Companyโs Recent Letter to Stockholders Relies on Disingenuous Total Shareholder Return Comparisons Claiming Credit for Stock Outperformance Following Launch of Legionโs Public Campaign
Board Attempts to Obfuscate Long-Tenured Directorsโ Lack of Relevant Qualifications by Touting a Director That Has Resigned and Directors from Legacy On-Premise and Non-Technology Companies as โCloud Leadersโ
Board has Misrepresented Legion Partnersโ Engagement with Company and Plan to Unlock Stockholder Value While Suggesting No Further Strategic Action is Necessary
We Believe the Boardโs โStay the Courseโ Plan Will Continue to Fail Stockholders โ Legionโs Nominees Will Provide New Perspectives and Seek to Take Tangible Steps Towards Unlocking Value at OneSpan
Legion Partners Asset Management, LLC, which, together with its affiliates (collectively, โLegion Partnersโ or โLegionโ), beneficially owns 2,790,121 shares of common stock of OneSpan Inc. (โOneSpanโ or the โCompanyโ) (Nasdaq: OSPN), representing approximately 6.9% of the outstanding stock, today issued an open letter to stockholders in response to the recently published letter by OneSpanโs Board of Directors (the โBoardโ) on April 26, 2021. Legion Partners has nominated four highly-qualified independent directors for election to the Companyโs Board of Directors (the โBoardโ) at the Companyโs 2021 annual meeting of stockholders: Sarika Garg, Sagar Gupta, Michael J. McConnell and Rinki Sethi.
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Exhibit 1. Source: Capital IQ (2/24/21-4/16/21)
A full copy of the letter can be found below and here: https://protectonespan.com/
May 3, 2021
Dear Fellow OneSpan Stockholder,
Legion Partners Asset Management, LLC (together with its affiliates, โLegion Partnersโ, โLegionโ or โweโ) is a long-term stockholder beneficially owning 2,790,121 shares of common stock of OneSpan Inc. (โOneSpanโ or the โCompanyโ) (Nasdaq: OSPN), representing approximately 6.9% of the outstanding stock. We have nominated four highly-qualified independent directors for election to the Companyโs Board of Directors (the โBoardโ) at the Companyโs 2021 annual meeting of stockholders (the โAnnual Meetingโ). In this letter, we seek to clarify a series of misleading statements and claims found in the Boardโs recent letter to OneSpan stockholders published on April 26, 2021 (the โBoardโs Letterโ).
OneSpanโs Stock Price Has Drastically Underperformed the NASDAQ
Do not be misled by the Companyโs claims regarding OneSpanโs total shareholder returns (โTSRโ). The Boardโs Letter states that OneSpan stock has outperformed the NASDAQ โover the last three years.โ Upon further inspection, the Board selected a seemingly random date for this calculation, April 16, 2021, which we believe has no significance other than to support this artificial narrative, especially when the Boardโs Letter was published ten days later on April 26, 2021.
OneSpanโs total shareholder return performance versus the NASDAQ across multiple time periods using more pertinent dates demonstrates drastic underperformance. In fact, no portion of the Companyโs TSR claim holds true when utilizing most days in 2021. We believe this was a transparent attempt to conceal the incredibly poor track records of the underqualified Board directors we are seeking to replace โ and that OneSpanโs stockholders deserve better.
ย |
OSPN Relative TSR vs. NASDAQ |
||||||||||||
As of: |
ย |
1 Year |
2 Year |
3 Year |
5 Year |
10 Year |
15 Year |
||||||
12/31/2020
|
ย |
(23%) |
ย |
(35%) |
ย |
(38%) |
ย |
(134%) |
ย |
(231%) |
ย |
(375%) |
|
2/24/2021
|
ย |
(13%) |
ย |
(62%) |
ย |
8% |
ย |
(129%) |
ย |
(230%) |
ย |
(357%) |
|
4/16/2021
|
ย |
17% |
ย |
(16%) |
ย |
13% |
ย |
(119%) |
ย |
(287%) |
ย |
(311%) |
|
4/19/2021
|
ย |
13% |
ย |
(12%) |
ย |
(13%) |
ย |
(120%) |
ย |
(284%) |
ย |
(303%) |
|
4/23/2021
|
ย |
6% |
ย |
(13%) |
ย |
(12%) |
ย |
(123%) |
ย |
(286%) |
ย |
(291%) |
|
Note: Fiscal Year End (โFYEโ); the Unaffected Date of 2/24/21 is one day following OSPNโs Q4 2020 Earnings Call (2/23/21 after market close) and one day prior to the launch of Legionโs public campaign (2/25/21 before market open)
Source: Capital IQ
Even if we used the Companyโs randomly selected end date of April 16, 2021, the Board seems to ignore that the Companyโs TSR claim appears to have benefited greatly from the launch of Legion Partnersโ public campaign. We believe the recent stock price movement is representative of fellow stockholdersโ excitement for change, not a sudden bout of enthusiasm for the Boardโs strategy or the Companyโs performance (see Exhibit 1).
It is disappointing that the Board seems to believe other investors are not sophisticated enough to assess its true TSR track record. It is precisely this type of gamesmanship and lack of accountability Legion Partners is attempting to uproot at the highest levels of the Company.
We Believe the Boardโs Recent Changes Would Not Have Occurred Without Legionโs Active Engagement, But Their Self-Refresh Has Still Failed to Reverse Years of Underperformance
We have been investors in OneSpan since 2018 and over the past three years repeatedly attempted to privately engage with the Board on a long overdue refreshment process, including offering to jointly collaborate on a search for new candidates on numerous occasions. The Company has largely ignored or rejected Legionโs private outreach, while defensively adding some new directors, several of whom have prior personal connections to incumbent directors. But as the Board began adding new directors, there was little indication that any long-tenured directors would step down or even pass along their long-held leadership positions to new directors. Only after Legionโs public involvement did that change:
Legion Public Campaign Actions |
OneSpan Board Reaction |
In August 2020, Legion publishes a letter demanding Founder and Former Chairman & CEO T. Kendall โKenโ Hunt resign from the Board immediately after selling significant stock one day prior to the Company announcing a revenue miss and pulling full year guidance. |
In September 2020, Mr. Hunt announces his โretirement.โ |
In the August 2020 letter, Legion calls for a strategic review of the Hardware and eSignature businesses, as well as the whole Company. |
In September 2020, the Board forms a Finance & Strategy Committee. ย In December 2020, the Board hires an investment bank to run a strategic review of the eSignature business which supposedly failed to produce any โadequateโ offers. |
In January 2021, Legion requests OneSpanโs director questionnaire ahead of publicly nominating candidates. |
In February 2021, Director Michael Cullinane, a 23-year veteran on the Board, discloses his โretirementโ at the upcoming Annual Meeting. |
In February 2021, Legion issues a public letter which criticizes Director Michael Cullinaneโs track record and background while serving as the Boardโs Chair of the Audit Committee for 20 years. |
In April 2021, Director Al Nietzel is appointed the new Chair of the Audit Committee. |
The Board claims it has added โsix new directors since 2019โ and that โfive of the new independent directors (including Naureen Hassan) are experts in cloud-based business models and SaaS.โ However, Ms. Hassan resigned from the Board in March 2021, which is unfortunate as she appeared to have the best and most diverse background out of the six new additions. As for the remaining four directors with operating experience, three hail from non-technology or legacy, on-premise software companies that specialize in automotive dealership software, business process outsourcing, and physical check printing. We do not view these as cloud-first, recurring software revenue environments, which is the core of OneSpanโs strategic transformation.
Instead, the Board has collectively enabled and prioritized the ongoing concentration of power amongst its longest-tenured and arguably least qualified directors. With virtually no experience at a modern public technology company, whether as a board director1, executive, or investor, the four incumbent directors we are targeting to replace have overseen tremendous underperformance during their tenures:
Director, Age
|
Tenure
|
ย |
ย |
OSPN Relative TSR over Tenure vs. |
||||||||||||||||||||
ย |
ย |
Company Peers |
ย |
ย |
Direct
|
ย |
ย |
Cyber-
|
ย |
ย |
Russell
|
ย |
ย |
MSCI
|
ย |
ย |
IGV |
ย |
ย |
NASDAQ |
||||
John Fox, 77
|
16 |
ย |
ย |
(324%) |
ย |
ย |
(635%) |
ย |
ย |
(637%) |
ย |
ย |
12% |
ย |
ย |
(437%) |
ย |
ย |
(640%) |
ย |
ย |
(332%) |
||
Jean Holley, 62
|
14 |
ย |
ย |
(377%) |
ย |
ย |
(412%) |
ย |
ย |
(507%) |
ย |
ย |
(47%) |
ย |
ย |
(498%) |
ย |
ย |
(716%) |
ย |
ย |
(384%) |
||
Matthew Moog, 51 |
8 |
ย |
ย |
(324%) |
ย |
ย |
(359%) |
ย |
ย |
(335%) |
ย |
ย |
26% |
ย |
ย |
(240%) |
ย |
ย |
(284%) |
ย |
ย |
(145%) |
||
Marc Zenner, 58
|
2 |
ย |
ย |
(28%) |
ย |
ย |
(83%) |
ย |
ย |
(7%) |
ย |
ย |
35% |
ย |
ย |
9% |
ย |
ย |
3% |
ย |
ย |
1% |
||
Note: โCompany Peersโ are the Companyโs self-described peer group as set forth in its Annual Report on Form 10-K for FY 2020 and include AMSWA, APPN, BL, FEYE, PFPT, PMTS, PRO, QADA, QLYS, QTWO, RPD, VRNS, SCWX; โDirect Software Peersโ include CRWD, DOCU, DT, NCNO, NET, NICE, OKTA, PING, QLYS, SPLK, VRNS, ZS; โCybersecurity Peersโ include CHKP, CRWD, CYBR, FEYE, FTNT, MIME, MITK, NET, OKTA, PANW, PFPT, PING, QLYS, RDWR, RPD, SAIL, SCWX, TENB, VRNS, ZS; โIGVโ references the iShares Expanded Tech-Software Sector ETF; TSR figures as of respective Board appointment date through Unaffected Date (2/24/21); tenure calculation as of June 2021
Source: Capital IQ
As we have consistently demonstrated, OneSpan stock has severely underperformed multiple broader market indices as well as the Companyโs hand-selected peer group. This is in addition to its Cybersecurity Peers that thoughtfully include many cybersecurity companies selling both hardware and software solutions. Without substantive change to the Board, we fear OneSpan stockholders will continue to suffer long-term suboptimal valuation.
We Believe the Board Has Misrepresented Legionโs Plan to Unlock Stockholder Value and Instead Chosen to Advocate for the Status Quo
The Board has claimed that our campaign to replace directors is based on an โill-conceived theoryโ of selling the legacy Hardware business to transform OneSpan into a pure play software company. The Boardโs most recent letter implies that our approach is simply a narrow exercise in financial engineering that disregards broader strategic implications. This is a gross misrepresentation of Legion Partnersโ plan to unlock stockholder value at OneSpan. In our August 18, 2020 public letter to the Board, we acknowledged that there may still be some operational and strategic synergies between Hardware and Software, and suggested alternative paths towards achieving a potential separation that would still deconsolidate Hardware financials from OneSpan and transform OneSpan into a high-growth, profitable Software company that we believe public investors would be far more excited to own.
The Boardโs forceful defense of maintaining the Hardware segment underscores, in our view, their close-mindedness around conducting a strategic review of a business unit in secular decline. Given the Boardโs Letter touts long-tenured directorsโ โcritical experience with our hardware-centric business,โ it could help explain why such a resistance to conducting a strategic review of Hardware exists โ a potential divestiture would further render these directorsโ continued Board service useless. However, none of the four directors we are targeting for replacement have experience in cybersecurity, including hardware authentication, other than sitting on OneSpanโs Board. On the other hand, if our campaign is successful, the Board would keep two incumbent directors with extensive hardware authentication experience and gain another who also has more relevant cloud-first, recurring software revenue experience. Rather than wiping away any relevant โinstitutional knowledge,โ we believe the success of our campaign will accelerate OneSpanโs transformation and leave the Board better positioned to oversee the Hardware segment. But by clearly tying the legacy Hardware business to the justification for their continued presence on the Board, it is unsurprising that the Board seems to have only conducted a strategic review for the eSignature business and seemingly concluded that nothing further should be done. Based on the failures of the incumbent directors we are seeking to replace, OneSpan stockholders should not be misled by the Boardโs desperate attempt to spin the relevancy of their slate.
Instead, the Board believes that โinvestors and sell-side analysts can fairly value OneSpan using a sum-of-the-parts approach or other methodologiesโฆโ given that โhardware salesโฆmust be valued differently than software sales.โ We agree that Hardware should be valued separately from Software, which is why we have asked the Company for three years to provide more detailed financial disclosures between Hardware and Software, including Software gross and operating margins. As we believe the Board lacks relevant experience overseeing modern software public companies, it is unsurprising that they have failed to understand the importance of showcasing profitability in addition to revenue, especially when Software carries ~30-40 points higher gross margins than Hardware per our estimates. We believe the high-growth and high-margin profile of OneSpanโs Software business remains underappreciated given the Companyโs confusing disclosures, thus contributing to OSPNโs discounted valuation. Furthermore, only two out of the Companyโs five sell-side analysts utilize a sum-of-the-parts approach and have price targets ranging from $38 to $39 per share.
In our view, the Board has not presented any meaningful ideas or plans for closing the significant gap between OneSpanโs current stock price and OneSpanโs intrinsic value, leading us to conclude that the Board appears either unwilling or unable to figure out a viable plan for unlocking value. We have little confidence that the Boardโs โstatus quoโ plan will result in full and fair value for OneSpan stockholders. Following the publication of the Boardโs Letter, others appear to agree:
โ[We] believe the company could use a fresh perspective such as that offered by Legion Partners' proposed candidates.โ
- Colliers Research (4/26/2021)
If elected, Legionโs nominees will bring fresh perspectives to the Board and seek to evaluate all strategies to close the significant gap between OSPNโs current stock price and its intrinsic value, including a potential divestiture of Hardware (considering various transaction structures) or a sale of the entire Company. These processes would complement efforts to fix OneSpanโs standing in the public markets, including by improving its financial disclosures on Software profitability.
Legionโs Nominees Bring Tremendous Technology Industry and Public Company Board Experience
The Boardโs latest attempt to alarm stockholders about our campaign centers around director continuity and maintaining the Boardโs โinstitutional knowledge.โ If Legionโs nominees are elected, the longest serving director will have a tenure of four years. And, while the Company believes the replacement of โfour important contributorsโ would do harm to stockholders, their track records detailed above likely proves the opposite.
We have carefully curated a slate of highly-qualified and diverse candidates with strong backgrounds in technology, including both software and hardware. In addition, Legion Partnersโ nominee Michael McConnell arguably has more public technology company board experience than the entire OneSpan Board combined, which includes current and former board service at other cloud SaaS public companies. We believe the election of Mr. McConnell, as well as Legion Partnersโ other three nominees: Sarika Garg, Sagar Gupta and Rinki Sethi, would bring tremendous industry and governance experience that would be far more additive than the hypothetical loss of โinstitutional knowledgeโ that incumbent directors have gained while largely overseeing the disrupted, legacy Hardware segment that is now in secular decline. In our view, stockholders have suffered enough under current Board leadership and should not be penalized for the Boardโs failure to objectively self-assess and refresh its directors with high-quality talent pertinent to the Companyโs go-forward strategy.
While the Boardโs Letter likely sought to shore up support for incumbent directors, we believe its numerous misleading statements and arguments against taking strategic action have only further damaged the Boardโs credibility. If stockholders cannot trust the Board on a simple topic such as honestly communicating the Companyโs own stock price performance โ what can they trust?
The time has come for stockholders to #ProtectOneSpan from this Boardโs longstanding underperformance by electing strong technology leaders to the Board. For more information about Legion Partnersโ nominees, please visit https://protectonespan.com/.
Sincerely,
Chris Kiper and Ted White
Legion Partners Asset Management, LLC
About Legion Partners
Legion Partners is a value-oriented investment manager based in Los Angeles, with a satellite office in Sacramento, CA. Legion Partners seeks to invest in high-quality businesses that are temporarily trading at a discount, utilizing deep fundamental research and long-term shareholder engagement. Legion Partners manages a concentrated portfolio of North American small-cap equities on behalf of some of the worldโs largest institutional and HNW investors.
1 Other than OneSpan
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