious delinquency and default. We estimate that there were $11.8 billion and $12.7 billion at December 31, 2010 and December 31, 2009, respectively, of loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio with both original LTV ratios greater than 90% and FICO scores less than 620 at the time of loan origination. Certain mortgage product types, such as interest-only or option ARM loans, that have additional higher risk characteristics, such as lower credit scores or higher LTV ratios, will also have a higher risk of default than those same products without these characteristics. In addition, some borrowers may use second liens at the time of purchase to reduce the LTV ratio on first lien mortgages, or may obtain second lien mortgages subsequently. A borrower who obtains a second lien mortgage, either at the time of origination or subsequently, is more susceptible to declines in home prices, which would reduce the equity in their home to a lower level than if there were no second lien and increase the risk of delinquency on the first lien. The practice of simultaneously obtaining first and second lien mortgages declined in 2009 and 2010, as compared to prior years. We obtain second lien information on loans we purchase only if the second lien mortgage was established at or before the time of origination of the first lien, and therefore we do not know about a second lien mortgage if the borrower obtains it after origination. As of both December 31, 2010 and 2009, approximately 14% of loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio had second lien financing at the time of origination of the first lien and we estimate that these loans comprised 19% and 21%, respectively, of our seriously delinquent loans, based on UPB.

*Single-Family Mortgage Product Types*

Product mix affects the credit risk profile of our total mortgage portfolio. In general, 15-year amortizing fixed-rate mortgages exhibit the lowest default rate among the types of mortgage loans we securitize and purchase, due to the accelerated rate of principal amortization on these mortgages and the credit profiles of borrowers who seek and qualify for them. In a rising interest rate environment, balloon/reset and ARM borrowers typically default at a higher rate than fixed-rate borrowers. However, during the last two years, when interest rates have generally declined, our delinquency and default rates on adjustable-rate and balloon/reset mortgage loans on a relative basis have been as high as, or higher than, fixed-rate loans since these borrowers are also susceptible to declining housing and economic conditions and/or had other higher-risk characteristics.

The primary mortgage products in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio are first lien, fixed-rate mortgage loans. During 2009 and 2010, a higher proportion of our single-family mortgage purchases were fixed-rate loans as compared to earlier periods, due to continued low interest rates for conforming mortgages, which increased refinancing activity by borrowers that desire fixed-rate products. Our non-HAMP loan modifications generally result in new terms that include fixed interest rates after modification. Increased non-HAMP modification volume in recent periods therefore also contributed to the increase in the amount of fixed-rate single-family loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio. Our HAMP modifications generally result in reduced payments for a minimum of five years, after which time payments gradually increase to a rate consistent with the market rate at the time of modification.

The following paragraphs provide information on the interest-only, option ARM, and adjustable-rate mortgage loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio. Interest-only and option ARM loans have experienced significantly higher serious delinquency rates than other mortgage products.

*Interest-Only Loans*

Interest-only loans have an initial period during which the borrower pays only interest, and at a specified date the monthly payment changes to begin reflecting repayment of principal until maturity. At December 31, 2010 and December 31, 2009, interest-only loans represented approximately 5% and 7%, respectively, of the UPB of our single-family credit guarantee portfolio. The UPB of interest-only loans declined during 2010 primarily due to refinancing into other mortgage products, modifications of seriously delinquent loans to amortizing terms, and foreclosure events. We purchased $0.9 billion and $0.8 billion of these loans during the years ended December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively. As of September 1, 2010, we no longer purchase interest-only loans.

*Option ARM Loans*

Most option ARM loans have initial periods during which the borrower has payment options until a specified date, when the terms are recast. At both December 31, 2010 and 2009, option ARM loans represented approximately 1% of the UPB of our single-family credit guarantee portfolio. We did not purchase option ARM loans in our single-family credit

guarantee portfolio during 2010 or 2009. For information on our exposure to option ARM loans through our holdings of non-agency mortgage-related securities, see CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS ANALYSIS Investments in Securities.

*Adjustable-Rate Mortgage Loans*

Table 43 presents information for single-family mortgage loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio, excluding Other Guarantee Transactions, at December 31, 2010 that contain adjustable payment terms. The reported balances in the table are aggregated by adjustable-rate loan product type and categorized by year of the next scheduled contractual reset date. At December 31, 2010, approximately 60% of these adjustable-rate loans have interest rates that are scheduled to reset in 2011 or 2012. The timing of the actual reset dates may differ from those presented due to a number of factors, including refinancing or exercising of other provisions within the terms of the mortgage.

**Table 43 Single-Family Scheduled Adjustable-Rate Resets by Year at December 31, 2010[(1)]**

| | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | Thereafter | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | (in millions) | | | |
| ARMs/amortizing | $ 28,022 | $ 7,418 | $ 3,827 | $ 2,758 | $ 11,946 | $ 6,594 | $ 60,565 |
| ARMs/interest-only[(2)] | 25,261 | 18,802 | 10,681 | 5,021 | 3,681 | 8,365 | 71,811 |
| Balloon/resets[(3)] | 1,190 | 334 | 95 | 16 | 12 | 1 | 1,648 |
| Total | $ 54,473 | $ 26,554 | $ 14,603 | $ 7,795 | $ 15,639 | $ 14,960 | $ 134,024 |

(1) Based on the UPBs of mortgage products that contain adjustable-rate interest provisions. These reported balances are based on the UPB of the underlying mortgage loans and do not reflect the publicly-available security balances we use to report the composition of our PCs and REMICs and Other Structured Securities. Excludes mortgage loans underlying Other Guarantee Transactions since reset information was not available to us for these loans.
(2) Reflects the UPB of interest-only loans that reset and begin amortization of principal in each of the years shown.
(3) Represents the portion of the UPBs that are scheduled to reset during the period specified above.

*Conforming Jumbo Loans*

We purchased $23.9 billion and $26.3 billion of conforming jumbo loans during the years ended December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively. The UPB of conforming jumbo loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio as of December 31, 2010 and December 31, 2009 was $37.8 billion and $26.6 billion, respectively. The average size of these loans was approximately $548,000 and $546,000 at December 31, 2010 and December 31, 2009, respectively.

*Other Categories of Single-Family Mortgage Loans*

While we classified certain loans as subprime or Alt-A for purposes of the discussion below and elsewhere in this Form 10-K, there is no universally accepted definition of subprime or Alt-A, and our classifications of such loans may differ from those used by other companies. For example, some financial institutions may use FICO credit scores to delineate certain residential mortgages as subprime. In addition, we do not rely primarily on these loan classifications to evaluate the credit risk exposure relating to such loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio.

*Subprime Loans*

Participants in the mortgage market may characterize single-family loans based upon their overall credit quality at the time of origination, generally considering them to be prime or subprime. While we have not historically characterized the loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio as either prime or subprime, we do monitor the amount of loans we have guaranteed with characteristics that indicate a higher degree of credit risk (see *Higher Risk Loans in the Single-Family Credit Guarantee Portfolio* and Table 52 Single-Family Credit Guarantee Portfolio by Attribute Combinations for further information).

We estimate that approximately $2.5 billion and $2.9 billion of security collateral underlying our Other Guarantee Transactions at December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively, were identified as subprime based on information provided to us when we entered into these transactions. In addition, as of December 31, 2010 and 2009, we also held $1.5 billion and $1.6 billion, respectively, of certain securities backed by FHA/VA guaranteed loans within our Other Guarantee Transactions that we previously reported as subprime. In prior disclosures, we reported these FHA/VA loans as subprime because they were incorrectly identified as subprime at that time.

As of December 31, 2010 and 2009, we also held $8.4 billion and $9.6 billion, respectively, of option ARM securities underlying our Other Guarantee Transactions. We have not identified these option ARM securities as either subprime or Alt-A securities. However, these securities could currently be exhibiting similar credit performance to collateral identified as subprime or Alt-A.

We also categorize our investments in non-agency mortgage-related securities as subprime if they were identified as such based on information provided to us when we entered into these transactions. At December 31, 2010 and 2009, we held $54.2 billion and $61.6 billion, respectively, in UPB of non-agency mortgage-related securities backed by subprime loans. These securities were structured to provide credit enhancements, particularly through subordination, and 10% and 18% of these securities were investment grade at December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively. The credit performance of loans

underlying these securities deteriorated significantly beginning in 2008 and continued to deteriorate in 2010. For more information on our exposure to subprime mortgage loans through our investments in non-agency mortgage-related securities see CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS ANALYSIS Investments in Securities.

*Alt-A Loans*

Although there is no universally accepted definition of Alt-A, many mortgage market participants classify single-family loans with credit characteristics that range between their prime and subprime categories as Alt-A because these loans have a combination of characteristics of each category, may be underwritten with lower or alternative income or asset documentation requirements compared to a full documentation mortgage loan, or both. The UPB of Alt-A loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio declined to $116.1 billion as of December 31, 2010 from $147.9 billion as of December 31, 2009. The UPB of our Alt-A loans declined in 2010 primarily due to refinancing into other mortgage products, foreclosure transfers, and other liquidation events. As of December 31, 2010, for Alt-A loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio, the average FICO credit score at origination was 719. Although Alt-A mortgage loans comprised approximately 6% of our single-family credit guarantee portfolio as of December 31, 2010, these loans represented approximately 37% of our credit losses during 2010.

We implemented several changes in our underwriting and eligibility criteria in 2008 and 2009 to reduce our acquisition of certain loans with higher-risk characteristics, including Alt-A loans. As a result, we did not purchase any new single-family Alt-A mortgage loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio during the year ended December 31, 2010, compared to $0.5 billion of Alt-A purchases for the year ended December 31, 2009. However, during the second quarter of 2010, we partially terminated certain other guarantee commitments, which included $1.5 billion of UPB of Alt-A mortgage loans, in order to permit these loans to be securitized within a new PC issuance. There was no change to our Alt-A exposure on these mortgages as a result of these transactions. Although we discontinued new purchases of mortgage loans with lower documentation standards for assets or income beginning March 1, 2009 (or later, as our customers contracts permitted), we continued to purchase certain amounts of these mortgages in cases where the loan was either a part of our relief refinance mortgage initiative or in another refinance mortgage initiative and the pre-existing mortgage (including Alt-A loans) was originated under less than full documentation standards. However, in the event we purchase a refinance mortgage in one of these programs and the original loan had been previously identified as Alt-A, such refinance loan may no longer be categorized or reported as an Alt-A mortgage in this Form 10-K and our other financial reports because the new refinance loan replacing the original loan would not be identified by the servicer as an Alt-A loan. As a result, our reported Alt-A balances may be lower than would otherwise be the case had such refinancing not occurred. From the time the product became available in 2009 to December 31, 2010, we purchased approximately $10.2 billion of relief refinance mortgages that were previously categorized as Alt-A loans in our portfolio, including $7.0 billion during the year ended December 31, 2010.

We also hold investments in non-agency mortgage-related securities backed by single-family Alt-A loans. At December 31, 2010 and 2009, we held investments of $18.8 billion and $21.4 billion, respectively, of non-agency mortgage-related securities backed by Alt-A and other mortgage loans and 22% and 31%, respectively, of these securities were investment grade. The credit performance of loans underlying these securities deteriorated significantly beginning in 2008 and continued to deteriorate in 2010. We categorize our investments in non-agency mortgage-related securities as Alt-A if the securities were identified as such based on information provided to us when we entered into these transactions. For more information on our exposure to Alt-A mortgage loans through our investments in non-agency mortgage-related securities see CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS ANALYSIS Investments in Securities.

*Higher-Risk Loans in the Single-Family Credit Guarantee Portfolio*

Table 44 presents information about certain categories of single-family mortgage loans within our single-family credit guarantee portfolio that we believe have certain higher-risk characteristics. These loans include categories based on product type and borrower characteristics present at origination. The table includes a presentation of each higher risk category in isolation. A single loan may fall within more than one category (for example, an interest-only loan may also have an original LTV ratio greater than 90%). Mortgage loans with higher LTV ratios have a higher risk of default, especially during housing and economic downturns, such as the one the U.S. has experienced over the past few years.

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**Table 44 Certain Higher-Risk[1] Categories in the Single-Family Credit Guarantee Portfolio**

| | As of December 31, 2010 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | UPB | Estimated Current LTV[2] | Percentage Modified[3] | Serious Delinquency Rate[4] |
| | (dollars in billions) | | | |
| Loans with one or more specified characteristics | $ 369.0 | 100% | 5.5% | 10.3% |
| Categories (individual characteristics): | | | | |
| Alt-A | 116.1 | 99% | 5.8% | 12.2% |
| Interest-only loans | 95.4 | 112% | 0.5% | 18.4% |
| Option ARM loans | 9.4 | 115% | 3.1% | 21.2% |
| Original LTV ratio greater than 90%[5] | 154.3 | 104% | 5.3% | 7.8% |
| Lower original FICO scores (less than 620)[5] | 61.2 | 89% | 10.4% | 13.9% |

| | As of December 31, 2009 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | UPB | Estimated Current LTV[2] | Percentage Modified[3] | Serious Delinquency Rate[4] |
| | (dollars in billions) | | | |
| Loans with one or more specified characteristics | $ 413.3 | 97% | 2.6% | 10.8% |
| Categories (individual characteristics): | | | | |
| Alt-A | 147.9 | 94% | 1.9% | 12.3% |
| Interest-only loans | 129.9 | 106% | 0.2% | 17.6% |
| Option ARM loans | 10.8 | 111% | 1.4% | 17.9% |
| Original LTV ratio greater than 90%[5] | 144.4 | 104% | 3.0% | 9.1% |
| Lower original FICO scores (less than 620)[5] | 67.7 | 87% | 6.1% | 14.9% |

(1) Categories are not additive and a single loan may be included in multiple categories if more than one characteristic is associated with the loan. Loans with a combination of these characteristics will have an even higher risk of default than those with an individual characteristic.

(2) Based on our first lien exposure on the property and excludes secondary financing by third parties, if applicable. For refinance mortgages, the original LTV ratios are based on third-party appraisals used in loan origination, whereas new purchase mortgages are based on the property sales price.

(3) Represents the percentage of loans based on loan count in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio that have been modified under agreement with the borrower, including those with no changes in the interest rate or maturity date, but where past due amounts are added to the outstanding principal balance of the loan. Excludes loans underlying certain Other Guarantee Transactions for which data was not available.

(4) See *Portfolio Management Activities Credit Performance* Delinquencies for further information about our reported serious delinquency rates.

(5) See endnotes (4) and (7) to Table 42 Characteristics of the Single-Family Credit Guarantee Portfolio for information on our calculation of original LTV ratios and our use of FICO scores, respectively.

Loans with one or more of the above attributes comprised approximately 20% and 22% of our single-family credit guarantee portfolio as of December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively. The total UPB of loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio with one or more of these characteristics declined approximately 11%, to $369.0 billion as of December 31, 2010 from $413.3 billion as of December 31, 2009. This decline was principally due to liquidations resulting from repayments, payoffs, refinancing activity and other principal curtailments as well as those resulting from foreclosure events. The serious delinquency rates associated with these loans decreased slightly to 10.3% as of December 31, 2010 from 10.8% as of December 31, 2009.

*Multifamily Mortgage Portfolio Diversification, Characteristics and Product Types*

Portfolio diversification is an important aspect of our strategy to manage mortgage credit risk. We monitor a variety of mortgage loan characteristics which may affect the default experience on our overall mortgage portfolio, such as the LTV ratio, DSCR, geographic concentrations and loan duration. We also monitor the performance and risk concentrations of our multifamily loans and the underlying properties throughout the life of the loan.

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Table 45 provides attributes of our multifamily mortgage portfolio at December 31, 2010 and 2009.

**Table 45 Multifamily Mortgage Portfolio by Attribute**

| | UPB at December 31, | | Delinquency Rate[2] at December 31, | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | 2009 | 2010 | 2009 |
| **Original LTV Ratio[1]** | (dollars in billions) | | | |
| Below 75% | $ 72.0 | $ 65.0 | 0.08% | 0.07% |
| 75% to 80% | 29.9 | 29.5 | 0.24 | 0.15 |
| Above 80% | 6.8 | 6.8 | 2.30 | 1.63 |
| Total | $ 108.7 | $ 101.3 | 0.26% | 0.20% |
| Weighted average LTV ratio at origination | 70% | 70% | | |
| **Geographic Distribution** | | | | |
| California | $ 19.4 | $ 18.2 | 0.06% | % |
| Texas | 12.8 | 11.7 | 0.52 | 0.26 |
| New York | 9.2 | 9.0 | | |
| Florida | 6.4 | 5.6 | 0.56 | 0.42 |
| Virginia | 5.6 | 5.6 | | |
| Georgia | 5.5 | 5.3 | 0.98 | 0.65 |
| All other States | 49.8 | 45.9 | 0.24 | 0.24 |
| Total | $ 108.7 | $ 101.3 | 0.26% | 0.20% |
| **Maturity Dates** | | | | |
| 2010 | N/A | $ 1.8 | N/A | 0.21% |
| 2011 | $ 2.3 | 3.5 | 0.97% | |
| 2012 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 0.82 | 0.14 |
| 2013 | 6.8 | 7.4 | | |
| 2014 | 8.5 | 8.8 | 0.02 | |
| Beyond 2014 | 87.0 | 75.4 | 0.26 | 0.25 |
| Total | $ 108.7 | $ 101.3 | 0.26% | 0.20% |
| **Year of Origination** | | | | |
| 2004 and prior | $ 15.9 | $ 19.4 | 0.31% | 0.08% |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2005 | 8.0 | 8.4 | | |
| 2006 | 11.7 | 12.0 | 0.25 | 0.16 |
| 2007 | 20.8 | 21.3 | 0.97 | 0.63 |
| 2008 | 23.0 | 23.9 | 0.03 | 0.13 |
| 2009 | 15.2 | 16.3 | | |
| 2010 | 14.1 | N/A | | N/A |
| Total | $ 108.7 | $ 101.3 | 0.26% | 0.20% |
| **Current Loan Size Distribution** | | | | |
| Above $25 million | $ 39.7 | $ 36.9 | 0.07% | % |
| Above $5 million to $25 million | 59.7 | 55.3 | 0.38 | 0.32 |
| $5 million and below | 9.3 | 9.1 | 0.37 | 0.25 |
| Total | $ 108.7 | $ 101.3 | 0.26% | 0.20% |
| **Legal Structure** | | | | |
| Unsecuritized loans | $ 85.9 | $ 83.9 | 0.11% | 0.08% |
| Non-consolidated Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities | 13.1 | 8.2 | 1.30 | 1.61 |
| Other guarantee commitments | 9.7 | 9.2 | 0.23 | |
| Total | $ 108.7 | $ 101.3 | 0.26% | 0.20% |

(1) Original LTV ratios are calculated as the UPB of the mortgage, divided by the lesser of the appraised value of the property at the time of mortgage origination or the mortgage borrower s purchase price. Second liens not owned or guaranteed by us are excluded from the LTV ratio calculation.

(2) See *Portfolio Management Credit Performance* Delinquencies for more information about our delinquency rates.

Our multifamily mortgage portfolio consists of product types that are categorized based on loan terms. Multifamily loans may be interest-only or amortizing, fixed or variable rate, or may switch between fixed and variable rate over time. However, our multifamily loans are generally for shorter terms than single-family loans, and most have balloon maturities ranging from five to ten years. Amortizing loans reduce our credit exposure over time because the UPB declines with each mortgage payment. Fixed-rate loans may also create less risk for us because the borrower s payments are determined at origination, and, therefore, the risk that the monthly mortgage payment could increase if interest rates rise as with a variable-rate mortgage is eliminated. As of December 31, 2010 and 2009, approximately 85% and 86%, respectively, of the multifamily loans on our consolidated balance sheets had fixed interest rates while the remaining loans had variable-rates.

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We estimate that approximately 8% of loans in our multifamily mortgage portfolio had a current LTV ratio of greater than 100% as of December 31, 2010, and the estimated current average DSCR for these loans as of that date was 1.1, based on the latest available income information for these properties and our assessments of market conditions. Our estimates of the current LTV ratios for multifamily loans are based on values we receive from a third-party service provider as well as our internal estimates of property value, for which we may use changes in tax assessments, market vacancy rates, rent growth and comparable property sales in local areas as well as third-party appraisals for a portion of the portfolio. We periodically perform our own valuations or obtain third-party appraisals in cases where a significant deterioration in a borrower s financial condition has occurred, the borrower has applied for refinancing, or in certain other circumstances where we deem it appropriate to reassess the property value.

Because multifamily loans generally have a balloon payment and typically have a shorter contractual term than single-family mortgages, the maturity date for a multifamily loan is also an important loan characteristic. Borrowers may be less able to refinance their obligations during periods of rising interest rates, which could lead to default if the borrower is unable to find affordable refinancing. Loan size at origination does not generally indicate the degree of a loan s risk, but it does indicate our potential exposure to default.

While we believe the underwriting practices we employ for our multifamily loan portfolio are prudent, the ongoing weak economic conditions in the U.S. negatively impacted many multifamily residential properties. Our delinquency rates have remained relatively low compared to other industry participants, which we believe to be, in part, the result of our underwriting standards versus those used by others in the industry. We monitor the financial performance of our multifamily borrowers and during 2010 we observed stabilization in measures such as the DSCR and estimated current LTV ratios for many of our properties. To the extent multifamily loans reach maturity and a borrower with deterioration in cash flows and property market value requires refinancing of the property, we will work with the borrower to obtain principal repayment to reduce the refinanced balance to conform to our underwriting standards. However, should a distressed borrower not have the financial capacity to do so, we may either experience higher default rates and credit losses, or need to provide continued financing ourselves at below-market rates through a TDR. This refinancing risk for multifamily loans is greater for those loans with balloon provisions where the remaining UPB is due upon maturity. Of the $108.7 billion in UPB of our multifamily mortgage portfolio as of December 31, 2010, approximately 2% and 4% will reach their maturity during 2011 and 2012, respectively.

*Portfolio Management Activities*

The portfolio information below relates to our single-family credit guarantee and multifamily mortgage portfolios, which exclude our holdings of non-Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities. See CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS ANALYSIS Investments in Securities *Mortgage-Related Securities* for credit enhancement and other information about our investments in non-Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities.

*Credit Enhancements*

Our charter requires that single-family mortgages with LTV ratios above 80% at the time of purchase be covered by specified credit enhancements or participation interests. In addition, for some mortgage loans, we elect to share the default risk by transferring a portion of that risk to various third parties through a variety of other credit enhancements.

At December 31, 2010 and 2009, our credit-enhanced mortgages represented 15% and 16%, respectively, of our single-family credit guarantee portfolio and multifamily mortgage portfolio, on a combined basis, excluding those backing Ginnie Mae Certificates and HFA bonds guaranteed by us under the HFA initiative. Freddie Mac securities backed by Ginnie Mae Certificates and HFA bonds guaranteed by us under the HFA initiative are excluded because we consider the incremental credit risk to which we are exposed to be insignificant.

We recognized recoveries of $3.4 billion and $2.1 billion in 2010 and 2009, respectively, under our primary and pool mortgage insurance policies and other credit enhancements as discussed below related to our single-family credit guarantee portfolio. In 2010 and 2009, there was a significant decline in our credit enhancement coverage for new purchases compared to 2008, primarily as a result of the high refinance activity during these years. Refinance loans typically have lower LTV ratios, which fall below the 80% charter threshold noted above. In addition, we have been purchasing significant amounts of relief refinance mortgages. These mortgages allow for the refinance of existing loans guaranteed by us under terms such that we may not have mortgage insurance for some or all of the UPB of the mortgage in excess of 80% of the value of the property for certain of these loans.

Our ability and desire to expand or reduce the portion of our total mortgage portfolio covered by credit enhancements will depend on our evaluation of the credit quality of new business purchase opportunities, the risk profile of our portfolio and the future availability of effective credit enhancements at prices that permit an attractive return. While the use of credit enhancements reduces our exposure to mortgage credit risk, it increases our exposure to institutional credit risk. As guarantor, we remain responsible for the payment of principal and interest if mortgage insurance or other credit

enhancements do not provide full reimbursement for covered losses. Our credit losses could increase if an entity that provides credit enhancement fails to fulfill its obligation, as this would reduce the amount of our recovery of credit losses.

Primary mortgage insurance is the most prevalent type of credit enhancement protecting our single-family credit guarantee portfolio and is typically provided on a loan-level basis. Primary mortgage insurance transfers varying portions of the credit risk associated with a mortgage to a third-party insurer. Most mortgage insurers increased premiums and tightened underwriting standards during 2009 and 2008. The amount of insurance we obtain on any mortgage depends on our requirements and our assessment of risk.

Generally, in order to file a claim under a primary mortgage insurance policy, the insured loan must be in default and the borrower s interest in the underlying property must have been extinguished, such as through a foreclosure action. The mortgage insurer has a prescribed period of time within which to process a claim and make a determination as to its validity and amount. Historically, it typically took two months from the time a claim was filed to receive a primary mortgage insurance payment; however, due to our insurers performing greater diligence reviews on these claims to verify that the original underwriting of the loans by our seller/servicers was in accordance with their standards, the recovery timelines extended beginning in 2008 by several months and continued to extend in the last two years. As of December 31, 2010 and 2009, in connection with loans underlying our single-family credit guarantee portfolio, excluding Other Guarantee Transactions, the maximum amount of losses we could recover under primary mortgage insurance, excluding reimbursement of expenses, was $52.9 billion and $58.2 billion, respectively.

Other prevalent types of credit enhancements that we use are lender recourse (under which we may require a lender to repurchase a loan upon default) and indemnification agreements (under which we may require a lender to reimburse us for credit losses realized on mortgages), as well as pool insurance. Pool insurance provides insurance on a pool of loans up to a stated aggregate loss limit. In addition to a pool-level loss coverage limit, some pool insurance contracts may have limits on coverage at the loan level. For pool insurance contracts that expire before the completion of the contractual term of the mortgage loan, we seek to ensure that the contracts cover the period of time during which we believe the mortgage loans are most likely to default. As of December 31, 2010 and 2009, in connection with loans underlying our single-family credit guarantee portfolio, excluding Other Guarantee Transactions, the maximum amount of losses we could recover under lender recourse and indemnification agreements was $9.6 billion and $11.1 billion, respectively, and under pool insurance was $3.3 billion and $3.6 billion, respectively. In certain instances, the cumulative losses we have incurred as of December 31, 2010 combined with our expectations of potential future claims may exceed the maximum limit of loss allowed by the policy.

In order to file a claim under a pool insurance policy, we generally must have finalized the primary mortgage claim, disposed of the foreclosed property, and quantified the net loss payable to us with respect to the insured loan to determine the amount due under the pool insurance policy. Certain pool insurance policies have specified loss deductibles that must be met before we are entitled to recover under the policy. Pool insurance proceeds are generally received five to six months after disposition of the underlying property. We have institutional credit risk relating to the potential insolvency or non-performance of mortgage insurers that insure mortgages we purchase or guarantee. See *Institutional Credit Risk Mortgage Insurers* for further discussion about pool insurance coverage and our mortgage loan insurers.

Other forms of credit enhancements on our single-family credit guarantee portfolio include government insurance or guarantees, collateral (including cash or high-quality marketable securities) pledged by a lender, excess interest and subordinated security structures. At December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively, the maximum amount of losses we could recover under other forms of credit enhancements in connection with loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio, excluding Other Guarantee Transactions, was $0.2 billion and $0.3 billion.

At December 31, 2010 and 2009, the UPB of single-family Other Guarantee Transactions with subordination coverage at origination was $4.1 billion and $4.5 billion, respectively, and the subordination coverage on these securities was $622 million and $784 million, respectively. However, at December 31, 2010 and 2009, the average serious delinquency rate on single-family Other Guarantee Transactions with subordination coverage was 21.1% and 24.1%, respectively.

We also use credit enhancements to mitigate risk of loss on certain multifamily mortgages and housing revenue bonds. Typically, we required credit enhancements on loans in situations where we delegated the underwriting process for the loan to the seller/servicer, which provides first loss coverage on the mortgage loan. We may also require credit enhancements during construction or rehabilitation in cases where we commit to purchase or guarantee a permanent loan upon completion and in cases where occupancy has not yet reached a level that produces the operating income that was the basis for underwriting the mortgage. The total UPB of mortgage loans in our multifamily mortgage portfolio, excluding Other Guarantee Transactions, for which we have credit enhancement coverage was $13.0 billion and $11.0 billion as of December 31, 2010 and December 31, 2009, respectively, and we had maximum potential coverage as of such dates of $3.4 billion and $3.0 billion, respectively.

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Additionally, Other Guarantee Transactions issued by our Multifamily segment include subordinated classes, that we do not guarantee, that provide for credit loss protection to the senior classes that we guarantee. Subordinated classes are allocated credit losses prior to the senior classes. At December 31, 2010 and 2009, the UPB of Multifamily Other Guarantee Transactions with subordination coverage was $8.2 billion and $2.6 billion, respectively, and the subordination coverage on these securities was $1.0 billion and $0.3 billion, respectively.

*Other Credit Risk Management Activities*

To compensate us for higher levels of risk in some mortgage products, we may charge upfront delivery fees above a base management and guarantee fee, which are calculated based on credit risk factors such as the mortgage product type, loan purpose, LTV ratio and other loan or borrower characteristics. In 2009, we implemented certain increases in delivery fees for certain mortgages deemed to be higher risk based on combinations of product type, property type, loan purpose, LTV ratio and/or borrower credit scores. We announced additional delivery fee increases in the fourth quarter of 2010 that become effective March 1, 2011 (or later, as outstanding contracts permit) for loans with higher LTV ratios.

We have also entered into credit derivatives on specified mortgage-related assets that in most cases are intended to limit our exposure to credit default losses. The fair value of these credit derivatives was not significant at December 31, 2010, or 2009. See NOTE 12: DERIVATIVES for further discussion.

*MHA Program*

The MHA Program is designed to help in the housing recovery, promote liquidity and housing affordability, expand foreclosure prevention efforts and set market standards. Participation in the MHA Program is an integral part of our mission of providing stability to the housing market. Through our participation in this program, we help borrowers maintain home ownership. Some of the key initiatives of this program are:

*Home Affordable Modification Program.* HAMP commits U.S. government, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae funds to help eligible homeowners avoid foreclosures and keep their homes through mortgage modifications, where possible. Under this program, we offer loan modifications to financially struggling homeowners with mortgages on their primary residences that reduce the monthly principal and interest payments on their mortgages. HAMP applies both to delinquent borrowers and to those current borrowers at risk of imminent default. Other features of HAMP include the following:

- HAMP uses specified requirements for borrower eligibility. The program seeks to provide a uniform, consistent regime that all participating servicers must use in modifying loans held or guaranteed by all types of investors: Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, banks and trusts backing non-agency mortgage-related securities.

- Under HAMP, the goal is to reduce the borrowers monthly mortgage payments to 31% of gross monthly income, which may be achieved through a combination of methods, including interest rate reductions, term extensions and principal forbearance. Although HAMP contemplates that some servicers will also make use of principal reduction to achieve reduced payments for borrowers, we only used forbearance in 2009 and 2010 and did not use principal reduction in modifying our loans.

- Under HAMP, each modification must be preceded by a standardized NPV test to evaluate whether the NPV of the income that the mortgage holder will receive after the modification will equal or exceed the NPV of the income that the holder would have received had there been no modification. HAMP does not require a modification if the NPV of the income that the mortgage holder will receive after modification is less than the NPV of the income the holder would have received had there been no modification; however, Freddie Mac will

permit such a modification in certain circumstances. Our practice in this regard is intended to increase the number of modifications under the program; however, it may cause us to incur higher losses than would otherwise be recognized under HAMP.

HAMP requires that each borrower complete a trial period during which the borrower will make monthly payments based on the estimated amount of the modification payments. Trial periods are required for at least three months. After the final trial-period payment is received by our servicer and the borrower has provided necessary documentation, the borrower and servicer will enter into the modification.

Servicers will be paid a $1,000 incentive fee when they originally modify a loan and an additional $500 incentive fee if the loan was current when it entered the trial period (*i.e.*, where default was imminent but had not yet occurred). In addition, servicers will receive up to $1,000 for any modification that reduces a borrower s monthly payment by 6% or more, in each of the first three years after the modification, as long as the modified loan remains current.

Borrowers whose loans are modified through HAMP will accrue monthly incentive payments that will be applied annually to reduce up to $1,000 of their principal, per year, for five years, as long as they are making timely payments under the modified loan terms.

HAMP applies to loans originated on or before January 1, 2009, and borrowers requests for such modifications will be considered until December 31, 2012.

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Table 46 presents the number of single-family loans that completed or were in process of modification under HAMP as of December 31, 2010 and 2009.

**Table 46 Single-Family Home Affordable Modification Program Volume[1]**

| | As of December 31, 2010 | | As of December 31, 2009 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Amount[2] | Number of Loans | Amount[2] | Number of Loans |
| | (dollars in millions) | | | |
| Completed HAMP modifications[3] | $ 23,635 | 107,073 | $ 3,127 | 13,927 |
| Loans in the HAMP trial period | $ 4,905 | 22,352 | $ 28,151 | 129,380 |

(1) Based on information reported by our servicers to the MHA Program administrator.
(2) For loans in the HAMP trial period, this reflects the loan balance prior to modification. For completed HAMP modifications, the amount represents the balance of loans after modification under HAMP.
(3) Completed HAMP modifications are those where the borrower has made the last trial period payment, has provided the required documentation to the servicer and the modification has become effective. Amounts presented represent completed HAMP modifications with effective dates since our implementation of HAMP in 2009 through December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively.

As of December 31, 2010, the borrower s monthly payment was reduced on average by an estimated $566, which amounts to an average of $6,787 per year, and a total of $727 million in annual reductions for all of our completed HAMP modifications (these amounts are calculated by multiplying the number of completed modifications by the average reduction in monthly payment, and have not been adjusted to reflect the actual performance of the loans following modification). Except in limited instances, each borrower s reduced payment will remain in effect for a minimum of five years and borrowers whose payments were adjusted below current market levels will have their payment gradually increase after the fifth year to a rate consistent with the market rate at the time of modification. Since we repurchase loans modified under HAMP from our PC pools, we bear the costs of these payment reductions. Although mortgage investors under the MHA Program are entitled to certain subsidies from Treasury for reducing the borrowers monthly payments from 38% to 31% of the borrower s income, we do not receive such subsidies on modified mortgages owned or guaranteed by us.

The number of our loans in the HAMP trial period declined to 22,352 as of December 31, 2010 from 129,380 as of December 31, 2009. A large number of borrowers entered into trial period plans when the program was initially introduced in 2009, and many of them either received permanent modifications or had their trial period plans cancelled in 2010. Significantly fewer new borrowers entered into HAMP trial period plans during 2010. Consequently, we expect fewer borrowers will complete a HAMP modification during 2011 than did in 2010, since a large number of the delinquent borrowers that were eligible for the program already attempted or completed the trial period.

Approximately 31% of our loans in the HAMP trial period as of December 31, 2010 had been in the trial period for more than the minimum duration of three months. Since the start of our HAMP effort, the trial period plans of more than 121,000 borrowers, or 48% of those starting the program, have been cancelled and the borrowers did not receive permanent HAMP modifications, primarily due to the failure to continue trial period payments, the failure to provide the income or other required documentation of the program, or the failure to meet the income requirements of the program. To address the documentation issues, guidelines for HAMP provide that, beginning with trial periods that became effective on or after June 1, 2010, borrowers must provide income documentation before entering into a

HAMP trial period. The ultimate completion rate for HAMP modifications, which is the percentage of borrowers that successfully exit the trial period and receive final modifications, remains uncertain. When a borrower s HAMP trial period is cancelled, the loan is considered for our other workout activities. For more information on our HAMP modifications, including redefault rates on these loans, see *Loan Workout Activities*.

In March 2010, Treasury expanded HAMP to include borrowers with FHA-insured loans, including incentives comparable to the incentive structure of HAMP. In November 2010, we notified our seller/servicers that we will not pay any incentive fees for mortgages modified under HAMP that are insured by FHA.

During 2010, Treasury issued guidelines for the following enhancements to HAMP. We do not currently have plans to apply these changes to mortgages that we own or guarantee. However, it is possible that FHFA might direct us to implement some or all of these changes.

*Unemployed Homeowners*: In May 2010, Treasury announced a plan to provide temporary assistance for unemployed borrowers while they search for employment. Under this plan, certain borrowers may receive forbearance plans for a minimum of three months. At the end of the forbearance period or when the borrowers financial situation changes, *e.g.*, they become employed, the borrowers must then be evaluated for a HAMP modification or other loan workouts, including HAFA.

*Principal Reduction Approach and Incentives*: In June 2010, Treasury announced an initiative under which servicers will be required to consider an alternative modification approach including a possible reduction of principal for loans with LTV ratios over 115%. Mortgage investors will receive incentives based on the amount of reduced principal. In October 2010, Treasury provided guidance with respect to applying this alternative for borrowers who have already

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received permanent modifications or are in trial plans. Investors will not be required to agree to a reduction of principal, but servicers must have a process for considering the approach.

*Home Affordable Refinance Program.* The Home Affordable Refinance Program gives eligible homeowners with loans owned or guaranteed by us or Fannie Mae an opportunity to refinance into loans with more affordable monthly payments and/or fixed-rate terms and is available until June 2011. Under the Home Affordable Refinance Program, we allow eligible borrowers who have mortgages with high current LTV ratios to refinance their mortgages without obtaining new mortgage insurance in excess of what was already in place.

The relief refinance mortgage initiative, which we announced in March 2009, is our implementation of the Home Affordable Refinance Program. We have worked with FHFA to provide us the flexibility to implement this element of the MHA Program. The Home Affordable Refinance Program is targeted at borrowers with current LTV ratios above 80%; however, our program also allows borrowers with LTV ratios below 80% to participate. On July 1, 2009, we announced that the current LTV ratio limit would be increased from 105% to 125%. We began purchasing mortgages that refinance such higher-LTV ratio loans on October 1, 2009. We also increased the amount of closing costs that can be included in the new refinance mortgage to up to $5,000. Through our program, we offer this refinancing option only for qualifying mortgage loans that we hold or guarantee. We will continue to bear the credit risk for refinanced loans under this program, to the extent that such risk is not covered by existing mortgage insurance or other existing credit enhancements.

The implementation of the relief refinance mortgage product will result in a higher volume of purchases and increased delivery fees from the new loans. However, the net effect of the refinance activity on our financial results is not expected to be significant.

Table 47 below presents the composition of our purchases of refinanced single-family loans during the years ended December 31, 2010 and 2009.

**Table 47 Single-Family Refinance Loan Volume[1]**

| | Year Ended December 31, 2010 | | | Year Ended December 31, 2009 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Amount | Number of Loans | Percent | Amount | Number of Loans | Percent |
| | (dollars in millions) | | | (dollars in millions) | | |
| Relief refinance mortgages: | | | | | | |
| Above 105% LTV Ratio | $ 3,977 | 16,667 | 1.1% | $ 219 | 953 | 0.1% |
| 80% to 105% LTV Ratio | 43,906 | 192,650 | 13.1 | 19,380 | 85,110 | 4.8 |
| Below 80% LTV Ratio | 57,766 | 323,851 | 22.0 | 15,119 | 83,155 | 4.7 |
| Total relief refinance mortgages | $ 105,649 | 533,168 | 36.2% | $ 34,718 | 169,218 | 9.6% |
| Total refinance loan volume[2] | $ 303,060 | 1,470,786 | 100% | $ 379,035 | 1,757,500 | 100% |

(1) Consists of all single-family refinance mortgage loans that we either purchased or guaranteed during the period, excluding those associated with other guarantee commitments and Other Guarantee Transactions.
(2) Consists of relief refinance mortgages and other refinance mortgages.

Relief refinance mortgages comprised approximately 36% and 10% of our total refinance volume in 2010 and 2009, respectively. Relief refinance mortgages with LTV ratios of 80% and above represented approximately 12% and 4% of our total single-family credit guarantee portfolio purchases in 2010 and 2009, respectively. It is uncertain how relief refinance mortgages with LTV ratios of 80% and above will perform in the future, as only a short period of time has elapsed since these loans were originated. These mortgages comprised approximately 4% of our total single-family credit guarantee portfolio at December 31, 2010.

*Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives Program.* In May 2009, the Obama Administration announced HAFA, which is designed to permit borrowers who meet basic HAMP eligibility requirements to sell their homes in short sales, if such borrowers did not qualify for or participate in a trial period or if they defaulted on their HAMP modification. HAFA also provides a process for borrowers to convey title to their homes through a deed in lieu of foreclosure. HAFA took effect in April 2010 and we began our implementation of this program in August 2010. Under HAFA, we will pay certain incentive fees to borrowers and servicers of mortgages that we own or guarantee that become the subject of HAFA short sales or deed-in-lieu transactions. We will not receive reimbursement of these fees from Treasury. In December 2010, Treasury announced changes to HAFA intended to expand eligibility of borrowers and to eliminate the percentage cap on amounts payable to subordinate lienholders. We will work with FHFA to determine the extent to which we will implement such changes. We also allow for non-HAFA short sale or deed in lieu transactions. We historically paid and may continue to pay incentive fees for non-HAFA short sales and deed-in-lieu transactions.

*Hardest Hit Fund.* In 2010, the federal government created the Hardest Hit Fund, which provides funding for state HFAs to create programs to assist homeowners in those states that have been hit hardest by the housing crisis and economic downturn. In August 2010, Treasury issued guidelines on how the MHA Program should operate in conjunction with these HFA programs. These HFA programs include, among others, unemployment assistance and mortgage reinstatement assistance

programs. In October 2010, we issued instructions requiring servicers to accept assistance on behalf of borrowers under the HFAs unemployment assistance and mortgage reinstatement assistance programs. The unemployment assistance programs are designed to assist unemployed or underemployed borrowers by paying all or a portion of their monthly mortgage payment for a period of time. The mortgage reinstatement assistance programs are designed to bring delinquent borrowers to current status. To the extent our borrowers participate in the HFA unemployment assistance programs and the full contractual payment is made by an HFA, a borrower s mortgage delinquency status will remain static and will not fall into further delinquency. As HFAs were in the process of implementing these programs during 2010, we believe participation in these programs by our borrowers has been limited through December 31, 2010, and our delinquency statistics have not been significantly affected. However, our delinquency reporting statistics may be impacted in 2011 to the extent a significant number of borrowers receive assistance through these programs.

*Compliance Agent.* We are the compliance agent for Treasury for certain foreclosure avoidance activities under HAMP by mortgage holders other than Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Among other duties, as the program compliance agent, we conduct examinations and review servicer compliance with the published requirements for the program. Some of these examinations are on-site, and others involve off-site documentation reviews. We report the results of our examination findings to Treasury. Based on the examinations, we may also provide Treasury with advice, guidance and lessons learned to improve operation of the program. It is unclear how servicers will perceive our actions in this role. It is possible that this could hurt our relationships with our seller/servicers, which could negatively affect our ability to purchase loans from them in the future.

*Expected Impact of the MHA Program on Freddie Mac*

As previously discussed, HAMP, which is part of the MHA Program, is intended to provide borrowers the opportunity to obtain more affordable monthly payments and to reduce the number of delinquent mortgages that proceed to foreclosure and, ultimately, mitigate our credit losses by reducing or eliminating a portion of the costs related to foreclosed properties. We believe our overall loss mitigation programs could reduce our ultimate credit losses over the long term. However, we cannot currently estimate whether, or the extent to which, costs incurred in the near term from HAMP or other MHA Program efforts may be offset, if at all, by the prevention or reduction of potential future costs of serious delinquencies and foreclosures due to these initiatives.

We are devoting significant internal resources to the implementation and support of the various initiatives under the MHA Program, which has increased, and will continue to increase, our expenses. It is likely that the costs we incur related to loan modifications and other activities under HAMP will be significant, to the extent that borrowers participate in this program in large numbers, for the following reasons:

Except for certain Other Guarantee Transactions and loans underlying our other guarantee commitments, we will bear the full cost of the monthly payment reductions related to modifications of loans we own or guarantee and all servicer and borrower incentive fees and we will not receive a reimbursement of these costs from Treasury. We paid $241 million of servicer and borrower incentive fees in 2010, as compared to $11 million of such fees in 2009. We also have the potential to incur up to $8,000 of additional servicer incentive fees and borrower compensation fees per modification as long as the borrower remains current on a loan modified under HAMP. As of December 31, 2010, we have also accrued $83 million for both initial fees and recurring incentive fees not yet due. We also incur incentive fees to the servicer and borrower for short sales and deed-in-lieu transactions under HAFA. As of December 31, 2010, the incentive fees on these HAFA transactions were not significant.

Under HAMP, we typically provide concessions to borrowers, including interest rate reductions and forbearance of principal and interest on a portion of the UPB. To the extent borrowers successfully obtain HAMP

modifications, we will continue to experience high volumes of TDRs, similar to our experience during 2010.

Some borrowers will fail to complete the HAMP trial period and others will default on their HAMP modified loans. For those borrowers who redefault or who do not complete the trial period and do not qualify for another loan workout, HAMP will have delayed the foreclosure process. If home prices decline while these events take place, a delay in the foreclosure process may increase the losses we recognize on these loans, to the extent the prices we ultimately receive for the foreclosed properties are less than the prices we could have received had we foreclosed upon the properties earlier.

We expect that non-GSE mortgages modified under HAMP will include mortgages backing our investments in non-agency mortgage-related securities. Such modifications reduce the monthly payments due from affected borrowers, and thus could reduce the payments we receive on these securities (to the extent the payment reductions have not been absorbed by subordinated investors or by other credit enhancement).

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*Loan Workout Activities*

Loan workout activities are a key component of our loss mitigation strategy for managing and resolving troubled assets and lowering credit losses. Our single-family loss mitigation strategy emphasizes early intervention in seriously delinquent mortgages and provides alternatives to foreclosure. Other single-family loss mitigation activities include providing our single-family servicers with default management tools designed to help them manage non-performing loans more effectively and to assist borrowers in retaining home ownership where possible, or facilitate foreclosure alternatives when continued homeownership is not an option. Loan workouts are intended to reduce the number of seriously delinquent mortgages that proceed to foreclosure and, ultimately, mitigate our total credit losses by reducing or eliminating a portion of the costs related to foreclosed properties and avoiding the additional credit losses that likely would be incurred in a REO sale. See BUSINESS Our Business Segments *Single-Family Guarantee Segment Loss Mitigation and Workout Activities* for a general description of our loan workouts.

For multifamily loans, we monitor a variety of mortgage loan characteristics such as the LTV ratio, DSCR and geographic concentrations, among others, that help us assess the financial performance of the property and the borrower s ability to repay the loan. In certain cases, we may provide short-term loan extensions of up to 12 months with no changes to the effective borrowing rate. During 2010, we extended, modified, or restructured multifamily loans totaling $816 million in UPB, compared with $225 million in 2009. Multifamily loan modifications during 2010 included: (a) $71 million in UPB for short-term loan extensions; and (b) $745 million in UPB for loan modifications. Where we have granted a concession to borrowers experiencing financial difficulties, we account for these loans as TDRs. Although our loan modification activity for multifamily loans is increasing, and we expect it may continue to increase in the near term, the majority of our workout activities are for single-family loans.

We are currently focusing our single-family loan modification efforts on HAMP. If a borrower is not eligible for a HAMP modification, the borrower is considered for modification under our other loan modification programs. If the borrower is not eligible for any such programs, the loan is considered for other foreclosure alternatives, such as a short sale. In 2010, we helped more than 275,000 borrowers either stay in their homes or sell their properties and avoid foreclosures through our various workout programs, including HAMP, and we completed approximately 143,000 foreclosures.

The UPB of loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio for which we have completed a loan modification increased to $52 billion as of December 31, 2010 from $20 billion as of December 31, 2009. The estimated current LTV ratio for all modified loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio was 116% and the serious delinquency rate on these loans was 19.1% as of December 31, 2010.

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Table 48 presents volumes of single-family workouts, serious delinquency, and foreclosures for the years ended 2010, 2009, and 2008.

**Table 48 Single Family Loan Workouts, Serious Delinquency, and Foreclosure Volumes[1]**

| | Years Ended December 31, | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | | 2009 | | 2008 | |
| | Number of Loans | Loan Balances | Number of Loans | Loan Balances | Number of Loans | Loan Balances |
| | (dollars in millions) | | | | | |
| **Home retention actions:** | | | | | | |
| Loan modifications[2] | | | | | | |
| with no change in terms[3] | 4,639 | $ 799 | 5,866 | $ 1,008 | 10,122 | $ 1,524 |
| with extension of loan terms | 20,664 | 3,602 | 15,596 | 2,500 | 9,401 | 1,549 |
| with reduction of contractual interest rate | 48,749 | 10,838 | 2,375 | 562 | 15,465 | 3,315 |
| with rate reduction and term extension | 65,937 | 14,439 | 38,540 | 8,043 | 96 | 18 |
| with rate reduction, term extension and principal forbearance | 30,288 | 7,915 | 2,667 | 621 | | |
| Total loan modifications[4] | 170,277 | 37,593 | 65,044 | 12,734 | 35,084 | 6,406 |
| Repayment plans[5] | 31,210 | 4,523 | 33,725 | 4,711 | 42,062 | 5,768 |
| Forbearance agreements[6] | 34,594 | 7,156 | 14,628 | 2,848 | 4,192 | 518 |
| Total home retention actions: | 236,081 | 49,272 | 113,397 | 20,293 | 81,338 | 12,692 |
| **Foreclosure alternatives:** | | | | | | |
| Short sale[7] | 38,773 | 9,109 | 18,890 | 4,481 | 5,333 | 1,208 |
| Deed-in-lieu transactions | 402 | 63 | 329 | 56 | 200 | 32 |
| Total foreclosure alternatives | 39,175 | 9,172 | 19,219 | 4,537 | 5,533 | 1,240 |
| **Total single-family loan workouts** | 275,256 | $ 58,444 | 132,616 | $ 24,830 | 86,871 | $ 13,932 |
| Delinquent loan additions | 502,710 | | 597,188 | | 340,094 | |
| Single-family foreclosures[8] | 142,877 | | 90,436 | | 53,371 | |
| Delinquent loans, at period end | 462,439 | | 498,829 | | 231,426 | |

(1) Based on completed actions with borrowers for loans within our single-family credit guarantee portfolio. Excludes those modification, repayment and forbearance activities for which the borrower has started the required process, but the actions have not been made permanent, or effective, such as loans in the trial period under HAMP. Also excludes certain loan workouts where our single-family seller/servicers have executed agreements in the current or prior periods, but these have not been incorporated into certain of our operational systems, due to delays in processing. These categories are not mutually exclusive and a loan in one category may also be included

within another category in the same period (see endnote 6).
(2) Includes approximately 128,000, 4,000, and 2,000 TDRs during the years ended December 31, 2010, 2009 and 2008, respectively.
(3) Under this modification type, past due amounts are added to the principal balance and reamortized based on the original contractual loan terms.
(4) Includes completed loan modifications under HAMP; however, the number of such completions differs from that reported by the MHA Program administrator in part due to differences in the timing of recognizing the completions by us and the administrator.
(5) Represents the number of borrowers as reported by our seller/servicers that have completed the full term of a repayment plan for past due amounts. Excludes the number of borrowers that are actively repaying past due amounts under a repayment plan, which totaled 23,151 and 35,608 borrowers as of December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively.
(6) Excludes loans with long-term forbearance under a completed loan modification. Many borrowers complete a short-term forbearance agreement before a loan workout is pursued or completed. Our reported activity has been revised such that we only report forbearance activity for a single loan once during each quarterly period; however, a single loan may be included under separate forbearance agreements in separate periods.
(7) In 2010, we began to exclude third-party sales at foreclosure auction from our short sale results. Prior period amounts have been revised to conform to the current period presentation. See endnote (8).
(8) Represents the number of our single-family loans that complete foreclosure transfers, including third-party sales at foreclosure auction in which ownership of the property is transferred directly to a third-party rather than to us.

We had significant increases in single-family loan workout activity, particularly loan modifications and short sales during the year ended December 31, 2010 compared to the year ended December 31, 2009. Loan modifications may include the additions of past due amounts to principal, interest rate reductions, term extensions and principal forbearance. Although HAMP contemplates that some servicers will also make use of principal reduction to achieve reduced payments for borrowers, we only used forbearance in 2009 and 2010 and did not use principal reduction in modifying our loans. In the second quarter of 2010, we implemented a temporary streamlined alternative loan modification process for single-family borrowers who completed an existing trial period but did not qualify for a permanent modification under HAMP. We refer to this initiative as the HAMP backup modification and it was offered for modifications completed on or before December 1, 2010. This temporary non-HAMP modification program was intended to minimize the need for additional documentation. We paid servicer incentive fees on our HAMP backup modifications that differed in amount from the incentive fees that are paid under HAMP. We did not offer borrower incentive fees under our HAMP backup modification. We completed only a modest number of HAMP backup modifications in 2010. If the borrower was not eligible for this program, the borrower was considered for other workout activities, such as another type of non-HAMP modification or a short sale.

We completed 38,773 short sales during the year ended December 31, 2010, compared to 18,890 in the year ended December 31, 2009. We expect that the growth in short sales will continue, in part due to our implementation of HAFA effective August 1, 2010 and also due to incentives we provide to servicers to complete short sales instead of foreclosures.

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The number of modified loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio has been increasing and such loans comprised approximately 2.1% and 0.9% of our single-family credit guarantee portfolio as of December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively. Table 49 presents the reperformance rate of modified single-family loans in each of the last five quarterly periods.

**Table 49 Reperformance Rates[1] of Modified Single-Family Loans**

| | Quarter of Loan Modification Completion[2] | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **HAMP loan modifications:** | **3Q 2010** | **2Q 2010** | **1Q 2010** | **4Q 2009** | **3Q 2009** | **2Q 2009** |
| Time since modification | | | | | | |
| 3 to 5 months | 93% | 94% | 95% | 94% | 96% | |
| 6 to 8 months | | 91% | 93% | 93% | 93% | |
| 9 to 11 months | | | 90% | 91% | 93% | |
| 12 to 14 months | | | | 88% | 92% | |
| 15 to 17 months | | | | | 91% | |
| 18 to 20 months | | | | | | |

| | Quarter of Loan Modification Completion[2] | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Non-HAMP loan modifications:** | **3Q 2010** | **2Q 2010** | **1Q 2010** | **4Q 2009** | **3Q 2009** | **2Q 2009** |
| Time since modification | | | | | | |
| 3 to 5 months | 93% | 93% | 94% | 90% | 88% | 73% |
| 6 to 8 months | | 86% | 87% | 82% | 78% | 64% |
| 9 to 11 months | | | 81% | 77% | 72% | 60% |
| 12 to 14 months | | | | 75% | 69% | 58% |
| 15 to 17 months | | | | | 67% | 57% |
| 18 to 20 months | | | | | | 55% |

| | Quarter of Loan Modification Completion[2] | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Total (HAMP and non-HAMP):** | **3Q 2010** | **2Q 2010** | **1Q 2010** | **4Q 2009** | **3Q 2009** | **2Q 2009** |
| Time since modification | | | | | | |
| 3 to 5 months | 93% | 94% | 95% | 92% | 89% | 73% |
| 6 to 8 months | | 90% | 92% | 88% | 79% | 64% |
| 9 to 11 months | | | 88% | 85% | 74% | 60% |
| 12 to 14 months | | | | 82% | 71% | 58% |
| 15 to 17 months | | | | | 68% | 57% |
| 18 to 20 months | | | | | | 55% |

(1) Represents the percentage of loans that are current or less than three monthly payments past due. Excludes those loan modification activities for which the borrower has started the required process, but the modification has not been made permanent, or effective, such as loans in the trial period under HAMP.

(2)

Loan modifications are recognized as completed in the quarterly period in which the servicer has reported the modification as effective and the agreement has been accepted by us, which in certain cases may be delayed by a backlog in servicer processing of modifications.

The redefault rate is the percentage of our modified loans that became seriously delinquent, transitioned to REO, or completed a loss-producing foreclosure alternative. As of December 31, 2010, the redefault rate for all our single-family loan modifications (including those under HAMP) completed during 2010, 2009, and 2008 was 8%, 38%, and 50%, respectively. Many of the borrowers that received modifications in 2008 and 2009 were negatively affected by worsening economic conditions, including high unemployment rates during the last two years. As of December 31, 2010, the redefault rate for loans modified under HAMP in 2010 and 2009 was approximately 7% and 11%, respectively. These redefault rates may not be representative of the future performance of loans, including those modified under HAMP, as only a short period of time has elapsed since the modifications were effective. We believe the redefault rate for loans modified in 2010 and 2009, including those modified under HAMP, is likely to increase, particularly since the housing and economic environments remain challenging.

Our servicers have a key role in the success of our loan workout activities, including the HAMP process. The majority of our HAMP efforts have been primarily focused with our larger seller/servicers, which service the majority of our loans, and variations in their approaches may cause fluctuations in HAMP processing volumes. The significant increases in seriously delinquent loan volume and the challenging conditions of the mortgage market during 2009 and 2010 placed a strain on the loan workout resources of many of our mortgage servicers. To the extent servicers do not complete loan modifications with eligible borrowers or are unable to facilitate the increasing volume of foreclosures, our credit losses could increase.

In order to allow our mortgage servicers time to implement our more recent modification programs and provide additional relief to troubled borrowers, we implemented several temporary suspensions of all foreclosure transfers of occupied homes during certain periods of the last two years. The MHA Program further restricts foreclosure while the borrower is being evaluated for HAMP and during the borrower s trial period. We continued to pursue loss mitigation options with delinquent borrowers during these temporary suspension periods; however, we also continued to proceed with the initiation and other, pre-closing steps in the foreclosure process.

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*Credit Performance*

Delinquencies

Unless otherwise noted, we report single-family serious delinquency rate information based on the number of loans that are three monthly payments or more past due or in the process of foreclosure, as reported by our seller/servicers. For multifamily loans, we report delinquency rates based on UPB of mortgage loans that are two monthly payments or more past due or in the process of foreclosure. Mortgage loans whose contractual terms have been modified under agreement with the borrower are not counted as delinquent as long as the borrower is current under the modified terms. In addition, Multifamily loans are not counted as delinquent if the borrower has entered into a forbearance agreement and is abiding by the terms of the agreement, whereas single-family loans for which the borrower has been granted forbearance will continue to reflect the past due status of the borrower, if applicable. As of December 31, 2010, approximately $0.1 billion of multifamily loans had been granted forbearance and were not included in delinquency amounts.

Our single-family and multifamily delinquency rates include all single-family and multifamily loans that we own, that are collateral for Freddie Mac securities, and that are covered by our other guarantee commitments, except financial guarantees that are backed by either Ginnie Mae Certificates or HFA bonds because these securities do not expose us to meaningful amounts of credit risk due to the guarantee or credit enhancements provided on these securities by the U.S. government. In 2010, we began to include loans underlying Other Guarantee Transactions in both our multifamily and single-family delinquency rates, which generally resulted in higher reported rates. Where applicable, prior period data throughout this report has been revised to conform with the current presentation.

Some of our workout and other loss mitigation activities create fluctuations in our single-family serious delinquency statistics. For example, loans that we report as delinquent before they enter the HAMP trial period continue to be reported as delinquent for purposes of our delinquency reporting until the modifications become effective and the loans are removed from delinquent status. However, under many of our non-HAMP modifications, the borrower would return to a current payment status sooner, because these modifications do not have trial periods. Consequently, the volume, timing, and type of loan modifications impact our reported serious delinquency rate. In addition, there may be temporary timing differences, or lags, in the reporting of payment status and modification completion due to differing practices of our servicers that can affect our delinquency reporting.

Temporary actions to suspend foreclosure transfers of occupied homes, the longer foreclosure process timeframes of certain states, process requirements of HAMP, and general constraints on servicer capacity caused our single-family serious delinquency rates to increase more rapidly in 2009 than they would have otherwise, as loans that would have completed a workout or been foreclosed upon have instead remained in a delinquent status. These factors also caused our single-family delinquency rates to be higher in 2010 than they otherwise would have been. Delays in the foreclosure process relating to the concerns about deficiencies in foreclosure practices could have a similar effect on our single-family serious delinquency rates.

Table 50 presents delinquency rates for our single-family credit guarantee and multifamily mortgage portfolios.

**Table 50 Delinquency Rates**

| | December 31, | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | | 2009 | | 2008 | |
| | Percentage | Delinquency Rate[1] | Percentage | Delinquency Rate[1] | Percentage | Delinquency Rate[1] |

| | of Portfolio | | of Portfolio | | of Portfolio | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Single-family: | | | | | | |
| Non-credit-enhanced | 85% | 3.01% | 84% | 3.02% | 82% | 1.27% |
| Credit-enhanced | 15 | 8.27 | 16 | 8.68 | 18 | 4.27 |
| Total single-family credit guarantee portfolio[2] | 100% | 3.84 | 100% | 3.98 | 100% | 1.83 |
| Multifamily: | | | | | | |
| Non-credit-enhanced | 80% | 0.12 | 87% | 0.07 | 87% | 0.02 |
| Credit-enhanced | 20 | 0.85 | 13 | 1.03 | 13 | 0.21 |
| Total multifamily mortgage portfolio | 100% | 0.26 | 100% | 0.20 | 100% | 0.05 |

(1) In 2010, we began to include loans underlying Other Guarantee Transactions in our reported delinquency rates. Prior period delinquency rates have been revised to conform to the current year presentation.
(2) As of December 31, 2010 and December 31, 2009, approximately 61.3% and 49.2%, respectively, of the single-family loans reported as seriously delinquent were in the process of foreclosure.

Serious delinquency rates of our single-family credit guarantee portfolio declined slightly to 3.84% as of December 31, 2010 from 3.98% as of December 31, 2009. Serious delinquency rates for interest-only and option ARM products, which together represented approximately 6% of our total single-family credit guarantee portfolio at December 31, 2010, increased to 18.4% and 21.2% at December 31, 2010, respectively, compared with 17.6% and 17.9% at December 31, 2009,

respectively. Serious delinquency rates of single-family 30-year, fixed rate amortizing loans, which is a more traditional mortgage product, were 4% at both December 31, 2010, and December 31, 2009. The slight improvement in the single-family serious delinquency rate during 2010 was primarily due to a higher volume of loan modifications and foreclosure transfers, as well as a slowdown in new serious delinquencies. Although the volume of new serious delinquencies declined in each quarter of 2010, our serious delinquency rate remains high, reflecting continued stress in the housing and labor markets. In addition our serious delinquency rate has been negatively impacted by the decline in the total number of loans of our single-family credit guarantee portfolio during 2010, which is the denominator used in our rate calculations.

During 2010 and 2009, home prices in certain regions and states improved modestly, but remained weak overall due to significant inventories of unsold homes in every region of the U.S. In some geographical areas, particularly in certain states within the West, Southeast and Northeast regions, the home price declines of the past three years combined with higher rates of unemployment have resulted in persistently high serious delinquency rates. These increases in serious delinquency rates have been more severe in Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada. As of December 31, 2010, single-family loans in California comprised 16% of our single-family credit guarantee portfolio; however, seriously delinquent loans in California comprised more than 20% of the seriously delinquent loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio, based on UPB. During 2010, we also continued to experience higher serious delinquency rates on single-family loans originated between 2005 and 2008. We purchased significant amounts of loans with higher-risk characteristics in those years. In addition, those borrowers are more susceptible to the declines in home prices since 2006 than those homeowners that have built equity over time.

Table 51 presents credit concentrations for certain loan groups in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio.

**Table 51 Credit Concentrations in the Single-Family Credit Guarantee Portfolio**

| | As of December 31, 2010 | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Alt-A UPB | Non Alt-A UPB (in billions) | Total UPB | Estimated Current LTV Ratio[1] | Percentage Modified[2] | Serious Delinquency Rate | 2010 Credit Losses Alt-A (in billions) | Non Alt-A |
| Geographical distribution: | | | | | | | | |
| Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada | $ 47 | $ 410 | $ 457 | 91% | 3.3% | 7.1% | $ 3.7 | $ 5.0 |
| All other states | 69 | 1,283 | 1,352 | 73% | 1.9% | 3.0% | 1.5 | 3.9 |
| Year of origination: | | | | | | | | |
| 2010 | | 323 | 323 | 70% | | 0.1% | | |
| 2009 | | 391 | 391 | 70% | <0.1% | 0.3% | | 0.1 |
| 2008 | 10 | 149 | 159 | 86% | 2.2% | 4.9% | 0.2 | 0.8 |
| 2007 | 36 | 172 | 208 | 104% | 6.2% | 11.6% | 1.9 | 2.8 |
| 2006 | 31 | 125 | 156 | 104% | 5.8% | 10.5% | 1.9 | 2.3 |
| 2005 | 21 | 156 | 177 | 91% | 3.3% | 6.0% | 1.1 | 1.7 |
| All other years | 18 | 377 | 395 | 58% | 1.7% | 2.5% | 0.1 | 1.2 |

**As of December 31, 2009**

| | Alt-A UPB | Non Alt-A UPB | Total UPB | Estimated Current LTV Ratio[1] | Percentage Modified[2] | Serious Delinquency Rate | 2009 Credit Losses Alt-A | 2009 Credit Losses Non Alt-A |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (in billions) | | | | | | (in billions) | |
| Geographical distribution: | | | | | | | | |
| Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada | $ 59 | $ 421 | $ 480 | 86% | 1.1% | 7.7% | $ 2.7 | $ 2.4 |
| All other states | 89 | 1,334 | 1,423 | 74% | 0.9% | 3.0% | 0.8 | 2.0 |
| Year of origination: | | | | | | | | |
| 2009 | | 438 | 438 | 70% | | 0.1% | | |
| 2008 | 13 | 214 | 227 | 82% | 0.3% | 3.4% | 0.1 | 0.3 |
| 2007 | 46 | 227 | 273 | 97% | 1.8% | 10.5% | 1.4 | 1.4 |
| 2006 | 40 | 167 | 207 | 98% | 1.9% | 9.4% | 1.6 | 1.2 |
| 2005 | 25 | 205 | 230 | 87% | 1.2% | 5.2% | 0.3 | 0.9 |
| All other years | 24 | 504 | 528 | 58% | 0.9% | 2.2% | 0.1 | 0.6 |

(1) See endnote (5) to Table 42 Characteristics of the Single-Family Credit Guarantee Portfolio for information on our calculation of estimated current LTV ratios.

(2) Represents the percentage of loans, based on loan count in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio, that have been modified under agreement with the borrower, including those with no changes in interest rate or maturity date, but where past due amounts are added to the outstanding principal balance of the loan.

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Table 52 presents statistics for combinations of certain characteristics of the mortgages in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio as of December 31, 2010 and 2009.

**Table 52 Single-Family Credit Guarantee Portfolio by Attribute Combinations**

| | December 31, 2010 | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Current LTV Ratio[1] £ 80 | | | Current LTV Ratio[1] of 81-100 | | | Current LTV Ratio[1] > 100 | | | Current LTV Rati Loans | |
| | Percentage of Portfolio[2] | Percentage Modified[3] | Serious Delinquency Rate | Percentage of Portfolio[2] | Percentage Modified[3] | Serious Delinquency Rate | Percentage of Portfolio[2] | Percentage Modified[3] | Serious Delinquency Rate | Percentage of Portfolio[2] | Percentage Modified(3 |
| Type | | | | | | | | | | | |
| s < 620: | | | | | | | | | | | |
| year or more fixed rate ortizing | 1.1% | 6.2% | 8.6% | 0.8% | 12.1% | 15.1% | 0.9% | 26.4% | 27.5% | 2.8% | 12.9% |
| | 0.2 | 1.7 | 4.6 | <0.1 | 3.0 | 11.8 | <0.1 | 5.4 | 22.2 | 0.2 | 1.8 |
| stable rate[4] | 0.1 | 6.5 | 12.2 | <0.1 | 8.6 | 18.4 | <0.1 | 9.6 | 28.6 | 0.1 | 7.6 |
| y[5] | <0.1 | 0.5 | 17.6 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 25.3 | 0.1 | 1.2 | 39.9 | 0.2 | 0.9 |
| | <0.1 | 2.6 | 3.7 | <0.1 | 2.6 | 8.5 | 0.1 | 6.0 | 13.2 | 0.1 | 3.1 |
| scores < 620 | 1.4 | 4.9 | 7.6 | 0.9 | 11.2 | 15.3 | 1.1 | 23.2 | 27.9 | 3.4 | 10.4 |
| s of 620 to | | | | | | | | | | | |
| year or more fixed rate ortizing | 2.4 | 3.6 | 5.2 | 1.7 | 7.3 | 9.8 | 1.8 | 18.5 | 20.5 | 5.9 | 8.3 |
| | 0.6 | 0.9 | 2.6 | <0.1 | 1.5 | 7.3 | <0.1 | 3.3 | 16.6 | 0.6 | 0.9 |
| stable rate[4] | 0.1 | 0.6 | 6.0 | 0.1 | 1.2 | 13.5 | 0.1 | 3.1 | 25.9 | 0.3 | 1.5 |
| y[5] | <0.1 | 0.2 | 10.9 | 0.2 | 0.7 | 20.6 | 0.3 | 1.1 | 35.6 | 0.5 | 0.9 |
| | <0.1 | 1.0 | 2.6 | <0.1 | 1.0 | 5.4 | <0.1 | 1.1 | 5.3 | <0.1 | 1.0 |
| scores of | 3.1 | 2.7 | 4.5 | 2.0 | 6.6 | 10.3 | 2.2 | 15.6 | 22.0 | 7.3 | 6.5 |
| s ³ 660 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| year or more fixed rate ortizing | 36.5 | 0.5 | 1.0 | 20.0 | 1.6 | 2.8 | 10.4 | 8.2 | 10.4 | 66.9 | 1.9 |
| | 12.5 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 1.4 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 7.3 | 13.5 | 0.1 |
| stable rate[4] | 1.9 | 0.1 | 1.6 | 0.8 | 0.3 | 5.4 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 17.0 | 3.5 | 0.4 |
| y[5] | 0.7 | 0.1 | 3.7 | 1.2 | 0.3 | 10.3 | 2.8 | 0.6 | 23.1 | 4.7 | 0.4 |
| | <0.1 | 0.5 | 2.1 | <0.1 | 0.3 | 2.0 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 1.3 | 0.1 | 0.4 |
| FICO ³ 660 | 51.6 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 22.9 | 1.4 | 3.1 | 14.2 | 6.5 | 12.6 | 88.7 | 1.3 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CO scores not | 0.4 | 3.0 | 4.6 | 0.1 | 8.2 | 11.9 | 0.1 | 17.0 | 23.7 | 0.6 | 4.1 |
| cores | | | | | | | | | | | |
| year or more fixed rate | 40.2 | 1.0 | 1.6 | 22.6 | 2.6 | 3.9 | 13.2 | 11.0 | 13.1 | 76.0 | 2.9 |
| ortizing | 13.3 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 0.3 | 2.0 | 0.2 | 1.1 | 8.8 | 14.4 | 0.2 |
| stable rate(4) | 2.1 | 0.4 | 2.4 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 7.0 | 0.9 | 2.0 | 18.7 | 4.0 | 0.8 |
| y(5) | 0.7 | 0.1 | 4.5 | 1.3 | 0.3 | 11.7 | 3.2 | 0.7 | 24.9 | 5.2 | 0.5 |
| | 0.2 | 5.0 | 9.3 | 0.1 | 5.6 | 8.6 | 0.1 | 5.1 | 7.3 | 0.4 | 5.2 |
| e-Family antee | 56.5% | 0.7% | 1.4% | 25.9% | 2.4% | 4.3% | 17.6% | 8.9% | 14.9% | 100.0% | 2.1% |
| 3) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| s < 620: | | | | | | | | | | | |
| al | 0.2% | 4.7% | 7.1% | 0.2% | 10.5% | 13.7% | 0.2% | 22.2% | 22.5% | 0.6% | 10.9% |
| | 0.5 | 5.7 | 9.4 | 0.3 | 14.3 | 19.9 | 0.2 | 30.0 | 30.5 | 1.0 | 10.7 |
| | 0.2 | 4.9 | 8.4 | 0.2 | 10.9 | 15.5 | 0.3 | 21.4 | 31.9 | 0.7 | 10.7 |
| | 0.3 | 4.5 | 5.9 | 0.1 | 10.4 | 12.7 | 0.1 | 24.7 | 24.1 | 0.5 | 7.6 |
| | 0.2 | 4.0 | 5.6 | 0.1 | 8.5 | 13.5 | 0.3 | 22.8 | 28.0 | 0.6 | 12.3 |
| scores < 620 | 1.4 | 4.9 | 7.6 | 0.9 | 11.2 | 15.3 | 1.1 | 23.2 | 27.9 | 3.4 | 10.4 |
| s of 620 to | | | | | | | | | | | |
| al | 0.6 | 2.7 | 4.3 | 0.4 | 6.4 | 9.6 | 0.4 | 14.5 | 16.6 | 1.4 | 6.6 |
| | 0.9 | 2.9 | 5.4 | 0.6 | 8.4 | 13.7 | 0.3 | 20.3 | 23.2 | 1.8 | 6.4 |
| | 0.5 | 2.8 | 5.3 | 0.4 | 6.0 | 10.0 | 0.6 | 13.7 | 25.5 | 1.5 | 6.6 |
| | 0.6 | 2.6 | 3.4 | 0.3 | 6.1 | 8.1 | 0.1 | 15.2 | 15.3 | 1.0 | 4.5 |
| | 0.5 | 2.1 | 3.5 | 0.3 | 5.6 | 9.6 | 0.8 | 16.7 | 23.7 | 1.6 | 8.5 |
| scores of | 3.1 | 2.7 | 4.5 | 2.0 | 6.6 | 10.3 | 2.2 | 15.6 | 22.0 | 7.3 | 6.5 |
| s ³ 660 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| al | 8.9 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 4.9 | 1.4 | 2.8 | 2.3 | 5.4 | 7.9 | 16.1 | 1.2 |
| | 15.0 | 0.4 | 1.0 | 5.6 | 2.1 | 4.4 | 1.5 | 8.7 | 12.0 | 22.1 | 1.1 |
| | 7.4 | 0.4 | 1.2 | 4.1 | 1.2 | 3.0 | 3.6 | 5.0 | 15.1 | 15.1 | 1.4 |
| | 7.3 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 2.9 | 1.3 | 2.3 | 0.3 | 5.3 | 6.8 | 10.5 | 0.7 |
| | 13.0 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 5.4 | 1.2 | 2.7 | 6.5 | 7.8 | 13.8 | 24.9 | 2.1 |
| scores ³ 660 | 51.6 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 22.9 | 1.4 | 3.1 | 14.2 | 6.5 | 12.6 | 88.7 | 1.3 |
| CO scores not | 0.4 | 3.0 | 4.6 | 0.1 | 8.2 | 11.9 | 0.1 | 17.0 | 23.7 | 0.6 | 4.1 |
| cores | | | | | | | | | | | |
| al | 9.6 | 0.6 | 1.2 | 5.6 | 2.3 | 3.9 | 3.0 | 8.1 | 10.5 | 18.2 | 2.0 |
| | 16.6 | 0.8 | 1.6 | 6.4 | 3.3 | 6.0 | 2.0 | 12.5 | 15.4 | 25.0 | 1.9 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 8.2 | 0.9 | 1.9 | 4.7 | 2.2 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 7.4 | 17.8 | 17.4 | 2.4 |
| | 8.2 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 3.4 | 2.4 | 3.6 | 0.5 | 10.0 | 10.9 | 12.1 | 1.5 |
| | 13.9 | 0.4 | 0.9 | 5.8 | 1.6 | 3.4 | 7.6 | 9.4 | 15.5 | 27.3 | 2.7 |
| e-Family antee | 56.5% | 0.7% | 1.4% | 25.9% | 2.4% | 4.3% | 17.6% | 8.9% | 14.9% | 100.0% | 2.1% |

| | December 31, 2009 | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Current LTV Ratio[1] £ 80 | | | Current LTV Ratio[1] of 81-100 | | | Current LTV Ratio[1] > 100 | | | Current LTV Rati Loans | |
| | Percentage of Portfolio[2] | Percentage Modified[3] | Serious Delinquency Rate | Percentage of Portfolio[2] | Percentage Modified[3] | Serious Delinquency Rate | Percentage of Portfolio[2] | Percentage Modified[3] | Serious Delinquency Rate | Percentage of Portfolio[2] | Percentage Modified[3] |
| Type | | | | | | | | | | | |
| s < 620: | | | | | | | | | | | |
| year or more fixed rate | 1.2% | 4.0% | 9.5% | 0.9% | 7.2% | 16.6% | 0.9% | 14.9% | 29.1% | 3.0% | 7.5% |
| ortizing | 0.2 | 1.0 | 4.4 | <0.1 | 1.4 | 11.4 | <0.1 | 1.9 | 18.6 | 0.2 | 1.0 |
| stable rate[4] | 0.1 | 4.6 | 12.2 | <0.1 | 4.9 | 19.9 | 0.1 | 5.2 | 29.7 | 0.2 | 4.8 |
| y[5] | <0.1 | 0.2 | 17.9 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 27.1 | 0.1 | 0.8 | 44.2 | 0.2 | 0.5 |
| | <0.1 | 2.3 | 3.9 | <0.1 | 1.8 | 7.5 | <0.1 | 2.1 | 11.9 | <0.1 | 2.2 |
| scores < 620 | 1.5 | 3.2 | 8.2 | 1.0 | 6.5 | 16.8 | 1.1 | 12.8 | 29.7 | 3.6 | 6.0 |
| s of 620 to | | | | | | | | | | | |
| year or more fixed rate | 2.5 | 2.1 | 5.3 | 1.9 | 3.7 | 10.0 | 1.8 | 8.3 | 20.4 | 6.2 | 4.1 |
| ortizing | 0.6 | 0.5 | 2.6 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 5.9 | <0.1 | 1.4 | 11.9 | 0.7 | 0.5 |
| stable rate[4] | 0.2 | 0.3 | 6.0 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 13.1 | 0.1 | 1.6 | 25.0 | 0.4 | 0.7 |
| y[5] | 0.1 | 0.1 | 11.9 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 21.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 38.1 | 0.6 | 0.4 |
| | <0.1 | 0.9 | 2.3 | <0.1 | 0.8 | 5.5 | <0.1 | 0.6 | 4.0 | <0.1 | 0.7 |
| scores of | 3.4 | 1.6 | 4.7 | 2.2 | 3.3 | 10.6 | 2.3 | 6.8 | 22.3 | 7.9 | 3.2 |
| s ³ 660: | | | | | | | | | | | |
| year or more fixed rate | 36.2 | 0.3 | 1.0 | 19.3 | 0.6 | 2.8 | 10.2 | 2.2 | 9.4 | 65.7 | 0.6 |
| ortizing | 11.3 | | 0.4 | 1.0 | 0.1 | 1.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 4.9 | 12.5 | <0.1 |
| stable rate[4] | 1.8 | | 1.7 | 0.9 | 0.1 | 5.6 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 16.0 | 3.5 | 0.2 |
| y[5] | 1.2 | | 3.4 | 1.8 | 0.1 | 9.6 | 3.1 | 0.3 | 24.2 | 6.1 | 0.2 |
| | <0.1 | 0.4 | 2.0 | <0.1 | 0.2 | 1.5 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 1.3 | 0.1 | 0.2 |
| scores ³ 660 | 50.5 | 0.2 | 0.8 | 23.0 | 0.5 | 3.2 | 14.4 | 1.7 | 12.1 | 87.9 | 0.4 |
| CO scores not | 0.4 | 1.9 | 4.8 | 0.1 | 3.8 | 14.1 | 0.1 | 8.2 | 28.9 | 0.6 | 2.5 |
| cores: | | | | | | | | | | | |
| year or more fixed rate | 40.3 | 0.6 | 1.7 | 22.0 | 1.2 | 4.1 | 12.9 | 4.0 | 12.5 | 75.2 | 1.3 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| nortizing | 12.1 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 1.1 | 0.1 | 1.9 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 6.1 | 13.4 | 0.1 |
| ıstable rate(4) | 2.0 | 0.3 | 2.6 | 1.1 | 0.4 | 7.2 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 17.9 | 4.2 | 0.5 |
| y(5) | 1.3 | | 4.2 | 2.0 | 0.1 | 11.2 | 3.6 | 0.3 | 26.4 | 6.9 | 0.2 |
| | 0.1 | 2.5 | 10.5 | 0.1 | 2.2 | 10.2 | 0.1 | 2.0 | 8.6 | 0.3 | 2.3 |
| e-Family rantee | 55.8% | 0.4% | 1.4% | 26.3% | 1.0% | 4.6% | 17.9% | 3.2% | 14.8% | 100.0% | 0.9% |
| 8) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| s <620: | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ral | 0.2% | 3.2% | 7.9% | 0.3% | 6.5% | 14.8% | 0.2% | 12.8% | 23.6% | 0.7% | 6.8% |
| | 0.5 | 3.3 | 9.4 | 0.2 | 7.4 | 20.3 | 0.2 | 14.5 | 30.4 | 0.9 | 5.7 |
| | 0.3 | 3.3 | 9.1 | 0.2 | 6.8 | 18.0 | 0.3 | 12.4 | 33.6 | 0.8 | 6.3 |
| | 0.3 | 3.4 | 6.5 | 0.1 | 6.5 | 13.3 | 0.1 | 13.9 | 22.0 | 0.5 | 5.3 |
| | 0.2 | 2.5 | 7.3 | 0.2 | 4.3 | 18.3 | 0.3 | 11.5 | 34.8 | 0.7 | 5.9 |
| scores < 620 | 1.5 | 3.2 | 8.2 | 1.0 | 6.5 | 16.8 | 1.1 | 12.8 | 29.7 | 3.6 | 6.0 |
| s of 620 to | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ral | 0.5 | 1.5 | 4.5 | 0.5 | 3.4 | 9.6 | 0.5 | 6.9 | 16.5 | 1.5 | 3.5 |
| | 1.0 | 1.5 | 5.0 | 0.5 | 3.7 | 12.3 | 0.4 | 7.7 | 21.3 | 1.9 | 2.9 |
| | 0.7 | 1.7 | 5.5 | 0.4 | 3.2 | 11.3 | 0.6 | 6.4 | 26.0 | 1.7 | 3.3 |
| | 0.6 | 1.9 | 3.6 | 0.4 | 3.2 | 8.0 | 0.1 | 6.9 | 13.6 | 1.1 | 2.8 |
| | 0.6 | 1.2 | 4.3 | 0.4 | 2.3 | 12.5 | 0.7 | 6.7 | 27.5 | 1.7 | 3.3 |
| scores of | 3.4 | 1.6 | 4.7 | 2.2 | 3.3 | 10.6 | 2.3 | 6.8 | 22.3 | 7.9 | 3.2 |
| s ³ 660: | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ral | 8.3 | 0.2 | 0.8 | 5.1 | 0.5 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 1.6 | 7.0 | 16.1 | 0.4 |
| | 14.3 | 0.1 | 0.8 | 5.4 | 0.6 | 3.7 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 10.0 | 21.6 | 0.3 |
| | 7.8 | 0.2 | 1.2 | 4.1 | 0.5 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 1.5 | 14.6 | 15.3 | 0.5 |
| | 6.8 | 0.2 | 0.7 | 3.2 | 0.5 | 2.0 | 0.6 | 1.4 | 4.9 | 10.6 | 0.3 |
| | 13.3 | 0.1 | 0.7 | 5.2 | 0.3 | 3.9 | 5.8 | 1.9 | 15.6 | 24.3 | 0.5 |
| scores ³ 660 | 50.5 | 0.2 | 0.8 | 23.0 | 0.5 | 3.2 | 14.4 | 1.7 | 12.1 | 87.9 | 0.4 |
| CO scores not | 0.4 | 1.9 | 4.8 | 0.1 | 3.8 | 14.1 | 0.1 | 8.2 | 28.9 | 0.6 | 2.5 |
| cores: | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ral | 9.1 | 0.4 | 1.3 | 5.8 | 1.1 | 3.9 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 9.8 | 18.3 | 1.0 |
| | 16.0 | 0.4 | 1.5 | 6.2 | 1.2 | 5.4 | 2.4 | 3.9 | 13.5 | 24.6 | 0.8 |
| | 8.8 | 0.5 | 2.0 | 4.8 | 1.1 | 5.2 | 4.3 | 3.1 | 17.8 | 17.9 | 1.1 |
| | 7.7 | 0.6 | 1.3 | 3.8 | 1.1 | 3.4 | 0.8 | 3.8 | 8.6 | 12.3 | 0.9 |
| | 14.2 | 0.2 | 1.1 | 5.7 | 0.6 | 5.0 | 7.0 | 2.9 | 17.8 | 26.9 | 0.9 |
| e-Family rantee | 55.8% | 0.4% | 1.4% | 26.3% | 1.0% | 4.6% | 17.9% | 3.2% | 14.8% | 100.0% | 0.9% |

(1) The current LTV ratios are our estimates. See endnote (5) to Table 42 Characteristics of the Single-Family Credit Guarantee Portfolio for further information.
(2) Based on UPB of the single-family credit guarantee portfolio.
(3) See endnote (2) to Table 51 Credit Concentrations in the Single-Family Credit Guarantee Portfolio.
(4) Includes balloon/resets and option ARM mortgage loans.
(5) Includes both fixed rate and adjustable rate loans.
(6) Consist of FHA/VA and USDA Rural Development product types.
(7) The total of all FICO scores categories may not sum due to the inclusion of loans where FICO scores are not available in the respective totals for all loans. See endnote (7) to Table 42 Characteristics of the Single-Family Credit Guarantee Portfolio for further information about our use of FICO scores.
(8) Presentation with the following regional designation: West (AK, AZ, CA, GU, HI, ID, MT, NV, OR, UT, WA); Northeast (CT, DE, DC, MA, ME, MD, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT, VA, WV); North Central (IL, IN, IA, MI, MN, ND, OH, SD, WI); Southeast (AL, FL, GA, KY, MS, NC, PR, SC, TN, VI); and Southwest (AR, CO, KS, LA, MO, NE, NM, OK, TX, WY).

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The table below presents delinquency and default rate information for our single-family credit guarantee portfolio based on year of origination.

**Table 53 Single-Family Credit Guarantee Portfolio by Year of Loan Origination**

| | December 31, | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | | | 2009 | | | 2008 | | |
| Year of Loan Origination | Percentage of Portfolio | Serious Delinquency Rate | Foreclosure and Short Sale Rate[1] | Percentage of Portfolio | Serious Delinquency Rate | Foreclosure and Short Sale Rate[1] | Percentage of Portfolio | Serious Delinquency Rate | Foreclosure and Short Sale Rate[1] |
| 2010 | 18% | 0.05% | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| 2009 | 21 | 0.26 | 0.04 | 23 | 0.05 | | | | |
| 2008 | 9 | 4.89 | 1.26 | 12 | 3.38 | 0.37 | 15 | 0.56 | 0.02 |
| 2007 | 11 | 11.63 | 4.92 | 14 | 10.47 | 2.24 | 19 | 3.46 | 0.63 |
| 2006 | 9 | 10.46 | 5.00 | 11 | 9.35 | 2.70 | 15 | 3.50 | 1.14 |
| 2005 | 10 | 6.04 | 2.95 | 12 | 5.24 | 1.63 | 15 | 2.05 | 0.79 |
| 2004 and prior | 22 | 2.46 | 0.88 | 28 | 2.20 | 0.69 | 36 | 1.08 | 0.48 |
| Total | 100% | 3.84% | | 100% | 3.98% | | 100% | 1.83% | |

(1) Calculated for each year of origination as the number of loans that have proceeded to foreclosure transfer or short sale and resulted in a credit loss, excluding any subsequent recoveries during the period from origination to December 31, 2010, 2009, and 2008, respectively, divided by the number of loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio.

At December 31, 2010, approximately 29% of our single-family credit guarantee portfolio consisted of mortgage loans originated in 2008, 2007 or 2006, which experienced higher serious delinquency rates in the earlier years of their terms as compared to our historical experience. We attribute this to a number of factors, including: (a) the expansion of credit terms under which loans were underwritten during these years; (b) an increase in the origination and our purchase of interest-only and Alt-A mortgage products in 2006 through 2008; and (c) an environment of decreasing home sales and broadly declining home prices in the period shortly following the loans origination. Interest-only and Alt-A products have higher inherent credit risk than traditional fixed-rate mortgage products. Our single-family credit guarantee portfolio was positively affected by refinance activity in 2010 and 2009 as the UPB of loans originated for these years comprised 39% of this portfolio as of December 31, 2010. Approximately 95% and 99% of the loans we purchased in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio in 2010 and 2009, respectively, were amortizing fixed-rate mortgage products.

Our multifamily mortgage portfolio delinquency rate increased during 2010, rising to 0.26% at December 31, 2010 from 0.20% at December 31, 2009, due to weakness in certain markets. The delinquency rates for loans in our multifamily mortgage portfolio are positively impacted to the extent we have been successful in working with troubled borrowers to modify their loans prior to their becoming delinquent or providing temporary relief through loan modifications. While major multifamily market fundamentals improved on a national basis during 2010, improvements in loan performance have historically lagged improvements in broader economic and market trends

during market recoveries. As a result, we may continue to experience elevated credit losses in the first half of 2011, even if market conditions continue to improve. The majority of multifamily loans included in our multifamily mortgage portfolio delinquency rates are credit-enhanced loans for which we believe the credit enhancement will reduce our expected losses. Market fundamentals for multifamily properties that we monitor in Nevada, Arizona, and Georgia continued to be challenging during 2010. For further information regarding concentrations in our multifamily mortgage portfolio, including regional geographic composition, see NOTE 19: CONCENTRATION OF CREDIT AND OTHER RISKS.

Non-Performing Assets

Non-performing assets consist of single-family and multifamily loans that have undergone a TDR, single-family seriously delinquent loans, multifamily loans that are three or more payments past due or in the process of foreclosure, and REO assets, net. Non-performing assets also include multifamily loans that are deemed impaired based on management judgment. We place non-performing loans on non-accrual status when we believe the collectability of interest and principal on a loan is not reasonably assured, unless the loan is well secured and in the process of collection. When a loan is placed on non-accrual status, any interest income accrued but uncollected is reversed. Thereafter, interest income is recognized only upon receipt of cash payments. There were no loans three monthly payments or more past due for which we continued to accrue interest during the year ended December 31, 2010.

We classify TDRs as those loans in which we have modified the loan and granted the borrower a concession. TDRs remain categorized as non-performing throughout the remaining life of the loan regardless of whether the borrower makes payments which return the loan to a current payment status after modification.

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Table 54 provides detail on non-performing loans and REO assets on our consolidated balance sheets and non-performing loans underlying our financial guarantees.

**Table 54 Non-Performing Assets[1]**

| | December 31, | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 | 2007 | 2006 |
| | (dollars in millions) | | | | |
| Non-performing mortgage loans on balance sheet: | | | | | |
| Single-family TDRs: | | | | | |
| Reperforming or less than three monthly payments past due | $ 26,612 | $ 711 | $ 484 | $ 282 | $ 323 |
| Seriously delinquent | 3,144 | 477 | 163 | 67 | 87 |
| Multifamily TDRs | 911 | 229 | 150 | 167 | 216 |
| Total TDRs | 30,667 | 1,417 | 797 | 516 | 626 |
| Other single-family non-performing loans[2][3] | 84,272 | 12,106 | 5,590 | 5,842 | 3,335 |
| Other multifamily non-performing loans[4] | 1,750 | 1,196 | 197 | 188 | 257 |
| Total non-performing mortgage loans on balance sheet | 116,689 | 14,719 | 6,584 | 6,546 | 4,218 |
| Non-performing mortgage loans off-balance sheet: | | | | | |
| Single-family loans[3] | 1,450 | 85,395 | 36,718 | 7,786 | 2,718 |
| Multifamily loans | 198 | 178 | 63 | 51 | 82 |
| Total non-performing mortgage loans off-balance sheet | 1,648 | 85,573 | 36,781 | 7,837 | 2,800 |
| Real estate owned, net | 7,068 | 4,692 | 3,255 | 1,736 | 743 |
| Total non-performing assets | $ 125,405 | $ 104,984 | $ 46,620 | $ 16,119 | $ 7,761 |
| Loan loss reserves as a percentage of our non-performing mortgage loans | 33.7% | 33.8% | 36.0% | 19.6% | 8.8% |
| Total non-performing assets as a percentage of the total mortgage portfolio, excluding non-Freddie Mac securities | 6.4% | 5.2% | 2.4% | 0.9% | 0.5% |

(1) Mortgage loan amounts are based on UPB and REO, net is based on carrying values.
(2) Represents loans recognized by us on our consolidated balance sheets, including loans purchased from PC trusts due to the borrower s serious delinquency.
(3)

The significant increase in other single-family non-performing loans on balance sheet and the significant decrease in the non-performing single-family mortgage loans off-balance sheet from December 31, 2009 to December 31, 2010 is primarily related to the adoption of amendments of the accounting standards for transfers of financial assets and consolidation of VIEs. See NOTE 2: CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES for further information.

(4) Of this amount, $1.6 billion and $1.1 billion were current at December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively.

The amount of non-performing assets increased to approximately $125.4 billion as of December 31, 2010, from $105.0 billion at December 31, 2009, primarily due to continued high transition of loans into serious delinquency, which led to higher volumes of loan modifications and, consequently, a rise in the number of loans categorized as TDRs. Serious delinquencies have remained high due to the impact of continued weakness in home prices and persistently high unemployment, extended foreclosure timelines and foreclosure suspensions in many states, and challenges faced by servicers in building capacity to service high volumes of problem loans. The UPB of loans categorized as TDRs increased to $30.7 billion at December 31, 2010 from $1.4 billion as of December 31, 2009, largely due to a significant increase in loan modifications during 2010 in which we decreased the contractual interest rate, deferred the balance on which contractual interest is computed, or made a combination of both of these changes. Many of the TDRs during 2010 were loan modifications under HAMP, but an increasing number of our non-HAMP modifications have similar changes in terms, excluding forbearance of principal amounts. We expect the number of non-HAMP modifications to continue to increase in 2011. We expect our non-performing assets, including loans deemed to be TDRs, to increase in 2011.

Table 55 provides detail by region for REO activity. Our REO activity relates almost entirely to single-family residential properties. Consequently, our regional REO acquisition trends generally follow a pattern that is similar to, but lags, that of

regional serious delinquency trends of our single-family credit guarantee portfolio. See Table 52 Single-Family Credit Guarantee Portfolio by Attribute Combinations for information about regional serious delinquency rates.

**Table 55 REO Activity by Region**[1]

| | December 31, | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 |
| | (number of properties) | | |
| **REO Inventory** | | | |
| Beginning property inventory | 45,052 | 29,346 | 14,394 |
| Adjustment to beginning balance[2] | 1,340 | | |
| Properties acquired by region: | | | |
| Northeast | 11,022 | 7,529 | 5,125 |
| Southeast | 35,409 | 19,255 | 10,725 |
| North Central | 29,550 | 19,946 | 13,678 |
| Southwest | 14,092 | 8,942 | 5,686 |
| West | 36,843 | 29,440 | 15,317 |
| Total properties acquired | 126,916 | 85,112 | 50,531 |
| Properties disposed by region: | | | |
| Northeast | (8,490) | (5,663) | (3,846) |
| Southeast | (26,082) | (15,678) | (8,239) |
| North Central | (22,349) | (15,549) | (10,548) |
| Southwest | (11,044) | (7,142) | (5,155) |
| West | (33,250) | (25,374) | (7,791) |
| Total properties disposed | (101,215) | (69,406) | (35,579) |
| Ending property inventory | 72,093 | 45,052 | 29,346 |

(1) See endnote (8) to Table 52 Single-Family Credit Guarantee Portfolio by Attribute Combinations for a description of these regions.
(2) Represents REO assets associated with previously non-consolidated mortgage trusts recognized upon adoption of the amendment to the accounting standard for consolidation of VIEs on January 1, 2010.

Our REO property inventory increased 60% during 2010 and 54% during 2009, in part due to increased levels of foreclosures associated with borrowers that did not qualify for or that did not successfully complete a modification or short sale. During 2009, we experienced a significant increase in the number of seriously delinquent loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio. However, due to the effect of HAMP, our suspensions of foreclosure transfers and other programs, many of these loans did not transition to REO until 2010 or have not yet transitioned to REO. We expect our REO acquisitions to continue to increase in 2011. However, the pace of our REO acquisitions slowed during the fourth quarter of 2010 and could continue to be affected by delays in the foreclosure process, including delays related to concerns about deficiencies in foreclosure documentation practices. We temporarily suspended certain foreclosure proceedings, REO sales and eviction proceedings for our REO properties for certain servicers in the fourth quarter of 2010 due to these concerns, but we resumed REO sales in November 2010.

As discussed in *Loan Workout Activities,* we have implemented several initiatives designed to assist troubled borrowers avoid foreclosure. We temporarily suspended foreclosure transfers in 2009 on owner-occupied homes where the borrower may be eligible to receive a loan modification under the MHA Program; however, for seriously delinquent borrowers, we continued with steps in the foreclosure process up to, but stopping short of, a foreclosure sale of the property. The MHA Program restricts foreclosure activities when a borrower is being evaluated for HAMP and during a borrower s trial period. Our suspension or delay of foreclosure transfers and any delay in foreclosures that might be imposed by regulatory or governmental agencies result in a temporary decline in REO acquisitions and slow the rate of growth of our REO inventory. In July 2008, we also extended the period of time in which we required seller/servicers to complete the foreclosure process on our loans. This was done with respect to certain states where the normal timeframe for foreclosure is relatively short, and was intended to provide more time to evaluate the possibilities for a loan workout solution. Due to temporary suspensions and other factors, the average length of time for foreclosure of a Freddie Mac loan significantly increased in recent years. The nationwide average for completion of a foreclosure (as measured from the date of the last scheduled payment made by the borrower) on our single-family delinquent loans, excluding those underlying our Other Guarantee Transactions, was 448 days and 370 days for foreclosures completed during 2010 and 2009, respectively.

Our single-family REO acquisitions during 2010 and 2009 were most significant in the states of California, Florida, Arizona, Michigan, Georgia, and Illinois. The West region represented approximately 29% of the new REO acquisitions during 2010, based on the number of units, and the highest concentration in that region is in California. At December 31, 2010, our REO inventory in California comprised 11% of total REO property inventory, based on the number of properties. Although we have increased our resource capacity necessary to maintain and dispose of the progressive increase in our REO acquisitions and inventory over the last two years, we are limited in our disposition efforts by the capacity of the market to absorb large numbers of foreclosed properties. A portion of our REO properties are: (a) located in jurisdictions that require a period of time after foreclosure during which the borrower may reclaim the property; or (b) occupied and we have begun the

process of eviction. During the period when the borrower may reclaim the property, or we are completing the eviction process, we are not able to market the property. As of December 31, 2010, 2009 and 2008, approximately 28%, 35% and 23%, respectively, of our REO property inventory were not marketable due to the above conditions. For these and other reasons, the average holding period of our REO property varies significantly in different geographical areas. As of December 31, 2010 and 2009, the percentage of our single-family REO property inventory that had been held for sale longer than one year was 3.4% and 1.6%, respectively.

Although the composition of interest-only and Alt-A loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio, based on UPB, was approximately 5% and 6%, respectively, at December 31, 2010, the percentage of our REO acquisitions in 2010 that had been secured by either of these loan types represented approximately 39% of our total REO acquisitions, based on loan amount prior to acquisition.

We expanded our methods for REO sales during 2010, including the expanded use of REO auctions and bulk sale transactions of properties in certain geographical areas. In addition, in certain locations we have offered REO properties for purchase by Neighborhood Stabilization Program grant recipients prior to listing the properties for sale to the general public. For the first 15 days following listing, we also offer most of our REO properties exclusively to Neighborhood Stabilization Program grant recipients and purchasers who intend to occupy the properties.

Loan Loss Reserves

We maintain mortgage-related loan loss reserves at levels we deem adequate to absorb probable incurred losses on mortgage loans held-for-investment on our consolidated balance sheets and those underlying Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities and other guarantee commitments. Determining the loan loss reserves is complex and requires significant management judgment about matters that involve a high degree of subjectivity. See CRITICAL ACCOUNTING POLICIES AND ESTIMATES Allowance for Loan Losses and Reserve for Guarantee Losses and NOTE 1: SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING POLICIES for further information.

Table 56 summarizes our loan loss reserves activity for held-for-investment mortgage loans recognized on our consolidated balance sheets and underlying Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities and other guarantee commitments, in total.

**Table 56 Loan Loss Reserves Activity[1]**

| | Year Ended December 31, | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **2010** | **2009** | **2008** | **2007** | **2006** |
| | (dollars in millions) | | | | |
| Total loan loss reserves: | | | | | |
| Beginning balance | $ 33,857 | $ 15,618 | $ 2,822 | $ 619 | $ 548 |
| Adjustments to beginning balance[2] | (186) | | | | |
| Provision for credit losses | 17,218 | 29,530 | 16,432 | 2,854 | 296 |
| Charge-offs, gross[3] | (16,322) | (9,402) | (3,072) | (376) | (313) |
| Recoveries[3] | 3,363 | 2,088 | 779 | 239 | 166 |
| Transfers, net[4] | 1,996 | (3,977) | (1,343) | (514) | (78) |
| Ending balance | $ 39,926 | $ 33,857 | $ 15,618 | $ 2,822 | $ 619 |

Components of Loan Loss Reserves:

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Single-family | $ 39,098 | $ 33,026 | $ 15,341 | $ 2,760 | $ 592 |
| Multifamily | $ 828 | $ 831 | $ 277 | $ 62 | $ 27 |
| Total loan loss reserve, as a percentage of the total mortgage portfolio, excluding non-Freddie Mac securities | 2.03% | 1.69% | 0.81% | 0.16% | 0.04% |

(1) Consists of reserves for loans held-for-investment and those underlying Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities and other guarantee commitments.

(2) Adjustments relate to the adoption of accounting standards for transfers of financial assets and consolidation of VIEs. See NOTE 2: CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES for further information.

(3) Charge-offs represent the amount of the UPB of a loan that has been discharged to remove the loan from our consolidated balance sheet due to either foreclosure transfer or a short sale or deed-in-lieu transaction. Charge-offs exclude $528 million, $280 million, $377 million, and $156 million for the years ended December 31, 2010, 2009, 2008, and 2007, respectively, related to certain loans purchased under financial guarantees and reflected within losses on loans purchased on our consolidated statements of operations. Recoveries of charge-offs primarily result from foreclosure alternatives and REO acquisitions on loans where a share of default risk has been assumed by mortgage insurers, servicers or other third parties through credit enhancements.

(4) Consist primarily of: (a) amounts related to agreements with seller/servicers where the transfer represents recoveries received under these agreements to compensate us for previously incurred and recognized losses; (b) the transfer of a proportional amount of the recognized reserves for guarantee losses associated with loans purchased from non-consolidated Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities and other guarantee commitments; and (c) net amounts attributable to recapitalization of past due interest on modified mortgage loans. See Institutional Credit Risk Mortgage Seller/Servicers for more information about our agreements with our seller/servicers in 2010, including GMAC Mortgage, LLC, Bank of America, N.A., and certain of their affiliates.

See CONSOLIDATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS Provision for Credit Losses, for a discussion of our provision for credit losses.

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Credit Loss Performance

Many loans that are seriously delinquent or in foreclosure result in credit losses. Table 57 provides detail on our credit loss performance associated with mortgage loans and REO assets on our consolidated balance sheets and underlying our non-consolidated mortgage-related financial guarantees.

**Table 57 Credit Loss Performance**

| | December 31, | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 |
| | (dollars in millions) | | |
| REO | | | |
| REO balances, net: | | | |
| Single-family | $ 6,961 | $ 4,661 | $ 3,208 |
| Multifamily | 107 | 31 | 47 |
| Total | $ 7,068 | $ 4,692 | $ 3,255 |
| REO operations (income) expense: | | | |
| Single-family | $ 676 | $ 287 | $ 1,097 |
| Multifamily | (3) | 20 | |
| Total | $ 673 | $ 307 | $ 1,097 |
| Charge-offs | | | |
| Single-family: | | | |
| Charge-offs, gross[1] (including $16.2 billion, $9.4 billion and $3.1 billion relating to loan loss reserves, respectively) | $ 16,746 | $ 9,661 | $ 3,441 |
| Recoveries[2] | (3,362) | (2,088) | (779) |
| Single-family, net | 13,384 | 7,573 | 2,662 |
| Multifamily: | | | |
| Charge-offs, gross[1] (including $104 million, $21 million and $8 million relating to loan loss reserves, respectively) | 104 | 21 | 8 |
| Recoveries[2] | (1) | | |
| Multifamily, net | 103 | 21 | 8 |
| Total Charge-offs: | | | |
| Charge-offs, gross[1] (including $16.3 billion, $9.4 billion and $3.1 billion relating to loan loss reserves, respectively) | 16,850 | 9,682 | 3,449 |
| Recoveries [2] | (3,363) | (2,088) | (779) |
| Total Charge-offs, net | $ 13,487 | $ 7,594 | $ 2,670 |
| Credit losses[3] | | | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Single-family | $ 14,060 | $ 7,860 | $ 3,759 |
| Multifamily | 100 | 41 | 8 |
| Total | $ 14,160 | $ 7,901 | $ 3,767 |
| Total (in bps)(4) | 72.7 | 40.8 | 20.1 |

(1) Represent the amount of the UPB of a loan that has been discharged in order to remove the loan from our consolidated balance sheets at the time of resolution, regardless of when the impact of the credit loss was recorded on our consolidated statements of operations through the provision for credit losses or losses on loans purchased. Charge-offs primarily result from foreclosure transfers and short sales and are generally calculated as the contractual balance of a loan at the date it is discharged less the estimated value in final disposition or actual net sales in a short sale.
(2) Recoveries of charge-offs primarily result from foreclosure transfers and short sales on loans where a share of default risk has been assumed by mortgage insurers, servicers, or other third parties through credit enhancements.
(3) Equal to REO operations expense plus charge-offs, net. Excludes foregone interest on non-performing loans, which reduces our net interest income but is not reflected in our total credit losses. In addition, excludes other market-based credit losses: (a) incurred on our investments in mortgage loans and mortgage-related securities; and (b) recognized in our consolidated statements of operations.
(4) Calculated as credit losses divided by the average balance of our total mortgage portfolio, excluding non-Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities and that portion of REMICs and Other Structured Securities that are backed by Ginnie Mae Certificates.

Our credit loss performance metric generally measures losses at the conclusion of the loan and related collateral resolution process. There is a significant lag in time from the implementation of problem loan workout activities until the final resolution of seriously delinquent mortgage loans and REO assets. Our credit loss performance is based on our charge-offs and REO expenses. We record charge-offs at the time we take ownership of a property through foreclosure, and any delays in the foreclosure process could reduce the rate at which seriously delinquent loans proceed to foreclosure, and would delay our recognition of charge-offs. We expect our credit losses to increase in 2011, as our short sale and REO acquisition volumes will likely remain high, because the level of seriously delinquent loans and pending foreclosures remains elevated and market conditions, such as home prices and the rate of home sales, continue to remain weak. However, our realization of credit losses could be delayed due to the concerns about deficiencies in foreclosure documentation practices.

As discussed in *Loan Workout Activities,* we implemented several suspensions in foreclosure transfers of owner-occupied homes during certain periods of 2008 and 2009, and some servicers implemented suspensions in 2010, all of which affected our charge-off and REO operations expenses. Any suspension or delays of foreclosure transfers, including as a result

of concerns about foreclosure documentation practices, and any imposed delays in the foreclosure process by regulatory or governmental agencies will cause a delay in our recognition of credit losses.

Table 58 provides detail by region for charge-offs. Regional charge-off trends generally follow a pattern that is similar to, but lags, that of regional serious delinquency trends.

**Table 58 Single-Family Charge-offs and Recoveries by Region[1]**

| | Year Ended December 31, | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | | | 2009 | | | 2008 | | |
| | Charge-offs, gross | Recoveries[2] | Charge-offs, net | Charge-offs, gross | Recoveries[2] | Charge-offs, net | Charge-offs, gross | Recoveries[2] | Charge-offs, net |
| | (in millions) | | | | | | | | |
| Northeast | $ 1,367 | $ (318) | $ 1,049 | $ 854 | $ (194) | $ 660 | $ 353 | $ (86) | $ 267 |
| Southeast | 4,311 | (1,005) | 3,306 | 2,124 | (557) | 1,567 | 693 | (193) | 500 |
| North Central | 2,638 | (694) | 1,944 | 1,502 | (393) | 1,109 | 689 | (191) | 498 |
| Southwest | 761 | (288) | 473 | 484 | (169) | 315 | 234 | (82) | 152 |
| West | 7,669 | (1,057) | 6,612 | 4,697 | (775) | 3,922 | 1,472 | (227) | 1,245 |
| Total | $ 16,746 | $ (3,362) | $ 13,384 | $ 9,661 | $ (2,088) | $ 7,573 | $ 3,441 | $ (779) | $ 2,662 |

(1) See endnote (8) to Table 52 Single-Family Credit Guarantee Portfolio by Attribute Combinations for a description of these regions.
(2) Recoveries of charge-offs primarily result from foreclosure alternatives and foreclosure transfers on loans where a share of default risk has been assumed by mortgage insurers, servicers or other third parties through credit enhancements. Recoveries of charge-offs through credit enhancements are limited in many instances to amounts less than the full amount of the loss.

Single-family charge-offs, gross, for 2010 increased to $16.7 billion compared to $9.7 billion for 2009, primarily due to an increase in the volume of foreclosure transfers and short sales and continued weakness of residential real estate markets. The severity of charge-offs increased slightly in 2010 due to overall declines in housing markets resulting in higher per-property losses, but was more stable than we experienced in 2009. Our per-property loss severity during 2010 continued to be greatest in those states that experienced significant increases in property values during 2000 through 2006, such as California, Florida, Nevada and Arizona. California also accounted for 16% of loans in our single-family credit guarantee portfolio as of December 31, 2010, and comprised approximately 26% of our total credit losses in 2010. In addition, although Alt-A loans comprised approximately 6% and 8% of our single-family credit guarantee portfolio as of December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively, these loans accounted for approximately 37% and 44% of our credit losses during 2010 and 2009, respectively. See Table 3 Credit Statistics, Single-Family Credit Guarantee Portfolio for information on severity rates, and see NOTE 19: CONCENTRATION OF CREDIT AND OTHER RISKS for additional information about our credit losses.

*Credit Risk Sensitivity*

Under a 2005 agreement with FHFA, then OFHEO, we are required to disclose the estimated increase in the NPV of future expected credit losses for our single-family credit guarantee portfolio over a ten year period as the result of an immediate 5% decline in home prices nationwide, followed by a stabilization period and return to the base case. Since the real estate market has already experienced significant home price declines since 2006 and we experienced

significant growth in actual credit losses during 2009 and 2010, our portfolio s market value has been less sensitive to additional 5% declines in home prices during 2010 for purposes of this analysis. As shown in the analysis below, the NPV impact of expected credit losses resulting from a 5% home price shock declined significantly in the first half of 2010, primarily due to the impacts of a decline in interest rates and actual losses realized during that period. This sensitivity analysis is hypothetical and may not be indicative of our actual results. We do not use this analysis for determination of our reported results under GAAP. Our quarterly credit risk sensitivity estimates are as follows:

**Table 59 Single-Family Credit Loss Sensitivity**

| | Before Receipt of Credit Enhancements[1] | | After Receipt of Credit Enhancements[2] | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | NPV[3] | NPV Ratio[4] | NPV[3] | NPV Ratio[4] |
| | (dollars in millions) | | | |
| At: | | | | |
| December 31, 2010 | $ 9,926 | 54.9 bps | $ 9,053 | 50.0 bps |
| September 30, 2010 | $ 9,099 | 49.5 bps | $ 8,187 | 44.6 bps |
| June 30, 2010 | $ 8,327 | 44.5 bps | $ 7,445 | 39.8 bps |
| March 31, 2010[5] | $ 10,228 | 54.4 bps | $ 9,330 | 49.6 bps |
| December 31, 2009 | $ 12,646 | 67.4 bps | $ 11,462 | 61.1 bps |

(1) Assumes that none of the credit enhancements currently covering our mortgage loans has any mitigating impact on our credit losses.
(2) Assumes we collect amounts due from credit enhancement providers after giving effect to certain assumptions about counterparty default rates.
(3) Based on the single-family credit guarantee portfolio, excluding REMICs and Other Structured Securities backed by Ginnie Mae Certificates.
(4) Calculated as the ratio of NPV of increase in credit losses to the single-family credit guarantee portfolio, defined in note (3) above.
(5) Credit loss projections in this sensitivity analysis beginning as of March 31, 2010 declined, in part, because as of March 31, 2010, we adjusted our model used in this analysis for both serious delinquency and loss severity projections. The enhanced model reduces our serious delinquency projections for loans that are at least one year of age based on the mortgage product type, borrower s credit score and other attributes. Other changes to the model included incorporating recent delinquency experiences to better forecast serious delinquencies for fixed coupon Alt-A mortgages. Severity assumptions for certain loans with reduced documentation, regardless of whether the loan has a fixed or variable coupon, were increased based on our experience with these loans.

### Interest Rate and Other Market Risks

For a discussion of our interest rate and other market risks, see QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DISCLOSURES ABOUT MARKET RISK.

### Operational Risks

Risk types have become increasingly inter-related such that an operational breakdown, can result in a credit or market related event or loss. Operational risks are inherent in all of our business activities and can become apparent in various ways, including accounting or operational errors, business interruptions, fraud and failures of the technology used to support our business activities. Our risk of operational failure may be increased by vacancies or turnover in officer and key business unit positions and failed or inadequate internal controls. These operational risks may expose us to financial loss, interfere with our ability to sustain timely and reliable financial reporting, or result in other adverse consequences.

Our business decision-making, risk management and financial reporting are highly dependent on our use of models. In recent periods, external market factors have contributed to increased risk associated with the use of these models. We are taking certain actions to address our model oversight and governance process, including clarifying roles, aligning model resources and providing more transparency to management over model issues and changes.

Our primary business processing and financial accounting systems lack sufficient flexibility to handle all the complexities of, and changes in, our business transactions and related accounting policies and methods. This requires us to rely more extensively on spreadsheets and other end-user computing systems. These systems are likely to have a higher risk of operational failure and error than our primary systems, which are subject to our information technology general controls. We believe we are mitigating this risk through active monitoring of, and improvements to, controls over the development and use of end-user computing systems.

In order to manage the risk of inaccurate or unreliable valuations of our financial instruments, we engage in an ongoing internal review of our valuations. We perform analysis of internal valuations on a monthly basis to confirm the reasonableness of the valuations. For more information on the controls in our valuation process, see FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENTS AND ANALYSIS Fair Value Measurements *Controls over Fair Value Measurement.*

Announcements in the fall of 2010 of deficiencies in foreclosure documentation by several large seller/servicers and designated counsel firms have raised various concerns relating to foreclosure practices. The integrity of the foreclosure process is critical to our business, and our financial results could be adversely affected by deficiencies in the conduct of that process. For further information about foreclosure documentation deficiencies and our other operational risks, see RISK FACTORS Operational Risks.

Management, including the company s Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer, conducted an evaluation of the effectiveness of our internal control over financial reporting and our disclosure controls and procedures as of December 31, 2010. As of December 31, 2010, we had one material weakness which remained unremediated related to conservatorship, causing us to conclude that both our internal control over financial reporting and our disclosure controls and procedures were not effective as of December 31, 2010. Given the structural nature of this weakness, we believe it is likely that we will not remediate this material weakness while we are under conservatorship. In view of our mitigating activities related to the material weakness, we believe that our consolidated financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2010 have been prepared in conformity with GAAP. For additional information on our disclosure controls and procedures and related material weakness in internal control over financial reporting, see CONTROLS AND PROCEDURES.

# LIQUIDITY AND CAPITAL RESOURCES

## Liquidity

Our business activities require that we maintain adequate liquidity to fund our operations, which may include the need to make payments of principal and interest on our debt securities, including securities issued by our consolidated trusts; make payments upon the maturity, redemption or repurchase of our debt securities; make net payments on derivative instruments; pay dividends on our senior preferred stock; purchase mortgage-related securities and other investments; and purchase mortgage loans, including modified or seriously delinquent loans from PC pools.

We fund our cash requirements primarily by issuing short-term and long-term debt. Other sources of cash include:

- receipts of principal and interest payments on securities or mortgage loans we hold;
- other cash flows from operating activities, including the management and guarantee fees we receive in connection with our guarantee activities;
- borrowings against mortgage-related securities and other investment securities we hold; and
- sales of securities we hold.

We have also received substantial amounts of cash from Treasury pursuant to draws under the Purchase Agreement, which are made to address deficits in our net worth. We received $12.5 billion in cash from Treasury pursuant to draws under the Purchase Agreement during 2010.

We believe that the support provided by Treasury pursuant to the Purchase Agreement currently enables us to maintain our access to the debt markets and to have adequate liquidity to conduct our normal business activities, although the costs of our debt funding could vary.

We may require cash in order to fulfill our mortgage purchase commitments. Historically, we fulfilled our purchase commitments related to our mortgage purchase flow business primarily by swap transactions, whereby our customers exchanged mortgage loans for PCs, rather than through cash outlays. However, it is at the discretion of the seller, subject to limitations imposed by the contract governing the commitment, whether the purchase commitment is fulfilled through a swap transaction or with cash. We provide liquidity to our seller/servicers through our cash purchase program. Loans purchased through the cash purchase program are typically sold to investors through a cash auction of PCs, and, in the interim, are carried as mortgage loans on our consolidated balance sheets. See OFF-BALANCE SHEET ARRANGEMENTS for additional information regarding our mortgage purchase commitments.

We make extensive use of the Fedwire system in our business activities. The Federal Reserve requires that we fully fund our account in the Fedwire system to the extent necessary to cover cash payments on our debt and mortgage-related securities each day, before the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, acting as our fiscal agent, will initiate such payments. We routinely use an open line of credit with a third party, which provides intraday liquidity to fund our activities through the Fedwire system. This line of credit is an uncommitted intraday loan facility. As a result, while we expect to continue to use the facility, we may not be able to draw on it, if and when needed. This line of credit requires that we post collateral that, in certain circumstances, the secured party has the right to repledge to other third parties, including the Federal Reserve Bank. As of December 31, 2010, we pledged approximately

$10.5 billion of securities to this secured party. See NOTE 8: INVESTMENTS IN SECURITIES Collateral Pledged for further information.

Depending on market conditions and the mix of derivatives we employ in connection with our ongoing risk management activities, our derivative portfolio can be either a net source or a net use of cash. For example, depending on the prevailing interest-rate environment, interest-rate swap agreements could cause us either to make interest payments to counterparties or to receive interest payments from counterparties. Purchased options require us to pay a premium while written options allow us to receive a premium.

We are required to pledge collateral to third parties in connection with secured financing and daily trade activities. In accordance with contracts with certain derivative counterparties, we post collateral to those counterparties for derivatives in a net loss position, after netting by counterparty, above agreed-upon posting thresholds. See NOTE 8: INVESTMENTS IN SECURITIES Collateral Pledged for information about assets we pledge as collateral.

We are involved in various legal proceedings, including those discussed in LEGAL PROCEEDINGS, which may result in a use of cash in order to settle claims or pay certain costs.

***Liquidity Management***

Maintaining sufficient liquidity is of primary importance and we continually strive to enhance our liquidity management practices and policies. Under these practices and policies, we maintain an amount of cash and cash equivalent reserves in the form of liquid, high quality short-term investments that is intended to enable us to meet ongoing cash obligations for an extended period, without access to short- and long-term unsecured debt markets. We also actively manage the concentration

of debt maturities and closely monitor our monthly maturity profile. Under these practices and policies, we maintain a backup core reserve portfolio of liquid non-mortgage securities designed to provide additional liquidity in the event of a liquidity crisis.

Our liquidity management policies provide for us to:

- maintain funds sufficient to cover our maximum cash liquidity needs for at least the following 35 calendar days, assuming no access to the short- or long-term unsecured debt markets. At least 50% of such amount, which is based on the average daily 35-day cash liquidity needs of the preceding three months, must be held: (a) in U.S. Treasury securities with remaining maturities of five years or less or other U.S. government-guaranteed securities with remaining maturities of one year or less; or (b) as uninvested cash at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York;

- maintain a portfolio of liquid, high quality marketable non-mortgage-related securities with a market value of at least $10 billion, exclusive of the 35-day cash requirement discussed above. The portfolio must consist of securities with maturities greater than 35 days. The credit quality of these investments is monitored by our risk management group on a daily basis;

- limit the proportion of debt maturing within the next year. We actively manage the composition of short-and long-term debt, as well as our patterns of redemption of callable debt, to manage the proportion of effective short-term debt to reduce the risk that we will be unable to refinance our debt as it comes due; and

- maintain unencumbered collateral with a value greater than or equal to the largest projected cash shortfall on any one day over the following 365 calendar days, assuming no access to the short- and long-term unsecured debt markets. This is based on a daily forecast of all existing contractual cash obligations over the following 365 calendar days.

No more than an aggregate of $10 billion of market value may be held in U.S. Treasury notes with remaining maturities of between one and five years to satisfy the short-term liquidity requirements described above.

We also continue to manage our debt issuances to remain in compliance with the aggregate indebtedness limits set forth in the Purchase Agreement.

Throughout 2010, we complied with all liquidity requirements under these policies. Furthermore, the majority of funds for covering our short-term cash liquidity needs are invested in short-term assets with a rating of A-1/P-1 or AAA, as appropriate. In the event of a downgrade of a position, our credit governance policies require us to exit from the position within a specified period.

To facilitate cash management, we forecast cash outflows. These forecasts help us to manage our liabilities with respect to asset purchases and runoff, when financial markets are not in crisis. For further information on our management of interest-rate risk associated with asset and liability management, see QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DISCLOSURES ABOUT MARKET RISK.

Notwithstanding these practices, our ability to maintain sufficient liquidity, including by pledging mortgage-related and other securities as collateral to other financial institutions, could cease or change rapidly and the cost of the available funding could increase significantly due to changes in market confidence and other factors. For more information, see RISK FACTORS Competitive and Market Risks *Our business may be adversely affected by limited availability of financing and increased funding costs.*

***Actions of Treasury, the Federal Reserve and FHFA***

Since our entry into conservatorship, Treasury, the Federal Reserve and FHFA have taken a number of actions that affect our cash requirements and ability to fund those requirements. The conservatorship, and the resulting support we received from Treasury, enabled us to access debt funding on terms sufficient for our needs. The support we received from the Federal Reserve through its debt purchase program, which was completed in March 2010, also contributed to our ability to access debt funding.

Under the Purchase Agreement, Treasury made a commitment to provide funding, under certain conditions, to eliminate deficits in our net worth. The Purchase Agreement provides that the $200 billion maximum amount of the commitment from Treasury will increase as necessary to accommodate any cumulative reduction in our net worth during 2010, 2011, and 2012. If we do not have a capital surplus (*i.e.*, positive net worth) at the end of 2012, then the amount of funding available after 2012 will be $149.3 billion ($200 billion funding commitment reduced by cumulative draws for net worth deficits through December 31, 2009). In the event we have a capital surplus at the end of 2012, then the amount of funding available after 2012 will depend on the size of that surplus relative to cumulative draws needed for deficits during 2010 to 2012, as follows:

- If the year-end 2012 surplus is lower than the cumulative draws needed for 2010 to 2012, then the amount of available funding is $149.3 billion less the surplus.

- If the year-end 2012 surplus exceeds the cumulative draws for 2010 to 2012, then the amount of available funding is $149.3 billion less the amount of those draws.

While we believe that the support provided by Treasury pursuant to the Purchase Agreement currently enables us to maintain our access to the debt markets and to have adequate liquidity to conduct our normal business activities, the costs of our debt funding could vary due to the uncertainty about the future of the GSEs and potential investor concerns about the adequacy of funding available to us under the Purchase Agreement after 2012. Upon funding of the draw request that FHFA will submit to eliminate our net worth deficit at December 31, 2010, our aggregate funding received from Treasury under the Purchase Agreement will increase to $63.7 billion. This aggregate funding amount does not include the initial $1.0 billion liquidation preference of senior preferred stock that we issued to Treasury in September 2008 as an initial commitment fee and for which no cash was received.

The GSE Act requires us to set aside in each fiscal year an amount equal to 4.2 basis points for each dollar of the UPB of total new business purchases, and allocate or transfer such amount to: (a) HUD to fund a Housing Trust Fund established and managed by HUD; and (b) a Capital Magnet Fund established and managed by Treasury. FHFA has the authority to suspend our allocation upon finding that the payment would contribute to our financial instability, cause us to be classified as undercapitalized or prevent us from successfully completing a capital restoration plan. In November 2008, FHFA advised us that it had suspended the requirement to set aside or allocate funds for the Housing Trust Fund and the Capital Magnet Fund until further notice.

We are required to pay a quarterly commitment fee to Treasury under the Purchase Agreement. Treasury waived the fee for the first quarter of 2011. The amount of the fee has not yet been established and could be substantial.

For more information on these actions, see BUSINESS Conservatorship and Related Matters and Regulation and Supervision.

***Dividend Obligation on the Senior Preferred Stock***

Following funding of the draw request related to our net worth deficit at December 31, 2010 that FHFA will submit on our behalf, our annual cash dividend obligation to Treasury on the senior preferred stock will increase from $6.42 billion to $6.47 billion, which exceeds our annual historical earnings in all but one period. The senior preferred stock accrues quarterly cumulative dividends at a rate of 10% per year or 12% per year in any quarter in which dividends are not paid in cash until all accrued dividends have been paid in cash. We paid a quarterly dividend of $1.6 billion in cash on the senior preferred stock on December 31, 2010 at the direction of our Conservator. We have paid cash dividends to Treasury of $10.0 billion to date, an amount equal to 16% of our aggregate draws under the Purchase Agreement. Continued cash payment of senior preferred dividends will have an adverse impact on our future financial condition and net worth and will increasingly drive future draws. In addition, we are required under the Purchase Agreement to pay a quarterly commitment fee to Treasury, which could also contribute to future draws if the fee is not waived in the future. Treasury has waived the fee for the first quarter of 2011, but it has indicated that it remains committed to protecting taxpayers and ensuring that our future positive earnings are returned to taxpayers as compensation for their investment.

The payment of dividends on our senior preferred stock in cash reduces our net worth. For periods in which our earnings and other changes in equity do not result in positive net worth, draws under the Purchase Agreement effectively fund the cash payment of senior preferred dividends to Treasury. Under the Purchase Agreement, our ability to repay the liquidation preference of the senior preferred stock is limited and we will not be able to do so for the foreseeable future, if at all.

As discussed in Capital Resources, we expect to make additional draws under the Purchase Agreement in future periods. Further draws will increase the liquidation preference of and the dividends we owe on the senior preferred stock.

***Other Debt Securities***

We fund our business activities primarily through the issuance of short- and long-term debt. Competition for funding can vary with economic, financial market, and regulatory environments. Historically, we have mainly competed for funds in the debt issuance markets with Fannie Mae and the FHLBs. We repurchase or call our outstanding debt securities from time to time to help support the liquidity and predictability of the market for our debt securities and to manage our mix of liabilities funding our assets.

To fund our business activities, we depend on the continuing willingness of investors to purchase our debt securities. Changes or perceived changes in the government s support of us could have a severe negative effect on our access to the debt markets and on our debt funding costs. In addition, any change in applicable legislative or regulatory exemptions, including those described in BUSINESS Regulation and Supervision, could adversely affect our access to some debt investors, thereby potentially increasing our debt funding costs.

Spreads on our debt and our access to the debt markets remained favorable relative to historical levels during 2010, due largely to support from the U.S. government. As a result, we were able to replace certain higher cost debt with lower cost

debt. Our short-term debt was 28% of outstanding other debt on December 31, 2010, as compared to 31% and 30% at December 31, 2009 and September 30, 2010, respectively.

Because of the debt limit under the Purchase Agreement, we may be restricted in the amount of debt we are allowed to issue to fund our operations. Under the Purchase Agreement, without the prior written consent of Treasury, we may not incur indebtedness that would result in the par value of our aggregate indebtedness exceeding 120% of the amount of mortgage assets we are allowed to own on December 31 of the immediately preceding calendar year. Our debt cap under the Purchase Agreement was $1.08 trillion in 2010 and will be $972 billion in 2011. We also cannot become liable for any subordinated indebtedness without the prior written consent of Treasury.

As of December 31, 2010, we estimate that the par value of our aggregate indebtedness for purposes of the debt limit imposed by the Purchase Agreement totaled $728.2 billion, which was approximately $351.8 billion below the applicable limit of $1.08 trillion. Under the Purchase Agreement, the amount of our indebtedness is determined based on par value, without giving effect to any change in the accounting standards related to transfers of financial assets and consolidation of VIEs or any similar accounting standard. Accordingly, our aggregate indebtedness for this purpose excludes debt securities of consolidated trusts held by third parties. We disclose the amount of our indebtedness on this basis monthly under the caption Other Debt Activities Total Debt Outstanding in our Monthly Volume Summary reports, which are available on our website and in current reports on Form 8-K we file with the SEC.

*Other Debt Issuance Activities*

Table 60 summarizes the par value of other debt securities we issued, based on settlement dates, during 2010 and 2009.

**Table 60 Other Debt Security Issuances by Product, at Par Value[1]**

| | Year Ended December 31, 2010 | 2009 |
|---|---|---|
| | (in millions) | |
| Other short-term debt: | | |
| Reference Bills® securities and discount notes | $ 481,853 | $ 590,697 |
| Medium-term notes callable | 1,500 | 7,780 |
| Medium-term notes non-callable[2] | 1,364 | 11,886 |
| Total other short-term debt | 484,717 | 610,363 |
| Other long-term debt: | | |
| Medium-term notes callable[3] | 219,847 | 193,580 |
| Medium-term notes non-callable | 74,487 | 99,099 |
| U.S. dollar Reference Notes® securities non-callable | 36,500 | 56,000 |
| Total other long-term debt | 330,834 | 348,679 |
| Total other debt issued | $ 815,551 | $ 959,042 |

(1)

Excludes federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to repurchase and lines of credit. Also excludes debt securities of consolidated trusts held by third parties.

(2) Includes $1.4 billion and $536 million of medium-term notes non-callable issued for the years ended December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively, which were accounted for as debt exchanges.

(3) Includes $0 million and $25 million of medium-term notes callable issued for the years ended December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively, which were accounted for as debt exchanges.

Other Short-Term Debt

We fund our operating cash needs, in part, by issuing Reference Bills® securities and other discount notes, which are short-term instruments with maturities of one year or less that are sold on a discounted basis, paying only principal at maturity. Our Reference Bills® securities program consists of large issues of short-term debt that we auction to dealers on a regular schedule. We issue discount notes with maturities ranging from one day to one year in response to investor demand and our cash needs. Short-term debt also includes certain medium-term notes that have original maturities of one year or less.

Other Long-Term Debt

We issue debt with maturities greater than one year primarily through our medium-term notes program and our Reference Notes® securities program.

*Medium-term Notes*

We issue a variety of fixed- and variable-rate medium-term notes, including callable and non-callable fixed-rate securities, zero-coupon securities and variable-rate securities, with various maturities ranging up to 30 years. Medium-term notes with original maturities of one year or less are classified as short-term debt. Medium-term notes typically contain call provisions, effective as early as three months or as long as ten years after the securities are issued.

*Reference Notes® Securities*

Reference Notes® securities are regularly issued, U.S. dollar denominated, non-callable fixed-rate securities, which we generally issue with original maturities ranging from two through ten years. We have also issued Reference Notes® securities denominated in Euros, which remain outstanding, but did not issue any such securities in 2010 or 2009. We hedge our exposure to changes in foreign-currency exchange rates by entering into swap transactions that convert foreign-currency denominated obligations to U.S. dollar-denominated obligations. See QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DISCLOSURES ABOUT MARKET RISK Interest-Rate Risk and Other Market Risks *Sources of Interest-Rate Risk and Other Market Risks* for more information.

The investor base for our debt is predominantly institutional. From late 2008 through the first quarter of 2010, the Federal Reserve purchased substantial amounts of our debt securities under its debt purchase program.

*Subordinated Debt*

During 2010 and 2009, we did not call or issue any Freddie SUBS® securities. At both December 31, 2010 and 2009, the balance of our subordinated debt outstanding was $0.7 billion. Our subordinated debt in the form of Freddie SUBS® securities is a component of our risk management and disclosure commitments with FHFA. See RISK MANAGEMENT AND DISCLOSURE COMMITMENTS for a discussion of changes affecting our subordinated debt as a result of our placement in conservatorship and the Purchase Agreement, and the Conservator s suspension of certain requirements relating to our subordinated debt. Under the Purchase Agreement, we may not issue subordinated debt without Treasury s consent.

*Other Debt Retirement Activities*

We repurchase or call our outstanding medium- and long-debt securities from time to time to help support the liquidity and predictability of the market for our debt securities and to manage our mix of liabilities funding our assets. When our debt securities become seasoned or one-time call options on our debt securities expire, they may become less liquid, which could cause their price to decline. By repurchasing debt securities, we help preserve the liquidity of our debt securities and improve their price performance, which helps to reduce our funding costs over the long-term. Our repurchase activities also help us manage the funding mismatch, or duration gap, created by changes in interest rates. For example, when interest rates decline, the expected lives of our investments in mortgage-related securities decrease, reducing the need for long-term debt. We use a number of different means to shorten the effective weighted average lives of our outstanding debt securities and thereby manage the duration gap, including retiring long-term debt through repurchases or calls; changing our debt funding mix between short-and long-term debt; or using derivative instruments, such as entering into receive-fixed swaps or terminating or assigning pay-fixed swaps. From time to time, we may also enter into transactions in which we exchange newly issued debt securities for similar outstanding debt securities held by investors. These transactions are accounted for as debt exchanges.

Table 61 provides the par value, based on settlement dates, of other debt securities we repurchased, called, and exchanged during 2010 and 2009.

**Table 61 Other Debt Security Repurchases, Calls, and Exchanges[1]**

| | Year Ended December 31, | |
|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | 2009 |
| | (in millions) | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Repurchases of outstanding Reference Notes® securities | $ 262 | $ 5,814 |
| Repurchases of outstanding medium-term notes | 5,301 | 35,795 |
| Repurchases of outstanding Freddie SUBS® securities | | 3,875 |
| Calls of callable medium-term notes | 256,256 | 198,940 |
| Exchanges of medium-term notes | 1,364 | 551 |

(1) Excludes debt securities of consolidated trusts held by third parties.

*Credit Ratings*

Our ability to access the capital markets and other sources of funding, as well as our cost of funds, is highly dependent upon our credit ratings. Table 62 indicates our credit ratings as of February 11, 2011.

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**Table 62 Freddie Mac Credit Ratings**

| | Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | S&P | Moody s | Fitch |
| Senior long-term debt(1) | AAA | Aaa | AAA |
| Short-term debt(2) | A-1+ | P-1 | F1+ |
| Subordinated debt(3) | A | Aa2 | AA |
| Preferred stock(4) | C | Ca | C/RR6 |

(1) Consists of medium-term notes, U.S. dollar Reference Notes® securities and Reference Notes® securities.
(2) Consists of Reference Bills® securities and discount notes.
(3) Consists of Freddie SUBS® securities.
(4) Does not include senior preferred stock issued to Treasury.

Effective September 7, 2008, we no longer had a risk-to-the-government rating from S&P because of conservatorship. Moody s also provides a Bank Financial Strength rating that represents Moody s opinion of our intrinsic safety and soundness and, as such, excludes certain external credit risks and credit support elements. Our Bank Financial Strength rating from Moody s remained at E+ as of February 11, 2011. A security rating is not a recommendation to buy, sell or hold securities. It may be subject to revision or withdrawal at any time by the assigning rating organization. Each rating should be evaluated independently of any other rating.

***Cash and Cash Equivalents, Federal Funds Sold, Securities Purchased Under Agreements to Resell, and Non-Mortgage-Related Securities***

Excluding amounts related to our consolidated VIEs, we held $82.1 billion in the aggregate of cash and cash equivalents, federal funds sold, securities purchased under agreements to resell, and non-mortgage-related securities at December 31, 2010. These investments are important to our cash flow and asset and liability management and our ability to provide liquidity and stability to the mortgage market. At December 31, 2010, our non-mortgage-related securities primarily consisted of FDIC-guaranteed corporate medium-term notes, Treasury notes, and Treasury bills that we could sell to provide us with an additional source of liquidity to fund our business operations. For additional information on these assets, see CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS ANALYSIS Cash and Cash Equivalents, Federal Funds Sold and Securities Purchased Under Agreements to Resell and Investments in Securities *Non-Mortgage-Related Securities.*

***Mortgage Loans and Mortgage-Related Securities***

We invest principally in mortgage loans and mortgage-related securities, which consist of securities issued by us, Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae, and other financial institutions. Historically, our mortgage loans and mortgage-related securities have been a potential source of funding. A large majority of these assets is unencumbered. However, we are subject to limits on the amount of mortgage assets we can sell in any calendar month without review and approval by FHFA and, if FHFA so determines, Treasury.

During 2010, the market for non-agency mortgage-related securities backed by subprime, option ARM, and Alt-A and other loans continued to be illiquid as investor demand for these assets remained low. We expect this illiquidity to continue in the near future. These market conditions, and the continued poor credit quality of the underlying assets, limit our ability to use these investments as a significant source of funds. See CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS ANALYSIS Investments in Securities *Mortgage-Related Securities* for more information.

**Cash Flows**

Our cash and cash equivalents decreased approximately $27.7 billion to $37.0 billion during 2010. The adoption of the new accounting standards on transfers of financial assets and the consolidation of VIEs effective January 1, 2010 impacted the presentation of our consolidated statements of cash flows. Cash flows provided by operating activities during 2010 were $9.8 billion, primarily driven by a decrease in net purchases of held-for-sale mortgages. Cash flows provided by investing activities during 2010 were $386.6 billion, primarily resulting from net proceeds received on a higher balance of held-for-investment mortgage loans as repayments of held-for-investment mortgage loans now include both unsecuritized and securitized loans. Cash flows used for financing activities for 2010 were $424.1 billion, largely attributable to repayments, net of proceeds from issuances, of debt securities of consolidated trusts held by third parties.

Our cash and cash equivalents increased approximately $19.4 billion during 2009 to $64.7 billion at December 31, 2009. Cash flows provided by operating activities during 2009 were $1.3 billion, which primarily related to increased net interest income offset by a reduction in cash as a result of a net increase in our held-for-sale mortgage loans. Cash flows provided by investing activities during 2009 were $47.6 billion, primarily resulting from net proceeds related to sales and maturities of our available-for-sale securities, partially offset by a net increase in trading securities. Cash flows used for financing activities for 2009 were $29.5 billion, largely attributable to repayments of short-term debt, partially offset by $36.9 billion received from Treasury under the Purchase Agreement.

Our cash and cash equivalents increased $36.8 billion to $45.3 billion during 2008. Cash flows used for operating activities during 2008 were $10.1 billion, which primarily reflected a reduction in cash as a result of a net increase in held-for-sale mortgage loans. Cash flows used for investing activities during 2008 were $71.4 billion, primarily resulting from purchases of trading securities and available-for-sale securities, partially offset by proceeds from maturities of available-for-sale securities and sales of trading securities. Cash flows provided by financing activities in 2008 were $118.3 billion, largely attributable to proceeds from the issuance of debt securities, net of repayments.

## Capital Resources

Our entry into conservatorship resulted in significant changes to the assessment of our capital adequacy and our management of capital. On October 9, 2008, FHFA announced that it was suspending capital classification of us during conservatorship in light of the Purchase Agreement. FHFA continues to monitor our capital levels, but the existing statutory and FHFA-directed regulatory capital requirements are not binding during conservatorship. We continue to provide submissions to FHFA on both minimum and risk-based capital. See NOTE 18: REGULATORY CAPITAL for our minimum capital requirement, core capital, and GAAP net worth results as of December 31, 2010.

Under the Purchase Agreement, Treasury made a commitment to provide us with funding, under certain conditions, to eliminate deficits in our net worth. The Purchase Agreement provides that, if FHFA determines as of quarter end that our liabilities have exceeded our assets under GAAP, Treasury will contribute funds to us in an amount equal to the difference between such liabilities and assets; a higher amount may be drawn if Treasury and Freddie Mac mutually agree that the draw should be increased beyond the level by which liabilities exceed assets under GAAP. In each case, the amount of the draw cannot exceed the maximum aggregate amount that may be funded under the Purchase Agreement.

We are focusing our risk and capital management, consistent with the objectives of conservatorship, on, among other things, maintaining a positive balance of GAAP equity in order to reduce the likelihood that we will need to make additional draws on the Purchase Agreement with Treasury, while returning to long-term profitability. Our business objectives and strategies have in some cases been altered since we were placed into conservatorship, and may continue to change. Certain changes to our business objectives and strategies are designed to provide support for the mortgage market in a manner that serves public policy and other non-financial objectives. In this regard, we are focused on serving our mission, helping families keep their homes, and stabilizing the economy by playing a vital role in the Obama Administration s housing programs. However, these changes to our business objectives and strategies may conflict with maintaining positive GAAP equity. In addition, notwithstanding our failure to maintain required capital levels, FHFA directed us to continue to make interest and principal payments on our subordinated debt. For more information, see BUSINESS Regulation and Supervision *Federal Housing Finance Agency Subordinated Debt.*

Under the GSE Act, FHFA must place us into receivership if FHFA determines in writing that our assets are and have been less than our obligations for a period of 60 days. Obtaining funding from Treasury pursuant to its commitment under the Purchase Agreement enables us to avoid being placed into receivership by FHFA. At December 31, 2010, our liabilities exceeded our assets under GAAP by $401 million. Accordingly, we must obtain funding from Treasury pursuant to its commitment under the Purchase Agreement in order to avoid being placed into receivership by FHFA. FHFA, as Conservator, will submit a draw request to Treasury under the Purchase Agreement in the amount of $500 million, which we expect to receive by March 31, 2011. See BUSINESS Regulation and Supervision *Federal Housing Finance Agency Receivership* for additional information on mandatory receivership.

We expect to make additional draws under the Purchase Agreement in future periods. The size and timing of such draws will be determined by a variety of factors that could adversely affect our net worth, including our dividend obligation on the senior preferred stock; how long and to what extent the housing market, including home prices, remains weak, which could increase credit expenses and cause additional other-than-temporary impairments of the

non-agency mortgage-related securities we hold; foreclosure prevention efforts and foreclosure processing delays, which could increase our expenses; adverse changes in interest rates, the yield curve, implied volatility or mortgage-to-debt OAS, which could increase realized and unrealized mark-to-fair-value losses recorded in earnings or AOCI; required reductions in the size of our mortgage-related investments portfolio and other limitations on our investment activities that reduce the earnings capacity of our investment activities; quarterly commitment fees payable to Treasury; our inability to access the public debt markets on terms sufficient for our needs, absent continued support from Treasury; establishment of additional valuation allowances for our remaining net deferred tax asset; changes in accounting practices or standards; the effect of the MHA Program and other government initiatives; limitations on our ability to develop new products; the introduction of additional public mission-related initiatives that may adversely impact our financial results; or changes in business practices resulting from legislative and regulatory developments.

Given the substantial senior preferred stock dividend obligation to Treasury, which will increase with additional draws, senior preferred stock dividend payments will contribute to our future draw requests under the Purchase Agreement with Treasury.

For more information on the Purchase Agreement, its effect on our business and capital management activities, and the potential impact of making additional draws, see Liquidity *Dividend Obligation on the Senior Preferred Stock,* BUSINESS Executive Summary *Long-Term Financial Sustainability and Future Status* and RISK FACTORS.

## FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENTS AND ANALYSIS

### Fair Value Measurements

Fair value represents the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date. The accounting standards for fair value measurements and disclosures establish a fair value hierarchy that prioritizes the inputs to valuation techniques used to measure fair value based on the inputs a market participant would use at the measurement date. Observable inputs reflect market data obtained from independent sources. Unobservable inputs reflect assumptions based on the best information available under the circumstances. Unobservable inputs are used to measure fair value to the extent that observable inputs are not available, or in situations where there is little, if any, market activity for an asset or liability at the measurement date. We use valuation techniques that maximize the use of observable inputs, where available, and minimize the use of unobservable inputs.

The three levels of the fair value hierarchy under the accounting standards for fair value measurements and disclosures are described below:

Level 1: Quoted prices (unadjusted) in active markets that are accessible at the measurement date for identical assets or liabilities;

Level 2: Quoted prices for similar assets and liabilities in active markets; quoted prices for identical or similar assets and liabilities in markets that are not active; inputs other than quoted market prices that are observable for the asset or liability; and inputs that are derived principally from or corroborated by observable market data for substantially the full term of the assets or liabilities; and

Level 3: Unobservable inputs for the asset or liability that are supported by little or no market activity and that are significant to the fair values.

We categorize assets and liabilities measured and reported at fair value in our consolidated balance sheets within the fair value hierarchy based on the valuation process used to derive their fair values and our judgment regarding the observability of the related inputs. Those judgments are based on our knowledge and observations of the markets relevant to the individual assets and liabilities and may vary based on current market conditions. In applying our judgments, we review ranges of third party prices and transaction volumes, and hold discussions with dealers and pricing service vendors to understand and assess the extent of market benchmarks available and the judgments or modeling required in their processes. Based on these factors, we determine whether the inputs are observable and whether the principal markets are active or inactive.

Our Level 1 financial instruments consist of exchange-traded derivatives, Treasury bills, and Treasury notes, where quoted prices exist for the exact instrument in an active market.

Our Level 2 instruments generally consist of high credit quality agency securities, CMBS, non-mortgage-related asset-backed securities, FDIC guaranteed corporate medium-term notes, interest-rate swaps, option-based derivatives, and foreign-currency denominated debt. These instruments are generally valued through one of the following methods: (a) dealer or pricing service inputs with the value derived by comparison to recent transactions involving similar securities and adjusting for differences in prepayment or liquidity characteristics; or (b) modeled through an industry standard modeling technique that relies upon observable inputs such as discount rates and prepayment assumptions.

Our Level 3 assets primarily consist of non-agency mortgage-related securities. The non-agency mortgage-related securities market continued to be illiquid during 2010, with low transaction volumes, wide credit spreads, and limited transparency. We value the non-agency mortgage-related securities we hold based primarily on prices received from pricing services and dealers. The techniques used by these pricing services and dealers to develop the prices generally are either: (a) a comparison to transactions involving instruments with similar collateral and risk profiles; or (b) industry standard modeling, such as a discounted cash flow model. For a large majority of the securities we value using dealers and pricing services, we obtain at least three independent prices, which are non-binding both to us and our counterparties. When multiple prices are received, we use the median of the prices. The models and related assumptions used by the dealers and pricing services are owned and managed by them. However, we have an understanding of their processes used to develop the prices provided to us based on our ongoing due diligence. We periodically have discussions with our dealers and pricing service vendors to maintain a current understanding of the processes and inputs they use to develop prices. We make no adjustments to the individual prices we receive from third party pricing services or dealers for non-agency mortgage-related securities

beyond calculating median prices and discarding certain prices that are determined not to be valid based on our validation processes. See *Controls over Fair Value Measurement* for information on our validation processes.

Our valuation process and related fair value hierarchy assessments require us to make judgments regarding the liquidity of the marketplace. These judgments are based on the volume of securities traded in the marketplace, the width of bid/ask spreads and dispersion of prices on similar securities. As previously mentioned, the non-agency mortgage-related security markets continued to be illiquid during 2010. We continue to utilize the prices on such securities provided to us by various pricing services and dealers and believe that the procedures executed by the pricing services and dealers, combined with our internal verification process, ensure that the prices used to develop our financial statements are in accordance with the guidance in the accounting standards for fair value measurements and disclosures.

We also consider credit risk in the valuation of our assets and liabilities with the credit risk of the counterparty considered in asset valuations and our own institutional credit risk considered in liability valuations. See *Consideration of Credit Risk in Our Valuation* for more information.

We periodically evaluate our valuation techniques and may change them to improve our fair value estimates, to accommodate market developments or to compensate for changes in data availability and reliability or other operational constraints. We review a range of market quotes from pricing services or dealers and perform analysis of internal valuations on a monthly basis to confirm the reasonableness of the valuations. See QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DISCLOSURES ABOUT MARKET RISK Interest-Rate Risk and Other Market Risks for a discussion of market risks and our interest-rate sensitivity measures, PMVS and duration gap.

Table 63 below summarizes our assets and liabilities measured at fair value on a recurring basis at December 31, 2010.

**Table 63 Summary of Assets and Liabilities at Fair Value on a Recurring Basis**

| | At December 31, | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | | 2009 | |
| | Total GAAP Recurring Fair Value | Percentage in Level 3 | Total GAAP Recurring Fair Value | Percentage in Level 3 |
| | (dollars in millions) | | | |
| **Assets:** | | | | |
| Investments in securities: | | | | |
| Available-for-sale, at fair value | $ 232,634 | 30% | $ 384,684 | 37% |
| Trading, at fair value | 60,262 | 5 | 222,250 | 2 |
| Mortgage loans: | | | | |
| Held-for-sale, at fair value | 6,413 | 100 | 2,799 | 100 |
| Derivative assets, net[1] | 143 | | 215 | 1 |
| Other assets: | | | | |
| Guarantee assets, at fair value | 541 | 100 | 10,444 | 100 |

| Total assets carried at fair value on a recurring basis[1] | $ |
| --- | --- |